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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the analysis o f policy implementation and the involvement 
o f village official leaders (phu yai ban) in Southern Thailand Its main foci were on the 
implementation o f  policies related to common property resource (CPR) management at 
the local level, particularly at the village (mooban) level, and the role o f phu yai ban in 
planning and implementing these policies. The study views that significant changes 
occur in implementation stages, especially at the local level These changes are 
influenced by the context in which policy is implemented Local official leaders who are 
responsible for implementing CPR management policies make decisions according to 
local contexts, and their decisions determine the achievement o f policies. Recent 
reforms in the organisational structure o f natural resource management planning in 
Thailand were designed to allow local leaders to participate formally in planning, in 
order to meet the needs o f the local people and to encourage more effective 
implementation.
The research fieldwork was undertaken in two freshwater fishing villages in Southern 
Thailand by means o f participant observation. The main fieldwork was undertaken in 
June 1993 until July 1994 in tandem with the collaborative project on floodplain 
fishery management between the University o f Bath and the Prince o f  Songkla 
University. Some o f the data presented in this thesis was obtained through this 
project's fieldwork. Two local projects related to CPR management taking place in the 
study area were used as case studies for an in-depth analysis.
The findings o f this thesis show that although phu yai ban play a key role in 
implementing CPR management policies at the local level, there are several factors 
affecting their performances. These factors include historical backgrounds, socio­
economic conditions, and organisational arrangements o f  communities in which they 
are situated. Moreover, the conventional administrative arrangement and bureaucratic 
culture provide obstacles to their fu ll involvement in planning and effective 
implementation o f local CPR management projects. Conclusions are given on 
prospects o f more sustainable local CPR management in Thailand
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CHAPTER ONE
THE STUDY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL THAILAND
1.1 Introduction
The problem of natural resource depletion is one of the most important issues in 
contemporary development. In most developing countries, natural resources are the 
basis for the livelihoods of rural inhabitants. Allowing natural resources to be 
continually degraded can cause a great adverse impact on the well-being of the rural 
population who are the majority of the population in these countries. Frequently the 
issue of natural resource degradation is viewed as being related to directions of 
development policies adopted by individual countries. In countries where economic 
growth is perceived to be the primary development goal, the extent to which natural 
resources are degraded is likely to be high. Thailand’s experience of development 
has been referred to as ‘uneven development’ (see Parnwell, 1996, especially 
Chapter 1). From the beginning of its formal development plans, the emphasis has 
been on economic growth. The effects on rural livelihoods and the environment 
have, until recently, been overlooked. This has made the problem of natural 
resource depletion and environmental degradation a serious issue despite the 
country’s economic achievements.
Thailand is a predominantly agrarian country with over two thirds of the population 
residing in rural areas. Rural livelihoods which are natural resource based remain 
important to Thailand’s development. Despite this, most of the country’s past 
development policies, as guided by its National Economic and Social Development 
Plans formulated on a five-year basis, have not weighted rural development and 
natural resources management as very important. The primary emphasis on
2accelerating economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, has undermined the rural 
way of life by overexploiting vital natural resources. In prioritising an increase in 
GNP, the first four five-year Plans (1961-1981) widened the disparity between 
urban rich and rural poor (see Krongkaew, 1985; Suphachalasai et al. 1990). Many 
natural resources, such as forest, waterbodies, and fishery resources, were placed in 
a precarious position. More recent recognition of these problems, however, has 
meant that the alleviation of poverty and conservation of natural resources and the 
environment, have been stressed in later development plans. This has been coupled 
with the introduction of structural reforms in development administration, 
emphasising participation of local organisations in the planning process. This marks 
an important change in Thailand’s rural development administration system, which 
was highly dependent on central planning bodies. The change is very important in 
reshaping the system of development administration in Thailand, especially at the 
local level. These reforms provide a chance for local administrative bodies and local 
leaders to play a significant role in the planning process related to rural 
development, which also includes the management of natural resources at the local 
level.
Many natural resources in rural areas in Thailand are common property resources. 
Each of these resources is used by certain numbers of local beneficiaries which are 
small in their proportion to the total population. Before the administrative reforms 
mentioned above, policies towards the management of these resources were 
centralised. Nation-wide regulations were designed for particular types of natural 
resources, regardless of local variations of resource conditions and socio-economic 
patterns of resource users. In practice, the actual management of natural resources at 
the local level remained largely dependent on traditional systems. However, these 
traditional systems were not recognised by the state as important. The recent 
changes in the development administration structure have brought about a 
reassessment of the role of traditional management systems. There is a growing 
recognition of the need for these traditional systems to be integrated into the formal 
policy process through the participation of local organisations and official leaders in 
the planning process. The new discourse of participation in state development
3planning does not always fit with the local level realities. As the official leader of 
the village in the Thai administration, the phu yai ban plays a crucial role in the 
implementation of government policy at the local level. In order to understand the 
actual application of recent reforms of development administration structure, it is 
therefore necessary to have a detailed understanding of the role of this local leader 
and local organisations. This thesis presents a detailed study of the role of phu yai 
ban and local organisations in natural resource management, based on fieldwork in 
two fishing villages in southern Thailand.
In this introductory chapter, the discussion will highlight the importance of natural 
resources in Thailand’s rural development, the nature of this study and the study 
area, and the study fieldwork. This discussion will provide a background to the 
relationship between development policies and natural resource conditions in 
Thailand, the importance of and my interest in conducting this study, and 
methodology employed in this research.
1.2 Rural Development in Thailand and The Importance of Natural 
Resources
Different views of rural development and natural resource management have 
emerged in Thailand. Though the country’s development began to be formalised 
through the introduction of national development plans in the early 1960s, the focus
v
on rural development and natural resource management is rather recent. This is 
evident in the emphases of different National Economic and Social Development 
Plans (henceforth referred to as Plan or Plans), which will be discussed in this 
section.
During the first three Plans (1961-1976), the concept of development centred on the 
acceleration of overall economic growth as the key strategy for promoting the 
country’s development. It was assumed that in line with general views benefits of an 
increase in the Gross National Product (GNP) would trickle down to the whole
4population and there was no need for specific emphasis to be given to rural 
development (Wirajnibhawan, 1993). Similarly, the wealth of natural resources in 
most parts of Thailand (see Donner, 1982) meant that the importance of conserving 
and managing these resources was largely overlooked. As a result, early 
development Plans had a significant negative impact on rural population and the 
environment. This was evident in the emergence of income disparity between the 
majority poor rural population and the handful of rich urban dwellers. At the same 
time, there was an emphasis on the expansion of infrastructure and industrialisation, 
but without proper assessment of the environmental impact. Agricultural production 
was also promoted through the employment of modern technologies and the 
expansion of cultivated land, but this too seriously exploited and degraded many 
valuable natural resources. It is argued that during the first three Plans natural 
resources were viewed as a state possession which should be utilised and invested in 
national development (Wirajnibhawan, 1992). As a consequence, many natural 
resources such as forest, land and fisheries were at risk (Panpiemrat, 1990). The 
imbalance between the achievement of economic growth, income distribution and 
natural resource depletion became an important consideration in the later Plans.
The Fourth Plan (1977-1981) was the first to deal with problems that had emerged 
from previous Plans. The Plan specifically addressed the importance of reducing 
economic and social disparities among different social groups, and improving the 
management of the environment and major natural resources among its main 
objectives. However, concepts and strategies for dealing with these issues were 
imprecise, and rural development appeared to be only a small component of the 
Plan. As regards natural resource management, only major natural resources, such as 
forest resources and coastal and marine fishery resources, which were considered as 
important to the economy of the country at the macro level, were clearly recognised 
in the Plan. Those which are important for rural livelihoods, but do not contribute 
much to the national economy in term of GNP, such as freshwater fishery resources 
and non-commercial forest resources in small forest areas, were not emphasised. 
These natural resources are mainly common property resources which, as will be 
argued here, require specific plan and management strategies.
5It was not until the Fifth Plan (1982-1986) that rural development was first given a 
strong emphasis. In this Plan, a separate section was devoted to rural development 
and a new concept of rural development involving area specification and the use of 
an interdisciplinary approach in planning was introduced. With respect to natural 
resource development, the Plan focused on the management of selected areas where 
natural resource problems were significant for poverty eradication. In other areas, 
most natural resources were left to be managed under general policies. Moreover, 
the Fifth Plan also introduced a structural reform in the development administration 
system. This included the introduction of provincial planning and the co-ordination 
between four major ministries -- The Ministry of the Interior, The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives, The Ministry of Health, and The Ministry of 
Education — in the planning and implementation processes with respect to rural 
development. Under this structural reform, changes were also made at the local level 
with a greater authority given to local planning bodies, especially the sub-district 
council (sapha tambon). It also marked the beginning of efforts to introduce a 
bottom-up approach in the country’s rural development planning, departing from the 
conventional top-down approach which had dominated rural development since the 
introduction of formal planning.
Nevertheless, the implications for natural resource and environmental planning were 
still not clear at the local level. The inclusion of local organisations appeared for the 
first time in the Sixth Plan (1987-1991), with an emphasis on people’s participation 
in the administration and management of natural resources and the environment 
through these organisations. The Plan also stressed the necessity to consider 
environmental consequences alongside economic and social development. In order 
to effectively apply this idea, the Cabinet decided, shortly after the commencement 
of the Sixth Plan, that every provincial government should develop guidelines for 
natural resource and environmental management, alongside its rural development 
plan. In addition, both provincial and district development bodies were also entitled 
to extend their rural development plans to cover the management of the environment 
and natural resources within their territories (CBAMNREP, 1990). In the planning
6process, it was expected that these bodies would co-ordinate with lower level 
administrative bodies, i.e. sapha tambon and village committees, in gathering 
information related to natural resource and environmental issues. In this Plan, 
therefore, the notions of sustainable development and local participation began to be 
introduced in development planning. Combining these two ideas appeared to offer 
an appropriate means of dealing with the problems of the imbalance between rapid 
growth and environmental degradation, and its effects on rural population.
The application of these development concepts has continued in the Seventh Plan 
(1992-1996) used in the period of this study. In this plan, two specific sections are 
dedicated to the management of natural resources and the environment: one for 
environmental development; and another for the management of natural resources. 
In each of these sections, specific guidelines were set in dealing with different types 
of natural resources and the environment (see NESDB, 1992).
As a consequence of the Sixth and Seventh Plans, several attempts have been made 
to improve the condition of natural resources and the environment in the last few 
years during their implementation. These included revisions of related regulations, 
especially the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality 
Act B.E. 2535 (1992), and the restructuring of government bodies concerned with 
natural resource and environmental management to correspond with the objectives 
of these policies (Wirawattananond, 1994, pp. 216-217). Additionally, a special 
budget allocation is set 'to promote environmental and natural resource management 
locally, especially at the provincial, district, and municipal levels (see DEQP, 1991; 
Wirawattananond, 1994).
Clearly the recognition of natural resource and environmental issues in Thailand has 
increased in the last few years. This is not only because of the emphasis of the last 
two Plans, but also because of greater media interest in such global issues. Growing 
interest in the subject can be seen from the emergence and restructuring of various 
movements and organisations, both in the government and non-government sectors, 
to deal with environmental and natural resource issues. With respect to
7environmental problems, anti-pollution movements in urban areas are common, but 
movements concerned with natural resource degradation seem to concentrate mainly 
on major issues which are important to the country’s economy at the macro level, 
for example, deforestation, depletion of marine fishery resources, and the impact of 
large dam construction. Issues such as resource depletion and conflict over the use 
of common property resources at the local level have not been recognised by the 
state. This is largely because they are not seen as significant for the country’s 
economy, despite being crucially important for local livelihoods. Although in theory 
all common property resources are protected by law and related regulations, they are 
often neglected by concerned bodies. The negligence of state implementing bodies 
in enforcing these regulations effectively is partly due to benefits generated from 
these resources. Since the resources are used mainly by local people, and they 
benefit over the long term, these benefits can be considered as dispersed. It is 
observed that policies which benefits are dispersed are likely to receive a negative 
response or inactive reaction from bureaucrats (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas 
and Grindle, 1990). Moreover, because most regulations are designed for nation­
wide application, it is not uncommon to find that they contain details which do not 
correspond with the actual conditions of natural resources in particular situations 
and the system of traditional management existing in particular localities. Since 
most natural resources of this type have their own history of traditional 
management, the low applicability of the state regulations means that they are likely 
to be left for traditional organisations to allocate among local users. Leaving 
common property resources under traditional arrangements can be efficient under 
conditions where cohesiveness is high among members of an organisation, and the 
organisation is relatively undisturbed by outside forces (see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton 
and Taylor, 1992). However, these conditions are unlikely to be met in most rural 
areas in Thailand, where high levels of government intervention on local 
organisations are often witnessed. The attempt to formalise and integrate local 
administration into central bureaucratic systems seems to weaken both the functions 
of traditional organisations, and the power of traditional leaders, as a new form of 
organisation is created and legalised under the leadership of official leaders. At the 
same time, traditional organisations are unlikely to be completely replaced by
8formal organisations in rural societies (Riggs, 1964). Interactions between local 
organisations and formal organisations, and hence their leaders, are likely to be 
unavoidable, especially when dealing with delicate matters such as common 
property resource management.
The management of common property resources (CPRs) is a complex issue. Their 
common pool principle, which excessive use of one user affects the welfare of other 
users, implies that common agreements must be met in the allocation and 
distribution of resources among users. Moreover, it is necessary that users are aware 
of the carrying capacity of a particular resource if sustainable use is to be achieved. 
In reality, the increase in demand for resources is positively associated with an 
increase in the user population and the improvement of technology to exploit the 
resources. Additionally, changes in living standards often mean an increase in needs, 
which accelerates the exploitation of natural resources, if no appropriate 
management strategy is employed to control it. In Garrett Hardin’s most frequently 
cited article, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, he argues that common property 
regimes lead to overexploitation of resources because of the freedom of use over the 
commons (or CPRs) and the increase in the user population. He asserts that if ‘the 
tragedy of the commons’ is to be prevented, it is necessary for concerned bodies to 
limit population growth and issue conservation regulations in order to sustain the 
commons (Hardin, 1968; see also Hardin, 1993). Hardin’s propositions have 
generated a great deal of interest and research in searching for solutions to the 
overexploitation of the commons. Several studies have been devoted to gaining a 
better understanding of the degradation of CPRs. As a result, at least two different 
management approaches perceived to be effective for this type of resources have 
emerged: the first prefers management via state regulation of rights and access to the 
resources; and the second favours a traditional or community-based approach. Since 
both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses, no explicit answer can be 
given to the question of which approach is more effective. Observations in different 
parts of the world illustrate mixed achievements in their application. The historical 
perspectives of resource use, the strengths of concerned government bodies, the 
strengths of communities or groups, and the nature of traditional values within those
9communities or groups, all seem to affect the applicability of these approaches (see 
Taylor, 1992). The employment of the regulatory approach seems to be preferable 
to state agencies once state bodies become involved in resource management. 
Nevertheless, the application of a regulatory approach can face complications and be 
ineffective if the regulations issued are not carefully designed to correspond with the 
reality of the problems within each community. This situation is common in many 
rural areas in Thailand, where centrally designed government regulations related to 
common property resources are rarely enforced.
As mentioned earlier, many natural resources in rural Thailand are common 
property resources, and their management depends predominantly on traditional 
organisations of local users. A question has arisen over the inability of the state to 
fully control these resources. The answer to this question lies in the relationships 
between the state and local communities in the contemporary Thai administration 
with respect to natural management issues. Although the idea of integrating local 
administration into the national administration system was first introduced over a 
century ago in 1892 during the reign of King Rama V, its significant effects on local 
communities have been quite recent, and predominantly on general administrative 
business. Many other local affairs, especially at sub-district (tambon) and village 
(mooban) levels, remain least disturbed. Under traditional arrangements, common 
property resources are managed through norms which are either unique to particular 
communities, or part of a larger society. In these arrangements, traditional leaders or 
elders have an important role in maintaining existing norms (see Wetchaphitak, 
1991; Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991). The recent increase in state penetration of 
local communities, together with structural reforms in the development 
administration system, clearly strengthens the power of formal leaders over 
traditional leaders. Additionally, pressure has been placed on natural resources due 
to the increase in population and the changing needs of that population, making the 
problem of common property resource management more critical than in the past. 
Although, as has been noted, there exist several policies and regulations related to 
the management of different natural resources, several questions arise concerning 
the effectiveness of their enforcement. These include questions about the
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appropriateness of regulations to local conditions, and the role of local leaders, 
especially phu yai ban, in contributing to the management of common property 
resources available in their communities. The roles of phu yai ban in rural 
development and in the management of common pool natural resources are 
increasingly important, since they are given more opportunity to participate in both 
planning and implementation of policies under the recent reforms of administrative 
structures.
1.3 The Nature of the Study and the Study Area
Given the fact that most rural areas in Thailand face rapid change toward 
modernisation and a market economy, natural resource depletion is certainly one of 
the major problems that confront rural inhabitants. Many natural resources have 
been exploited to increase the overall economic productivity of the country without 
a careful consideration of the long-term consequences. As a result, many rural 
communities which depend largely on the richness of natural resources for their 
livelihoods, have suffered from problems related to natural resource degradation. 
Moreover, the discussion in the previous section pointed out that one of the major 
obstacles to the management of natural resources, especially common property 
resources in rural areas in Thailand, is the contradiction between implementation 
and existing policies or whether policies are right.
The gap between policy and practice is not unfamiliar to social scientists who are 
interested in public administration and policy implementation in Thailand. Central 
to this ineffectiveness is the fact that whilst policy-making is dominated by central 
government and central departments, policy implementation relies on different 
levels of government offices, who take instruction from their central departments 
(see for example Panpiemrat, 1990; Vorathepputipong, 1984). Lack of 
correspondence between centrally constructed policies designed for nation-wide 
application, and actual locally occurring problems and their contexts, is viewed as a 
key issue. It is argued that this issue can be alleviated if participation of local people 
in the policy process is promoted (Panpiemrat, 1982). The fact that recent
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development policies have taken great account of local participation in rural 
development in general, as well as in more specific environmental and natural 
resource development, has instigated this study, which investigates how these 
policies are applied in a local context with respect natural resource management. It 
is often argued that participation of local people is likely to be limited under Thai 
culture which is highly hierarchical, therefore, investigating the involvement and the 
importance of local leaders, especially village official leaders or phu yai ban, is 
considered vital for further understanding of obstacles to and effectiveness of 
natural resource management at the local level.
1.3.1 The Nature of this Study
This study considers the role of community organisations in the management of 
natural resources at the local level in Southern Thailand, by focusing on the role of 
phu yai ban in handling natural resources related to freshwater capture fisheries. 
Whilst I was researching the management of floodplain fisheries in a floodplain 
ecosystem in the region for the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University 
of Bath, I discovered that a number of natural resources available in this area are 
considered by local people and officials to be under threat, and many local people 
are concerned about their future. Foremost among these are fishery resources, which 
form an important source of earnings to the majority of settlers in the area (see 
Masae, 1994; Masae and McGregor, 1996). It was observed that the management of 
fisheries requires further investigation if this common property resource is to be 
maintained. Other related resources such as swamp forest must also be considered, 
since their condition is believed to be connected with the decline of fisheries. My 
interest was aroused by the fact that fishing in this area has a long history, perhaps 
dating back to the first established community which is believed to have taken place 
over 400 years ago. The survival of fishing should have evolved over time through 
the adaptation of these fishing communities, enabling them to cope with economic 
and social changes. However, in the last few decades the fisheries have declined 
significantly. While there are state regulations to control the exploitation of both 
fishery and swamp forest resources in the area, both are subject to limited
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enforcement. At this point, I realised that the question of ineffective implementation 
must be addressed, and consideration must be given to the role of implementors 
themselves. Moreover, it seems that the success of many development programmes 
or projects, is dependent largely on the attributes of the leaders of organisations 
undertaking these programmes or projects (Korten, 1980). Since the issue was 
observed to be local, and it is widely known in Thailand that most official work in 
rural areas is left to local official leaders, the investigation of the role of phu yai 
ban, who is the lowest official and has the closest relationship with resource users, 
was an obvious focus. Based on this understanding, this study has taken the phu yai 
ban as a key actor in dealing with resource management policies and problems 
facing resource users. The study will treat the phu yai ban both as the leader of the 
village community and a member of the village community of which he is a part. In 
considering the role the phu yai ban plays, special attention is given to their 
participation in effectuating policies related to the management of common property 
resources. This is based on the widely held assumption that local participation is 
essential if local resource management is to be sustained. It is also motivated by a 
belief that participation of ordinary villagers is likely to be restrained in Thai 
society, because of its highly hierarchical structure. Therefore, the focus should be 
given on the participation of phu yai ban who is the closest representative of 
villagers in their efforts to participate in the present structure of development 
administration.
The phu yai ban is the lowest official in Thai administration, and comes to power 
through the village election. A phu yai ban is generally elected from villagers whose 
educational qualification and personal behaviour meet the requirements of the state. 
The phu yai ban usually resides in the village which he/she leads. This makes 
him/her have the closest relationship with the community among officials and 
leaders. Being in this position he/she should play a significant role in the 
management of natural resources available in his/her community, as these are 
important for the livelihoods of his/her fellow villagers. Additionally, as the link 
between natural resources and rural livelihoods is often strong, he/she should see the 
significance of management for sustainable use. However, being an official agent in
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charge of all administrative duties assigned by the state, at the same time as being 
the top leader of his/her village community, a phu yai ban is located between his/her 
village community and the state. This position is very important for mediating 
between the state aims and the community needs. Thus all phu yai ban have two 
primary obligations to fulfil; to follow state commands, and to respond positively to 
the need of villagers.
Ideally, every phu yai ban should act positively both with respect to the state and to 
his/her fellow villagers. It is often assumed that all the state commands are a 
response to people’s needs, and for the benefit of those needs. However, this is not 
always the case, as conflicts between state rules and people’s needs are widespread 
in Thailand. The phu yai ban often plays an ambiguous role. Hirsch (1990) refers to 
him/her as an agent of state penetration of the village. At other times phu yai ban 
have been the representatives of villagers in their struggles against the state (see also 
Wetchaphitak, 1991). Furthermore, there are likely to be several factors which can 
influence the phu yai ban’s performance in fulfilling their primary obligations. 
These include the personal backgrounds of each phu yai ban, the expectations of 
different groups he/she is connected to, and the environment in which he/she is 
working. Interactions between these factors are crucial in understanding the actual 
role each phu yai ban plays, even if his/her formal or official role is clearly stated. 
The influence of these factors and the consequences of their interactions should be 
taken into consideration in the analysis of phu yai ban’s role in dealing with 
common property resource management.
1.3.2 The Significance and Objectives of the Study
This study is significant not only because it deals with the issue of natural resource 
management in rural areas, which is crucial for sustainable development and 
increasingly popular among students of development studies, but also because it 
provides a unique study on the role of phu yai ban in the management of natural 
resources at the local level. Moreover, by focusing on the involvement of phu yai 
ban in the policy process, or more specifically in policy implementation process,
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this study seeks to provide a more penetrating understanding of the contemporary 
policy process in rural Thailand, than has hitherto been offered. Though there 
appear to be many studies dealing with rural leaders and development in rural 
Thailand, they rarely emphasise the role of phu yai ban. Most research on village- 
state relations in Thailand to date focuses on the sub-district level or tambon, which 
encompasses a number of villages, and on the role of kamnan or sub-district official 
leaders (see Turton, 1987; Ingavata, 1990; Gohlert, 1991).
Additional to the main focus mentioned above, this study aims specifically to find 
out the capacity of phu yai ban to pursue the management of threatened common 
property resources, in response to related policies and the needs of local people. In 
order to fulfil this main objective, the investigation has sought to understand how 
much power phu yai ban have in dealing with natural resource management, the 
degree of their involvement in the policy process related to natural resource 
management under the present administrative structure, and their interactions with 
factors influencing their performance in dealing with this management. With respect 
to these factors, consideration will be given to both the context in which the policy 
process takes place and the content of policy in question. The investigation of policy 
context will take social, political and economic factors into consideration, both with 
reference to formal organisational and local community framework. However, the 
main focus is the investigation of the local community, as its attributes are central to 
the success of sustainable management of common property resources (see Ostrom, 
1990 and 1992; Massey,' 1994; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).
1.3.3 The Study Area and the Selection the Study Villages
In fulfilling the above objectives, the selection a proper research design was 
essential before conducting fieldwork. Since the research aims to provide an 
understanding of a complex issue which relates to several different factors, drawing 
an area boundary and selecting research techniques was necessary in order to 
correspond to the nature of data needed and the fieldwork. Originally, fieldwork was 
undertaken in several villages (mooban) in the study area, but it was discovered that
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a combination of different geographical and political settings between villages 
significantly affected the management of common property resources. 
Understanding the relationship between physical and political characteristics of Thai 
villages requires an understanding of the village arrangement in the Thai context.
In brief, mooban is the smallest unit in the Thai administration, which is drawn
based on the population size in terms of household numbers. This system of
arrangement derives from the administrative reforms of King Rama V over a
century ago, and their goals of modernisation. While a few types of villages can be
found throughout the country (see Wijeyewardene, 1967), two main categories can
be drawn with respect to their physical characteristics and political boundaries; (a)
villages which are relatively separated in their settlements from their neighbouring
villages, and (b) villages which are part of the larger settlements and separated only
for administrative purposes. Clearly this categorisation may not be useful for all
kinds of village studies in Thailand since there may still be many differences within
each category, but it is valid for this study as far as the village administration and
management of common property resources are concerned. This presumption is
based not only on observations within the study area, but also from my experience
of field visits in other areas of Thailand, especially in the southern region. After
mature consideration, only two villages were selected for this study; each village
representing one of the categories discussed above. The selection of these two
villages was also because they are both important fishing villages in the area.
\
The villages selected for this study are both located in the floodplain ecosystem of 
Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake in Southern Thailand (Map 1). These 
two villages were given the pseudonyms ‘Ban Nua Phru’ and ‘Ban Bon Lay.’ Ban 
Nua Phru is located to the northwest of Phru Thung Samet swamp whereas Ban Bon 
Lay is part of a large and densely populated community called Bueng Yai 
community, located on the west bank of Bueng Yai lake. Comparing their location 
and their relationship with neighbouring villages, it is clear that Ban Nua Phru is 
separated more clearly from other villages than Ban Bon Lay (see Map 2 and Map
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4). Ban Bon Lay is aggregated into Bueng Yai Community, since its separation is 
only marked by its political boundary.
All pseudonyms of the places employed in this thesis reflect either the locations or 
main physical characteristics of the places; this is useful because the resemblance 
between the characteristics of a location and its pseudonym is helpful for both the 
reader and myself. At the same time, naming a place on the basis of its location and 
main physical nature is not atypical in the Thai context, as it is commonly observed 
in the field and in literature that names of places are given in a similar manner. The 
term ‘Barf in Thai can either means ‘house’ or ‘village.’ Occasionally, it is used as 
equivalent to ‘community’ which is sometimes not differentiated from ‘village’ in a 
generic sense, especially when the settlement in the community is seen as a single 
settlement, though it is officially divided into various ‘administrative villages.’ In 
this study the term is used only to refer to ‘village’ which is its most common 
meaning. The term ‘Nua Phru’ contains two words, ‘nua* means ‘north’, and ‘phru’ 
means ‘swamp.’ Therefore, ‘Ban Nua Phru’ can be translated as ‘the village at the 
north of the swamp.’ Similarly, the term ‘Bon Lay’ comes from two words, ‘bon’ 
and ‘lay’, which mean ‘on’ and ‘sea’ respectively. Actually, the word ‘lay’ or 7e’ is 
used only among southerners as a short form of ‘thale,’ the full word for ‘sea’ in 
the central Thai language. The name ‘Ban Bon Lay’ given to this village resembles 
‘the village on the bank of the sea’, in which ‘the sea’ here is used as a substitution 
of Take’ in the term ‘Bueng Yai lake.’ Again, this is not drawn from a vacuum, 
since the term ‘ thale’ is also used in its real name, and means Take’ in this case. For 
clarification, the pseudonyms given to both villages are based on their locations with 
reference to Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake, two main landmarks of 
this ecological system. For Phru Thung Samet, the name was given to reflect its 
main characteristic, which is that of a large field {thung) covered by swamp trees 
{samet). A similar logic is used in naming Bueng Yai lake, the name of which 
reflects my first impression of this large (yai) natural reservoir {bueng) like 
waterbody. The Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake are important not 
only because they form major landmarks of the area, but also because their natural
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characteristics are related to the way of life of people settling in the area. Hence, it is 
important to briefly describe their settings.
Bueng Yai lake is the largest natural freshwater lake in Thailand. The lake forms a 
component of the Songkhla lake system located across three southern provinces of 
Songkhla, Patthalung and Nakhom Sri Thammarat. Bueng Yai lake itself is located 
14 kilometres to the east of Khuan Mangkhud district headquarters in Patthalung 
province. The lake stretches over two sub-districts or tambon ~  Tambon Bueng Yai 
and Tambon Khuan Phanang (Map 4). The lake forms the northmost part of the 
Songkhla lake system which is connected to Thale Nua, the upper part of Songkhla 
lake. It is connected to the swamp area to the north and east. To the west of the lake, 
the land is dominated by paddy fields and rubber plantations. The lake has an area 
of about 30 square kilometres or about 2,800 hectares. It has an average depth of 1.5 
meters with the highest level of water of about 3.00 metres at the peak of the rainy 
season and the lowest of about 0.80 a meter in the dry season, measured at the 
deepest point of the lake.
The water quality of Bueng Yai lake is complex. Its proximity to the sea and its 
connections to the Songkhla lake system which opens onto the sea at its southern 
end, make the water in the lake vary seasonally in its salinity. Moreover, its 
connection with a peat swamp in which the water is acidic also affects the quality of 
water in the lake. Acidity levels are higher in the rainy season than in the dry 
season. An acid-base measurement shows the variation from pH 3.0 in November, 
to pH 9.2 in June, with an annual average value of pH 7.25. The variation mainly 
results from variations of inflowing water from the surrounding swamp, and 
variations in the level of saltwater intrusion into the lake (Tansakul, 1987). Seasonal 
variations of substantial levels of saltwater intrusion affect the water salinity in the 
lake, and is believed to affect fishery conditions. Historically, however, salinity 
levels of the lake were much higher than at present. Water salinity was at its highest 
during the driest season of the year due to the intrusion of saltwater from the 
adjacent eastern coast through Khlong Rawa near Ranot. However, since 1956, 
several water gates had been constructed near Ranot because of concerns over rice
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production in the district. Having cut off the main channels of saltwater intrusion 
into the lake, there has been a substantial reduction in salinity, despite some 
remaining saline intrusion via groundwater and other channels. Consequently, the 
lake is now predominantly freshwater, a change which is believed to have had a 
significant effect on the richness of its fishery resources. The substantial seasonal 
variations of salinity in the past are presupposed as beneficial for the productivity of 
the fisheries. This is explained in terms of its potential to recruit a variety of fish 
species to the lake in different seasons through fish migration. It is also believed that 
the high level of salinity in the driest season, together with a better circulation of 
water in the past, helped in keeping the lake free from aquatic weeds covering. The 
change in hydrological dynamics resulting from the aforementioned water gates 
construction, is seen to be the main factor behind the presently apparent choking of 
water weeds in the lake. It is believed to encourage a higher rate of sedimentation 
which is perceived to correspond to the decrease in the productivity of the fisheries 
(Tansakul, 1992).
The swamp surrounding the lake is connected to Phru Thung Samet swamp. This 
swamp consists of a combination of swamp forest (paa samet), sedge (krajoot), 
rough grazing, and contains some land suitable for rice cultivation. Most of the 
swamp forest is degraded forest and is regarded by the state as a public forest area. 
However, most of the land is informally occupied by residents of surrounding 
communities. In the rainy season, the flood turns the swamp into a floodplain area, 
which allows fish to disperse widely and makes the area an important fishing 
ground.
There are a few villages located on the west bank of Bueng Yai lake, in the adjacent 
area and in its nearby swamp. These villages differ in their access to different 
natural resources. Villages located further inland have better access to land suitable 
for rice and rubber production than those located on the banks of the lake and in the 
swamp. On the other hand, villages on the banks of the lake and in the swamp have 
better access to fishery resources, and these villages are known locally as fishing 
villages. Ban Bon Lay is one out of seven villages forming Bueng Yai community,
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which is known as a long settled fishing community in this area. The lake and the 
community are not only well known for their fishing, but also for the lake’s beauty 
and the community’s handicraft activities which have attracted a steady flow of 
outside visitors.
Phru Thung Samet is one of the largest floodplain swamps in southern Thailand. Its 
boundaries extend to the north and the east of Bueng Yai lake. It covers an area of 
195,545 rai or around 31,287 hectares, and stretches over five districts in three 
provinces ~  Songkhla, Patthalung and Nakhorn Sri Thammarat (Poosakulsuk and 
Keawnooh, 1994; CORIN and FEKU, 1994). It is believed that Phru Thung Samet 
used to be covered predominantly by healthy rain forest and enriched with wildlife. 
Moreover, most of the swamp was under water throughout the year, thus it was also 
rich in freshwater fish; only part of the swamp was covered by swamp forest (paa 
samet). However, beginning about 50 years ago, there have been several natural and 
social phenomena, including a hurricane, a series of forest fires and flooding, and 
various human activities, that have harmed natural resources by creating marked 
changes in the physical conditions of the swamp (Poosakulsuk and Keawnooh, 
1994). The area is now covered predominantly by swamp trees known locally as 
samet {Melaleuca leucadendra (L.) Linn.), sedge grasses known as krajoot {Lemna 
minor L.) and joo t nooh {Eleocharis ochrostachy Steud), and rough grassland used 
for grazing cattle and water buffaloes. The low-lying areas of the swamp are 
covered with acidic water for most of the year, while the remainder floods during 
the rainy season and can remain covered in water between October and March. 
Some of these areas are used for swamp rice cultivation. The level of water acidity 
is higher in the dry season because of the restricted availability of water compared 
to the rainy season; this water acidity ranges from pH 2.8 to pH 3.5 (CORIN and 
FEKU, 1994). There are several canals and water channels running through the 
swamp, which are used mainly as alternative transport routes between villages 
which have access to them. More importantly, they are essential for transporting rice 
and krajoot from areas inaccessible by road. However, though the canals are also 
used as fishing grounds, they are not considered to be as significant as the swamp 
itself.
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At present, there are several settlements in and around Phru Thung Samet. It is 
estimated that there are about 23,000 inhabitants in 33 villages located in and 
around the swamp. However, not all these villages are actively involved in fishing. 
The majority of the villages are located to the east and northeast of the swamp, and 
are predominantly farming villages (Poosakulsuk and Keawnooh, 1994). Only a few 
villages located on ‘islands’ (khuan) in the middle of the swamp, and those at the 
northwest of the swamp are actively involved in fishing; Ban Nua Phru is one of 
these villages.
The physical characteristics of Bueng Yai lake, its adjacent swamp and Phru Thung 
Samet swamp, allow the villagers of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay to practise 
fishing as one of their main sources of income. Additionally, rice farming and 
handicrafts from krajoot are also widely practised. These three activities are 
common to the majority of households in both villages, and raising of livestock, 
especially cattle and water buffalo, is also found in some households. These animals 
are raised mainly for selling rather than as draught animals, as most of the 
ploughing in this area nowadays is done by small hand tractors (kwai lehk). The 
details of the economic characteristics of these villages will be discussed later, in the 
chapter specially devoted to the backgrounds of these villages. The main purpose 
here is to point out that the active involvement of both villages in fishing, though in 
different degrees, was the main criterion for selecting them for this study.
As mentioned earlier, though a few villages were included at the beginning of this 
study, and the decision to concentrate only on two villages was taken at a later stage, 
it is important to clarify the reasons for selecting these two villages. There are a few 
reasons behind the selection of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, other than the 
reason that they are both prominent fishing villages. First of all, these two villages 
differ in their historical perspectives, which to a certain degree influences the way 
their communities are organised. The fact that the settlement in Ban Nua Phru is 
quite new whereas Ban Bon Lay is part of a long settled community, is considered 
as interesting for making comparison of the influence of historical factors on
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community organisations. Secondly, they differ in their relationship with their 
neighbouring villages, especially with respect to the control over natural resources. 
This difference also affects their relationships with natural resources, and hence 
their management. Thirdly, both of them are connected with newly developed 
projects related to the management of fishery resources; this is important for an in- 
depth analysis of the role of communities and their leaders in these projects, which 
represent policy implementation at the local level. It is important to point out that 
despite the existence of another project in a nearby village, projects undertaken in 
Ban Nua Phru and in Bueng Yai community are clearly different in their origins and 
their spatial relationships with the villages, making them useful for the purposes of 
comparison. Finally, these two villages are the most accessible villages, both 
socially and politically, of all the villages originally included. This social and 
political accessibility was crucial for this study, as it involves matters which can be 
considered as socially and politically sensitive. After spending some time in a few 
villages in this area, and making some efforts to gain the trust with various people in 
these villages, the trust I received in these two villages can be considered to be most 
productive. The final decision to select these two villages, was based on the overall 
weighting of these criteria.
1.4 Fieldwork: A Note from Experience
Most books and manuals on social research methodology guide researchers to
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follow the subsequent research steps; beginning with the selection of a research 
topic, setting research objectives, reviewing theoretical grounds, constructing a 
conceptual framework, perhaps setting hypotheses before starting fieldwork, and so 
on. Though carefully following these steps may be ideal for conducting good 
research, their application in the real world can vary according to circumstances and 
limitations faced by individual researchers. However, when it comes to the writing 
about research, it is not uncommon for many researchers to indulge in a degree of 
mystification by presenting their research methodologies as following the above 
conventional process smoothly with only marginal difficulties, even though this may 
not fully reflect the reality. At the same time, they frequently explain how well
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suited their methods are for the characteristics particular research and how they 
intend to conduct their fieldwork and analyse their data in a very formal way. On 
rare occasions, researchers do mention methodological problems they have 
encountered, especially during their fieldwork periods, which lead to some 
adjustments in the research techniques they initially prepared. In reality, conducting 
research in the social sciences often faces some difficulties, either before, during, or 
after the fieldwork stage (see Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992c; Bulmer and 
Warwick, 1993).
Throughout the period of conducting this research, I have experienced several things 
which have given rise to a mixture of feelings. This was partly related to the rather 
special arrangement of this research and other commitments I had at the early stage 
of the research that drove the research to move forward under limited conditions. 
Clearly, working under limited conditions is not unusual for social scientists, as 
Collins (1993) mentions:
‘The fieldworker is rarely or never in the position to choose a method 
of research free from the constraints of time, money, social skills and 
linguistic resources.’ (p. 68).
Many researchers who have conducted their fieldwork in developing countries 
recount both hardships and useful experiences during their fieldwork period with 
mixed feelings (see Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992a). These feelings are also shared 
by myself. However, in recounting the fieldwork hardships and experience, I intend 
not just to share experience with others, but also to unveil a ‘story behind the 
curtain’ which will allow fuller understanding of this study. This section will 
highlight the arrangement of this study and limitations faced in connection with this 
arrangement. Additionally, this section will also deal with the methodology 
employed for data collection, its adjustments, and reasons behind the adjustments.
The arrangement of this study is quite peculiar, since it did not properly follow the 
conventional processes of conducting social research, especially in its pre-fieldwork 
stage. This research started while I was working at Prince of Songkla University
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(PSU) in southern Thailand, which is connected to the Centre for Development 
Studies (CDS), University of Bath, through its research on floodplain fisheries in 
South and South-east Asia (henceforth referred to as the PSU-CDS project); I was 
employed as the research officer for the Thailand component of the project, and at 
the same time involved in teaching at PSU. Through the connection with the project, 
my request to further my study was processed. It was in the early 1993 that I was 
informed to prepare my research proposal, and at the same time, to start 
implementing the research fieldwork as soon as possible. Through a close 
consultation with Dr. J. Allister McGregor who accepted me under his supervision, 
the proposal for this research was prepared in brief form, and then submitted for 
registration in 1993. This arrangement was based on the condition that I would be a 
part time student in the first year, conducting the research fieldwork in Thailand, 
and then I would spend the second and third years in the University of Bath to 
complete my study. While my commitment with PSU-CDS project and my teaching 
at PSU continued until mid 1994, this study had to begin with at least two 
limitations. The first of these was related to time management during the first year 
of this study, as other commitments mentioned above still had to be fulfilled. The 
second concerned my access to relevant literature prior to my fieldwork stage.
The fieldwork started in June 1993 in combination with the PSU-CDS project 
fieldwork, which continued until July 1994. Combining two research projects which 
were taking place in the same area at the same time was useful but difficult. The 
advantage of it was that I could cover a broader range of issues and gain a wider 
understanding of the research site. At the same time, it also meant that I had to 
divide my attention between two subjects with different foci. Regarding time 
management, I had to carefully prioritise my time allocation between different tasks. 
The high demands on my time meant that research techniques employed for this 
study had to be adjusted to meet with the time required for other tasks. However, all 
the adjustments made in the research techniques (which will be discussed in more 
detail later in this section) were done with the full awareness of the researcher and 
with careful consideration of their effects on both projects. This brief explanation 
should clarify questions which may arise in relation to the adjustments of research
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techniques used in this study. It should also be noted that the reality of conducting 
fieldwork in rural societies denotes that no research techniques or guidelines can be 
fully applied without some adjustments (see Bulmer and Warwick, 1993; Gans, 
1982; Frankenberg, 1982; Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992a).
Considering the period of time available for this study, the fieldwork took only one 
year to complete, which may be argued as being rather short for a qualitative study 
in rural communities. This time frame should not be a crucial issue, bearing in mind 
that some information was obtained through the PSU-CDS project which started 
much earlier. Additionally, this study did not intend to conduct a full ethnography of 
communities selected. It is instead an issue-oriented study which makes use of 
ethnographic application for the purpose of achieving a more holistic understanding 
of factors which are related to the issue under consideration. It should also be noted 
that this study also differs from other anthropological studies in the context of the 
relationships between the researcher and the researched. Most frequently, 
researchers conduct their research in societies which are alien to them in various 
respects. Many of them have to spend a considerable amount of time studying 
languages and cultures which are completely different from their original 
backgrounds. This is not the case with this study, as the researcher is highly familiar 
with the society studied. Being a southerner who was born in a rural village myself 
and having spent more than half of my life in rural areas, most of the social 
elements in rural life are not completely strange. Moreover, the communities 
selected for the study are those which are not new, as they are among those included 
under the PSU-CDS project which the researcher had been contacted since late 
1992. However, it should be said that the researcher was still to some degree a 
stranger to the communities, since a few factors continued to alienate the researcher 
and members of the communities under the study. These factors will be discussed in 
detail later in this chapter.
Regarding the second limitation, my access to relevant literature was limited prior to 
the conduction of fieldwork. Being unable to come to Bath before starting the 
fieldwork, meant that I had to rely mainly on literature available at PSU and other
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universities that I had access to in Thailand. These institutions had limited literature 
related to the study, especially with respect to common property resource 
management and policy analysis. Realising this limitation, the PSU-CDS project 
made some books and articles available for theoretical preparation. It was from this 
limited amount of literature that the research ideas and key questions were 
developed, which were then used as the main methodological basis for this study. In 
other words, no firm conceptual framework was developed before conducting the 
research fieldwork; the development of a full conceptual framework used in this 
study took place after the first round of the fieldwork was completed. Though this 
research arrangement may be seen peculiar, it does not necessarily lead to a serious 
problem in conducting social research in which the main aim is to investigate facts 
from the real settings, and where interpretation can be made at a later stage. 
Conducting qualitative research based on general ideas without specifying the 
conceptual framework and hypothesises is not uncommon among anthropologists 
(Jorgensen, 1989).
Because no firm conceptual framework was developed prior to the fieldwork, I 
began my field work by bringing along several questions related to the role of phu  
yai ban with respect to natural resource management and rural development These 
include questions about their official duties with respect to natural resource 
management, the significance of these duties compared to other duties, their 
interests in natural resource problems, their capacity to handle these problems, and 
factors influencing their performance in dealing with these problems both within 
their villages and beyond. Together with these key questions, I also had a broad idea 
about the types of people that should be consulted when gathering information, and 
the main methodology that should be employed.
The main methodology used for this study was participant observation. Clarification 
of how this method was applied is important, since it covers a wide range of 
practices. Moreover, it should be distinguished from the observation method to 
avoid some confusion which may arise. Collins (1984) mentions:
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‘A standard approach to participant observation treats the options 
available to the researcher as lying on a continuum between complete 
participation — with associate difficulties of observation — and total 
concentration on observation with hardly any participation.’ (p. 55).
From this statement, it can be understood that the method of participant observation 
is a combination of both participation and observation techniques in different 
degrees. Therefore, it is up to the researcher to apply these different degrees, 
depending on the circumstances he or she faces. It is likely that the combination of 
participation and observation varies with different researchers, and is illustrated in 
terms of their relationships with the people they study. This is of course influenced 
by the content of the subjects they study, the social and cultural contexts of 
communities under investigation, the personalities of researchers themselves after 
they adapt to local situations, and the ability of each researcher to communicate with 
the local people (see Frankenberg, 1982; Gans, 1982; McGregor, 1991; Devereux 
and Hoddinott, 1992b). The method primarily employed for this study falls midway 
on a continuum between complete participation and complete observation. It was 
considered to be suitable for the specific type of data needed in this study, which 
was qualitative and concerned with culture and norms. Collecting this type of data 
through other methods is questionable in terms of adequacy and efficiency (see 
Zelditch, 1969). The application of participant observation was judged to be most 
appropriate under the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the study. In order 
to understand the extent to which the combination between participation and 
observation was applied to this research, and its suitability for this study, one should 
consider the situation in which this fieldwork was undertaken. There are three points 
which are worth raising here — the entry to the research sites, the nature of 
participant observation undertaken, and the relationships between the researcher and 
the researched.
Making an entry into the research site and community is one of the most important 
aspects of doing participant observation fieldwork. Thus it is often suggested that a 
researcher should recognise the accessibility, especially to people and their needs, as 
one of the most important criteria in selecting a research site, since there are usually
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more than one equally good sites available. Moreover, the researcher should be well 
prepared and make all necessary contacts, either formal or personal, to facilitate 
his/her entry. Using personal contacts is often very useful (Bernard, 1988). In rural 
Thailand, making contacts with village and sub-district leaders is considered to be 
one of the first things a researcher should do. It is also important to inform the 
district officer (nai amphoe), preferably in writing. The researcher should explain 
the purposes of coming and ask for permission to conduct his/her fieldwork. This is 
essential in preventing any misunderstandings which may occur during the 
fieldwork period. Moreover, it is helpful in reducing any suspicions that may 
emerge between the researcher and the people, since their leaders will be able to 
provide clarification.
Most village and sub-district leaders in the area were visited at the beginning of my 
work with PSU-CDS project. The district officer (nai amphoe) as well as a few 
other concerned officials were contacted in person. Being a university staff member 
myself, there was no difficulty in making contacts with these leaders, but this does 
not mean that they did not have any suspicions about my research work. A few 
questions were asked, especially by officials at the district office, regarding details 
of my study, including some sensitive points. Friendly clarification was then given 
about the main research idea, and its anticipated benefits. To avoid creating a bad 
impression, I decided not to mention any points which may be sensitive for them. I 
made use of the first contact made for the PSU-CDS project to continue this study, 
which has a different focus from the earlier study, but without telling them about the 
change of subject. During the time of my PSU-CDS project fieldwork, difficulties 
arose regarding my relationships with some concerned officials in the district office, 
and with a few local leaders. Though there was no serious confrontation, I witnessed 
lack of co-operation in discussing relevant subjects, in providing information, and in 
avoiding meetings. These caused some difficulties in managing this research. 
Because of lack of co-operation from some district officials, the villages under the 
study were selected on the basis that confrontation could be avoided. As mentioned 
earlier, the selection of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay for this study was partly
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based on the better access I had with these two communities and their leaders, 
compared to other villages.
In conducting this research fieldwork, I managed to participate in various activities, 
including the every day economic activities of some households, social and cultural 
gatherings, formal village meetings, as well as informal social circles. Moreover, 
informal interviews and discussions were undertaken with key informants and 
concerned officials, as well as with some villagers from different socio-economic 
groups. As with key informants, selection was made from different groups whose 
interests were sometimes in conflict. All these methods are common among 
participant observers. However, my approach in conducting participant observation 
in this study differed from that of most participant observers mentioned in 
anthropological literature. Conventional anthropological studies of rural 
communities often stress the importance of adopting a holistic perspective in order 
to understand human activities, in which cultural and social elements play an 
important role (Fetterman, 1989). Accordingly, social anthropologists are expected 
to absorb the culture as a whole in their studies. Nevertheless, actual applications of 
this notion appear to be somewhat compromised, depending largely on the main 
focus of each study. Research in development studies often emphasises particular 
issues of development, and at the same time does not deny the importance of 
holism. Because this study is issue-oriented, a compromise method of practice was 
adopted following the notion widely adopted among researchers in development 
studies. My time constraint and my commitments with other work at PSU meant 
that I adopted participant observation practice in a way which did not allow me to 
fully absorb the whole culture of the communities I studied. Unlike most social 
anthropologists, I did not spend the majority of the time with the people I studied. 
Instead, making a few visits every month to each village was commonly practised 
with some over night stays in these villages. Additionally, I was also limited by the 
availability of accommodation in the villages. I could only stay with local 
households, but could not hide my status as a ‘guest from the university’, which 
may have made them uncomfortable. To them, I was always a special person of 
superior status, similar to government officials to whom they must show respect,
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even if I tried to bridge this gap in various ways. In one village I managed to hire a 
room allocated as a guest house for casual tourists, and where the owner’s family 
also stayed. This place was located outside the village, so was not representative of 
the social environment of the village. Because the main focus of this study is the 
issue of common property resource management and the role of the phu yai ban, its 
scope differs from more general ethnographic studies. The particular nature of this 
study allows such practice to be possible, and should not substantially diminish the 
quality of data obtained.
As with the relationships between the researcher and the people researched, several 
factors can affect types of their interactions. The questions of conformity and 
language ability are frequently cited in previous studies. These issues will be 
brought into the discussion as far as this study is concerned.
The question of how participant observers should behave in order to accomplish 
their research work and maximise the quality and quantity of data they need, is one 
of the issues widely debated. Most debates arise around ‘the unending dialectic 
between the role of member (participant) and stranger (observer and reporter)’ 
(Hughes, 1960, quoted in Gans, 1982). These two different roles are located at the 
opposite ends of the continuum line between complete participation and complete 
observation, as mentioned earlier. Although it is often mentioned that to be a ‘total 
participant’ or an ‘unobtrusive participant observer’ is the ultimate role a participant 
observer should play ‘(Gans, 1982; Fetterman, 1989), it is doubtful that any 
fieldworker can adopt this role completely. Being an outsider by nature, with the 
main aim of researching the village community, it is likely that a fieldworker can 
participate in village life, but not in an unobtrusive manner. I prefer the term 
‘researcher participant’ used by Gans (1982) to refer to the status of fieldworkers 
who undertake participant observation, including myself.
In my case, it is clear that the way I employed participant observation in this study 
cannot be labelled as unobtrusive. At the same time, it cannot be categorised as a 
‘complete observation’, since it involved some amount of participation in various
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activities. My relationship with the communities studied had been very good 
throughout the study period, and I believe that I was familiar to members of 
communities in general. However, I was only a sincere outsider who had a close 
relationship with them, but at the same time neither a full community member nor a 
stranger. Through my experience in these two communities, I would like to argue 
that the boundary always remains between being an outsider and a member of the 
community. However, this does not necessarily lessen the researcher’s ability to 
access information as long as the researcher gains a high degree of trust from the 
community. Therefore, building the trust between the researcher and the community 
being researched, especially community leaders, is important in conducting 
participant observation. In rural Thailand, showing sincerity through friendly 
discussions with people, participating in social and ceremonial activities, and 
showing kindness by occasionally making reasonable donations to social activities 
and presenting small gifts to leaders and other frequently contacted individuals, are 
often very useful. These practices are parts of a culture practised widely throughout 
Thailand. Through my attempts to follow these practices, I received a very warm 
welcome in these two villages.
Language ability plays a crucial role in obtaining adequate information, as well as in 
constructing and maintaining a good relationship with villagers in participant 
observation. Without a good knowledge of the local language, it is difficult for 
researchers to conduct participant observation, because gathering information 
greatly depends on informal communication which is often complicated in its 
structure for outsiders. Moreover, being handicapped in the local language or dialect 
is likely to obstruct active participation in the community studied. On the other 
hand, being able to communicate in the local language is likely to promote better 
co-operation from those being researched, and also lessen the researcher’s 
strangeness. Foreigners who conduct their qualitative research in other countries, 
manage to learn local languages and often hire native research assistants who are 
able to communicate in researchers’ languages (see for example Devereux, 1992; 
Francis, 1992; McGregor, 1991).
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Problems with respect to language difficulties were marginal in this study. Being a 
southerner, I do not face a major difficulty in understanding the Southern Thai 
Dialect or ‘Bhasa Pakstai. * Therefore, no native speaking assistant was needed in 
this study. However, I still have a marginal language problem, especially in 
speaking and understanding some expressions, since Bhasa Pakstai is not my first 
language. Though this minor problem should not have a substantial impact on my 
correspondence, as I can always ask for clarification of some expressions and I can 
use the Central Dialect (Bhasa Klaang) which is understandable to all villagers, I 
observed that a more friendly environment was obtained when I spoke Bhasa 
Pakstai with them. This issue is raised in order to remind the reader about a point 
discussed earlier with regard to being an unobtrusive participant observer in the 
village, and how this is unlikely to occur easily, even with a minor problem like 
this.
Data were recorded by means of making notes. No tape recording was used to assist 
the study, since this may have led to suspicion among villagers. This can happen 
when some of the subject discussed is considered as political and quite sensitive. 
Most of field notes were written while discussions or observation took place. 
Nevertheless, they were written in a short form in order to reduce communication 
discontinuity. This was normally followed by writing a full note immediately after 
each conversation, or in the evening of the same day while the data was still fresh in 
my mind. Some degree of analysis was involved while writing full notes. This 
practice is common in this type of study as Bogdan and Taylor (1975) observe:
‘In a sense, data analysis is an ongoing process in participant observation 
research. Observers note important themes and formulate hypotheses 
throughout their studies.’ (p. 80).
Analysing data while writing field notes was very useful for this study. It helped in 
refining key questions, as well as improving my views on the subject of interest. 
However, in terms of its analytical function, it forms only the first step of analysis 
with further analysis needed in the later stages.
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After the main fieldwork was completed, all fieldwork notes were compiled and 
reorganised. It was in this stage that further analysis was undertaken. Since my 
status was also changed from being a part time student to a full time student, and I 
came to Bath University soon after the completion of the main fieldwork, the chance 
to concentrate on this study increased, and access to literature also greatly improved. 
This provided me an opportunity not just for more thoughtful analysis, but also to 
revise the whole idea of the work. During this period, further questions also 
emerged. This led to the development of a proper conceptual idea, and the decision 
to make another short visit to the field in August and September 1995, to conduct 
minor fieldwork supplementing the previous fieldwork. The major analysis of 
fieldwork data was undertaken after returning from this second fieldwork period, 
and continued alongside the writing of this thesis.
The discussion of this chapter so far has revealed the interest of the researcher in 
conducting this study, the significance of the problems, the issues focused on in the 
study, and the fieldwork experience. It is aimed to provide a good grasp of the 
research before the full presentation which follows. The organisation of the 
following parts of this thesis will begin with general concepts of policy analysis and 
popular participation in the policy process in Chapter Two. This chapter will include 
also a conceptual framework used in guiding the analysis of this study. Chapter 
Three will deal with a discussion about the policy process and participation in 
Thailand. The emphasis will mainly be on policies related to rural development, in 
which the management of natural resources at local levels is included. Chapter Four 
will deal with backgrounds of the villages selected for this study; this will cover 
physical, historical, social and economic backgrounds of the villages, in order to 
provide a basic understanding about their settings, before entering into the analytical 
part of the thesis which will be presented in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. In 
Chapter Five, the presentation will emphasise the community organisation of the 
villages, and their different backgrounds will be related to the differences in their 
organisational arrangements and politics. The discussion will cover the power 
structure of the organisations, including the place of local leaders. Chapter Six will 
concentrate on the role of village official leaders or phu yai ban as important actors
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in the rural development process. The main focus of this chapter will be on their 
role with respect to the management of common property resources available in 
their communities. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, will provide the conclusions 
derived from this study, and prospects of applying the study’s findings to improve 
the relationship between policy and practice, with references to common property 
resource management at local level, especially in rural Thai communities.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY AND 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
2.1 Introduction
In the contemporary world, policy plays a crucial role in the development of any 
group of people. The study of development has increasingly addressed various aspects 
of policy such as policy issues, policy characteristics, and policy outcomes or impacts. 
The study of policy is an important element in the understanding of development 
taking place within any administrative and political boundary.
One of the first things that is essential for studying policy is an understanding of
policy as a concept. The term policy has different meanings in different contexts (see
for example, Anderson, 1975; Heclo, 1972; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). However, in
development studies the term can be viewed basically as the courses of action pursued
under the authority of governments with regard to the development of their people
(McGregor, 1991). From this point of view, policy forms an important linkage
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between the state and the people in which the state translates policy into action. In this 
sense it can be seen as one of the most important manifestations of the state. This 
linkage is important in understanding the relationship between the state and its people, 
and makes the analysis of policy an important element in the study of development. 
Moreover, both the state and the people are key elements in the analysis of policy, and 
therefore most concepts are developed around them. Because the policy process is a 
complex process, different views emerge on the juxtaposition of the state and the 
people in the process. This thesis is one of the studies which are related to the 
understanding of the relationships between the state and people, with particular
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reference to policies related to the management of natural resources in fishing 
communities in Southern Thailand.
In this chapter, attention will be given to understanding the policy process and the 
concepts of policy analysis that have been developed over recent years. It will also 
underline the relationships between policy-making, implementation and outcomes, 
together with considering the influence of the environment in which policy making 
takes place, the roles of actors in the policy process, and the participation of local 
people in the policy process. A brief discussion will also address policy questions 
related to common property resources management. Finally, a conceptual framework 
for analysing development policy at local level will be proposed.
2.2 The Concepts of Policy Analysis and Policy Process
The term ‘policy analysis’ is widely used in the study of policy. It is basically 
concerned with identifying problems that occur in the policy process, as well as 
seeking solutions to those problems (Wildavsky, 1972). The purpose of policy 
analysis is to acquire greater understanding of the policy process, so that its quality 
can be improved. Due to growing problems related to policy-making and practice, the 
interest in policy analysis has grown steadily, and become central to academics from 
related disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology (Ham and Hill, 
1993). This greater interest in policy analysis has brought about the development of 
concepts of policy analysis to deal with a variety of circumstances. Among a number 
of concepts developed, the process model and the political system model have been 
widely adopted by policy analysts since interest in the subject was first aroused. Both 
of these models have been the prominent frameworks for policy analysis. The 
following discussion will deal with these models in more detail.
2.2.1 The Process Model
The process model or ‘rational model’ derives from the perception that policy occurs 
as a process involving a series of activities. The model was first introduced by Harold
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Lasswell in his article entitled ‘The Decision Process’ published in 1963. It is one of 
the simplest and most frequently used as a framework of policy analysis. According to 
this conceptualisation, policy is assumed to emerge through a logical path, as Jenkins 
illustrates; ‘...an issue moves through the political system in a processual way from 
the point of entry, through decision and implementation, until a final choice is made 
to proceed with or terminate a course of action.’ (1978, p. 18). The process comprises 
various successive stages occurring over time, the number of which varies from one 
author to another (Figure 2.1). Generally, there are three main stages; problem 
formation, policy-making, and implementation (Anderson, 1975; Gordon et a l , 
1993). However, this classification is not the core of the policy process framework. 
The main concern of the framework is with various actions taking place in a 
processual way, the involvement of various actors in each stage and the dependency 
of one stage on its precedent stages (Jenkins, 1978; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
DecisionInitiation Inforniatioi Evaluation TerminationConsideration Implementation
Figure 2.1: Schematic presentation of process perspective on policy 
(Source: Jenkins, 1978, p. 17)
The process model is useful in drawing attention to the ordering of policy activities 
which fall into different subsequent stages. It also draws attention to certain concerned 
bodies which at certain times are more likely to be connected to only one stage of the 
policy process, rather than another. This feature of policy is viewed among its 
supporters as an ideal representation of reality (Jenkins, 1978). Another important
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characteristic of the process framework is that it is dynamic, which allows for forward 
as well as backward movement in response to feedback received at different stages. 
The opportunity to provide feedback at many points of the process means that 
modifications can be made whenever problems are found (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984).
Despite its advantages, there are some weaknesses in using the process framework. 
Its major weakness is its clearly defined sequence of stages. This characteristic is 
often criticised by some writers such as Grindle, Hill, Barrett and Hjern, as 
questionable and inaccurate when applied to the real world (Grindle, 1980b; Hill, 
1981; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and .Porter, 1993). Hogwood and Gunn, who 
see the framework as being very useful, also agree that viewing the process in terms 
of clearly defined stages is dangerous, because it may be interpreted that ‘...any 
policy episode is more or less self-contained and comprises a neat cycle of initial 
intermediate and culminating events’, which is not necessarily what actually happens 
in the real world (1984, p. 26).
2.2.2 The Political System Model
David Easton who proposed the system model explains policy in forms of input- 
output relation of political activity occurring as a system (Figure .2.2). He calls this 
system a ‘political system’ which contains a number of processes which need to be in 
balance in order to survive. Moreover, it forms a sub-system within other systems 
which are referred to as the environment (Easton, 1965; see also Ham and Hill, 1993). 
One of the important features of this model is the relationship between the political 
system in which policy-making takes place, and the environment. It can be seen that a 
major concern in the understanding of policy outputs is the influence of the 
environment -- either economic, political, or social environments — on the political 
system. It is from the^e environments that the inputs are fed into the system, and are 
then processed to produce the outputs. Therefore, policy analysis must consider the 











Figure 2.2: A simplified model o f the political system 









Despite its strength in explaining the relationship between the political system in 
which policy-making takes place and the environment surrounding it, several 
arguments arise about the inaccuracy of the model with regard to some of its 
assumptions. One of its major weaknesses is it pays little attention to explaining the 
input side with regard to the demands of policy-makers and the conversion process 
occurring in this stage. Another point is its assumption about the situation in ‘the 
political system’ as ‘the object of political action.’ This assumption overlooks the 
relationships between government units which are subject to continual adjustments as 
powers and duties or financial arrangements are altered (Ham and Hill, 1984). 
Moreover, the assumption about ‘the political system’ is criticised widely by policy 
analysis students as misleading. The system is labelled by its critics as ‘the black box’ 
to indicate its air of mystery (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a).
Though the process model and the political system model are presented here as 
separate models, they are both equally influential to the development of policy 
theories which have followed them, and are frequently applied in their synthesis. Most 
theories in policy analysis have developed as modifications of these two conceptual 
frameworks, to meet with various disciplines. The evidence can be seen from most of 
the literature related to policy analysis — as some writers deal with more details of the 
whole policy process (for example Dror, 1968; Anderson, 1975; Edwards and 
Sharkansky, 1978), others focus on each of the main stages of the policy process, 
especially the policy-making stage (for example Blowers, 1993; March, 1978; 
McGrew and Wilson,' 1982) and implementation (for example Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). 
Instead of considering actions taking place in each stage as prescriptive, most of these 
writers also take account of political interactions and the influence of environments 
which correspond to the political system model.
The process model and the political system model also share some common features, 
especially the fact that they are both based on the same perspective -- a top-down 
perspective. This means that most theories which came after them are developed 
along a similar path. The main characteristic of the top-down approach is that it
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views the state as playing the key role in pursuing policies. Advocates of this top- 
down perspective assume that a policy begins with a decision made by political elites 
and high level governmental officials, which is then implemented through hierarchical 
structures of implementing organisations. Thus the top-down approach of policy 
analysis focuses on examining the extent to which the policy’s legally mandated 
objectives are achieved over time, and the reasons behind the achievement (Sabatier, 
1993). Though this approach has dominated the study of policy for a long time, it has 
recently been challenged by some findings which perceive the weaknesses of the 
approach in explaining policy outcomes. Many of the recent studies point out the 
importance of the relationship between policy implementation and its effects on 
policy outcomes (see Grindle, 1980b; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Hjern and Porter, 
1993). However, before discussing this any further, it is important to discuss the 
relationship between policy-making, policy implementation and policy outcomes.
2.3 Policy-Making, Policy Implementation and Policy Outcomes
The conventional view suggests that a model of the policy process is roughly linear.
Briefly, it begins with entering issues on the agenda for government action — a
decision is then made and issues are transformed into policy, and finally, the policy is
implemented (Grindle, 1980a). According to this view, policy-making forms an
important step in which an affirmative decision is made and becomes, what Anderson
stresses, ‘the pay-off of the entire policy process (Anderson, 1975, p. 76). The step
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involves a series of decisions, including the selection of policy alternatives and 
decision on a preferred alternative. Because it functions to make a choice of policy 
alternatives to be implemented, the step is seen to determine the policy outcomes. 
This makes the policy-making step one of the main focuses of policy analysis 
frequently found in policy literature.
Most of the studies op policy-making often concentrate on the complexity of the 
policy-making sphere. Central to these studies are power structures, the roles of policy 
makers, especially state policy makers, interactions in the policy-making sphere, and 
factors influencing these interactions (for the review see for example Heclo, 1972;
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Peters, 1987; King, 1990; Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). As a consequence, several 
concepts have been developed to explain the context of decision-making, modes of 
decision-making, and their effects on the choices made (see Ham and Hill, 1993, 
Chapter 2). Among the concepts which are widely adopted, Grindle and Thomas 
(1989) suggest they can be divided into two broad categories based on the types of 
explanation they offer: society-centred concepts and state-centred concepts. They note 
that the society-centred concepts view the decision to adopt, pursue and change public 
policies as occurring as a result of the exercise of power and competition among 
individuals, groups, or classes in society or in international sphere of class-based or 
interest based society. Theorists in this group see policy activities undertaken by state 
policy makers and state bureaucrats, as dependent variables; their outcomes depend on 
social contexts of classes and interest groups, more than on original ideas and 
objectives of the activities and the organisational context of the state. On the other 
hand, the state-centred concepts see the organisational context of the state, rather than 
societal context, as being important in determining the outcomes of policy-making. 
According to this view, policy makers have greater autonomy and are less constrained 
by the society in which the policy-making takes place. Nevertheless, it does not deny 
the influence of the societal context on the outcomes of the policy-making. The 
implication of these different explanations in the analysis of policy is that the 
direction of policy can be understood by understanding the interactions and influences 
of different groups of actors in the policy-making process, and the environment in 
which policy-making takes place.
To many students of policy analysis, the policy-making step is crucially important in 
the policy process, because it plays a crucial role in determining the policy outcomes. 
The process approach which views policy as proceeding from one step to another, 
assumes that policy-making proceeds in a rational and coherent manner. That is, once 
a decision is made, it will be implemented in order to achieve the desired goals 
(Anderson, 1975). Tfre political system approach, which emphasises the importance of 
political interactions in policy-making, sees policy-making outputs, which determine 
policy outcomes, as a result of the political interactions in a given environment. This 
implies that different modes of interaction affect the extent to which different actors
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influence policy-making, and hence its outputs. Despite their different foci, they both 
assume that making a good choice in the policy-making stage means good policy 
outcomes. As Barrett and Fudge state: ‘Decisions are seen as the outputs of the policy 
process, the assumption being that once made they will be translated into action’ 
(1981a, p. 5). The process approach treats implementors as agents for policy makers. 
Problems which occur after the policy-making stage are seen as managerial and 
concerned with the effectiveness of the government administrative system in 
controlling, co-ordinating policy implementation in compliance with the decisive 
policy. Therefore, the concern of policy studies from this perspective is to find out 
ways to improve policy-making skills and public intervention in order to make 
decisive policies relevant to specific problems and issues. In order to put policy into 
effect, it is necessary to improve management and co-ordination among public 
agencies (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a).
The above views have dominated the determination of the effectiveness of public 
policy, and the development of policy analysis frameworks ever since the 
establishment of policy studies in 1960s (see Jenkins, 1978, p. 261). However, the 
failure of many policies, especially in developing countries, as observed by some 
policy analysts, does not correspond to the above assumptions. The studies of Merilee 
Grindle with her colleagues and some other social scientists, such as Stephen Quick, 
Irene Rothenberg and Gerald Sussman, indicate that policy outcomes depend not only 
on how good policies are, but also on how effective their implementation is, as they 
see many changes can occur during the implementation stage (see Grindle, 1980a; 
Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; Quick, 1980; Rothenberg, 
1980; Sussman, 1980). For Grindle and her colleagues, the implementation process 
may be as important as the policy-making process in determining policy outcomes, 
because it occurs over a longer time-period and may therefore be more prone to 
conflict. They conclude from their observations of policy reforms in several 
developing countries that outcomes resulting from the implementation appear not only 
in a bi-modal form of being successfully or unsuccessfully implemented. There can 
also be a third outcome which results from a significant change occurring during 
implementation, and this outcome may be very different to that intended by the policy
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makers (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Though the work of this group of policy analysts 
does not mark the beginning of the interest in the importance of implementation, their 
work seems to be influential in shifting the interest of some policy analysts away from 
the conventional policy process and political system approaches, to new more 
‘bottom-up’ analytical approaches. Among recent studies in policy analysis, a number 
of them focus on implementation as their major interest. Due to this increasing 
interest in the study of the role of policy implementation, it is important to further 
explore the significance of the implementation stage in the policy process.
2.4 The Importance of Policy Implementation: From Top-Down to 
Bottom-Up Perspectives
Conventional policy analysts who follow the top-down approach tend to equate policy 
decisions with action. For them, decisions are the outputs of the policy process, and 
once they are made they will be implemented (Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Policy 
implementation is seen as the business of translating decisions into action or ‘getting 
things done’ (Minogue, 1993, p. 19). The step-by-step approach sees the 
implementation step as separate though related to the policy-making step, since the 
functions of the latter relate to specific objectives which emerge from the complex 
process of policy-making. The policy implementation step forms a process that 
includes a series of activities of putting policy into- effect. These activities are 
concerned mainly with ‘co-ordinating and managing various elements required to 
achieve the desired ends’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, p. 10). These views of the 
relationships between policy implementation and policy-making have influenced the 
studies and literature on policy implementation to focus on the analysis of 
organisations.
In the organisational perspectives of implementation, after a policy is made by policy 
makers, it then is handed in to the administrative systems for execution. The tasks of 
executing the policy go through the state’s organisational structures and processes. By 
adopting Weberian concepts of hierarchical organisation and management which are 
embedded firmly in the conventional wisdom of public organisations, the
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implementation process is perceived as automatically associated with a hierarchical 
‘chain of command’ which tends to follow-on the decisions made at the top. This 
perception implies that the problems of policy implementation are the matters of 
controls and incentives in the operation to ensure compliance and the operation of 
discretion. When the application is made in the context of a single organisation whose 
basic purpose is to carry out specific functions, problems emerging in the 
implementation stage are seen as a matter of ‘communication, channels of 
communication, and control systems’, which can be ameliorated through the 
improvement of the performance of public agencies (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, p. 9). 
On this basis, effective implementation is translated as how a policy is put into effect, 
by taking policy-making as the starting point from which action must follow. Failure 
of policy is seen as being concerned with policy-making and administration. 
Therefore, effective policy-making as well as communication and control systems of 
executing organisations are the keys to success (Barrett and Fudge, 1981b; Nixon, 
1980). Scholars such as Gunn (1978), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), suggest that 
by providing clear guidelines to policy makers and administrators who are concerned 
with policy-making, more effective policy-making is possible. They believe that if the 
conditions in the guidelines are met, the chances of successful policy implementation 
will improve. The guidelines provided by Sabatier and Mazmanian are as follows:
‘1. The program is based on a sound theory relating to changes in target 
group behaviour to the achievements of the desired end state (objectives).
2. The statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous policy 
directives and structures of the implementation process so as to maximize the 
likelihood that the target group will perform as desired.
3. The leaders of the implementation agencies possess substantial 
managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory goals.
4. The program is actively supported by organised constituency groups and 
by a few key legislators (or the chief executive) throughout the 
implementation process, with the court being neutral or supportive.
5. The relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined 
overtime by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by change in 
relevant socio-economic conditions that undermine the statute’s “technical” 
theory or political support.’ (1979, pp. 484-5).
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Though Sabatier and Mazmanian suggest that policy implementation is likely to be 
more effective if the above conditions are met, it is arguable whether such conditions 
can ever be met in the real world. Questions arise in relation to the characteristics of 
policy and the administrative conditions. Both unambiguous policy and the total and 
rational control stated above are unlikely to be found in practice, especially in the area 
of development policy. Frequently, it is argued that policy goals are often broad, 
unclear and inconsistent, and so obstacles to communication appear when transferring 
policy from one level of the organisation to another (Minogue, 1993; Sabatier, 1993). 
With respect to the notion of total and rational control, it should be borne in mind that 
neither the policy-making process, nor policy implementation, occurs in a politics-free 
vacuum. They both take place in a context in which conflict, bargaining, negotiation 
and compromise, are commonplace. Even though some authors, such as Dunsire 
(1978) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), argue that the conflict, bargaining and 
negotiation that emerge in policy implementation are part of the process in which 
different sets of actors struggle to influence each other when putting policy into effect 
within a formal framework of interdependence and apparently shared purpose, their 
arguments seem unclear with regard to the final outputs, and whether or not they still 
achieve compliance with a specific policy. Moreover, questions also arise about the 
boundary where policy-making ends and implementation begins. There seems to be 
no clear boundary between these two stages, and their relationships continue. This 
means that problems facing policy implementation may affect the pre-set directives 
and structures of the policy (see Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Together with the 
findings from many recent studies which clearly indicate that many changes are likely 
to occur during implementation due to a variety of reasons (see Barrett and Fudge, 
1981b; Grindle, 1980b; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990), these 
arguments mean that the concept of ‘implementation as putting policy into effect’ 
must be re-examined.
A decline in the popularity of the concept of ‘implementation as putting policy into 
effect’ has led some policy analysts to seek alternative concepts of policy 
implementation. These include a consideration of the importance of interactions of
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different actors in the implementation process which may influence and change the 
policies, and further exploration of the relationship between policy and action. By 
emphasising the importance of actors’ interactions in the implementation process, 
implementation can be regarded as occurring in the form of a negotiation process 
between policy-makers and implementors, in which bargaining and compromise are 
central. Also, the interaction may be influenced by the environment in which it takes 
place. Changes and modifications of decisive policies may occur in the 
implementation process as an outcome of the interactions between implementors and 
policy-makers, and among different sets of actors, as well as in response to the 
changing environment. With regard to the need for further exploration of the policy- 
action relationship, Barrett and Fudge suggest that:
‘...understanding the relationship between policy and action also requires an 
action perspective, which takes what is going on as central, seeks to 
understand how and why, and from that base explores the different kinds of 
frameworks within which action takes place.’ (1981a, p. 26).
This perspective of policy analysis focuses on the actions and responses of actors 
involved, the agencies which operate policies, and factors which influence their 
behaviours. This aspect of analysis is particularly important in the study of policy 
implementation, because it provides an insight into different actions and responses 
that actors may have in relation to a particular policy. In other words, it helps in 
explaining the interaction between policy content and the organisational contexts that 
affect policy outcomes. Merilee Grindle is among the authors who believe that policy 
content and policy context are important dimensions which must be included in policy 
analysis. With regard to policy implementation, both policy content and policy 
context are seen to be significant factors determining the ‘implementability’ of policy 
(Grindle, 1980a).
Grindle’s studies focus primarily on the importance of implementation in the analysis 
of policy, but she does not deny the concept of policy process completely. Her 
approach to analysis is instead a compromise between the process model and other 
models which consider the importance of interactions between different sets of actors
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and other factors, including policy content and policy context (Grindle, 1980a). In her 
view, public policies are generally translated into action programmes, and policy 
implementation can be viewed as a function of programme implementation. With 
respect to the policy content, she views that the linkage built between policy-making, 
policy implementation, and decisions made during policy formulation about the kind 
of policy to be pursued, affects the shape of programmes to be executed. At the same 
time, the execution of that policy or programme may have a real or potential impact 
on given social, economic and political settings, in which the response may determine 
the failure or success of that execution. In other words, though policy-making is 
important in guiding how a policy to be executed, its outcomes are determined 
significantly by the action and response of different actors occurring during the 
implementation stage.
The above reviews of implementation research signify some degree of difference in 
the views of policy analysts regarding the importance of implementation in the policy 
process. However, they still maintain the notion of linkages between policy-making 
and implementation, or what Sabatier calls the ‘top-down’ perspective (Sabatier, 
1993). More recently, studies have emerged which focus on the importance of 
interactions among various actors on a particular problem or issue at the operational 
level, without referring to policy formulation and policy decision. This view of policy 
analysis is referred to as the ‘bottom-up’ perspective (Sabatier, 1993). This approach 
to analysis is supported by some authors, who perceive the weakness of the ‘top- 
down’ perspective, especially Benny Hjern and his colleagues — David Porter, Chris 
Hull and Kenneth Hanf. To this group of social scientists, conventional analytical 
frameworks for policy analysis, based on the rationality of public administration 
theory and the economic efficiency of political economy theory are anachronisms, 
especially when applied to industrial society (see Sabatier, 1993; Hjern and Porter, 
1993; Hanf, 1993; Hjern and Hull, 1982). For them, the programme’s success depends 
more upon the skills pf specific individuals at local or operational level, than upon the 
efforts of central government officials (Hjern et al., 1978, quoted in Sabatier, 1993). 
Hjern and Porter argue that in industrial society, there emerges an increase in the 
interconnectedness of public and private organisations. Therefore, implementation of
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programmes is neither dependent on ‘the invisible hand of markets’ nor on ‘the heavy 
hand of large government bureaucracies.’ They see the implementation of 
programmes as being undertaken by multi-organisational clusters of organisations 
representing part of markets and part of government bureaucracies, which are 
interconnected and come together within the framework of those programmes (Hjern 
and Porter, 1993, pp. 249-50).
2.5 Implementors and Factors Influencing their Performance
In the previous section, various concepts of implementation were discussed, and it 
was agreed that implementation plays an important role in determining policy 
outcomes, whether they achieve the policy goals or not. Among the important features 
of policy implementation, complexity is often stressed. For example, Edwards and 
Sharkansky (1978) point out that public policy implementation forms a complicated 
process which may require a wide range of actions involving a large number of actors. 
Because various actors are involved, their interactions and their responses to the 
environment in which policy implementation takes place become the focal point for 
many policy analysts who stress the importance of implementation in driving and 
directing policies, whether to achieve decisive goals or to shift towards other 
directions. This section will discuss the roles of implementors, other actors and those 
factors which influence their interactions in the implementation process.
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2.5.1 State Implementors and their Working Environment
In democratic states, the implementation of public policy is generally seen as being 
undertaken by state administrative agencies designated to take responsibility for that 
particular policy, although non-state administrative bodies, such as community 
organisations, may be utilised for the administration of public programmes 
(Anderson, 1975). In tjiis context then, state administrative agencies or bureaucracies 
are seen as the key implementors of public policies. A bureaucracy, as viewed by Max 
Weber, is an organisational form which is based upon ‘legal rational authority’ which 
is applied through ‘a set of rules and administrative structure which closely control the
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action of the employees of the organisation’ (Wallis, 1989, p. 2). By applying this 
authority, it is believed that employees or bureaucrats are obedient to the requirement 
of the organisation because they have a common belief in the importance of the 
system. Weber believes that the system of bureaucratic authority is important, because 
it allows state power to shake itself free from bourgeois control (Ham and Hill, 1993). 
Moreover, the bureaucratic rule introduced is seen by Weber to be an ideal rule, 
which can be applied not only to state organisations, but also to non-state counterparts 
(Page, 1992). However, variations in the interpretation and application of Weber’s 
idea have brought about variations in its application to the contemporary bureaucratic 
system, which affects its reputation. With respect to the implementation of public 
policy, one of the classic Weberian interpretations of bureaucracy’s role in delivering 
policies appears in terms of the relationship between superiors and subordinates in 
complex bureaucratic organisations. Based on this assumption, once policies are made 
at the highest levels of bureaucracies or by policy-making bodies, they will then be 
carried out by lower level bureaucrats with a very limited discretion. In other words, 
bureaucracy is perceived to be a rational and efficient form of organisation for policy 
implementation (see Smith, 1988; Wallis, 1989).
Despite the widespread adoption of the Weberian interpretation of bureaucratic 
systems, its application seems to be debatable, particularly with respect to the 
rationality and efficiency of bureaucratic administration in delivering public policies. 
There has been much controversy concerning the imperfection of the structure of 
power and functioning of bureaucracies as big organisations. Smith (1988) mentions 
that because the organisations are big and are constituted of different interest groups, 
there may be conflicts in political relationships which create a shift away from the 
ideal model. Conflicts within a bureaucracy may arise from the prescriptive elements 
of the ideal model, in which Weber assumes no clear delineation between the 
authority of office and the authority of expertise. Based on this assumption, officials 
in the hierarchy who have the authority to issue commands also have ‘sufficient 
expertise and professional skill to command the acquiescence and support of 
subordinates’; a condition which may not be easily met (Smith, 1988, p. 6). This type
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of conflict may lead to confusion in administrative power, between the technical 
expert line and a system of control by impersonal commands in the official hierarchy.
Smith (1988) also points out another problematic aspect facing the real world 
bureaucratic application, that is, the exercise of discretion. Ideally, bureaucrats must 
be bound by the rules of the organisation in making any decision regarding policy, 
though this is often not true in the real application. It is argued that decision-making is 
frequently made by lower level officials based on their own value judgement, which is 
partly influenced by the social and political environment. This argument is supported 
by various studies which indicate that lower level officials do exercise their power 
which then affects the performance of the organisations in pursuing policies (Smith, 
1988). The work of Michael Lipsky on ‘street-level bureaucracy’ contributes 
significantly to understanding the behaviour of official actors, who interact directly 
with clients and workers in delivering public services and have substantial discretion 
in the execution of their work (Lipsky, 1980; see also Hudson, 1993). Based on his 
research of public services in America, Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats 
have a considerable amount of power in controlling ‘service consumers.’ At the same 
time, they confront a restricted working environment filled with limited resources, 
uncertainties and work pressures. These adverse circumstances compel them to 
modify their behaviour in order to get their jobs done and secure their working 
environment. Being in these circumstances, maintaining the original idea of policy 
command through the hierarchy of bureaucratic organisations becomes problematic, 
which affects the efficiency of policy implementation by state implementors to 
achieve pre-set policy goals.
Furthermore, it is argued that policy implementation should not be viewed as always 
undertaken by one organisation, but by many organisations. This means that more 
complicated patterns of relationships are likely to occur, not only among actors at 
different levels but also among actors from different organisations (Van Meter and 
Van Horn, 1975).
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It can be concluded here that the implementation of public policies is not simply 
undertaken by state officials following hierarchical systems of command, but rather 
involves political interactions among state actors, both within an organisation or 
between organisations, who are involved in the implementation process. Their 
patterns of interaction vary depending on circumstances in which they are situated. 
Because state actors, especially those who are dealing with providing direct services 
to clients, are often faced with several limitations, such as technical and financial 
limitation, their performance in dealing with policy implementation is likely to 
involve individual judgements. These individual judgements can shift the original 
ideas of policy they implement.
2.5.2 Factors Influencing Implementor’s Performance
In the previous section, it was stated that implementing public policy does not occur 
in a vacuum, but rather occurs in the context of wider political, social and economic 
environments. The political, social and economic conditions surrounding the 
implementation process may influence the performance of implementors and hence 
policy outcomes.
The economic conditions, such as economic depression of the state or the region can 
create a negative impact on policy implementation. For example, Simmie (1990) 
quotes Mohan (1989) and Duclaud-Williams (1990) in stating that economic 
depression in OECD countries during 1970s influenced both the thinking and action 
of state actors with respect to health and educational policy. The effect on health 
policies appears in forms of both the excuse of money shortage to pay for the 
execution of the policies and the low incentives to health service. Moreover, Duclaud- 
Williams (1990) observes that economic depression resulted in an increasing 
resistance by actors to implement government policies.
With respect to social and political conditions, there are several factors worth 
considering. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) suggest that the analytical framework 
for policy implementation should take the following socio-political factors into
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consideration: the nature of public opinion on the importance of policy issue; the 
reaction of social elites to the implementation of the policy in question; the biased 
character of implementing agencies; and the extent to which interest groups support or 
oppose the policy. From a top-down perspective, these social and political conditions 
may influence the outcomes of policy implementation to shift away from the original 
objectives. In their analysis of development policies in developing countries, Grindle 
and Thomas conclude that a variety of societal reactions are found at the 
implementation stage, depending on the policy characteristics or content. These 
reactions can occur in either the public or bureaucratic arena, and largely determine 
policy outcomes (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). The 
following are some examples of the different relationships between policy 
characteristics and societal reactions, as summarised by Grindle and Thomas: policies 
which bring a direct burden or costs to the public are more likely to receive a negative 
reaction, such as protest, from the public; policies which are technically complex may 
require competence and strong bureaucratic support; and policies which generate an 
immediate impact on the public are likely to receive a stronger public and 
bureaucratic response, than those which impacts can only be seen in the long term. In 
response to this likelihood, they suggest that policy changes which may create 
negative responses should receive solid, stable and legitimate political support, 
together with effective administration in order to be successful and sustained. This 
suggestion corresponds to that of Sabatier and Mazmanian, who also see that 
maintaining political support from interest groups, and from legislative and executive 
sovereign, is necessary'to be recognised in implementing public policy (Sabatier, 
1993; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981).
Culture can also influence policy implementation and policy outcomes, but it is often 
overlooked by policy makers, planners, and implementors. Cultural contributions to 
policy implementation may appear either in the form of support or resistance. 
However, because development policies are frequently designed without careful 
consideration, or are based on very broad assumptions about the characteristics of 
clients, negative contributions of culture often appear to be more prevalent. There are 
two main characteristics of culture which must be understood in the context of policy
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implementation; first, it is broad in its coverage, and second, it has several layers at 
different social levels (Staudt, 1991). These two major characteristics of culture 
contribute to the complexity of problems related to culture in the policy process. 
People are influenced differently by culture, as some people are more influenced by 
and bound with culture, or some elements of culture, than others. Moreover, the 
cultural differences found at different levels of society may create different impacts 
on different groups of people (Staudt, 1991, quoting Hofstede, 1980). Consequently, 
consideration of culture should not only emphasise the difference in cultural patterns, 
but also the variation of culture emerging at different levels of society.
The main concern of government bodies responsible for policy implementation is that 
they should attempt to overcome cultural barriers in order to carry out their policies to 
benefit their clients. Various cultural barriers may be found along policy 
implementation process, such as conflicts between policy objectives and existing 
traditional power arrangements within target communities, conflicts in perceptions of 
problems and solutions between implementors and clients, and so on (see Verhelst, 
1987). In reality, some barriers may arise within implementing organisations 
themselves, since bureaucracy operating in different countries is enmeshed in the 
culture of each country (Staudt, 1991). Heginbotham (1975) observes that the 
application of approaches to planning, implementation, and management of change 
under notions of westernisation in Tamil Nadu, India, bring about cultural conflicts 
between these notions and the traditional notions, and reduce the institutional capacity 
of its bureaucracy. McGregor (1991) concludes from his study of rural credit policy in 
Bangladesh that policy implementation has been structured in a way which allows 
powerful patrons and brokers better access than the poor, despite its claim to 
challenge the power of informal money lenders and to undermine exploitation in rural 
area. This discrepancy between policy implementation and its original objectives was 
observed to be a reflection of the domination of patronage and factionalised 
institutions, which forms part of the culture of production relations in Bangladesh. In 
Thailand, the domination of patron-client relations and hierarchy system in Thai 
culture is seen as obstacles to the implementation of the decentralisation policy 
recently introduced (Brahmanee, 1989; see also Kambhu, 1984; and Nakata, 1987).
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The discussion in this section indicates that though state implementors are expected to 
play a key role in implementing public policy, their performances are influenced by 
several factors, especially the economic, social, cultural and political conditions 
surrounding the implementation process. These factors interact with each other and 
influence not only the performance of official implementors, but also the reactions of 
other actors and the public to the policy in question. Moreover, differences in the 
characteristics of public policies may generate different responses from official 
implementors, as well as from other actors and the public. Therefore, it is important in 
the analysis of policy implementation to consider the interaction between different 
factors and their influence on official implementors, other actors and the public. This 
consideration should not be limited only to the local level where the final policy 
outcomes can be detected. Rather it should take an account of effects which may 
occur at different levels where important decisions take place.
2.6 The Interaction of Actors in the Implementation Process and the 
Concept of Implementation Structures
As was mentioned earlier, policy implementation forms a process involving various 
actors. These actors may play different roles in the ongoing process of policy 
implementation as Grindle states ‘...some actors may be called to make choices about 
specific allocation of public resources, others may attempt to influence decisions’ 
(1980a, p. 10). Apart from official implementors at different levels of bureaucracy, 
there are other actors with various backgrounds and interests. They include politicians 
at different levels, economic elites and recipient groups. The difference in their 
backgrounds and interests drives them to seek different achievements by making 
demands on allocation procedures. Grindle mentions that the goals of different actors 
are frequently in conflict with each other. Their conflicting goals may transform into 
contentious interactions to achieve their goals, which in turn may affect the 
performance of implementing officials and political elites in making decisions 
emerging in the implementation process.
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The attempts of different actors to take part in implementing public policies is crucial, 
especially in developing countries where access to the policy-making process is 
limited for non-official actors. Grindle (1980b) states that an implementor faces the 
situation of conflicting demands and expectations from different sets of actors, both 
within and outside his/her organisation. Within his/her own organisation, the 
implementor is required to fulfil the broad as well as long-term expectations of 
his/her superiors and subordinates. Generally, his/her superiors expect him/her to 
manage the available resources to achieve programme or policy goals, and at the same 
time, to maintain ‘a jurisdiction that is relatively free of open conflict in areas affected 
by the organisation’ (p. 202). His subordinates expect him to provide proper resources 
and support for specific projects. Outside the organisation, a variety of actors expect 
the implementor to respond to their demands, which vary according to their interests. 
For instance, the demands of local politicians may be concerned with the positive 
reaction of implementors to respond to their requests. Local economic elites may wish 
for resource allocation to benefit them or their businesses. These actors will challenge 
official implementors in pursuing programme or policy goals, by attempting to 
influence them to implement the policy in the way which satisfies their needs. Beside 
these actors, there are clients who constitute the target groups of particular 
programmes or policies. Though these groups may be viewed as being less active in 
demanding government resources as compared to other groups of actors, they have the 
right to receive benefits from effective policy implementation. Failure of public 
policy implementation which adversely affects their well-being, may provoke a 
negative reaction towards policy implementation. A study by Cynthia McClintock in 
Peru shows that peasants also attempted to maximise their benefits from agrarian 
reforms and minimise the ways in which such reforms may negatively effect their 
own goals (McClintock, 1980). In addition, negative impacts on clients may drive 
other actors, especially local politicians, to react against the implementors, so that 
these politicians can attract political support of their clients (Grindle and Thomas, 
1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). Because of the different and conflicting demands 
of these actors, the official implementor is seen to be under pressure in managing 
government resources to accomplish programme or policy goals, as well as to respond 
to the different demands of different actors.
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To fulfil their different and conflicting expectations and goals, different actors do not 
only attempt to influence the policy implementor, but they also interact with each 
other. The importance of actors' interaction in the policy-action process is seen to be 
crucial by some authors such as Hanf, Hjern, Porter, Barrett and Fudge, who perceive 
the top-down approach to policy analysis as problematic (Hanf, 1993; Hjern and 
Porter, 1993; Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Fudge and Barrett (1981) state:
‘We considered interactions between actors as crucial arenas for 
understanding the policy-action process and emphasised the importance of 
examining the particular organizational and administrative linkages used for 
implementation, and the negotiations and negotiative activity take place.’ (p. 
251).
For Fudge and Barrett, conflict between actors may arise from their different interests 
and value systems, which may reflect the impact of differences in the power structure 
in society, and differences in values concerning the policy direction and content. This 
is likely to occur at various stages throughout the policy process. Therefore, actors’ 
interactions, and interests and values involved in policy analysis, are not only related 
to macro-structure but also micro-structure of power, and the linkage between the 
two. In their view, the group of actors involved in policy implementation does not 
necessarily represent formal organisational structures or hierarchies, but their 
involvement rather appears in the form of ‘creating^-iqe- Gorging’ new ‘chains’ 
between policy and action (p. 254). This view is shared by Hjern and his colleagues 
who undertake their studies on policy implementation in Sweden, Germany and the 
UK. From their findings, they argue that one way to understand the policy-action 
relationship is to understand the actual linkages between individuals and groups 
involved in different parts of the policy implementation process. Based on this 
assumption, they propose a new unit of analysis called ‘implementation structure’ 
(Hjern and Porter, 1993). They define the term implementation structure as follows:
‘An implementation structure is comprised of subsets of members within 
organizations which view a programme as their primary (or an 
instrumentally important) interest. For these actors, an implementation 
structure is as much an administrative structure through which proposive
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actions are taken as the organizations in which they are employed.’ (1993, p.
253)
According to the above definition, it can be seen that Hjern and Porter view policy
implementation as occurring in the form of the interaction of activities and actors in
carrying out a programme of actions within their own network, rather than going
through formal administrative lines assumed by top-downers. Hjern and Porter believe
that the concept of implementation structure explains the context of policy
implementation in which parts of many public and private organisations take part in
the implementation of a programme. They state that the characteristics of
implementation structures are not the same as those of formal organisations. The
important characteristics which distinguish implementation structures from formal
organisations include: the existence of a less formal structure and fewer authoritative
relations; the more dynamic and shifting characteristics of social structures; and, the
basis of participation in a programme where consent and negotiation are dominant.
These characteristics are perceived as organisational rationales and programme
rationales. Therefore, they suggest that implementation structures should be
considered as a new unit of administrative analysis. Sabatier (1993) comments that
their methodology is explicit and replicable for a policy network, and
intersubjectively reliable. Because they do not begin with a governmental programme
or start with a focus on the attainment of formal policy objectives, but rather with the
problems perceived by actors and the strategies for dealing withi them, their
methodology has many strengths. These include the ability to view different
\
consequences of governmental and private programmes, the ability to deal with 
strategic interaction of actors over time, and the ability to deal with a policy or 
problem involving a number of programmes. These areas are difficult for top-down 
approaches to deal with.
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2.7 Local People, Local Organisations and their Participation in 
Policy Implementation
It is generally agreed that policy implementation forms a sub-process of the policy 
process, within which several management decisions take place for operational 
purposes. In the implementation of development policies even though official 
implementors are key actors in making these decisions, local people and local 
organisations cannot be seen only as recipients or beneficiaries of policies or 
programmes. Rather they can be among actors who take part, or influence the 
implementors in making these operational decisions. It is not uncommon for local 
people and organisations to influence the implementation of development policies, but 
earlier conventional literature on public policy seems to overlook this. This is partly 
due to the fact that many policy analysis students hold the view that ordinary people 
are incapable of understanding the complexity of policy contents, or of handling 
policy management. Recent findings suggest that the failure or success of many 
development policies or programmes, depends significantly on the reactions of 
beneficiaries and interest groups at various levels, including the local level. Moreover, 
the failure to respond to critical demands from beneficiaries may drive other powerful 
political groups to react against official implementors in their efforts to accomplish 
the policies in question. The following discussion deals with the role of local people 
and local organisations in the implementation of development policies. The focus will 
also be on their status in their relation with official implementors in implementing 
development policies.
In the development literature, different views regarding people’s participation may 
be found. The term ‘participation’ has many connotations such as ‘voluntary 
contribution’, ‘increasing people’s control’, ‘involvement in decision-making’ and 
alike (Pongquan, 1988). Though these connotations differ slightly in their 
implications, they are 1^1 derived from the basis of ‘development from below’ which 
recognises the importance of the involvement of local people and local-based 
organisations in expressing their needs, assessing their potential contribution, and 
making decisions in planning as well as implementing the development policies or
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programmes which affect them. Here, the focus is on the involvement of local people 
and local-based organisations in planning and implementation of development policies 
and programmes. The notion of people’s participation in development planning and 
implementation has been developed through the effort of academics who see the 
failure of centrally planned development in meeting the needs and solving the 
problems of local people, especially in developing countries (Cohen and Uphoff, 
1980). It is argued that development planning and implementation involve a series of 
management decisions and choices of action which generate benefits and impacts on 
local populations. Such choices can be general or specific. Some of the specific 
choices that take place in the broader political and bureaucratic arena may generate 
questions about the direction and distribution of benefits to different groups of people 
in different settings (Bryant and White, 1984; Chopra et al., 1990). From the 
experiences of unsatisfactory outcomes from top-down planning, and some successful 
stories of popular participation in many developing countries, there emerges a call for 
more attention to people-centred approaches which emphasise the importance of local 
participation and decentralisation (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). Unlike conventional 
views of development planning which focus on centralised concepts of development 
and economic growth at the macro-level whilst ignoring the importance of the 
management and implementation, new approaches which are people-centred consider 
management and implementation issues as important in development policies. The 
role of people in management and implementation is also explicitly recognised 
(Thomas, 1985).
There are several instances of centrally planned development policies or programmes 
which fail to achieve their well-defined goals and produce outcomes different from 
those anticipated, because of changes brought about by the influence of local people 
and local organisations during the implementation stage. However, the failure of such 
policies to achieve their pre-determined goals and the difference in outcomes due to 
the changes occurring during the implementation stage, do not necessarily indicate a 
failure to meet the needs or to solve the problems of local beneficiaries. In some cases 
the changes produce satisfactory outcomes in the opinion of beneficiaries. In other 
cases, implementation of development policies or programmes faces some difficulties
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and fails both in the sense of achieving their goals and in meeting the needs of 
beneficiaries. In Mexico, peasant organisations which have developed through a long 
history of battles against unfair treatment of government towards poor farmers, have 
been influential in Mexican politics and rural development. The success of peasant’s 
movements in compelling the government to introduce the land reform policy 
beginning in the state of Morelos in 1910s, has stimulated the movement of peasant 
organisations throughout the nation, and provoked the government to recognise them 
in the creation and implementation of development policies (Barraclough, 1971). The 
cases of national food and nutrition programmes in two West African countries 
indicate that the success of these programmes was determined largely by a change 
from centrally planned programmes which were originally introduced by the state, to 
a more participatory approach which included local elites in various types of decision­
making during their implementation. In these cases, local elites were traditionally 
powerful, and had great influence on the perception of beneficiaries towards the 
programmes, so that the programmes’ officers could not exclude them from 
participating in the implementation process if the programmes are going to be 
effective (Ryan, 1985). In Peru, the failure in the implementation of policy for 
agrarian co-operatives introduced by the Velasco government, was partly due to the 
conflict in peasants’ demands and lack of popular support which weaken the ability of 
official implementors to control the policy (McClintock, 1980). In Sri Lanka, the 
success of the Gal Oya irrigation project, which faced unforeseen crises and external 
problem, was due to the consolidation of local farmers who perceived changes during 
the implementation as positive, and therefore responded to them positively (Esman 
and Uphoff, 1984). The findings of a study by Montgomery (1972) on the 
achievement of land reform goals in a wide range of countries, show that the extent to 
which local people benefited from the policy depended more on the involvement of 
local organisations in the implementation process than on the policy’s ideology.
From the above examples, it can be argued that participation of local people and 
organisations in the implementation process of development policies, can impact 
greatly on the policies’ achievement and outcomes. This appears to be true for both 
traditional organisations, or energetic formal organisations. However, the direction of
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the impact and policy outcomes may vary depending on various factors or the context 
of participation. By considering policy implementation at the programme or project 
level, Cohen and Uphoff (1980) discover that factors affecting patterns of 
participation in rural development fall into two categories: programme or project 
characteristics, and environments. However, their clarification of the characteristics of 
project or programme — which cover the type of likely benefits perceived by local 
people, administrative characteristics, linkages, and flexibility -- emphasises only 
those which are likely to receive a positive response from local beneficiaries. The 
characteristics which are likely to generate negative responses are not included. With 
respect to the environment in which the programme or project is located, Cohen and 
Uphoff point out that physical, social, and economic settings, as well as the history of 
the region, determine patterns of participation. These situational factors may 
encourage or discourage local people from participating in the project or programme, 
or they may influence the direction of participation, either to support or to react 
against it. The difference in patterns of people’s participation either to support or to 
oppose a programme or project will impact on the implementation of the programme 
or project, and hence its outputs. Though positive reactions from local people in terms 
of participation are preferable in the eyes of implementors and planners, negative 
reactions do not necessarily create negative impacts on the beneficiaries of the project 
or programme. Rather negative reactions towards the programme or project may put 
pressure on the implementors to adjust the programme or project’s direction to 
respond to the actual needs of local people, or to the problems confronting the target 
groups.
The inclusion of local people in the implementation of development policy is seen to 
have various advantages depending on its purposes. Robert Chambers, one of the most 
well known advocates of the idea, says:
‘Local participation can be analysed in terms of objectives and 
functions...The values ascribed to participation in its various forms include: 
making local wishes known; generating developmental ideas; providing local 
knowledge; testing proposals for feasibility and improving them; increasing 
of capabilities of communities to handle their affairs and to control and 
exploit their environment; demonstrating support for the regime; doing what 
the government requires to be done; extracting, developing and investing
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local resources (labour, finance, managerial skills, etc.); and promoting 
desirable relationship between people, especially through cooperative work. ’ 
(1974, pp. 85-86).
Though the above categorisation of the values of local people’s participation is 
considered to be rather more descriptive than analytical, it covers the wide range of 
potential purposes which are well recognised by other supporters. However, not all 
these purposes are pursued at once in practice. Cohen and Uphoff (1980) mention that 
the practical purposes of participation are related to the intended benefits of the 
application of the approach. In other words, the practicality of participation’s 
purposes is based on the consideration of who is supposed to benefit from it primarily. 
When considering the application of a participatory approach in the implementation of 
development policy, the main benefit of participation should go to the target 
beneficiaries of each policy. In this view, local people’s participation is seen as 
imperative if the programme or project is going to benefit the local people, because it 
is the local people who know best about their needs and who care most about the 
impact of development policies on them. Montgomery and Esman (1971) assert that 
the inclusion of local people’s participation in the process of implementation allows 
the official implementors to make some adjustments and modification of the 
programme or project for the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of administration of 
development policies. Thus, local people’s participation should be included in the 
policy process, especially in the implementation stage which occurs at local level, in 
order to facilitate implementors in making operational decisions.
However, because implementation of development policy is generally undertaken by 
official implementors, the analysis of the effectiveness of people’s participation in 
policy implementation cannot overlook the influence of official implementors and the 
state intervention to promote participation. It is argued that local people alone, no 
matter how active their participation is in the development activities, are not capable 
of handling all development tasks effectively without outside assistance, especially 
from the state (Werlin, 1989). On this basis, the extent to which popular participation 
benefits development policy is determined largely by the consideration of its 
importance in the interaction between people and the official implementors. As
63
various forms of the interactions are likely to occur at local level, their significance 
and influence can also vary. Based on his observation of various studies on the 
relationship between pressure groups and bureaucracy in different countries, Peters 
(1982) classifies the varying patterns of interactions into four different types: 
‘illegitimate’; ‘parantela’; ‘clientela’; and ‘legitimate.’ He views this classificatory 
scheme as constituting ‘an informal continuum from situations in which pressure 
group influence on policy is regarded as quite illegitimate to situations where it is 
legally accepted or even required’ (Peters, 1982, p. 262). This typology may be 
applied to the relationship between local people, who can be considered as a pressure 
group, and official implementors. According to Peters, different styles of interactions 
may be found, and the extent of pressure groups’ influence on bureaucracy may also 
be varied, depending on the styles of their interactions. Pressure groups are likely to 
have more influence when their interaction is recognised as legitimate, or they are 
recognised as ‘quasi-official arms’, than the more varied response when their 
interaction is seen as illegitimate. In the other two forms of interaction, clientela and 
parantela, the influence is observed to be moderate. Therefore, the legitimacy of the 
participation of local people is important for its effectiveness and should be promoted.
The final point worth raising here is the importance of leadership in popular 
participation. The role of local leaders cannot be overlooked in the effectiveness and 
success of people’s participation at local level. Cohen and Uphoff (1980) state that the 
characteristics of local leaders, both formal and informal, are important for successful 
participation. David Korten accredits the devotion and characteristics of leaders as a 
key factor behind the success of the rural development programmes he reviewed from 
developing countries including Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Philippines and 
Thailand. He emphasises the importance of the leaders charismatic characteristics in 
influencing local people and government agencies to support the programmes. Credit 
is also given to their strengths in confronting problems emerging in the development 
process, and in finding out solutions through the learning process (Korten, 1980).
The involvement of local people and local organisations in the implementation of 
development policy is increasingly being recognised as important, and seen to be the
64
key to the success of development policies, especially in developing countries. Those 
who support this view blame the failure of many development programmes and 
projects on a neglect of local participation in the planning and implementation stages. 
The literature reviewed in this section indicates that there are cases in which 
development policies were affected significantly by the reaction of local people, and 
the intended outputs of the policies shifted so that they were more beneficial to local 
people. However, as the implementation of development policy is mainly in the hands 
of official implementors, the effectiveness of local participation in policy depends on 
the official perception of the importance of participation, which is more likely to relate 
to patterns of interactions between local people and official implementors. Finally, 
effective local participation is likely to depend also on the contribution of local 
leaders, including formal leaders and informal leaders.
2.8 Common Property Resources and Policy Questions
In preceding sections, the discussion has been mostly concerned with general 
development policies with no specification of subject matters dealt with by policies. 
Since the focus of this study is on policy related to natural resource management, it is 
important to include the discussion of policy related specifically to this case, and 
issues related to policy implementation.
There has been a growing interest in issues pertaining to the management of natural
%
resources, particularly common property resources (CPRs) or the ‘commons’, since 
the Hardin’s most frequently cited article, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, was 
published (Hardin, 1968). The increase in the interest in this type of policy is partly 
due to the overall rise in environmental problems, driven by the speed of economic 
change and overexploitation of natural resources. Hardin’s main ideas on the 
relationship between population growth and exploitation of CPRs have widely 
influenced students of environmental studies in various disciplines (Feeny et al., 
1990). His conclusions about the necessity of privatising the rights of the commons or 
regulating their uses and users, have led to these two approaches being widely adopted 
as important means of controlling CPRs for sustainable use. However, despite this
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wide acceptance of Hardin’s ideas, government’s attempts to reduce the 
overexploitation of CPRs by privatising rights and regulating use and users, often 
meet with several obstacles, and therefore they fail to achieve successful management 
(Feeny et al., 1990; Taylor, 1992). In order to understand why the state programmes to 
control CPRs are seldom associated with successful management, it is important to 
understand characteristics of CPRs and factors related to CPR management.
For resources to be classified as ‘common property resources’, they should share two 
important characteristics -- ‘excludability’ and ‘subtractability’ (Berkes and Farvar, 
1989; Feeny et al., 1990). The first characteristic, excludability, connotes the physical 
nature of the resources by which inclusion (or control of access) of users to these 
resources is problematic, or, in the extreme, virtually impossible. The second 
characteristic, subtractability, means ‘each user is capable of subtracting from the 
welfare of other users’ (Feeny et al., 1990, p. 3). By considering these two basic 
characteristics, Berkes and his colleagues briefly define the term common property 
resources as ‘a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves 
subtractability’ (Berkes, 1989, p. 7; see also Berkes et al, 1989, p. 91; and Feeny et 
al., 1990, p. 4). This definition is similar to the definition given by Elinor Ostrom 
(1990), even though Ostrom uses the term ‘common-pool resources’ instead of 
common property resources to specify the nature of this type of resources and their use 
(p. 30).
The basic characteristics of CPRs mentioned above contribute to the complexity and 
uncertainty in their management. Successful management of CPRs requires not only 
an understanding of the resource system or the stock alone, but also the flow of 
resource units produced by the system (Ostrom, 1992). It is important to distinguish 
these two aspects of each resource, but at the same time it must be realised that they 
are interdependent. In renewable resources, which represent most CPRs, 
understanding these ^ conditions is especially useful, as it is possible to determine a 
replenishment rate. For a renewable resource to be sustained over time, the average 
rate of withdrawal must not exceed the average rate of replenishment (Ostrom, 1990).
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The question is how to control the rate of withdrawal of a CPR to meet its carrying 
capacity over time, since it involves various users who take advantage of the resource 
to maximise their individual benefits. Moreover, an increase in number of users and 
the difference in their interests in the resource which are common phenomena in most 
cases means an increase in pressure on the resource and in the complication of its 
management.
Two main views have emerged in dealing with CPR management problems. The first 
view prefers privatisation or the state control of CPRs. The second view stresses the 
importance of local people, who are the users of CPRs, to have the right or to be 
highly involved in managing the resources they use in the form of collective action.
Hardin is a leading supporter of the first view. He sees the importance of controlling 
population growth and limiting access to the ‘commons.’ He suggests that there are 
only two possible solutions to control access effectively, either to privatise the 
resources or to keep them as public property controlled by the state (Hardin, 1968). 
Although Hardin’s ideas have been widely adopted, there emerge several arguments 
with respect to the application of his approaches. Central to these arguments are the 
emerging weaknesses in the application of these two approaches, evidenced in 
different parts of the world. Problems arise both in relation to effective enforcement 
and economic rationality of these approaches (see Feeny et aL, 1990; Berkes, 1989).
Supporters of the idea that prefers local users to take part in the management argue 
that obstacles to state control of CPRs relate not only to the biological and physical 
complexities of CPRs, but also the social, economic, and cultural diversity of users 
(see for example, Berkes, 1989; Doulman, 1993; Ostrom, 1990). Because of these 
complexities, state programmes to control CPRs, which are designed by planners from 
the central government, are seldom associated with successful management. 
Frequently, centrally designed programmes are said to be constructed with minimal 
knowledge of the needs and problems facing local beneficiary communities. 
Moreover, they are likely to be based on a misleading assumption about the 
homogeneity of local communities and resource users (Pomeroy, 1991). As a result,
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centrally designed programmes often do not correspond to the needs and conditions of 
specific local communities (Ferrer, 1989).
The problems facing the application of state policy to manage CPRs at the local level 
is also subject to ineffectiveness of state mechanisms in implementing policies and 
enforcing related regulations. These problems are common to developing countries 
where field officials are often inactive and corrupt. Wade (1988) mentions that farmers 
in rural villages of India have to bribe and entertain irrigation officers when they need 
jobs to be done properly, although these officials in principle are responsible for the 
jobs in the first place. Hirsch (1995) asserts that emerging corruption and nexus 
between bureaucratic power, influential people, and capital, are important in 
understanding of the failure of local resource management project in a village in 
Western Thailand. He observes that the unjust treatment of local people by the state is 
a result of corruption and mendacity of local officials. This leads to adverse 
relationships between local people and officials who implement the state policy. In 
both the Indian and Thai cases, policy implementation at the local level appears 
problematic if local users depend solely on the accountability of field officials.
Critics of the idea that state should dominate CPR management also argue that it is not 
only the state which is capable of managing the resources efficiently; numerous 
groups around the world have shown their ability to manage CPRs through self­
regulated rules developed by themselves (Taylor, 1992; see also Berkes, 1989). Based 
on observations of successful CPR management under traditional mechanisms and 
self-regulated bodies, many students of resource management believe that 
involvement of local communities is essential in solving CPR problems. To these 
scholars, community-based resource management and self-regulation should have a 
definite role within the larger framework of the resource policy (Berkes, 1985; 
Ostrom, 1990; Doulman, 1993).
The widely observed CPR degradation and common problems of the application of 
state mechanism in managing CPRs at the local level raise two important questions 
regarding the application of the community-based resource management approach and
68
the establishment of self-regulated institutions. First, why the development of 
community-based resource management systems and establishment of self-regulated 
institutions do not take place in all communities where CPR problems are apparent? 
Second, why do some communities experience great achievements in operating their 
self-regulated institutions, whereas others do not? Scholars who have wide research 
experience in CPR management study, such as Elinor Ostrom and Michael Taylor, 
have a consensus that, apart from the concern of the nature of each resource in 
question, the success or failure to establish community-based resource management 
regimes and to develop self-regulated institutions depends largely on characteristics or 
conditions of particular communities (see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992). 
Ostrom (1990), who analyses various cases in different parts of the world, makes a 
very important observation about conditions of community which are promising for 
organising self-regulated institutions in managing, their own CPRs. In a number of 
case studies she observed, she divides communities which are successful in 
establishing self-regulated organisations into two groups. The first group comprises 
cases in which users have had a long history of successful institutions for regulating 
access and managing certain CPRs in their communities. In the second group she 
includes cases in which CPRs were in the process of being destroyed, but later were 
able to successfully regulate with the help of agencies external to the user groups. 
Compared between these two groups, the success of cases in the first group is clearly 
related to the internal characteristics of communities, which can be regarded as 
ideological, whereas the success of the second group cannot be accredited to the 
internal efforts alone,' as external help from the state authorities also provides 
significant contribution.
From her comprehensive analysis of successful cases, Ostrom (1990) draws eight 
‘design principles’ which form essential elements or conditions that help in explaining 
the success of institutions in managing community CPRs towards sustainability. 
These design principles are briefly summarised by Singleton and Taylor as follows:
‘(1) the boundaries of user-group and of the resource are clearly defined; (2) 
the use rules are appropriate to local conditions; (3) most users can 
participate in modifying operational rules; (4) monitoring is done by the users
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themselves or by monitors accountable to them; (5) sanctions are graduated 
and are carried out by other users and/or officials accountable to them; (6) 
users and their officials have easy access to low cost arenas to resolve 
conflicts among users and officials; (7) the users have the right to organize 
their own solutions unchallenged by external governmental authorities; and 
(8) in larger, more complex cases, the institutional mechanism is organized in 
multiple layers of “nested enterprises.” (1992, p. 314).
Although Ostrom tends to believe that these design principles explain the success of a 
set of institutions in providing sustainable solutions to the collective action and 
problems associated with common property resources, it is argued by Singleton and 
Taylor (1992) that their explanatory status is not entirely clear. The key point in their 
argument is these principles do not provide a clear answer to the question of why 
some groups of resources users are able to solve problems of collective action without 
assistance from external agencies, other groups are not. Singleton and Taylor also 
point out that Ostrom omitted an overt discussion of community in her book, 
‘Governing the Commons’ (Ostrom, 1990), even though the successful cases or 
groups presented by Ostrom could all be characterised as having the attribute of 
community. In their view the attribute of community is important for a group to have 
the collective capacities to manage CPRs they use effectively and towards 
sustainability.
The kind of community that Singleton and Taylor (1992) view as promising to 
successful collective action is referred to as a set of people: (1) who hold some shared 
beliefs (including normative beliefs and preferences) that are beyond those 
constituting their collective action problem; (2) which have a fairly stable set of 
members; (3) who expect to be together as a group for at least a considerable length 
of time in the future; and (4) who have direct and ‘multiplex’ relationships among 
members. They stress that a community with these conditions is not ideological or 
utopian in the present time.
Conditions concluded by Ostrom (1990), and Singleton and Taylor (1992) provide a 
good explanation behind the success of user-groups who pursue collective action in 
managing CPRs. However, it does not appear that all conditions are prerequisite for a
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set of people to initiate and achieve their collective action in managing their CPRs. 
Wade (1988) observes that groups of villagers in a rural Indian community who 
successfully establish and operate their corporate organisation in managing irrigation 
water do not show a strong connection with shared beliefs or norms outside those 
constituting collective action. They are also very little influenced by the motive that 
Wade expresses as ‘a sense of devotion or obligation to a non-self-regarding “cause”, 
such as “the welfare of the village” or “cooperative ways of doing things’” , the sense 
which is often found in some Western rural communities (Wade, 1988, p. 196). 
Neither are villagers given clear rights by the state to organise themselves, nor do they 
receive support from powerful bodies external to the community. They strive 
themselves to operate self-regulated institutions which are overseen by a non-statutory 
organisation or council, to deal with problems facing water allocation and crop 
protection in their community, and to negotiate with concerned state officials who are 
reluctant and corrupt. Their striving in establishing and sustaining corporate 
organisation is steered by individuals concern of the risk they anticipate without 
having the organisation. It is very important to note that the movements of these 
villager’s groups are dynamic in order to adapt with the change of problems emerging 
both within and outside the organisation. When new problems are faced, the non- 
statutory council which is organised for special purposes play the most important role 
in making decisions to deal with the new problems. This indicates a high degree of 
autonomy they have in solving problems in their communities. The institution of 
‘autonomous’ organisation has long existed in this part of rural India, with the main 
role to settle dispute' among villagers. Wade believes that this institution of 
‘autonomous’ organisation does embody the idea of a standing council for village 
resource management, even though they are not the same things.
In Thailand, several movements are observed at the local level to deal with problems 
concerning CPR management. Some of these movements root from a long history of 
successful corporate ^ organisation prevailing in communities, for example Muang Fai 
irrigation system in the northern region (Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991; Lohmann, 
1995). Some movements are quite recent, and there is no clear evidence of the 
existence of autonomous institution in their communities which influences the
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movements (see Hirsch, 1995; Rittibhonbhun et al., 1993). Although all these recent 
movements emerged as a result of increasing pressure and conflict over CPRs, they 
are also steered and influenced by several forces in wider contexts. These include the 
growing interest in conservation ideas among academics, NGOs and media (Lohmann, 
1995; Rittibhonbhun et al., 1993). In connection with this growing interest, there 
emerges an attempt to recall and reconstruct some traditional values and beliefs to 
strengthen their movements (see Lohmann, 1995; Taylor, 1993). Despite the growing 
interest in the conservation ideas, many recent movements face several obstacles, 
especially in connection with the relationship between resource users and the state 
mechanisms which are corrupt and unreliable (see Hirsch, 1995). Although this 
condition is similar to the case in rural India mentioned above, the pattern of local- 
state relationship in rural Thailand differs from that in rural India. The complexity of 
relations in the patron-client network in Thailand makes negotiation difficult between 
ordinary people and state officials working at the local level (Hirsch, 1995). As a 
result, many recent movements fail to achieve their aims, due to the interference from 
outside and the inability of local communities to overcome difficulties emerging as 
part of the corrupt system (see Hirsch, 1995; Taylor, 1993). Only communities that are 
quite remote and have a historical reputation of successful collective action, such as 
those operating Muang Fai irrigation system in the northern region, and those who 
receive strong external support from NGOs, are likely to reach great achievements.
Besides their strengths, traditional mechanisms and grassroots movements with 
respect to local CPR management are also argued to have several weaknesses. This is 
especially true in conditions in which user-groups are so different in their socio­
economic backgrounds and in their interests in resources they share. In such 
conditions, competition and conflicts are likely to take place, and mutual agreements 
for collective action tend to be difficult. These conditions are likely to be found in 
communities where capital intrusion is high and CPRs in question are used for 
different purposes. Berkes (1985) asserts that self-regulation seems best suited to 
traditional societies where ‘economic activities are embedded in social relationships 
within the community, and are regulated by common values and rules (“the culture”)
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of the people who live in the society.’ However, it seems to be difficult to deal with 
problems facing societies where economic activities are highly commercial (p. 204). 
This argument is supported by several observations in contemporary societies where 
traditional institutions appear to be weakened. A good example is Pomeroy’s (1991) 
study of fishing communities in the Philippines, which suggests that in conditions 
where resources are insufficient and job opportunities are limited, fishermen tend to 
adopt a short-run survival strategy to meet their basic family needs. In such 
communities, attempts at sustainable management are unlikely to take place easily 
within the communities.
The above discussion provided evidence of traditional mechanisms and grassroots 
movements dealing with controlling CPRs for the users’ benefit. There are of course 
state mechanisms designed for implementing policies related to CPR management in 
most contemporary societies. In most cases, these state mechanisms exist in parallel 
with traditional mechanisms or grassroots movements available locally. However, 
they rarely cooperate in their attempts to control the resources. Since conditions 
confronting CPR management nowadays have adversely affected many CPRs and 
their users, it is important for the state to realise the welfare of users and their 
dependency on CPRs they use. Certainly, sustainable management with a fair 
distribution of resources among users, is the ultimate aim of CPR management. 
Nevertheless, to manage CPRs towards sustainability is a big question in itself in 
many localities which are in transition. As neither government control systems nor 
traditional systems are likely to work effectively on their own, many students of CPR 
management seem to agree that a community-based management or co-management 
approach, the approach in which national government and local communities share 
authority for resource management, should be an ultimate solution (Berkes, 1985; 
Pomeroy, 1991; Doulman, 1993; Pomeroy, 1993). However, the achievement of co­
management approach remains to be tested, as the idea involves devolution of 
resource management and allocation of decisions to local organisations. This is a task 
which provokes opposition from government authorities whose power is lessened, and 
also challenges the ability of local organisations to operate the resource management
73
system effectively. In countries like Thailand where complicated networks of patron- 
client relationship are evident, and centralisation of power is dominant, the application 
of community-based management approaches is really questionable.
2.9 Conclusion and Conceptual Framework for the Study
At the beginning of this chapter, two main concepts of policy analysis were presented: 
the process model and the political system model. These two models are prominent 
and have been widely adopted as a basis of policy analysis. The models characterise 
different views about how public policies are made and executed. The process model 
assumes public policy occurs as a process of sequential activities which is divided into 
various stages. It is basically seen as beginning with problem identification and 
formation, then policy-making, and implementation. These stages are assumed to 
occur in an ordered way, in which each subsequent stage depends on the preceding 
stage. The political system model presents policy as occurring in the forms of a 
relationship between inputs and outputs of the political system, and interactions in the 
system need to be in balance for the system to survive. It views political interactions in 
a given environment as being crucial in directing policy-making and its outputs. This 
model neither emphasises the processual way of policy nor denies it. Rather its 
emphasis is on interactions of actors within the political system, called by critics as 
‘the black box’, in which policy-making takes place. Because these models are among 
the earliest models, most policy students regard them as ideal for policy analysis in the 
real world due to their various strengths. As a consequence, many concepts in policy 
analysis are based on them: some concepts follow the process model, and deal with 
each stage of the policy process; and others follow the system model dealing with 
interactions within and between the political system and the environment.
Though the process and political system models differ in their foci, they are similar in 
perspective as they both view public policy as beginning from the top and flowing 
down through administrative lines to the bottom. The main feature of this ‘top-down’ 
perspective is that the activities happening at the top of the administrative structure are
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crucially important in affecting the subsequent activities at the bottom. In dealing with 
public policies, most literature following this perspective seems to overemphasise the 
importance of policy-making and often neglects implementation. This is mainly 
influenced by a perception of the effective role of bureaucratic administration in 
carrying out public policies, through the hierarchy of bureaucracy, once a policy is 
made. Therefore, good policies are assumed to produce good outcomes. Though the 
role of bureaucracy cannot be denied in the implementation of public policy, the 
results of a number of studies have rendered this assumption a debatable one. Many 
public policies, especially in developing countries, produce a variety of outcomes 
which may not correspond to the outputs intended at the policy-making stage. Central 
to these findings are arguments about the importance of interactions between various 
actors occurring at the implementation stage, which create a significant impact on the 
achievement of public policies. These arguments have brought about a call to re­
examining concepts of policy analysis by suggesting that more emphasis should be 
placed on the importance of implementation and a ‘bottom-up’ perspective within 
policy analysis.
Two main views arise in response to the above call. One is the introduction of a 
compromise concept led by Merilee Grindle, who works mostly on the analysis of 
development policies in developing countries, especially Latin America. The other is 
the concept of ‘the implementation structures’ developed by Benny Hjem and his 
colleagues, who have experienced of public policies in industrialised countries in 
Europe and United States. Grindle’s concept of analysis considers the importance of 
interactions among and between actors and the surrounding environment; this is seen 
as being crucial in affecting the outcomes of public policies. Whilst it does not deny 
the relationships between the implementors and their superiors, the results of her cross 
national studies stress interactions within the implementation process, rather than the 
superior-subordinate relationships within bureaucracy. Hjem and his colleagues, on 
the other hand, seem to consider the importance of implementation exclusively, and 
undermine the superior-subordinate relationships. To them, such relationships do not
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necessarily occur as actors interact with each other ‘equally’ over the issue under the 
implementation structure, regardless of class difference and official tie with their 
original organisations.
In this study, which is dealing with the analysis of development and natural resource 
policy at the local level in Southern Thailand, consideration is given to both the 
concept developed by Grindle and that of Hjern and his colleagues. As situation in 
Thailand is considered to be in a state of transition between the strong administrative 
tradition, dominated by the perception of patron-client relationships, and the 
awakening of popular participation concepts recently introduced, the status of 
relationships among actors, as well as the significance of the role of official 
implementors, are in question. In order to deal with this situation, an adapted version 
of the Grindle’s framework of policy implementation process is proposed for the 
analysis of this study as presented in Figure 2.3.
The model presented is drawn for the purpose of analysing development policies in 
which local people are target beneficiaries. The design of this model is based on the 
assumption that in developing countries like Thailand, which are in a state of 
transition, both state actors and non-state actors interact with each other throughout 
the policy process. However, the extent to which the non-state actors participate and 
are influential is greater in the implementation stage than in the preceding stage, since 
access is limited in the latter. Moreover, as implementation proceeds, the chance for 
actors to predict the impact policy will have on them, is greater than in the previous 
stage. The model does not emphasise a clear boundary between different stages, as it 
is not considered to be very important for this analysis. In the policy-making stage, 
which is represented by policy-decision, and policy design and formulation, the state 
political elites and bureaucratic elites, both at national and regional levels, are very 
influential in making decisions. Therefore, the issues, the broader content, and 
the shape of development policies, are all based on policy makers’ perception of 
problems and solutions to those problems under a given set of circumstances, which 
are broader than the environment at the local level. At the local level where a policy
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Figure 2.3: A Conceptual framework for analysing development policy 
(Adapted from Grindle, 1980c, p. 205)
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is implemented, field official implementors are expected to implement the policy 
according to the direction and design of the policy which were decided at the top. 
To follow the policy direction and design, official implementors are bound with rules 
and organisational structures of implementing organisation, which is presented as the 
‘organisational context’ in this model. At the same time, they are faced with local 
actors and more specific local environments. These local actors can be local interest 
groups (which includes local politicians, local economic elites and local based non­
governmental organisations), local opinion leaders, local official leaders, and clients. 
Generally these local actors are limited in their access to participation in the upper 
levels, due to their lack of power and the formality of bureaucratic organisations. 
However, at the implementation level where their access is better. They have a better 
opportunity to react upon policy and interact with local implementors, as well as 
among themselves, in order to influence the policy according to their perceptions. The 
context of policy implementation at this level is likely to be more significant in 
affecting the final outcomes of development policy. The official implementors do not 
seem to be very influential, as they are only field officers who are not highly 
knowledgeable about policy and are less powerful than their superiors in the eyes of 
other actors. Moreover, with the awakening of ideas of local participation in which the 
power of local people is stressed, local people, local leaders and local organisations 
are assumed to be more confident in interacting with field officials. However, 
hierarchical values and patron-client traditions which are prevailing in Thai societies 
should deter the activeness of local people and their leaders in their interaction with 
official implementors who are regarded as superior to them. Although the context of 
policy implementation at local level is likely to be similar to ‘the implementation 
structure’ suggested by Hjern and his colleagues, the extent to which local people and 
local leaders interact with official leaders and their influence on decision-making 
during the implementation process should be less significant than those of official 
implementors.
In this study, this model is intended to be used in explaining circumstances occurring 
at the lowest level of policy implementation, that is, the village level, and patterns of 
popular participation concerning CPR management. It is often argued that problems
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related to CPR management results from the exclusion of local people in the policy 
process. Also, though CPRs are predominantly used by local people, policies to 
control the use of these resources are constructed by the state. Consequently, they are 
often not suited to the socio-economic patterns of local users, so that effective 
implementation is problematic. In this context therefore, it is useful to investigate 
popular participation at the lowest level, since it is here that the closest relationship 
between users and resources can be observed. It is assumed that if policies are 
perceived to create negative impacts on local users, their response is likely to be more 
apparent at local level than at higher levels. At the same time, local actors should react 
positively when opportunities are officially given to them by the state (under the 
present system of development administration) to participate in policy process, 
because it is an important chance for them to influence policy in a direction which 
benefits them. The question is whether these opportunities are real or rhetoric, under 
the circumstances which hierarchical and patron-client values remain predominant.
Among different actors at the local level, the main interest of this study is to look at 
the role of phu yai ban who is the official village leader appointed by the central 
government through the village election. A phu yai ban is considered to be an official 
intermediary in village administration and in the implementation of public policies at 
the village level. As all phu yai ban are elected from members of individual village 
communities, their role in implementing development policy is crucial not only as an 
official implementor, but also as a member of the village community. More 
importantly, the change of their role with respect to natural resource management in 
the rise of the ideas of local empowerment, is critical and needs an in-depth analysis.
CHAPTER THREE
POLICY PROCESS AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION
IN THAILAND
3.1 Introduction
The concept of popular participation as a precondition for successful development 
has dominated development policy of the last decade. In rural development, 
participation is seen as an essential strategy for creating the opportunity for the rural 
poor to have their voice, the right to express their needs, access to productive assets, 
to gain a share in development benefits, and to make decisions (Oakley and Marsden, 
1984). Based on this notion, a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the policy process is 
suggested as an essential means for policy to correspond with the needs of the 
masses, rather than the conventional ‘top-down’ approach typical of developing 
countries. Calls to put this idea onto the development policy agenda, have been made 
by many rural development scholars and international organisations, such as the 
United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Labour Organisation. The 
United Nations in particular, has made much effort to persuade various countries to 
adopt the idea as a basip policy measure in their development strategies (Cohen and 
Uphoff, 1977). These calls have influenced some academics and policy officials in 
many developing countries to struggle for changes in development strategies, 
especially with respect to rural development in their own countries.
Thailand is no exception. The widespread interest in the concept of popular 
participation, together with the influence of international organisations, has forced 
policy-makers to integrate the concept into the policy process. The central planning 
body, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which 
dominates the country’s development policy-making, has moved from highly 
centralised to more decentralised strategies since the Fifth Plan, beginning in 1982.
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This change recognises the importance of popular participation in the policy process 
as the important strategy to improve policy to meet needs of the local people. In 
order to promote popular participation, a series of reforms, especially structural 
reforms of the planning organisation, have been made. However, as the concept is 
considered to be rather new and the administrative system in the country is known to 
be highly bureaucratic, effective application of this concept has been uncertain, at 
least in its early stage. The question centres at the structure of the administration 
system and the culture of the Thai bureaucracy, which have evolved through the 
county’s long history of independence. It is often argued that the Thai administration 
system and Thai bureaucratic culture will not permit the new concept to work 
effectively unless tremendous efforts are made (Brahmanee, 1989; 
Vorathepputipong, 1984). Moreover, the culture dominating the Thai bureaucracy 
also determines the people's ways of life, in the sense that they perceive that 
development roles should be played only by bureaucrats who are their ‘masters’. In 
this way, the full application of popular participation concept in the development 
process at the local level is unlikely to occur easily, despite the attempts of the 
central government to promote it.
This chapter will discuss features of the present Thai administrative system, its 
historical perspectives and the extent to which the concept of popular participation is 
applied with respect to the rural development process. It will also highlight the 
existence of popular participation in rural development in Thailand, both with 
respect to the influence of traditional settings and external interventions.
3.2 The Thai Administrative Structure
Before discussing features of policy-making and policy implementation in Thailand, 
it is important to have a basic understanding of the structure of the Thai 
administration. An ninderstanding of this structure provides a broad picture of 
different levels of the Thai government and how they are linked, which is 
indispensable for an understanding of the policy process in this country.
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The present Thai administrative structure is a revised version of that initially 
introduced through a series of fundamental reforms in the 1890s, during the reign of 
King Rama V. The reforms marked a major revolution in the Thai administration 
system. This new form of administration not only introduced a constitutional 
government to cope with internal and external difficulties being faced at that time, 
but once again consolidated power in the hands of the King in Bangkok. Under the 
previous jatusadom system, which was based on the Khmer or Khom system, power 
had been devolved to military and civilian officials in the central and peripheral areas 
(Kambhu, 1984; Samudavanija, 1987). Under this new system, eleven functional 
ministries were established, and regional and local administrative systems were 
introduced. The introduction of the regional administrative system marked the 
beginning of the great power of the Ministry of the Interior which is in charge of all 
levels of the country’s administration. The establishment of the local administrative 
system marked the start of local participation in Thai history. Nevertheless, the 
feature of local government in Thailand is said to be unique, since the local 
administrative system covered only urban and semi-urban areas. Its functions related 
mainly to specific tasks such as sanitary programmes and urban infrastructural 
development activities. However, this feature of local administrative system has 
changed significantly since it was first introduced (see Kambhu, 1984, pp. 67-69).
There are now fifteen ministries within the Thai central government located in 
Bangkok. Generally it is the central government, made up of political parties, who 
initiates the nation’s policies and oversees their implementation. The Cabinet 
constitutes the central organisation responsible for implementing these policies, and 
the ministries serve as the mechanism which carries out the work of the central 
government. This form of administration is said to characterise a centralisation of 
power by central government ‘in the interest of national security and the people’s 
well-being, and in order to ensure uniformity in decision-making’ (Kambhu, 1984, p. 
69). Regional administration consists of provinces (changwat), districts (amphoe), 
sub-district or communes (tambon), and villages (mooban), successively (Figure 
3.1). In some ways, the central government has decentralised the decision-making to 


































Note: Recently, some sapha tambon have been upgraded to the status of Tambon
Administrative Organisation, which is more autonomous than the sapha tambon.
Figure 3.1: The Present Thai administrative structure 
(Adapted from Kambhu, 1984, p. 70).
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is argued to be a form of ‘deconcentration of power’ rather than decentralisation in 
any real sense (Kambhu, 1984; see also LePoer, 1989). The local administrative 
system is divided into four kinds of local government namely provincial 
administrative organisations(o«gfo2<2« borihaan suan changwat), municipalities 
(;tesabaan), sanitation districts (sukaapibaan), and the special forms of local 
government of Bangkok Metropolis and Pattaya City. Another form of local 
government exists, called ‘sapha tambon' or sub-district council, which has a 
mixed feature of local government and regional administration unit. The sapha 
tambon is ‘a legal entity with a certain degree of self-government: a feature which 
encourages popular participation in the Thai system of democratic government’ 
(Kambhu, 1984, p. 71). Most recently, many sapha tambon have been upgraded to 
be sub-district administrative organisations (ongkaan borihaan suan tambon)', a 
more sophisticated local organisation which has more power than the original sapha 
tambon in the planning process. This change was made in late 1994, after the main 
fieldwork of this study was completed.
Of the various forms of local government mentioned above, only the sapha tambon 
applies to rural communities. The council is established at the sub-district level 
throughout the country. It can be regarded as a mixed form of power decentralisation 
as it is composed of both local leaders who hold official administrative posts 
including sub-district official leader ([kamnan), village official leader (phu yai ban), 
sub-district paramedic (phaet prajam tambon), a local teacher, and other members 
who are elected from qualified persons within individual villages (see Figure 3.2). 
Municipalities and sanitation districts exist only in urban or semi-urban areas 
represented mostly by provincial capitals and district capitals respectively (see 
LePoer, 1989). The provincial administrative organisation consists of two bodies: the 
provincial council (sapha changwat), which is composed of elected members 
representing various districts within the provincial territory; and the provincial 
administrative office, isamnak-ngaan ongkaan borihaan suan changwat), which is 
composed of the provincial under-secretary (palad changwat) and provincial 
representatives of various central departments (huana suan ratchakaan radab 
changwat). The provincial administrative office is legally entitled to derive incomes
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from various sources within the provincial boundary, such as duties, services, and the 
issue o f permits, etc., whereas the provincial council controls all the provincial 
expenditures.
Supervisor
(a District Under-Secretary 
or civil servant from 
Department of Community 
Development









- phu ya i ban
- tambon paramedic
Elected Members
one qualified villager 
from each village
SRDOC = Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee
Figure 3.2: The present structure o f sapha tambon 
(Adapted from Ingavata, 1990, p. 120)
Although several levels and types o f government exist in the Thai administrative
V- \
system, the central government remains unitary and the most powerful. Regional 
governments act as an apparatus o f the central government. Their main function is to 
carry out duties, at each individual level, in accordance with directives issued by the 
Cabinet, ministries, and central departments, or as directed by the Prime Minister.
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They are not entitled to make any important decisions. All important decisions are 
made by the traditionally powerful elite in Bangkok through the chain of command. 
The Ministry of the Interior is seen to be the most powerful ministry in this process, 
as it plays a key role in the administrative framework of the state, since all the heads 
of the regional governments are under its umbrella. Local government, which in 
principle was established to promote people's participation and was supposed to be 
self-governing, is in reality very much dependent on the central administration 
system, both technically and financially. Therefore, the issue of people's 
participation in Thailand still needs further investigation, especially with respect to 
the policy process regarding rural development. In this thesis, the emphasis will be 
on understanding the policy process concerning rural development as related to local 
resource management, and the extent to which the local people gain access to the 
policy process.
3.3 Policy-Making and Policy Implementation in the Thai Context
Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that policy-making and policy implementation in 
Thailand are highly centralised. The state bureaucracy plays a dominant role, either 
directly or indirectly, both in the process of policy-making and policy 
implementation. This is largely due to the historical background of the country’s 
administration in which bureaucrats have always been powerful not only in state 
administration, but also in the country’s politics. The involvement of non- 
bureaucratic actors has been minimal. This section will explain how development 
policies are made and implemented in Thailand. It will also explain the interaction of 
the state bureaucracy with other actors at different stages of the policy process.
3.3.1 The Planning Organisation
As has been discuss^dfn Chapter One, Thailand’s development policies have been 
based mainly on a series of five-year Economic and Social Development Plans (later 
referred to as Plan or Plans), ever since the first Plan called the National Economic 
Development Plan was introduced in 1961 (Rigg, 1991; Suphachalasai and
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Patmasiriwat, 1990; Pongquan, 1992). The National Economic and Social 
Development Board is the main planning body responsible for carrying out these 
Plans. The body was established in 1959 under the name of the National Economic 
Development Board (NEDB) in order to carry out the First Plan. It was later renamed 
the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) in 1978, in 
accordance with the extension of the Plan to cover social development as well as 
economic development (Pongquan, 1992). The NESDB forms an administrative 
body working closely with its executive body, the Office of National Economic and 
Social Development Board, in preparing, launching, implementing as well as 
evaluating the national economic and social policies and plans, which form the 
framework for the country’s development.(Chaisurojana, 1990; Pongquan, 1992). 
After national policies and plans are drafted and approved by the Cabinet, different 
levels of government organisations or committees will take action in formulating and 
executing their own operational policies in order to fit with the national policies. 
Several sets of committees are empowered to perform the tasks at different 
administrative levels. Setting up committees to be responsible for performing 
special tasks, or to respond to new problems, is not uncommon in the Thai 
administration system (Samudavanija, 1987). However, the discussion here will 
focus only on the organisational system dealing with rural development policies, 
with which this thesis is concerned.
There were several planning bodies responsible for rural development planning at 
different administrative'levels prior to a reform made in the Fifth Plan (1982-1986), 
in the name of the ‘new development concept’ (Pongquan, 1992; Panpiemrat, 1982). 
Under the ‘new development concept’, a significant structural reform was made in 
order to cope with changes in the emphasis of and approach to planning, which 
shifted from a comprehensive approach to an integrated approach. In the new 
approach to rural development, co-ordination between different levels of planning — 
village, sub-district, district, provincial, and national — is emphasised, and the rural 
population is encouraged to play an active role in the development process instead of 
being only ‘receivers’ as they used to be (Tagopom, 1983; see also Vandergeest,
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1991). This new adjustment brought about changes in the planning organisation at 
different levels of the administration system, which still remain today.
Under the present structure, the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC), 
known as ‘kaw-chaw-chaw’ in Thai, acts as the highest policy-making body 
responsible for formulating all rural development policies and plans, with the 
exception of those related to rural job creation and security zones, which are under 
specific bodies. The NRDC is headed by the Prime Minister and comprises Ministers 
of the Office of the Prime Minister, ministers and high-ranking officials from six 
principal ministries — the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, the 
Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Defence -- and other concerned units. The 
NESDB serves as the Secretariat to the NRDC and plays a vital role in initiating 
policies as well as in screening programmes (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). The 
National Rural Development Co-ordination Centre (NRDCC) functions as a 
supporting body and working in co-ordinating the ministerial plans and plans from 
lower levels to the national plans, and in undertaking the task of monitoring and 
evaluating national programmes (Khoumkhainaam et a l 1991; Pongquan, 1992).
At the provincial level, the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) is the primary 
body responsible for provincial planning. The PDC is chaired by the Governor 
(phuwa ratchakaan changwat) of each province (changwat), and comprises a vice 
governor (raung phuwa ratchakaan changwat), the Head of the Provincial Office 
(huana samnak-ngaan changwat), and representatives from various concerned 
departments at provincial level. The PDC functions primarily in formulating the 
provincial economic and social development plans according to national 
development policies, guidelines and framework provided by the NRDC. The PDC 
formulated the provincial plans based on the district development plans within the 
province. It also acts as the advisory body to concerned agencies within the 
province. It is assisted by the Provincial Rural Development Sub-committee 
(PRDS). The PRDS, which is headed by a Vice Governor, and comprises two 
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Figure 3.4: Planning organisation introduced under the Fifth Plan 
(Adapted from: Pongquan, 1992, p. 28).
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(palad changwat), and the Head of the Provincial Office (huana samnak-ngaan 
changwat), who also assesses and screens district plans before submitting them to 
the PDC for approval (Khoumkhainaam eta/., 1991; Pongquan, 1992).
At the district level, there exists the District Development Committee (DDC). The 
committee is chaired by the District Officer (nai amphoe) of each district, and 
consists of the Senior District Under-Secretary (palad aawuso) and district level 
representatives of various central departments concerned with rural development. 
The main functions of this body are to assess, approve and co-ordinate development 
projects proposed by various sub-district councils (sapha tambon) under their 
territorial areas. These projects are then formulated into the annual rural development 
plan of each district and subsequently submitted to the provincial and national levels 
(Khoumkhainaam et al., 1991). The DDC is also responsible for controlling and 
evaluating the implementation of development projects at this level and at the sub­
district level (Brahmanee, 1989). It should be noted here that the district level is the 
lowest level of the Thai administrative system which is served by appointed 
permanent government officials, and where representatives from most central 
departments are appointed. These officials are general civil servants employed by the 
central government. The lower levels, sub-district (tambon) and village (<mooban), 
are served by elected leaders, their assistants selected by them from within their 
territorial boundaries, and elected committees which are not considered as general 
civil servants. Although there are some general civil servants responsible for sub- 
district level activities, they are based at the district office.
At the sub-district and village levels, the nature of development planning is quite 
different from that of the upper levels mentioned above. One of the reasons is that 
these two levels of administration differ in their structures from their superior units 
which are served by appointed officials. At both sub-district and village levels, their 
leaders are elected. iV$ub-district official leader (kamnan) is elected by voters within 
an individual tambon from the nominated village official leaders (phu yai ban) under 
its territorial administration, and a phu yai ban is elected by villagers from nominees 
within eachmooban. These leaders represent the Ministry of the Interior and play an
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important role in the sub-district council or sapha tambon, the sub-district planning 
unit.
The sapha tambon is chaired by the kamnan and includes all phu yai ban within the 
sub-district area, the tambon paramedic (phaet prajam tambon), and one elected 
representative (phu song khunnawut) from each village. In order to facilitate the 
work of the council, a District Under-Secretary (palad amphoe) and the Sub-District 
Community Development Worker (pattanakorn), are appointed to serve as advisors. 
Moreover, based on the newly introduced act, a teacher (khru) from one of the local 
schools or other qualified person, based on the kamnan’s selection, serves as its 
secretary (Office of the Prime Minister, 1994). There is another set of committees 
established alongside the sapha tambon to assist and advise it in formulating 
development plans and development activities called the Sub-district Rural 
Development Operational Committee (SRDOC) or khana tam-ngaan sanabsanun 
kanpatibat-ngaan pattana chonnabot radab tambon (khaw-paw-taw) This committee 
is composed of kamnan, phu yai ban or their assistants, the Sub-district Agricultural 
Officer (kaset tambon), the Sub-district Community Development Worker 
(pattanakorn), the Sub-district Public Health Officer (sataranasuk tambon), a local 
teacher (khru), the village representative in sapha tambon (phu song khunnawut), 
and a villager knowledgeable about construction (chang khaw-paw- taw). At the 
village level, there exists the Village Committee (khana kammakaan mooban, VC) 
which is headed by the phu yai ban of each village and composed of up to nine 
members of the committee.
With regard to development planning, the VC plays a role in identifying problems 
and needs in the village, and in developing the village development proposals to be 
considered at the tambon level. The sapha tambon is then responsible for identifying 
problems and matters related to the development of the tambon area based on the 
proposals submitted4>y various VCs within its territory. The SRDOC plays roles in 
providing technical assistance and assessing the feasibility of projects developed by 
the sapha tambon (Brahmanee, 1989; see also Wirajnibhawan, 1992; Hirsch, 1989; 
and Ingavata, 1990). These proposals are then formulated into the tambon annual
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development plan (Khoumkhainaam et al. 1991; Brahmanee, 1989; Wirajnibhawan, 
1992; Office of the Prime Minister, 1994).
3.3.2 Planning Procedure
The planning procedure for rural development in Thailand was established on the 
basis of the duties assigned to the above organisations. In principle, the procedure of 
development policy formulation and implementation currently applied can be 
illustrated as follows (NESDB, 1982).
At the highest level of the planning hierarchy, the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) formulates the national Plans, which form the 
framework of national policies that must be followed by all planning bodies (see 
Figure 3.4). With respect to rural development policies, the National Rural 
Development Committee (NRDC) draws up various policies and forwards them to 
the Cabinet for its approval. Once policies are accepted and approved by the Cabinet, 
the Civil Service Commission and the Budget Bureau, under the co-ordination of the 
NESDB, will allocate manpower and budgets to the principal ministries. The 
principal ministries then set up their policy framework (kraub nayobai), specify the 
types of assistance, both technical and financial, available from central government, 
and indicate the types of project to be supported on a yearly basis. Because the 
policy frameworks and detailed development guidelines prepared by individual 
ministries are likely to' vary considerably, they are generally revised each year 
before passing down to the provincial level.
At the provincial level, the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) of each 
province proceeds the directives on the development policy framework and 
guidelines of the NRDC, which are obtained through the major concerned ministries, 
to districts within the provincial territory. The district planning body then transfers 
the directives to the sub-district or tambon officials in the same manner. After that, 
the directives are then passed downward to the lowest administrative level, the 
village or mooban.
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When the directives on policy framework and development guidelines are passed 
from the top administrative level to the bottom, the process then begins its upward 
movement again in the form of development plans. This part of the new approach is 
clearly distinguishable from the previous approach prior to the Fifth Plan (Figure 
3.3). According to this new concept, after receiving the directives from above, the 
Village Committee (VC) is responsible for collecting evidence of the problems and 
needs of villagers in each village, and then passing these upward to the sapha 
tambon. This is the first step in constructing bottom-up development propositions. 
When the sapha tambon receives propositions from several villages within its own 
territory, it then works together with the SRDOC in compiling problems and needs, 
identifying types of projects for its respective villages, and consolidating them into 
the sub-district development plan. In formulating the sub-district plan, the sapha 
tambon and the SRDOC must refer to the framework and follow the guidelines 
provided by the higher levels of administration. In this plan, the priority of each 
project must be determined in order to guide decision-makers at the higher levels, 
since there is a possibility of screening some projects out to meet pre-set budgets. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the plan formulated at the tambon level is not a proper 
plan in the real sense, since it appears as a project proposal indicating the problems 
and felt needs of the local people, without detail indicating costs and implementation 
schedules (Pongquan, 1992). This is perhaps due to a lack of knowledge and skills 
of concerned personnel with regard to making a proper plan. The plan therefore 
appears in the form of a simple proposal, rather than being formally designed. The 
tambon proposals then proceed to the district where the district planning body, the 
DDC, scrutinises the tambon proposals to make sure that they are in line with the 
original policy framework obtained from above. The DDC then combines several 
tambon proposals into the district plan which is then submitted to the province. The 
provincial planning body, the PDC, with the help of the PRDS, examines the district
plans on the same basis as the DDC does to the tambon proposals, but in a more
%
careful manner, in order to ensure that they are consistent with the given framework. 
The role of the PDC is also to integrate the priorities set in the project proposals 
submitted by various tambon, with those of the districts. After that, the PDC will
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consolidate the proposals from various districts into the annual provincial plan, 
which is set out on an agency-by-agency basis and then submitted to various 
ministries and their constituent departments in Bangkok via the NRDC.
At this stage, concerned departments examine various provincial proposals related to 
individual departments, and consolidate them into their annual workplans. The 
annual workplan from each department is then submitted to the Budget Bureau, and 
the Plan Co-ordination Sub-committee of the NRDC for final screening, before it is 
included into the Annual Budget Act submitted to the Cabinet and parliament for 
final approval. Once the final approval from parliament is obtained, the operation 
plans are passed down from the ministries to the provincial and lower level 
authorities for implementation. All these tasks occur generally on a yearly basis.
The policy and planning process under the new concept discussed above, illustrates a 
departure of the organisational structure and procedure from the top-down approach 
which dominated the policy and planning system in Thailand during the first two 
decades of the national five-yearly plans. In principle this new planning concept is 
aimed at encouraging more participation from the lower levels of the planning 
administration, especially the lowest levels of tambon and mooban. However, if we 
analyse the structural organisation of planning, it can be seen that throughout the 
policy and planning process under the new structural reform the state bureaucracy 
still has room to play a significant role in formulating policies and plans. Though at 
the lowest levels, the tambon and mooban, some forms of participation do exist, 
there seems to be a certain degree of intervention from the state bureaucrats 
representing different central departments in local administrative units 
(Vorathepputhipong, 1984, p. 433). In fact, government intervention in the practice 
of rural development planning occurs at all levels of planning administration, as the 
projects proposed from the tambon and mooban are subject to reformulating and
screening by the planning bodies at higher levels, in order to correspond with the
S
standard policy framework. This phenomenon cannot simply be interpreted as 
occurring because of the limitations of local organisations in preparing and 
formulating their own policies and plans. Rather it is a function of the administrative
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structure itself, which does not fully allow for more intensive participation by local 
organisations. This is why Jonathan Rigg argues that the grass-roots development 
planning in Thailand is still centrally controlled, and should therefore be viewed 
with ‘healthy skepticism’ (Rigg, 1991, p. 201). Questions regarding the policy 
process and the extent to which local people participate exist not only in the area of 
development planning, they also arise in the implementation of development plans, 
which will be discussed in the next section
3.3.3 Policy Implementation
The implementation of rural development plans in Thailand relies most on the state 
administrative system which is highly bureaucratic. Thai bureaucracy is not only 
highly hierarchical, but also bound up with self-generated traditions and cultural 
values which are problematic for the effective implementation and promotion of 
local participation. These characteristics of Thai bureaucracy are seen by concerned 
bodies, especially the NESDB and political leaders, as obstacles to the effective 
application of the new concept of development. It can be seen that efforts have been 
made by concerned bodies at the high level in the last three Plans to improve the 
administrative system in order to diminish the problems and to facilitate this new 
approach (see Kambhu, 1989; NESDB, 1982, 1987, and 1992). Political leaders, 
especially General Prem Tinasulanonda, Anand Panyarachun, and Chuan Leekpai, 
have made their statements about the need for adjustments within the state 
bureaucracy to cope with the new concept of development (Kambhu, 1989; Handley, 
1991 and 1992). However, the improvement of unpleasant conditions in the Thai 
bureaucratic system is unlikely to happen in a short time. This section will discuss 
the administration of policy implementation under the new concept of rural 
development and the obstacles which need to be investigated.
Despite the marked; preform in the organisation of rural development planning 
introduced in the Fifth Plan discussed earlier, there has been little change in the way 
the implementation of development plans is undertaken. Under the new approach, 
the only change made with regard to this implementation is an emphasis on the
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importance of achieving pre-set goals through participation of local beneficiaries. 
This differs from the old approach in which implementation relied solely on the 
routine administrative system. The routine administrative system is bound up 
strongly with hierarchical lines of command and rules, which are complex and time 
consuming (Brahmanee, 1989). Among government efforts to improve the 
administrative system and facilitate more effective policy implementation, attempts 
to co-ordinate various concerned agencies to work together on the basis of 
programme orientation or project orientation is a significant one. This is due to a 
change in the view that rural development projects cannot be sectoral, but should be 
integrated or intersectoral work (Na Chiangmai, 1985). Another feature which has 
been central to many concerned bodies, politicians and interest groups, is the effort 
to decentralise administrative power to the regions and localities, especially within 
the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), which is the most powerful ministry in the Thai 
administrative system (Kambhu, 1989, pp. 85-6). Traditionally, the administrative 
system of the MOI is strongly hierarchical, especially with respect to the decision­
making process as Pakom Priyakom states in his research report on the 
administrative capacities of the MOI:
‘Traditionally, the decision-making power structure and level of 
discretion in the MOI, particularly the boundaries between key 
personnel, were very clear. Analysed and synthesized information in 
conjunction with decision-making was always hierarchically top- 
down — from Ministers, Permanent Secretary or their Deputies, 
Department Heads, Provincial Governors, Division Chiefs, District 
Officers, and others. Discretion actions taken by top executives were 
welcomed by middle and lower managers. Actually, there have been 
no open conflicts between bureaucrats and Ministers in the decision­
making process.’ (Priyakom, 1989, p. xv).
The above statements demonstrate how strong the hierarchical bond in the MOI 
decision-making process is, which of course affects the implementation process of 
development policies as a whole. Details of this effort to devolve power within the 
MOI are reserved for further discussion later in this chapter.
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Despite the efforts to improve the co-ordination between concerned agencies and 
decentralise administrative power, in practice a high degree of central administrative 
control remains. This means that local and regional bodies are still tied up firmly 
with a vertical command structure. Some of the administrative procedures which are 
introduced under the new structural reforms do not allow for strengthening the co­
ordination mechanism at the sub-national levels of policy implementation, rather 
they retain the intra-agency bonds which have traditionally existed in the Thai 
administrative system. These problematic procedures as stated by Demaine and 
Malong (1987) are: each field agency should report on the performance of rural 
development work directly to its central administration in Bangkok; each field 
agency has its own budget separately allocated at its central level of administration 
which permits the agency to operate its programmes independently; and different 
standards and criteria in selecting and prioritising projects are employed by various 
field agencies involved, influenced by their central administrative system and 
discouraging inter-agency co-ordination at field level.
Problems related to the implementation of rural development policies are also 
associated with the monitoring and evaluation system. The tasks of monitoring and 
evaluating rural development policies at a local level are conducted solely by 
representatives of line agencies belonging to the Provincial Development Committee 
(PDC). Questions related to monitoring and evaluation arise regarding their purposes 
and methodologies. Pongquan (1992) argues that the measure of achievement of a 
project or programme is' not based on its success in terms of the development impact, 
but rather it focuses on inspecting procedures, such as by considering operational 
problems which may interrupt the completion of the programme within the original 
time schedule. Additionally, the process of monitoring is designed to ensure that the 
budget is spent in accordance with government rules and regulations, rather than to 
ensure that goals and services have been secured. Finally, the remaining emphasis on 
the notion of a ‘numerical target’ may create problems in selecting proper project 
sites and in encouraging popular participation in the project, as selection of project 
sites may be biased towards the areas which have a high capacities to carry out the 
projects rather than the areas which need the projects (see Demaine, 1986, p. 109).
98
The above discussion has mentioned government attempts to improve the 
administrative system to support the implementation of rural development policies 
under the new concept of rural development, and the problems that remain with 
respect to the administrative structure. As policy implementation relies strongly on 
the state administrative system which remains highly bureaucratic, it is worth 
investigating further the Thai bureaucratic system and its culture, for the better 
understanding of its strength and weaknesses in dealing with the new concept of 
rural development planning.
3.4 The Thai Bureaucracy and Its Culture
The domination of bureaucrats in the Thai administrative system and over Thai 
society makes it important to discuss here the culture of the Thai bureaucracy with 
respect to development administration. Inevitably, the close relationship between 
Thai bureaucracy and Thai society has led the former to be seen as a reflection of the 
latter. The characteristics of the contemporary Thai bureaucracy and Thai society 
have resulted to a great extent from a long history and the evolution of the Thai 
administrative system and its interactions with the Thai people (see Cohen, 1991, 
especially Chapter 5). In order to understand the current role of the Thai bureaucracy 
in development administration, one must not only consider its present features, but 
also its historical perspectives. This section will present a brief historical 
background and outline the present features of the Thai bureaucracy. The emphasis 
will be on the role and influences of the Thai bureaucratic system on development 
administration, especially with regard to the promotion of local participation in the 
development process.
Historically, Thailand remained under an absolute monarchy for almost sevpn 
centuries, from the founding of the Sukhothai Kingdom in the early 13th century 
until the 1932 revolution (see Rajchagool, 1994). During the Sukhothai period, the 
Thai governing system was considered to be paternalistic, with the King being 
regarded as the father of all his people. During the Ayudhya period beginning in
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1350, the introduction of the divine kingship concept as the basis for rule, changed 
the view towards the King to a divinity who had absolute power. This view remained 
until the early period of the present Chakkry Dynasty. Constitutional reform began 
as a result of the revolution in 1932, in which democratic principles were introduced 
to replace the traditional principles. Since then, the political control has alternated 
between parliamentary democracy and military rule. Nevertheless, those old 
traditional principles which are deeply rooted in Thai society, have to some extent 
remained and held their influence on Thai politics and administration up to the 
present (Nakata, 1987, pp. 168-169; Haas, 1979, pp. 3-15; Rubin, 1974, p. 3; see also 
Samudavanija, 1987). Because of these embedded traditional values, the Thai 
bureaucracy which has been bound up with and evolved alongside the monarchy, 
continues to be one of the most powerful institutions in Thai society up to the 
present, and perhaps will continue to be in the near future. Chai-anan Samudavanija, 
a leading Thai political scientist, mentions; ‘...even in the face of economic and 
social change, the bureaucracy’s power remains supreme, and it is still appropriate to 
term Thailand a “bureaucratic polity”’(Samudavanija, 1987, p. 95; for a detailed 
analysis see Riggs, 1966).
The main characteristics of Thai bureaucracy are that it is highly centralised, 
paternalistic, and hierarchical (Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Rigg, 1991). The 
centralisation of the Thai bureaucracy means that its administrative structure is 
centralised and unified from Bangkok, where all ministries and departments are 
located. These central ‘organisations characterise the concentration of power and 
decision-making, with a consequent lack of delegation of authority within 
departments (Samudavanija, 1987, p. 89). There exist an abundance of regulations 
and rules to control and unify the administrative practices of agencies at different 
levels. These regulations and rules overwhelm the administrative work, and make the 
system being well known as ‘tardy’ and ‘inefficient’ (Mingmaneenakin, 1988).
The hierarchical nature of the Thai bureaucracy in which patron-client relationship 
remains significant among officials and in the relationships between officials and 
people, is also viewed as problematic (Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Samudavanija, 1989;
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Wirajnibhawan, 1987). This type of relationships is believed to be a descendant of 
the ‘nai-phrai’ relationships which had dominated the Thai administrative system 
prior to the reform introduced by King Chulalongkom, Rama V, in the late of 
nineteenth century. The hierarchical nature of the Thai bureaucracy functions in 
accordance with the centralisation of power and relates strongly to paternalism (see 
for example Tambiah, 1976). This form of relationship in contemporary Thai 
administrative system appears in the domination of hierarchical commands together 
with interpersonal relationships within the bureaucracy. As Eisenstadt and Roniger 
(1984) explain:
‘...personal forms of co-ordination came to matter more than staff 
relations and operational formal imperatives. Career advancement and 
preferred assignments could be fostered or hampered by the personal 
support of patrons or they were reluctant to assist. In relation thereto, 
the employee’s loyalty was not necessarily assured to his bureaucratic 
superior but may have been given to his patrons. However, mainly in 
the past, but to some degree even recently, there was a tendency for 
patrons to move their clients to staff the offices to which they 
themselves had been transferred. This was related to the practice of 
discharging holder of office and replacing them by the followers of 
the new patron designated to head the department.’ (p. 134).
Though the above statement points out the importance of the patron-client
relationship within the Thai bureaucracy, and argues that the relationship does not -
necessarily correspond to that of superior-subordinate, the latter also seems to form
\
part of traditional values in the system.
The above argument is supported by the view of Chai-anan Samudavanija who 
argues that the way Thai bureaucracy is organised and operated reflects, to a 
considerable degree, differential status considerations (Samudavanija, 1987, p. 91).
In principle, superiors deserve to be obeyed (patibat taam) and respected (krengjai), 
and in return, they are^expected to act on behalf of subordinates in a ‘benevolent’ and 
‘concerned fashion’ (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984, p. 137). Paternalists’ concern for 
the well-being of subordinates is separate from concern for the performance of the 
professional responsibilities. Samudavanija asserts that there is a real desire for a
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superior to care for his subordinates regarding their well-being and personal matters 
as a means of enhancing his own authority. However, this concern does not extend to 
the performance of official tasks. The implication of these values is argued as being 
associated with the legal power structure of the system, which emphasises the 
authority of officials at high levels in making decisions while ignoring the 
delinquencies of their decisions. This permits high ranking officials to exercise their 
power without considering the importance of their subordinates. At the same time, 
lower level officials seem to accept their inferiority in the decision-making 
process in return for security in their professional positions. These attitudes are seen 
to cause ineffectiveness and inefficiency in development administration 
(Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Wirajnibhawan, 1987). In support of this argument, Rigg 
(1991) states that the administrative system prevailing in Thailand ‘...allows little 
room for initiative, and decisions are usually taken so that they correspond to the 
wishes, or the perceived wishes, of those above’ (p. 201-202).
The patron-client relationship in fact goes beyond the boundary of the bureaucratic 
system itself; it also forms a part of the relationships between bureaucrats and 
people, and even among the people within society. Wirajnibhawan (1987) mentions 
that officials often behave like the master of the people. They prefer to use their 
power through commands rather than to listen to people. Many government officials 
see people, especially those who are in rural area, as ignorant and deprived. Based on 
this, they often believe that people must receive commands and help in the form of 
gifts from the government via officials. In combination with the persistent values of 
favouring superiority among normal people, the superior-subordinate roles played by 
the officials remain largely acceptable in Thai society (see also Mulder, 1994; 
Vandergeest, 1991).
Other values in the present Thai bureaucratic system, including personalism, and 
arrogance and disdain for those outside the system, are also apparent. Thai 
bureaucrats are regarded as personalistic, especially those holding high ranking 
positions. Samudavanija (1987) states: ‘...personal relationships and individual 
concerns remain the basis for bureaucratic behaviour’ (p. 91). This behaviour is
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believed to be based on a dominant structure known as a ‘loose structure’ prevailing 
in Thai society (Embree, 1950; see also Bunnag, 1979). Although this notion is 
highly criticised, many Thai academics view as it reflects the reality evident in Thai 
society (see, for example, Wirajnibhawan, 1987). As a consequence, high ranking 
officials prefer to make decisions by themselves, and co-ordination between different 
agencies is unlikely to happen easily. The feeling of being arrogant and disdained 
makes many officials behave as though they are superior to outsiders and their 
subordinates. This not only affects the role they play in the decision-making process, 
but also in their accountability to others, and when providing services to outsiders. In 
the decision-making process, it is uncommon for lower ranking officials to make any 
propositions or comments without being asked by their superiors. In relationships 
with outsiders, it is observed that these barriers prevent normal people consulting the 
officials, especially high ranking officials, as they are not allowed to see them easily 
(Wirajnibhawan, 1987).
In association with the predominant values that exist in Thai bureaucracy as 
discussed above, behavioural traits have also emerged which impede both the 
implementation of development policies and the promotion of public participation. 
Among the most important of these traits is a lack of co-ordination, and the top- 
down development syndrome.
The need for co-ordination among and between concerned government and non­
government agencies, both in the vertical and horizontal sphere, is vital to the 
success of development administration. Although there are various factors that can 
affect co-ordination in rural development administration including factors related to 
the organisational structure and characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy, the influence 
of the latter is often seen as crucial. Among various characteristics of the Thai 
bureaucracy, personalism and disdain are major obstacles to co-ordination. Being
disdainful often me<ms that many bureaucrats are often arrogant in dealing with 
" S
others, especipecially when they deal with officials of the same or lower ranks from 
outside their organisations, and with non-bureaucrats. Personalism and disdain 
characteristics are often found among Thai bureaucrats, and argued by many public
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administration students to discourage effective group working among them 
(Wirajnibhawan, 1987). Additionally, lack of co-ordination may also be caused by 
the lack of intention to work for the benefits of the people, as bureaucrats tend to 
compete for benefits among themselves. Apart from these factors, the fact that each 
organisation has its own culture and budget allocated separately through its 
individual line of administration from the top, does not provide a strong basis for 
different agencies to co-ordinate effectively. This characteristic creates several 
problems in the implementation of development programmes, such as the 
overlapping of similar activities carried out by different government agencies, the 
disintegration of sub-projects, and the tension between governmental and non­
governmental organisations, in pursuing rural development activities (see 
Wirajnibhawan, 1987; Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Farrington and Lewis, 1993, pp. 277- 
9).
It can be said that the culture and values of the Thai bureaucracy in general are still 
top-down, despite structural reforms to promote a bottom-up approach to the 
development administration. The top-down values, therefore, create a syndrome in 
the development administration which simply cannot be cured in the short run 
without a rigorous structural reform. Hence there is continuing scepticism 
concerning the result of promoting public participation in development in Thailand. 
As Samudavanija (1987) asserts:
‘Most government development plans and programmes emphasise to 
get rural people involved in the development process. In practice,
however, decisions on priorities, identification of felt needs, sitting,
etc., are made from the top down. Officials tend to perceive and 
define problems and needs according to their own education, urban 
backgrounds, and organizational policies, centralized and formulated 
by the elite in Bangkok.’ (p. 93).
These arguments correspond to the view of Rigg (1991) who claims that Thai 
bureaucratic structure Hoes not permit a bottom-up development process to operate 
easily, despite increasing demands for it. He argues that even though there is a
decentralisation of authority to provincial, district and local levels, as stated in the
last three Plans, the operational success of the idea is doubtful. By quoting
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Prasitrathsint (1987), he points out that local government units have remained tightly 
controlled by the centre. Two powerful ministries, the Ministry of the Interior which 
dominates the operation of the decentralisation policy, and the Ministry of Finance 
which controls the country’s budget, have been reluctant to bequeath their power to 
the local level. The flow of information still remains organisationally top-down 
rather than bottom-up (Rigg, 1991, p. 302).
3.5 Local Level Administration, Politics, and Popular Participation
Much of the discussion in the earlier sections of this chapter dealt with the overall 
characteristics of the administrative system in the Thai context. From the above 
discussion, it can be seen that penetration of the central administrative system has 
reached every level of Thai society, from nation (chaat) to province (changwat), 
from province to district (<amphoe), and from district to sub-district (tambon) and 
village (mooban). At the national, provincial, and district levels of the 
administration, it is quite clear that the system of governing these units strictly 
follows the rules designated by the central government in Bangkok, as the head of 
each of these units is a permanent civil servant appointed by the central government. 
Moreover, most officials concerned with administrative work are also permanent 
civil servants, who serve various central departments represented at each of these 
levels of the administration. The situation in the last two units of administration, 
tambon and mooban, differs greatly from those above, though they have been 
assimilated into the national administrative system. This is because their 
administrative arrangements are mainly on a voluntary basis, and their leaders are 
recruited through election. Although there are other types of administration 
categorised as local governing systems existing at different levels, they are not going 
to be discussed in detail here, as most of these local governments oversee only 
certain areas, mostly urban or semi-urban areas, which are not directly related to the 
focus of this study. Tfj£ main purpose of this section is to discuss in more detail the 
features of local level administration, especially at the tambon and mooban levels. 
However, as these two units are directed closely by the district, their linkages with
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the district administration cannot be neglected. The emphasis will also be on the 
extent of people's participation in the administration at these levels.
The district administration forms the principal local administrative arm of the state. 
It is the lowest administrative unit in which representatives of most central 
departments are present. The District Officer {nai amphoe), who is a high ranking 
permanent civil servant belonging to the Ministry of the Interior, is appointed by 
central government to oversee the overall administration of the district according to 
the law. According to the State Administration Act 1991, a District Officer must 
follow directives from the central government via the provincial government, and the 
commands and advice of the Governor of the province {phuwa ratchakaan 
changwat) within which the district is located (Atiphothi et al, 1993). There are 
several central departments, whose work is related, and who have their offices and 
representatives at the district level. These offices are headed by the most senior 
officer of each office. Though administratively these officers should follow their 
departmental lines of administration in Bangkok, they also fall under the authority of 
the nai amphoe who is in charge of all administrative activities at this level.
With respect to the implementation of rural development policies, four out of six 
principal ministries concerned with rural development planning — the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry 
Agriculture and Go-operatives — have their own representatives in the form of 
departments with statutory functions at the district level (Hirsch, 1989b; see also 
Hirsch, 1990). As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the District Development 
Committee (DDC) is the only planning body designated to be responsible for 
development planning duties, as well as to oversee the implementation of 
development projects within the district territorial boundary. This planning body 
encompasses the nai amphoe, the palad aawuso (Senior District Under-Secretary), 
and the heads of various concerned departments in the district, particularly the 
District Community Development Officer (pattanakaan amphoe), the District 
Agricultural Officer (kaset amphoe), the District Public Health Officer {sataranasuk 
amphoe), and the District Educational Officer {sueksaatikaan amphoe), who
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represent the four principal ministries primarily manipulating rural development 
policies (Khoumkhainaam et al., 1991). There are no outsiders represented on this 
committee. Therefore, it can be assumed that the committee manages its 
development duties in a conventional manner. Popular participation, either in 
planning or implementing development policy at this level, does not have it place at 
this level. The domination of the district administration extends clearly to the tambon 
and mooban, as many officials from the district office are entitled to the seats in the 
sub-district planning body and its supporting body — the sapha tambon and the Sub- 
district Rural Development Operational Committee (SRDOC). Furthermore, some of 
these ministries have officials who are assigned to be responsible for implementing 
development works at tambon and mooban levels. These include the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives represented by the Sub-district Agricultural Extension 
Officer (kaset tambon), the Ministry of Health represented by the Sub-district Public 
Health Officer (sataranasuk tambon), and the Ministry of the Interior represented by 
the Sub-district Community Development Officer (pattanakorn). These officials play 
important roles in the implementation of development policies at the tambon and 
mooban levels, both in line with their ministries’ directives and in integrated forms.
At the tambon and mooban levels, though the tambon official leader (kamnan) and 
the mooban official leader (phu yai ban) are considered to be official representatives 
of the central government who lead the administrative units and oversee all activities 
within their territorial administrative boundaries, they are not regarded as general or 
permanent civil servants (khaaratchakaan prajam). This is because their roles and 
status with respect to the administration differ to some extent from general civil 
servants who hold administrative posts at the higher levels (STU, 1983a). They are 
both recruited from within the individual tambon and mooban respectively, through a 
form of official election. According to present practice, a phu yai ban is elected by 
adult village members living in the government-determined mooban, from nominees 
within the mooban. kamnan however is elected by adult members of each tambon 
from nominated phu yai ban within the tambon (for the process of election see 
Rubin, 1974 and Moerman, 1979, though the present situation does differ slightly 
from what they illustrate). This means that all kamnan must be elected as phu yai
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ban first, before being a candidate for the position. Once a phu yai ban is appointed 
to the kamnan post, he/she still remains the head of the village he/she represents. 
Because they are elected from within their own communities, they must not only 
represent the government, but also their people. Their work as the heads of tambon 
and mooban is paid for by the government in the form of stipends rather than salaries 
that other officials receive. Their stipends are quite small when compared to their 
assigned roles, e.g. a newly recruited phu yai ban receives about 1,100 baht per 
month (approximately £28 per month).
The tasks assigned to kamnan and phu yai ban are time-consuming. They act as 
government representatives who head the tambon and mooban units of 
administration. At the same time, they also act as the official representatives of their 
people, in informing the government of their needs and problems. As official 
personnel, they should theoretically follow government directives to carry out and 
oversee any government activities undertaken at the tambon and mooban levels. 
There is a tremendous amount of work undertaken by 19 departments at these levels, 
with kamnan and phu yai ban being involved in varying degrees (see STU, 1983a, 
pp. 14-18). However, their main tasks include publicising government rules and 
other important information received from the district office to their people, allowing 
the people to make contact with government authorities, keeping peace and order 
within their territorial boundaries, assisting other officials in the completion of their 
work in tambon and mooban, overseeing and protecting state properties within the 
areas, and acting as primary sources of information for government in dealing with 
problems occurring in their administrative areas (STU, 1983a; Department of Local 
Administration, 1991). As representatives of the people in their administrative units, 
they are supposed to comprehend the needs of their people and the problems facing 
them, so that these problems and needs can be informed immediately and correctly to 
the government for taking further actions (STU, 1983a). Considering expectations
from both government and people, these leaders can be viewed as important
K\
mediators between the government and people, which are sometimes in conflict (see 
Moerman, 1979). This raises the question of how these local leaders divide their 
roles and power to deal with conflicting expectations, and what their stances are in
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such situations. Undoubtedly, differences exist in the roles played by different 
official leaders in dealing with such situations, which may also be influenced by 
several other factors. Among these factors, one cannot overlook the different needs 
among different groups of people within a tambon and a mooban, or even from the 
outside, which can influence the performance of these formal leaders and other 
actors (see Moerman, 1979; Keyes, 1979). This subject has only been discussed 
superficially in previous studies of local leadership in Thailand, especially with 
regard to development administration. In combination with the rapid changes in rural 
life towards commercialisation, in which competition over scarce resources is 
increasing, this subject warrants further investigation.
Under the recently introduced regulations which attempt to promote grassroots 
participation in development process, kamnan and phu yai ban are entitled to chair 
the planning bodies at the tambon and mooban levels, the sapha tambon and the 
Village Committee (VC), respectively. Actually, the sapha tambon has been 
established for a long time, but in a different structure from the present one, and was 
highly controlled by civil servants (see Kambhu, 1989; Ingavata, 1990).The change 
in the structure of sapha tambon which increases the power of local leaders took 
place quite recently in order to correspond to the introduction of the new concept of 
rural development planning. This concept is believed to promote the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to planning, by expecting that through the new structural reforms of the 
sapha tambon and the planning organisation of the country as a whole, rural 
development planning will meet the real needs of grassroots. This is because the 
proposition of problems and needs starts at the lowest level planning body, the VC, 
and then proceeds through sapha tambon (for detail of their operation see Pongquan, 
1992; Turton, 1987). Through this process it is assumed that information concerning 
the real and perceived needs of people at the village level will be gathered accurately 
by the phu yai ban and his colleagues in the VC, as they are the closest leaders to the 
grassroots as well as. being part of the grassroots community themselves. Similarly, 
by appointing the kamnan to chair the sapha tambon and including all phu yai ban 
and other qualified villagers to be members, the process of screening problems and 
needs, and formulating the development plan in this very first step, will produce a
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result that represents the real needs of the grassroots. This assumption seems to be 
logical if  we consider the organisational structure of both VC and sapha tambon as 
institutions which are numerically dominated by local leaders who come from 
grassroots communities. However, the fact that the functions of these institutions do 
not simply depend on their organisational structures, is often seen as an obstacle to 
its effectiveness according to the above assumption. Among factors which must be 
taken into consideration are; the representativeness of these leaders with regard to 
their communities, the cultural or traditional dimension of paternalism in assessing 
needs and problems of the communities, and the influence of higher level officials 
who act as advisors and play dominant roles in the Sub-district Rural Development 
Operational Committees (SRDOC). In addition, there are questions relating to the 
understanding or perception of officials with regard to the concept of popular 
participation in development, and the structure of the planning organisation at the 
higher levels, which seems to overcontrol the planning process at the bottom level in 
various ways. Finally, questions also arise with respect to the understanding of local 
people themselves regarding their rights and power in participating in the 
development process. The following discussion will highlight some previous 
findings and arguments related to these questions.
Questions regarding the extent to which the local official leaders (i.e. kamnan and 
phu yai ban) represent people within their administrative boundaries in providing 
information to and requesting help from the central government through 
development process, are highly debatable. Rigg (1991) argues that these two 
positions tend to be held by the economically rich and politically powerful members 
of rural communities. Therefore, their perceptions about needs and problems may 
differ from those of the majority of villagers. This again depends on how the 
information is gathered and used in the process of problem and project identification 
at these levels, as it is more likely to be influenced by the aspirations of some 
villagers or cliques who are powerful and influential. Moreover, the decision-making 
process both in village or sapha tambon meetings, may also affect the outcome of 
project identification, and there is widespread evidence that the decision-making 
process in these two levels is highly authoritarian (Turton, 1987). Arguments relating
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to the cultural dimension of local people and their reluctance to express their 
disagreement (Rigg, 1991; Wirajnibhawan, 1987), are often combined with those 
that highlight their familiarity with the system whereby they receive development 
projects as ‘a gift’ from the government. Although the perception that development 
activities as ‘a gift’ has been argued as changing among grassroots in some rural 
communities in southern Thailand (see Vandergeest, 1991), its influence still 
remains very strong in general. In this context, decisions relating to development 
projects may be highly dependent on the will of village leaders, the influence of 
powerful community members, and the understanding of those leaders with regard to 
the needs and problems of the community.
The influence of officials who work closely with rural communities and who have 
their roles in sapha tambon and in SRDOC, also forms an important issue related to 
the practice of people's participation. It is argued that problems and needs are often 
identified by these officials. Even if they are initially identified by the leaders, these 
officials are still influential in formulating proposals through their roles in sapha 
tambon and in SRDOC. In association with this argument, there is the claim that the 
domination of these officials in terms of educational qualifications and social status, 
has allowed them to have a great influence in directing development planning, which 
may in fact deviate the original idea (see Brahmanee, 1989; Ingavata, 1990, p. ISO- 
131).
There are further questions about the uniformity in the understanding and the 
misconception of the participatory idea of popular participation among concerned 
government officials. Ingavata (1990) mentions: ‘For the government, participation 
was measured by the use of voting procedures, ... , and the formality of group 
formation’, which are not always the accurate measurements of the effective 
application of the idea. Others argue that the term ‘popular participation’ itself is 
unclear in meaning y/hen it is translated into Thai language as ‘kan mii (having) suan 
(part) ruam (common, mutual) khong (of) prachachon (the people)’ which can be 
interpreted in different ways (see Turton, 1987, footnote p. 10). This Thai phrase 
tends to be understood as a means or instrument to incorporate people in activities or
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projects already laid out by the state (Hirsch, 1990, p. 190-191). These 
misconceptions about the concept of popular participation may mislead its 
application. Finally, the problem of achieving effective local participation in the 
development process may be caused by a lack of understanding about this concept 
and a lack of awareness of its importance. A study by Pakting et al. (1989) in 
villages in Nakhom Sawan Province in the northern region of Thailand shows a low 
degree of participation in development projects laid down by the government, even 
though this research defined participation in a broad and conventional sense. Based 
on his experience in administrative work, Brahmanee (1989) mentions that villagers 
and their leaders do not have a clear understanding about their roles under the new 
concept of development. Moreover, they lack the skill to identify and formulate a 
proper development project that can be submitted to the higher level planning 
bodies. He blamed this on the government’s failure to clarify the concept, and how it 
could be applied. This argument is analogous to the view of Akin Rabibhadana and 
Andrew Turton who see that the government has not made serious efforts to promote 
popular participation in practice, so that the effect on local leaders and people has 
been minimal (Turton, 1987, p. 12-13).
It can be concluded from the discussion made in this section so far that the tambon 
and mooban administration in Thailand have been assimilated to a high degree into 
the wider administrative system of the state. Though their leaders, kamnan and phu 
yai ban, do not have the same social status as higher ranking official administrators 
in their relationships with villagers, the wider administrative system seems to have 
dominated them to a large extent in their administrative performances. When conflict 
between official expectations and the expectations of villagers emerge, they are 
placed in a difficult position to justify their roles in favour of both sides. This raises 
the question of to what extent these leaders represent grassroots opinion when 
interacting with the state administration. The introduction of the new concept of 
development, which: claims to encourage people's participation through the 
organisational structure purposively adjusted, seems to have had little effects so far, 
on the strategies employed in the development process. This is due to several factors 
which may be categorised as socio-cultural factors, socio-political factors, and
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structural factors, which frustrate the effectiveness of the application of this new 
concept. These factors may obstruct grassroots involvement in the policy process, as 
well as change the way the concept is applied in a practical sense.
3.6 Grassroots Participation in Rural Thailand: Some Concurring 
Evidence
Despite the emergence of several obstacles to the promotion of popular participation 
in the development process in rural Thailand, there is also evidence of grassroots 
movements in undertaking development activities and in interacting with state-led 
development activities. This evidence demonstrates the grassroots attempts to 
identify their needs and pursue their right to make changes in their societies. Their 
movements may occur traditionally or with assistance from outsiders, mainly non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) and local traditional institutions. This section 
will review some findings about grassroots movements in various aspects of 
development activities in Thailand. The presentation will be divided into two parts. 
The first part will focus on grassroots participation in dealing with development 
activities in general. The second part will emphasise their movements with regard to 
local natural resource management.
3.6.1 Participation in Development Project
The first type of grassroots participation, participation in development activities, is 
not uncommon in rural Thailand. To understand this type of participation, in-depth 
studies involving intensive interviews with several groups and participant 
observation of selected cases are needed. However, these study methods are not 
widely used among Thai researchers. A study by Sopart Pongquan devoted solely to 
this subject and a collective study under the theme of Popular Participation Project of 
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), are among 
very few studies of this kind (Pongquan, 1988; Turton, 1987).
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In Pongquan’s report entitled ‘Participatory Development in Villages of Central 
Thailand’, several projects of different features and with different outcomes highlight 
a very good source of information about popular participation at village level in the 
Central Region of Thailand (Pongquan, 1988). Two of the cases in this report will be 
reviewed here as examples of projects with different features of participation and 
different outcomes. These two projects are the Pump Irrigation Project and the Road 
Repair Project.
The Pump Irrigation Project was initiated by a phuyai ban who saw the success of a 
project of this type in a nearby area, and was eager to bring a similar project to his 
village. This case occurred shortly before the introduction of the new concept of 
development to the planning system in Thailand. The phu yai ban and his colleagues 
tried hard to propose the project to relevant agencies, but it was ignored several times 
until he approached a local politician who had a close relationship with a relative and 
belonged to one of the ruling political parties at that time. When the project was 
approved and began to be implemented, there emerged a dispute between the phu yai 
ban clique and a clique led by a rival within the village; this dispute later spread 
throughout the village. The dispute was rooted from the phu yai ban's claim that the 
project was a result of his personal connection with high ranking officials, which 
provoked aversion from his rival. In response to the claim, his rival announced that 
the project was approved through the normal planning process, not because of the 
competence of the phu yai ban and the special connection he had with high ranking 
officials. Moreover, he4 accused the phu yai ban of trying to change the project 
design in favour of him and his followers; the accusation was later found to be true, 
and the project was held up while further investigations were made. In the meantime, 
the phu yai ban in question died of illness, and his rival was elected to become the 
new phu yai ban. The new phu yai ban continued to pursue the project and worked 
more carefully than his predecessor in implementing it in order to show his 
competence. This included a form of people's participation in redesigning the project 
to distribute benefits among villagers, and organising the beneficiaries’ group to 
assist the implementation and to undertake the management task after the 
construction,was completed. Moreover, whenever problems emerged with regard to
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the management of water allocation, rather than working alone, he tried to use a 
participatory approach to problem solving, so that the water users were satisfied. The 
project was very successful, both in the material and management sense.
The second project was dealing with the repair of the village road which was 
originally constructed through a government fund, but became damaged due to poor 
maintenance. A few attempts had been made through the sapha tambon to find funds 
to repair it, but none had been successful. Eventually, the people of the village 
expressed their need to repair the road themselves, as they were agitated with these 
refusals from the government. In the beginning the kamnan of this tambon, who also 
served as the official leader of this village, did not make much effort to seek support 
from other sources as he should have done. Instead, an elder who led the village 
temple lay committee {kammakaan wat) and one of his leading followers took the 
initiative over the issue, as the direction of the road was leading to the temple, and its 
repair was considered to be beneficial to the temple. They initiated the discussion 
with the kamnan, and the kamnan bestowed his support but refused to act as the 
mobiliser due to his work load and his fear of uncertainty in achieving success. The 
kamnan also tried to avoid possible difficulties because of his conflict with the 
wealthiest and most powerful landlord in the village. Eventually, the elders’ group 
decided to solve the matter under the auspices of the abbot of the village temple from 
whom they received strong support. Through his highly respectable status, the abbot 
called on the villagers for any necessary contributions, as well as invoking the 
blessing of Lord BuddHa. This special act from the abbot meant that no one in the 
village, including the powerful landlord, could refuse. Together with the tireless 
efforts of the elder and his supporters in playing their roles as liaison persons by 
making personal contacts with different people who were in conflict, the project 
received strong support from all groups in the village. The wealthiest landlord 
himself not only contributed a considerable amount of resources, but also sought 
support from the outside. At the same time, the liaison persons also launched a 
campaign soliciting contributions from outside the village. The District Officer was 
impressed by the attempts, and he then decided to offer his personal support, as well 
as seeking further help from concerned agencies. The achievement of the project was
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very impressive. There was some degree of conflict between the wealthiest landlord 
and the organising committee during the implementation of the project, but the 
conflict was resolved through the mediation of the abbot, and did not deter from its 
ultimate success.
These two projects illustrate the success of development projects which differ in 
various aspects. Their differences can be seen from their initiation, the actors 
involved and their patterns of interactions, and the basis on which the projects were 
implemented. However, both indicate how powerful people’s participation is in the 
completion of projects if  the participation occurs willingly. It also illustrates the roles 
the different actors played in inspiring and organising community members, and the 
utilisation of indigenous knowledge and traditional institutions in organising the 
villagers and in achieving their success.
There is other evidence which illustrates the power of popular participation and its 
influence on development projects or programmes in other areas of Thailand. The 
survival of a group of farmers confronting production and marketing problems in a 
district of Chachoengsao Province in the central region of Thailand was partly due to 
their collective efforts in helping themselves, after a government-established 
farmers’ group, or ‘klum kasettakorn’, failed to achieve its original aims, is one 
example (Turton, 1987, pp. 56-58). The failure of a state-established rice bank 
(thanakhaan khao) followed by the success of a new institution with similar 
functions, but organised4 by the farmers themselves in a village in Northern Thailand, 
is another illustration of the ability of farmers to organise themselves, as this self­
organised institution was more suited to them than government-led projects (Turton, 
1987, p. 62). Though the outputs of these projects, as influenced by active local 
participation, are mixed in response to their original objectives, the outcomes in 
forms of impacts on local people are more likely to be beneficial to the grassroots, 
and the projects are more likely to be sustained as compared to the inflexible 
government projects.
116
3.6.2 Participation in Natural Resource Management
Natural resource management is an area in which popular participation is often 
noted. The fact that the quality of natural resources is important for the livelihoods of 
rural people has created patterns of human-environment relationship which are 
dynamic and symbolise the adaptation of human society in maintaining the resources 
they use. The patterns of human-environment relationship appear in forms of social 
organisations which are noteworthy for students of popular participation. In 
Thailand, several findings show that such organisations emerge in long-settled rural 
communities throughout the country, particularly in remote areas. The following 
cases are examples of this type of organisations found in different regions of the 
country: the Muang Faai irrigation organisation in Northern Region; the mangrove 
management organisation in Southern Region; and the forest conservation group in 
Northeastern Region.
The Muang Faai irrigation system is a small-scale irrigation system traditionally 
organised within the rural community. It is still commonly practised in many places 
in Northern Thailand, and the practice can be traced back over 700 years 
(Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991). It has been common among rural settlers in hilly 
areas for the purpose of irrigating their paddy fields, and covers over 60 per cent of 
the total irrigated land in Chiang Mai province alone. All activities concerned with 
the irrigation system afe organised by villagers, who can be from more than one 
community. These include selecting sites to build small dams, constructing and 
maintaining dams and ditches, allocating water among users, setting regulations, and 
solving disputes among water users. These activities are overseen by committee 
members who are elected on a term basis, which is said to be very effective as they 
do care about their performance and their reputation (Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 
1991). The management system forms a combination of ritual, belief and traditional 
forms of democracy. The system is also observed to be dynamic in order to adapt to 
changes occurring within the communities. This dynamism and ability to adapt are 
argued to be the main contribution to its survival, and is supported by the fact that
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the system has survived for several centuries. It is only recently that the system has 
been worsened by changes in both physical and social environments within and 
surrounding their communities. Some of these changes occurred through the general 
transformation of rural societies towards a cash economy, and others are related to 
the ignorance of concerned government bodies about the effectiveness of the 
system. This led to an attempt to change the system to the more ‘updated irrigation 
technology’ combined with a so-called ‘modem system’ of management.
The second example of this type of organisation is taken from a mangrove 
management project undertaken in a coastal community in Trang province, Southern 
Thailand. This was a community-based management project which was associated 
with the Yad Fon Association (YFA), a local NGO based in the province and 
established for the purpose of helping coastal villagers to improve their quality of 
life. The community where the project took place was considered to be among the 
poorest in the region and their small-scale fishing was in decline. It was therefore in 
the interest of the association to provide assistance, and so the project was initiated 
in 1985 as a part of the larger project of the YFA. In the beginning, the villagers 
hesitated because they felt that they were powerless to overcome their problems, 
which they saw as too difficult and complicated. The YFA sent its development 
workers to interact with the villagers in working out their problems and identifying 
activities to be undertaken, as well as upgrading their managerial skills. Several 
activities were established as a result of mutual planning between the YFA 
development workers ‘and the villagers, including activities for empowering 
individual villagers and the community, creating a savings group, improving 
intervillage network, and developing leadership skills for potential leaders, etc. 
Though the establishment of these activities was guided by the YFA development 
workers, during the process of implementing this project the idea of local resource 
management emerged within the community itself. The idea received a positive 
response from the YFA, and they worked together to start a project for mangrove 
rehabilitation and coastal fishery resource protection, as these issues were seen to be 
related to fishery conditions in the area. Through the co-ordination of the YFA, other 
concerned government officials were invited to join the project as working partners
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in a participatory approach emphasised in the project. Through a series of meetings,
YFA staff, concerned government officials and community leaders jointly produced
a plan which covered a series of activities to pursue the project’s goals. Moreover,
♦
the community leaders and YFA staff had tried hard to discuss the project with 
villagers as well. Traditional institutions, particularly religious institutions, were also 
emphasised in the organisation. The most important activity resulting from the joint 
plan was mangrove planting which involved several tasks, such as site selection, 
seed collection, planting, and monitoring. All these tasks were undertaken by 
community members and were organised at times which suited them. Management 
rules were also developed in order to maintain and use the mangrove trees in a 
sustainable manner. This project was very successful and led to the development of 
additional activities in the area (see Rittibhonbhun et al., 1993).
The last case is about the movement of a forest conservation group in a national 
forest reserve area of Dong Yai in Buriram province, Northeastern Region. The case 
was popular and controversial, as it had appeared in most Thai newspapers and in 
foreign newspapers for a few months in 1991. The case involved a well-known 
Buddhist monk, Phra Prajak Khutajitto, a forest monk and foremost follower of the 
late Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, the most well known philosophical monk in modem Thai 
Buddhism. Phra Prajak was involved in the movement as the philosopher and a 
leading supporter of forest settlers who had been opposed to the government policy 
to relocate them outside their settlement area. The government intended to use the 
land which was labelled as ‘degraded forest’ for planting eucalyptus trees for 
commercial purposes. This policy threatened the security and livelihoods of forest 
settlers, who had been settled in the area long before it was included as a part of the 
reserve forest. Indeed, some of these villagers were brought into the forest by the 
military for national security purposes, during the period of communist insurgency in 
the region. Phra Prajak took up the cause of forest settlers in opposition to the state’s 
policy to promote monoculture of eucalyptus, and combined it with his idea of 
‘social action as Buddhist truths’ and his alternative development philosophy which 
emphasised decentralisation of power, local resource management, and sustainable 
cultural practices. As a consequence, while he was camping in the forest he received
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strong support from the majority of the forest settlers, not only in the area where he 
encamped, but also expanded to other adjacent hamlets and to some NGO workers. 
At the same time, his movement displeased the civil and military authorities who 
supported the state policy. In due course, Phra Prajak was arrested twice, together 
with some of his followers, and charged with encroaching the Dong Yai forest. 
However, because he was a popular monk, he was forced by the government through 
the highest Buddhist monk institution in Thailand, the Maha Dhera Samakhom, to 
leave the priesthood and stop his popular movement, instead of being imprisoned. 
Although the actual achievement of his movement was not great, the movement had 
brought about many changes to the way grassroots movements were viewed in the 
history of conservation movements in the country as a whole (see Taylor, 1993 for 
details).
These cases are only a few examples to substantiate the existence of popular 
participation in development with respect to natural resource management in local 
areas in Thailand. The purpose of bringing these cases into discussion is partly to 
illustrate that even though the situation in rural Thailand has been presented as being 
an obstacle to grassroots movements and popular participation, there exist some 
grounds and culture which are bases for popular movements and popular 
participation. The three examples presented here demonstrate cases with mixed 
backgrounds remaining in rural societies which are promising for enhancing popular 
participation at local levels. However, the success or failure of their application 
depends largely on whether concerned bodies recognise or ignore such valuable 
elements. The first and last cases demonstrate how these important elements were 
ignored, and create a negative impact on local people, whereas in the second case, 
the situation was reversed.
3.7 Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter so far illustrates that the system of administration in 
Thailand after King Rama V underwent a series of reforms, has been dominated by a 
centralisation of power in Bangkok. The administration is characterised by
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paternalism and hierarchy; features which are descended from a long history of 
relationships between rulers and people. These characteristics form part of the 
dominant values in the Thai administrative system and of bureaucrats who remain 
the most powerful group in the state; some academics consider the system as a 
‘bureaucratic polity’ (Riggs, 1966). With respect to development administration, 
planning and implementation of development policies have traditionally been 
completely controlled by the central government and its regional arms of provincial 
and district governments.
However, during 1980s the concept of rural development was introduced and was 
followed by reforms in the structure of rural development administration. The new 
concept of rural development focuses more on grassroots participation in the 
development process through local level organisations, both at mooban and tambon 
levels, known as Village Committee and sapha tambon. By regulating these two 
institutions to comprise local leaders and members from within each grassroots 
community, they are expected to function effectively in formulating development 
plans to meet the real and felt needs of the local population. Nevertheless, questions 
have emerged concerning the application this new ideology in Thailand. These 
questions relate to different issues ranging from the cultural values deeply rooted in 
Thai society as a whole, the conceptions of this ideology among concerned officials, 
and the attention of the officials in promoting this ideology, to the suitability of the 
newly adjusted administrative structure itself.
In spite of the above potential difficulties, a precedent for active grassroots 
movements in rural communities in different regions of Thailand does exist. These 
movements demonstrate mixed results, depending on the types of outside 
intervention, especially from concerned government bodies and NGOs. More 
importantly, it should be noted from the cases illustrated in this chapter, and in other 
cases elsewhere, that the involvement of different types of local leaders, especially 
charismatic leaders, in these movements are a key factor in determining their 
success. Under a wide range of issues related to the achievement of grassroots
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participation, this study is interested to explore further the socio-cultural and political 
issues related to the administration of common property resource management at the 




BAN NUA PHRU AND BAN BON LAY
4.1 Introduction
‘People in Ban Khao Suai do not catch fish as much as we do. They grow 
rice quite a lot, since land there is very fertile and water is not as sour 
(acidic) as here.’ (An elder in Ban Nua Phru)
‘People in Bueng Yai are professional fishers. They have been living on 
fish ever since. One fisherman there uses hundreds of traps, and several 
hua (pieces) of floating nets. They even come up here during the flooding 
season. We here only catch fish for consumption. Only a small excess is 
sold. We cannot do fishing full time here as there has no enough fish to be 
caught for the whole year round.’ (A fisherman in Ban Thung Samet)
‘Life here had been very tough. Before the road was built a few years ago, 
we had to travel several hours by long-tailed boats (reua haang yao) to 
Thung Yaang market to buy necessary items. Officers rarely came here. 
We lived on our own.’ (An elder in Ban Thung Samet)
‘Bueng Yai Lake used to be very rich in fish, and we have enough land to 
grow rice. Thirty or forty years ago, no one would imagine the life we are 
facing today. Because it was easy to live here, villagers did not think to 
seek for other resources or to move out to other places, rather people from 
other communities preferred to move into this community. Therefore, the 
population has increased rapidly. But life has been changing very much in 
the last twenty years or so, mainly through more and easier contacts with 
outside...Patterns of consumption have changed very much. People need 
much more money today than in the past. They do every thing they can to 
earn more to meet their increasing needs...The fish is scarce now not only 
because of environmental problems, but also because we exploit it so 
much.’ (A key informant in Bueng Yai Community)
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The above remarks illustrate how people in different communities view their own 
communities and other communities within the Phru Thung Samet and Bueng Yai Lake 
ecosystem. They describe the relationships between people in different communities and 
surrounding natural environments which differ across the ecosystem. They also reflect the 
changes occurring in the communities, their relationships with the wider society and the 
consequences on their lives. The large area covered by Phru Thung Samet and Bueng Yai 
Lake ecosystem provides variations in its physical characteristics, its resource 
endowment, and its accessibility from outside. These variations influence the 
characteristics of villages settling in different parts of the ecosystem. Clearly there are 
some similarities shared among rural communities in the ecosystem and with other rural 
communities elsewhere in Thailand. However, differences in their physical settings, their 
access to natural resources and their historical interactions with the outside world are also 
influential in the evolution of each community, and the present forms and structures of 
the communities. Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are no exception. Although they are 
located near to each other, they are situated in different parts or ecotypes of the 
ecosystem, and have different histories of settlement and contact with outside. Their 
similarities and differences are important for the understanding of community 
organisations and their relationships with natural resources management.
Based on the field investigation made in this study and in the PSU-CDS project on 
floodplain fisheries, together with information available from secondary sources, this 
chapter intends to describe and compare the similarities and the differences in the 
backgrounds of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay where most of this research was 
undertaken. The presentation will cover their physical and historical settings, as well as 
their social, economic, and political structures. It will also consider the relationships 
between these different aspects with regards to natural resource exploitation and 
management in these two villages.
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4.2 Physical and Historical Settings
4.2.1 Physical Settings
a) Ban Nua Phru
Ban Nua Phru is located on the bank of Khlong Thung Yaang (Thung Yaang River) at the 
north-west part of Phru Thung Samet. It is about 6 kilometres from the nearest town of 
Thung Yaang where the headquarters of Thung Yaang district is located. The village 
covers a total area of about 3,500 rai or around 56 square kilometres. Over seventy per 
cent of the area is floodplain, used mainly for cultivating swamp rice and grazing 
animals. About ten per cent of the area is low lying swamp covered partly by swamp 
forest (paa samet). This low-lying swamp is important for the community, as it is full of 
sedge grasses, especially krajoot which is valuable for handicrafts commonly practised in 
this area. Krajoot is abundant in the low-lying swamp of Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, the 
low-lying swamp also forms the main fishing ground for the village population. 
Administratively the village is one of ten villages in Tambon Thung Samet, Thung Yaang 
district, Nakhon Si Thammarat province. Although the distance between the village and 
the town of Thung Yaang is not far in physical terms, travelling from the village to the 
town was not convenient until thirteen years ago when the road between Thung Yaang 
town and Ban Thung Samet was improved. Prior to this improvement, the road was 
poorly built and only seasonally accessible. Additionally, people had to depend on 
limited transportation privately run by local residents through modified pick-up trucks 
(rot saung theao) or motorcycles. Most people travelled to the town of Thung Yaang 
either by their own long-tailed boats or by a larger boat service operated twice daily along 
Khlong Thung Yaang and other water channels. Due to these communication difficulties, 
the village was regarded by officials as one of the most remote villages in this area, and 
was rarely visited. The villagers also had limited contact with the market prior to the road 
improvement. These conditions isolated of the village from outside penetration, both by 
the state and the market.
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b) Ban Bon Lav and Bueng Yai Community
Ban Bon Lay is part of Bueng Yai community located on the west bank of Bueng Yai 
lake. It is located 15 kilometres from Khuan Mangkhud town where the Khuan 
Mangkhud district headquarters is situated. The village covers an area of about 1,800 rai 
or about 29 square kilometres. About forty per cent of this area is used for agricultural 
production, mostly rice cultivation. The residential area occupies about six per cent of the 
total area; the remainder is either covered by low-lying swamp, swamp forest or fallow 
land which is partly used for grazing animals. Sedge grasses can also be found in some 
parts of the low-lying swamp in this village, but the availability of krajoot grasses is 
limited and far below the demand for the growing handicraft making in the village. Some 
villagers grow their own krajoot, but they still need to import much of it from 
communities in the swamp. The swamp also provides a fishing ground for the villagers, 
but it is less important than the lake as most fishing activities in the swamp are limited to 
only a few months of the year. Administratively Bueng Yai community comprises seven 
villages and is divided between two sub-districts or tambon; Tambon Bueng Yai and 
Tambon Khuan Phanang (see Map 4). Ban Bon Lay belongs to Tambon Bueng Yai, 
which includes five of the seven villages in the community. Contacts with outside 
communities have been much better established in Bueng Yai community and Ban Bon 
Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. The community is now easily accessible through a good 
metalled road connecting it with Khuan Mangkhud town and extending to other nearby 
towns. The road was first built about thirty years ago and it was metalled about ten years 
after that. Even before this road was built, people used to travel extensively by boats 
across the lake and through water channels. Travelling to the town of Khuan Mangkhud 
and other towns used to be by boat to Ban Tha Rua where access to road and train has 
long been established. The difference in contacts with outside and wider communities 
between Ban Nua Phru and Bueng Yai community, and hence Ban Bon Lay, is one of 
the important factors behind the broader difference between these two villages, which 
will be discussed later in this thesis.
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c) Climatic Conditions
The climatic conditions of these two villages are very similar, as they are located close to 
each other, and their proximity to the eastern coastline of southern Thailand is also of a 
comparable distance. Like other areas in southern Thailand, the village climatic 
conditions are influenced by monsoons. Though there are generally two seasons, dry 
season and rainy season, the monsoon influence makes the dry season less apparent than 
the rainy season. From February to April the weather is generally quite dry. From May 
onward, the coming of the south-west monsoon brings rains to the area. The rainfall 
continues at a moderate rate until September. Then the coming of the north-east 
monsoon, beginning in September, increases precipitation dramatically and often causes 
flooding, especially in low-lying areas in which these villages are situated. The heavy 
rains continue until January. The average rainfall of the area, as measured at a station near 
Khuan Mangkhud town, was 1,751.4 millimetres per year between 1980 and 1989, with 
over sixty per cent of this amount measured between September and January (CORIN 
and FEKU, 1994). The average temperature was 29.5 degrees Celsius with the highest 
often found in April, but the variation in temperature is generally not significant 
throughout the year.
4.2.2 Historical Settings
Differences in historical settings between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are also 
significant. There are two major areas of their historical differences which need to be 
considered in relation to this study — their settlements and their contacts with outside.
a) Ban Nua Phru
Ban Nua Phru can be considered a newly settled village. From several discussions with 
elders and key informants, it is quite clear that the first settlement in this village began
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around eighty years ago. The first group of settlers came from Ban Joot Ngaam, a 
neighbouring village to the east (see Map 2). They found the area was suitable for 
conversion to rice fields which they did not have enough of in their old village. At that 
time, having rice fields was crucially important for household food security, as the 
economy of a rural community as this village depended almost exclusively on their own 
production. At the same time, being located in the floodplain closed to the low-lying 
swamp allowed them to engage in fishing. This pioneer group of settlers comprised six 
families. They first settled on the bank of Khlong Thung Yaang close to the place where 
the village temple, Wat Nua Phru, is now situated. When they decided to stay 
permanently, they started to clear the land. They first began with clearing the more 
elevated land for housing and growing some field crops. Later they extended to the low- 
lying land for rice cultivation. They worked together and divided squatter land (teedin 
jabjaung) among them equally. During this time, some of their relatives (yaat pee naung) 
and close companions (phakphuak or kloe) came to join them. When the community was 
growing, they started to think about building a temple. The temple was then founded 
about ten years after the settlement. At that time, there were only about twenty 
households settled in this community, and all of them came from Ban Joot Ngaam and its 
neighbouring village of Ban Dong Joot. The foundation of the temple was led by an elder 
who was among the pioneer settlers and respected by the community as their leader. This 
man was later appointed by the state to be the first phu yai ban of the village when the 
village was firstly formalised into the state administrative systern about forty five years 
ago. This point is raised here to illustrate the connection of these pioneer settlers with the 
present leadership structure of the village, as it is important for the understanding of the 
current pattern of the organisation of the community. In fact, the first leader of the 
community is the grandfather of the present abbot ichao aawaat) of Wat Nua Phru. It is 
also important to note that all males who were pioneer settlers were regarded as leaders of 
the community at that time. One of them was selected to be the second phu yai ban of the 
community after the retirement of the first phu yai ban. The present village formal elder 
(phu song khunnawut) is a son of this second phu yai ban.
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During the early period of its settlement, there was very limited contact with the outside. 
Most of the contacts they had were with their old communities, as some of their relatives 
and their companions remained there. Additionally, they also had close contact with a 
rice growing community called Ban Khao Suai located at the eastern edge of the swamp 
in Hua Sai district. This occurred through the old connection which the leader of this 
village at that time had with a leading member of Ban Khao Suai. Because rice growing 
was not yet well established at the beginning of the settlement and the availability of rice 
from their old communities was insufficient, an attempt was made in contacting Ban 
Khao Suai to exchange rice for field crops and fish cultivated in this community. Through 
this contact, the relationship between this community and Ban Khao Suai grew even 
closer than before, and led to some intermarriages between their children, with most new 
couples settling in Ban Nua Phru.
Contacts with officials and towns were even more limited. As the village was not 
formally recognised as a separate village until about forty five years ago, officials hardly 
ever visited. Even after the village was formally established, the inconvenience of 
transportation seemed to be the main excuse officials used for not visiting. Only school 
teachers came regularly on their duties during that time, but their roles were limited to 
educational missions for children, whilst their influence on the village administration was 
limited and indirect. Consequently, the village had been left to run almost independently 
from state interference until the road connection to the, village was made possible. 
Contacts with towns followed in the same manner. Villagers only visited to the town of 
Thung Yaang, which is only a few kilometres away, to sell their small excess products in 
exchange for other necessary goods. This happened only once or twice a month for most 
households. Contacts with other towns were even more limited. Only a few households 
had experience of visiting towns far away during that time, since most of them depended 
very little on towns for their living. Their living conditions were very basic. However, 
marked changes started to appear in the last two decades, when the road connection was 
established and mains electricity was also connected. Most state-led development projects 
undertaken in the village happened during this time. Even so, most households nowadays
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are still highly dependent on produce available within the village for their daily 
consumption.
b) Ban Bon Lav and Bueng Yai Community
The settlement in Ban Bon Lay is believed to have taken place a long time ago. It 
emerged as result of an expansion of Bueng Yai community due to the increase in its 
population. Though there is no evidence concerning the time Bueng Yai community was 
first settled, a discussion with a prominent elder together with other evidence supports the 
view that it is one of the oldest communities in this area. This includes the age of the 
main community temple, Wat Bueng Yai, which is over three hundred and seventy years 
old, according to a written document available in the temple. There is also a written 
document published by the main provincial school in Patthalung province in 1935, which 
included a story related to the development of the area. According this document, Bueng 
Yai community had already grown to be a small town over one hundred years ago. In 
1907 the town was designated as the headquarters of Khuan Mangkhud district for a short 
period, before it was moved to another town nearby and later to the present location 
(Rongrian Patthalung, 1935). One of the main factors behind the growth of Bueng Yai 
community was its location on the bank of Bueng Yai lake, at a point that is easily 
accessible to other inland communities and towns located around the Songkhla Lake to 
the west and the north-west. At the time when road transportation was limited, many 
communities settling on the eastern side of the lake often travelled by boats to Bueng Yai 
before making connection with other inland destinations to the west and the north-west 
of the lake. The location of the community was also seen as being prosperous due to its 
richness of natural resources, especially fish and krajoot. As a result, a significant number 
of people migrated to settle in the community, which enhanced the expansion of its 
population and residential area. This expansion has been most marked in the last seventy 
years. The number of households has increased from around four hundred households 
seventy years ago to about eight hundred households thirty five years ago, and one 
thousand four hundred and forty two households at the time of this study. Accordingly,
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the number of administrative villages drawn from the community has also changed from 
two villages fifty years ago to seven villages at the present. Now the community as a 
whole is very crowded. Most of the residential area appears like a slum area in the middle 
of the city.
The community also has been long exposed to outside. Contacts with the state have been 
much better established than in Ban Nua Phru. As mentioned earlier, the state located the 
district headquarters in this community due to its growth and its geographical 
significance. Even after the withdrawal of the district headquarters the interactions 
between the community and the state have continued to a large extent. Apart from the 
provision of infrastructure, especially roads and mains electricity, many state agencies 
have conducted their projects of various forms in this community under the label of 
development projects. In many cases the community was assigned top priority for 
allocation of development projects and was targeted under the ‘rural development poverty 
eradicating scheme’ (Suphakason, 1993). Several local organisations were established at 
different times. These include savings co-operatives, housewives' groups, fishermen's 
groups, handicraft development groups, community self-defence groups, etc. Though the 
achievements of these projects have been mixed, inevitably they have had an impact on 
the community, either directly or indirectly. It is not my intention to discuss the details of 
these impacts in this study. However, it is worth noting that through these long term 
interactions the community organisation has been moulded from their original traditional 
arrangement.
The community’s contacts with the market appear to have happened earlier than in Ban 
Nua Phru. The exchange of local produce, especially fish and mats, for cash and for other 
products, began even before the extension of the road from Ban Tha Rua to the 
community. However, they have been more profound and more extensive after the 
construction of the metalled road connected with Khuan Mangkhud town was completed 
in 1974. The more convenient transportation has allowed for the improvement of market 
links which led to the increase in volume of goods exchanged between the community
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and the market. Considering the flow of products from the community alone, available 
evidence indicates that fish trading has grown significantly, and the system of 
measurement started to change from volume measurement to weight measurement after 
this road improvement. The growth of fish trading and the change in the system of 
measurement reflect the expansion of fish market for fishermen in this community and 
the adaptation they made to deal with measurement system common to the trading system 
outside the community. The expansion of the market has also increased demand for 
handicrafts from krajoot, and enhanced the development of its production patterns. 
Through support received from the Ministry of Industry’s Local Industrial Promotion 
Unit and the Ministry of the Interior’s Department of Community Development, several 
other products from krajoot have been developed, mostly for outside markets. The 
community’s connection with mains electricity happened shortly after the road was 
metalled, and marked another important breakthrough in the relationship of the 
community with the market. Many consumption goods, especially electric appliances, 
have increasingly been imported into the community. These changes have meant an 
increase in the community’s dependence on a market economy, which in turn has 
increased the demand for resources used as means of production (for a detailed discussion 
about the change towards a market economy and its consequences, see for example, 
Sahlins, 1974; Parry and Bloch, 1989). The marked decline in fishing in this community 
has been strongly determined by these changes. Also, the community now depends highly 
on other communities in the swamp for its supply of krajoot, as demand for krajoot 
increases due to an expansion of the handicraft market.
4.3 Population, Household and Out-Migration
In terms of population and number of households, Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay differ 
slightly in their sizes. However, the differences in the size of population and number of 
households alone may not be so meaningful in the understanding the difference in the 
relationship between the population and other components of the communities which 
feature their overall difference. Therefore, details about population structure are required
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for further consideration. This section will present some detail of population and 
household structures in these two villages. It will also include a brief discussion of out­
migration emerging in these two villages, as it is an important factor determining the 
trend of change in population.
4.3.1 Population
Ban Nua Phru is a large village by Thailand’s standards. By April 1995 it had one 
hundred and sixty five households with a population of eight hundred and seventy three. 
The average size of a household is five members per household. Of the total population, 
the proportion of the male population is almost equal to that of the female population. By 
categorising those aged from fifteen years old to sixty years old as the work force, sixty 
six per cent of the total population falls into this category. The proportion of males and 
females in the work force is about equal. Of those who are outside the work force, twenty 
five per cent are aged below fifteen years old and nine per cent aged above sixty years 
old. The population density is sixteen persons per square kilometre.
As with Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay can also be considered as a large village. However, 
the size of its population is slightly larger than in Ban Nua Phru. It has two hundred and 
three households with a population of nine hundred and twenty six. The average size of a 
household is also similar to that of Ban Nua Phru; that is about five members per 
household. Again, the proportion of the male population is about a half of the total 
population. About sixty two per cent of the total population is in the work force age- 
range. The proportion of male and female work force is accounted for fifty two and forty 
eight per cent respectively. Of the remainder, thirty per cent are aged under fifteen, 
whereas those who are aged over sixty represent eight per cent of the total population. 
This age structure differs slightly from that of Ban Nua Phru — a higher proportion of the 
population aged below fifteen is found in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru, against 
that of the work force age-range. With respect to the population density, because the 
number of the total population in Ban Bon Lay is higher than in Ban Nua Phru whereas
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its acreage size is much lower, the population density of Ban Bon Lay is much higher 
than that of Ban Nua Phru. Ban Bon Lay has a population density of thirty two persons 
per square kilometre, twice as high as in Ban Nua Phru.








1. Number of households 165 203 1,442
2. Population
2.1 Total population 873 926 6,850
2.2 Male proportion (%) 49 50 50
2.3 Female proportion (%) 51 50 50
3. Age structure
3.1 Age below 15 (%) 25 30 30
3.2 Age 15-60 (%) 66 62 56
3.3 Age over 60 (%) 9 8 14
4. Population density (persons/km ) 16 32 33
Source: The Official Basic Needs Census, 1995
Compared to Bueng Yai community of which Ban Bon Lay is a part, data for population 
structures is similar. Bueng Yai community has a population of six thousand eight 
hundred and fifty, and comprises one thousand four hundred and forty two households. 
Its population density is thirty three persons per square kilometre, which is comparable to 
that of Ban Bon Lay. The proportion of the male and the female population is also about 
the same. The figures on age structure between Bueng Yai community and Ban Bon Lay 
are also very close, except the proportion of those aged over sixty years old, where the 
figure in Bueng Yai community is almost twice as high as in Ban Bon Lay.
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4.3.2 Household
There are different types of households found in both Ban Nua Phru,and Ban Bon Lay. In 
this part of Thailand, there appears to be no strict tradition of maintaining an extended 
family. However, there is a likelihood that at least one of the children in each household 
will remain with their parents in order to care for them when they are old. At the same 
time, there is a possibility of finding four generations of members sharing the same 
house, though this is rare. In order to provide a clearer picture, household types have been 
divided into three categories; sub-nuclear, nuclear and joint (Table 4.2). This 
categorisation is adapted from Cain (1978) based on his study in Bangladesh (Cain, 1978, 
quoted in McGregor, 1991).





A single individual, or elderly member(s) with or without 
grand child(ren).
Parents with child(ren), or childless married couple.
Married couple with married or unmarried child(ren), 
grand child(ren), and/or elderly parent(s).
Source: Adapted from Cain (1978), quoted in McGregor (1991).
Based on the above categorisation, the majority of households in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon 
Lay as well as in Bueng Yai community, are nuclear. However, high proportions of joint 
households are found in all these communities. Households of sub-nuclear type are also
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found in Ban Nua Phru and in Bueng Yai community, but not in Ban Bon Lay (Table 
4.3). It is observed that people prefer to have a nuclear household and the trend is moving 
towards this direction. At the same time, values of caring for elderly parents as well as 
young married couples who are not yet ready to settle on their own continuing to live 
with are also strong. Occasionally, young married couples may leave the communities to 
seek employment outside, but leave their small child or children temporarily behind with 
their elderly parents. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find some households in which 
four generations stay together. In very rare cases, all members who are in the work force 
age-range leave the community to seek jobs outside the communities, while their houses 
are left for their elderly parent(s) to look after, possibly with one or two grand children. 
These elderly parents normally receive some financial support from their children who 
work outside the community. This is likely to happen among poor households whose 
assets are insufficient to support their stay in the communities.
Table 4.3: Distribution of household types in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai 
community
Unit: percentage
Household Types Ban Nua Phru Ban Bon Lay Bueng Yai Community
1. Sub-nuclear 13 0 8
2. Nuclear 60 67 50
3. Joint 27 33 42




Since out-migration is a common phenomenon nowadays in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban 
Bon Lay, and also in Bueng Yai community, it is important to consider some relevant 
features. Though out-migration is not new to both villages especially among males (a few 
males who are in the ‘middle-age’ range revealed having experiences in working outside 
the villages in the past), the number of out-migrants was said to have increased 
significantly in the last few years. Moreover, the migration pattern has also changed. In 
the past, almost all out-migrants were males who were heads or important economic 
contributors of households, and who went out to seek wage work on a temporary basis to 
support their families back home. Nowadays, out-migrants are from different age groups 
of both sexes, and the majority are young members who cannot see the future of 
continuing farm work at home. Many of them have migrated-out permanently or at least 
intend to do so. The increasing influence of the cash economy and the notion of 
modernisation on the communities is clearly a major factor behind the perceptions of 
these people in favour of out-migration. The increase in their dependency on cash and in 
the need for changes in their lifestyle influenced mainly by media, has induced them to go 
out to seek more cash and more modem lifestyles, to which they have less access if they 
remain in the communities.
Looking at the total number of out-migrants, it was found that as many as eighty per cent 
of households in Ban Nua Phru had their members migrating out at the time of this study. 
The overall figures from Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community differed significantly. 
Only about forty and fifty five per cent of households in Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai 
community respectively, had members migrating out, either on a temporary basis or on a 
permanent basis (Table 4.4). In this study, permanent out-migrants are defined as those 
who work and stay outside the village continuously for a period of over one year, but who 
may come back for a short visit; others are defined as temporary out-migrants. By 
dividing out-migrants based on the above criteria, there was a slightly higher proportion 
of households with permanent rather than temporary out-migrants in all cases, and a
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considerable proportion of households had both permanent and temporary out-migrants. 
Of the total households in Ban Nua Phru, sixty per cent had members migrating-out on a 
permanent basis whereas forty seven per cent had members migrating out on a temporary 
basis. Among these, twenty seven per cent had both permanent and temporary out- 
migrants. In Ban Bon Lay, households with permanent out-migrants and those with 
temporary out-migrants accounted for twenty seven per cent and twenty per cent of the 
total households in the village, respectively. The proportion of those having both 
permanent and temporary out-migrants accounted for seven per cent of the total 
households. Considering Bueng Yai community as a whole, forty one per cent of the total 
households had members migrated out on a permanent basis against twenty seven per 
cent representing those with temporary out-migrants. Those which had both permanent 
and temporary out-migrants represented eighteen per cent of the total households.








l.Households with out-migration (% of total households)
1.1 Permanent out-migration 60 27 41
1.2 Temporary out-migration 47- 20 27
1.3 Both categories1 80 40 60
2. Estimated number of out-migrants
2.1 Permanent - male 77 41 562
2.2 Permanent - female 132 54 562
2.3 Temporary - male 33 68 346
2.4 Temporary - female 66 27 216
2.5 Total number 308 190 1,686
Note: 1 Some households had both permanent and temporary out-migrants. 
Source: PSU-CDS survey.
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Jobs undertaken by out migrants vary according to places of migration, and depending on 
skills the migrants have. It was also observed that there exists an association between 
gender and types of jobs undertaken. Two main types of work common to out-migrants in 
this area are construction work and work in garment factories. Other types of work such 
as secretarial work, shop assistance, and different kinds of labouring work were also 
found, but in rare cases. Working in garment factories was the most common among 
young members, especially females who migrated to Bangkok. Some of them were 
trained before leaving home; others received their training in their work places. Working 
on construction sites was commonly done by males, especially those who migrated out on 
a seasonal basis to nearby towns such as Hat Yai and Patthalung. No particular skills are 
needed for this type of work, though having a particular skill will be of benefit to the 
workers, as they can be allocated to certain tasks in which they are specialised. In return, 
they are likely to be better paid than normal labourers.
One major factor behind the variation in the number of out-migrants between these 
communities is the difference in the linkages they have with job opportunities outside the 
villages. The most common linkage was the existence of members of each village who 
established their relationships with outside businesses, and brought more labour into 
these businesses. This type of linkage was quite clear for those who migrated out to work 
in garment factories in Bangkok. Another type of linkage that was less common, was the 
existence of friendship relations with outsiders who had connections with businesses. 
This was true in the case of construction and other labouring work. These linkages were 
found to vary between these communities. Moreover, the variation in the practice of 
income generating activities within each village, especially handicrafts for females, also 
seems to determine the variation in the number of out-migrants between villages. This is 
evident in the intensity of handicraft practice, which is more intensive and widespread in 
Ban Bon Lay, as well as in Bueng Yai community as a whole, than in Ban Nua Phru. This 
difference is related to the better established market for handicraft products and the more 
advanced production appearing in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community as compared 
to Ban Nua Phru. The improvement of handicraft practice in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai
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community has occurred through a series of training provided by concerned state 
agencies to targeted communities.
The above discussion includes the household measurement of out-migration only, and 
does not show the quantity of individual out-migrants, but I feel it would be useful to 
have this information for each village. From data collected through the village survey 
based on a small sample under the PSU-CDS project, it can be estimated that the total 
number of out-migrants could be as high as three hundred and eight in Ban Nua Phru at 
the time of this study. Two hundred and nine of these, or about sixty eight per cent of the 
total number of out-migrants, were permanent out-migrants. The number of out-migrants 
in Ban Bon Lay was also high but still much lower than that of Ban Nua Phru, and even 
in terms of households the data was significantly different. There were approximately one 
hundred and ninety out-migrants altogether in Ban Bon Lay of which about ninety five 
members or fifty per cent were permanent out-migrants. In Bueng Yai community as a 
whole, the overall number of out-migrants could be close to seventeen hundred which is 
very high, and those who migrated out on a permanent basis accounted for over sixty per 
cent. Though the figures from these different communities vary, they all illustrate how 
significant the number of out-migrants is to the population of each village. Moreover, it 
seems that the number of out-migrants is likely to increase unless alternative income 
generating activities can be developed significantly in the community itself.
As mentioned earlier, most out-migrants were among young members of households who 
are in the work force age-range. This phenomenon was common to both Ban Nua Phru 
and Ban Bon Lay. The average age for out-migrants was eighteen years old for females 
and twenty nine years old for males. There were also gender differences and differences 
in marital status among out-migrants and between different categories of out-migration. 
The proportion of females was slightly higher than that of males among permanent out- 
migrants. In contrast, the male proportion was considerably higher than the female 
proportion among temporary out-migrants. Most permanent out-migrants were single, 
whereas the majority of temporary out-migrants were married. This is logical as it seems
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to be rather difficult for married members to migrate out permanently unless proper 
working and living conditions can be arranged for their families in working places. Quite 
often among married couples, it was found that males migrated out and left their wives to 
stay at home with the children. These circumstances do not allow them to migrate out 
easily on a permanent basis.
4.4 The Economy of the Villages
Economically, both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay can be considered as farming and 
fishing based communities. As briefly mentioned in Chapter One, rice farming and small- 
scale fishing are the two most common activities performed by their households. 
Additionally, handicraft production from krajoot is also commonly practised in both 
villages. There are some other activities undertaken by members of some households, but 
each of them is less extensive than the above three. Even though in a broad view most 
households are similar in their involvement in economic activities and there is no formal 
delineation of class among them, variations in economic status among households do 
exist in both villages. These variations appear to be associated with occupations of 
households and access to main resources. To provide a clearer picture of the economy of 
these two villages, this section will focus mainly on the occupational structure and the 
overall economic structure of these two village communities.
4.4.1 Occupational Structure
All households in Ban Nua Phru were involved in rice farming at the time of this study. 
At the same time most of them were also involved in fishing. The proportion of fishing 
households accounts for eighty seven per cent of the total number of households in the 
village. Additionally, about sixty seven per cent of the total number of households 
practised handicrafts from krajoot. These are three predominant economic activities 
prevailing in this village. Apart from these three activities, a considerable number of 
households raised livestock and had members involved in rubber cultivation, either on
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their own rubber plots or as share tappers (Table 4.5). All these kinds of activities, except 
rubber cultivation, are also common to Ban Bon Lay, but the proportions of households 
involved in these activities differ between these two villages. Though the proportion of 
households involved in fishing in Ban Bon Lay was close to that in Ban Nua Phru, the 
proportion of households involved in rice farming was considerably lower. However, the 
proportion of households engaging in handicrafts was considerably higher in Ban Bon 
Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Only about sixty seven per cent of the total households in Ban 
Bon Lay engaged in rice cultivation at the time of this study, whereas the number of 
households engaging in handicrafts accounted for eighty seven per cent. Only four per 
cent of the households in Ban Bon Lay had members engaged in rubber cultivation and 
less than half of the total households raised livestock, mainly cattle. Apart from the above 
activities, a considerable number of households in both villages were involved in trading 
of various forms, although this was less common in Ban Nua Phru. A handful of 
households also had members working in wage works in nearby towns of Patthalung and 
Khuan Mangkhud.
When considering the level of production of three major activities found in both villages 
— rice cultivation, fishing, and handicrafts — the extent to which the villagers are involved 
in these activities can be seen to vary between these two villages. With the first two 
activities, i.e. rice cultivation and fishing, it is vital to compare their level of production 
whilst understanding the economic patterns of these two communities. They are both 
related to the issue of food security, and at the same, time, their produce can be sold for 
cash. To avoid the terms ‘subsistence’ and ‘semi-subsistence’ as they both are argued to 
be vague in meanings (see Hill, 1986, pp. 17-19), I would rather explain the level of 
production of these two activities by looking at the villagers’ effort in pursuing them in 
terms of labour, the level of resources naturally available to them, especially land, 
technologies employed, and intensity in marketing the produce.
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Rice cultivation 100 67 75
Fishing 87 80 58
Handicrafts 67 87 71
Rubber cultivation 47 4 15
Trading2 10 20 36
Others3 93 67 85
Note: 1 All households have more than one occupation.
2 This heading includes petty trading, fish trading and other forms of trading.
3 This heading includes farming activities outside rice and rubber cultivation, and any other 
activities which are not classified under previous headings.
Source: PSU-CDS survey.
a) Rice Cultivation
Rice production in Ban Nua Phru can be considered as traditional-oriented. Most 
households grow rice mainly to secure their needs by cultivating only part of the land 
available to them, mostly on a single cropping basis, either in the rainy season or in the 
dry season. Most of the land is cultivated during the rainy season, as it often faces water 
shortage problems in the dry season. However, cultivating rice in the rainy season is also 
risky since rice fields are located in low-lying areas which flood evenly. Rice cultivation 
is carried out mostly by household labour with a possibility of labour exchange between 
households through a reciprocal arrangement (khaw mue), a practice which has long
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prevailed in rural communities in Southern Thailand (see Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994, 
Chapter 3). Chemical fertilisers and small hand-tractors are commonly employed. A few 
traditional varieties of rice are the most common for rainy season cultivation, whereas in 
dry season cultivation, a few improved rice varieties of ‘kaw-khaw ’ brand, which are 
developed by the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives’ Rice Research 
Division, are used. Considering land which forms the most important resource for rice 
cultivation, the average size of land allotted for this purpose was 16 rai per household at 
the time of this study. This is higher than the sufficiency level for moderate productivity, 
say between 250 to 300 kilograms per rai per season. In this area, cultivating 10 rai of 
rice on a single cropping basis per year is perceived to be sufficient (paw kin) for feeding 
an average size household of five to six members. Most households in Ban Nua Phru are 
self-sufficient in rice. Very few of them have experience of selling surplus rice in a good 
production year, after assessing that they have reasonable amount of rice in stock 
to secure their household’s needs in the coming year. At the same time, a few 
households buy a portion of rice to meet their needs every year. It is noteworthy here that 
even rice production is not intensive in its practice, either in terms of land used or labour 
and technology employed, but it is referred to by villagers as being among the main 
occupations undertaken by members of most households. This illustrates how important 
rice farming is perceived to be for the household economy in this village community.
Table 4.6: Rice cultivation in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community
Items Ban Ban Bueng Yai
Nua Phru Bon Lay Community
I. Average size of rice landholding (rai) 15.9 6.7 11.1
2. Cultivating households (%) 100 67 75
3. Households cultivating as a main occupation (%) 100 20 44
3. Estimated number of members involved 424 365 2,466
Source: PSU-CDS survey.
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As with Ban Nua Phru, rice cultivation in Ban Bon Lay is also traditional-oriented in its 
operation. It has formed a main part of villagers’ livelihoods over a long time, and is still 
practised by the majority of them. Nevertheless, the proportion of households involved in 
rice cultivation was considerably lower than in Ban Nua Phru at the time of this study. 
The shortage in the availability of land for rice cultivation was observed to be the major 
factor behind this phenomenon, since most households which did not cultivate rice did 
not own rice fields. Approximately twenty per cent of the total households were landless 
in this village whereas no landless household was found in Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, the 
average size of holding for rice fields was 6.7 rai per household, which was significantly 
lower than in Ban Nua Phru. However, the shortage of land cannot be assumed to be the 
sole factor, as there appear to be a few households owning rice fields who did not 
cultivate or only partially cultivate the land themselves. Rather, access to other 
occupations, and the perception of the importance of rice farming itself, is of significance. 
Most households holding the rice land but not cultivating it were actively engaged in 
other economic activities, which are considered to be better alternatives than rice 
cultivation. To many people in this village, rice cultivation is seen as important to 
household food security, but it is no longer the prime economic activity to be undertaken 
if there are other economic activities which they can rely upon to secure their household 
expenses including food. Interestingly, the majority of rice farming households 
interviewed did not regard rice farming as among the primary occupations undertaken by 
their members, a perception which is contradictory to that of the majority in Ban Nua 
Phru. In terms of technology and labour employed, the cultivation of rice in this village 
does not differ from Ban Nua Phru. Most households cultivate rice only once a year, 
mainly in the rainy season. They depend mostly on family labour except for ploughing, 
since hand tractors are commonly employed even among those who do not own the 
machine themselves. Traditional rice varieties are commonly used for the rainy season 
cultivation whereas the dry season cultivation depends very much on improved varieties 
introduced by the state.
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The importance of rice farming in Bueng Yai community as a whole is similar to Ban 
Bon Lay. About three quarters of households in the community were engaged in rice 
farming at the time of this study. However, it was observed that the distribution of rice 
farming households is uneven among different villages due to their difference in access to 
rice land. Villages located on the edge of Bueng Yai lake have slightly less access to rice 
land than those located further inland. Though there is no rule about limiting access to 
land outside the boundary of each village, it was observed that most of the land cultivated 
by villagers in each village is likely to be within the village boundary, or not far away. 
The average size of holding for rice field was slightly higher in Bueng Yai community 
than in Ban Bon Lay. Again, this was observed to vary among villages. With respect to 
patterns of practices and technologies employed, no difference was observed from those 
in Ban Bon Lay.
b) Fishing
Like rice farming, fishing in Ban Nua Phru is also not highly cash-oriented. Fishermen 
spend only a few months a year, when the water level is high enough, setting most types 
of fishing gear commonly employed. Because the activity is undertaken only a few 
months a year and its yields are quite low, it is commonly regarded as a non-primary 
activity (see Table 4.7). Villagers usually refer to their levels of fishing as ‘jab khae paw  
kin \  which means to catch for consumption only. Nevertheless, most fishing households 
view the activity as a very important livelihood for members of the community, since it 
forms a major source of non-cash income for most households and fish is the only main 
source of protein in their diet. Several types of fishing gear were used at the time of this 
study including gill net, barrier and trap, hook and rod, cast net, and large lift net. The 
first three were the most common, and were used mostly in the low-lying part of the 
swamp during the rainy season -- hook and rod however was used intensively in the dry 
season (Table 4.8). There was another method also commonly practised, that is, the 
excavation of fish trap ponds. The pond is known locally as ‘baw law pla. ’ Cultivating 
fish from the pond is done by dewatering the pond using diesel water pumps when only a
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small amount of water remains in the pond. This is usually done in the dry season 
beginning from March and ending around August every year. Fishing via this method 
was observed to be the only method of fishing aimed mainly at cash, as it yields a 
considerable amount of fish once a pond is dewatered.







1. Fishing household (% of all households)
1.1 Total Fishing households 87 80 58
1.2 Households with fishing as a main occupation 0 60 37
1.3 Households with fishing only for consumption 40 7 2
3. Estimated number of fishers
3.1 Total 209 231 1,095
3.2 Average per fishing household 1.5 1.4 1.3
4. Number of gears used per fishing household (%)
4.2 One type 23 25 46
4.2 Two types 38 42 31
4.3 Three types 38 8 14
4.4 Four types 0 8 3
4.5 Five types and above 0 17 6
4.6 Total 991 100 100
Note: 1 Round-up error. 
Source: PSU-CDS survey.
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Table 4.8: The fishing calendar for the main types of fishing gear in Ban Nua Phru, Ban 
Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community 1992
Ban Nua Phru
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Gill net ** * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ** **
Seine net 0 0 * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barrier/trap ** * * 0 0 0 0 0 * ** ** **
Hook & rod * * ** ** ** ** ** ** * * *
Large lift net * * * * 0 0 0 0 0 * * *
Cast net 0 0 0 * * * * * 0 0 * *
Dewatering 0 0 * ** ** * * * 0 0 0 0
Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Gill net *** ** * * * * * * ** *** *** ***
Seine net 0 * * ** ** ** ** ** ** * 0 0
Fish trap * * * ** ** ** ** ** ** ** * *
Shrimp trap 0 * * * ** ** ** * * 0 0 0
Hook & Line * * ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 0 0 *
Barrier/trap 0 0 ** ** * 0 0 0 * * 0 0
Dewatering 0 0 * ** ** ** * * 0 0 0 0
Key: *** = intensive use
** = heavy use
* = normal use
0 = no use
Source: PSU-CDS survey
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Compared to Ban Nua Phru, the dependency of villagers in Ban Bon Lay on fishing is 
clearly higher. Fishing activity here is more intensive and more cash-oriented than in Ban 
Nua Phru. Although the proportion of households involved in fishing at the time of this 
study compared to the total households was slightly lower, the proportion of fishers to the 
work force was higher in this village than in Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, most fishing 
households surveyed regarded the activity as among the primary occupations undertaken 
by their members, done not only for consumption but also for sale, in contrast to those in 
Ban Nua Phru (see Table 4.7). The intensity of fishing in this village can also be 
determined from the number of months the fishers spend on the activity a year. The 
survey data shows that sixty per cent of fishing households fished the whole year round in 
1994. The average number of months spent by all fishing households was nine months a 
year. The variation in the number of months between households undertaking this 
activity, was observed to be related to types and number of gear they employed. Types of 
fishing gear commonly used in this community are gill net, fish trap, shrimp trap, hook 
and line, and seine net. A small proportion of fishermen use barrier and trap as well as 
refuge trap pond (Table 4.8). Gill net and fish trap can be used the whole year round since 
they have access to both Bueng Yai lake and the nearby swamp, whereas the use of other 
types of gear varies from five to nine months a year. It was found that approximately 
three quarters of fishing households employed more than one type of gear, and the 
average number of gear used was three types per household. The highest number of gear 
used in this village was six types per household, while in Ban Nua Phru the average 
number was two types per household with the highest number of three types per 
household. More importantly, the scale of gear used in Ban Bon Lay is much higher than 
in Ban Nua Phru. For example, a household in Ban Bon Lay employed three hundred 
units of fish trap, whereas the highest number of fish traps employed per household in 
Ban Nua Phru was only thirty units. The difference in the extent of access to other 
resources, especially land, between villagers of Ban Bon Lay and those of Ban Nua Phru, 
together with the difference in their dependency on cash, determine the level of their 
effort in fishing.
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Similar to its member village of Ban Bon Lay, fishing is important for settlers in Bueng 
Yai community as a whole, but its level of importance is slightly less than in Ban Bon 
Lay, as a wider range of activities are available to settlers in Bueng Yai community. In 
fact, the proportion of fishing households in some villages in Bueng Yai community are 
much lower than in Ban Bon Lay. Actually, Ban Bon Lay is among three villages in the 
community in which fishing households still remain in a very high proportion. There are 
some variations in gear specialisation and in the number of types of gear used among 
these villages. Gill net, fish trap, and hook and line are three types of gear common to all 
villages. Only in three villages including Ban Bon Lay are shrimp trap and barrier widely 
employed. These variations are also determined by fishing territories divided informally 
between villagers in different parts of the community, as some types of fishing gear are 
more suitable to be set in some places than in others. Overall it can be said that fishing is 
still important to the majority of Bueng Yai community as a whole, since over half of the 
total households still depend on it, though in various degrees.
c) Handicrafts
The case of handicrafts provides a good illustration of how differences in access to the 
market and in state intervention on the production of a commodity influence the 
development of that commodity. Handicraft practice in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon 
Lay is derived from the traditional practice of mat weaving from krajoot, available in the 
surrounding swamp. Originally, mat weaving in both communities was practised 
predominantly for home use. Exchanging the produce was very limited as its demand in 
local markets was limited. Later increase in demand for handicrafts from krajoot resulted 
from the expansion of market to other localities and the development of new forms of 
products for different purposes. These two factors interact with each other and play an 
important role in determining the differences in the intensity of the activity and the extent 
to which the activity has developed in these two communities.
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In Ban Nua Phru, approximately sixty seven per cent of households at the time of this 
study were involved in handicraft production using krajoot abundantly available in the 
swamp. It was estimated that there were around one hundred and forty members, 
predominantly females, involved in the activity. The activity forms the most common 
income-generating activity among females who choose to remain in the community. 
Despite the possibility of producing different forms of products from the same material, 
handicrafts in this village are limited to mat weaving. The lack of skills in making other 
forms of products such as hats, bags and assorted items of souvenir-like products, 
together with the weakness of outside markets for these items, hinders the development of 
handicrafts in this community. Neither has there been any strong effort from concerned 
government agencies to organise training, nor any strong push from inside the community 
to seek help from outside in developing skills for making new products. Comparing these 
two factors, the establishment of market links with the outside seems to play a more 
important role in pushing the development of handicrafts of these types. Once the market 
is improved, it will induce changes in the techniques which are already available through 
the assistance of related government agencies.
Handicrafts in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community are practised more widely and 
more intensively than in Ban Nua Phru. They were practised by as many as ninety per 
cent of the total households in Ban Bon Lay, with an estimate of workers of two hundred 
and seventy three at the time of this study. In Bueng Yai community, about seventy one 
per cent of the total households, with an estimation of one thousand two hundred and 
seventy workers, were engaged in the activity. As with Ban Nua Phru, most workers are 
females, but more males are also involved in the activity. It was observed that the 
expansion of the activity to cover a wide range of products increasingly allows male 
members to participate. This is because more labourers are needed and there exist some 
tasks perceived as not unsuitable for males to perform, and vice versa. The market for 
these products is much better established in this area. A few local traders are available in 
Ban Bon Lay, and many more in Bueng Yai community. These traders have connections
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with traders in other places, especially large cities and tourist places such as Hat Yai, 
Phuket and Bangkok.
The development of the market for the products began from a few local traders who 
travelled to other areas to introduce the products. These traders also brought the idea of 
modifying the production from mat weaving to different forms of products, as they saw 
the market opportunity for these new products outside the community. Later, they worked 
together with some phu yai ban to request related government agencies to organise a 
series of training scheme to develop skills in producing new products. In Ban Bon Lay 
alone, there have been three training sessions in the last ten years, and sixty females were 
trained under the scheme. They also received a small loan after the training to invest in 
improving their production. Now krajoot products from Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai 
community are widely recognised throughout the region. Bueng Yai community itself has 
recently received support from the state to establish the krajoot handicraft development 
centre at Ban Talard. Because the production is so extensive among households in this 
community, it can no longer depend on krajoot available in the community alone, and 
most of the krajoot used now is brought in from the swamp villages in Phru Thung 
Samet, where they buy it from local collectors.
4.4.2 The Economic Structure
Apart from looking at the occupational structure of households in both villages, an 
investigation was also made to differentiate the level of the overall economic difference 
among households in each village. The investigation was done through discussions with 
leaders, key informants, and a few villagers from different economic groups, by asking 
their views on the economic structure of households in their villages. Moreover, the 
survey which was based on small samples undertaken as part of the PSU-CDS project, 
also included items which allow for estimating the difference in economic conditions 
among households. The estimation from the survey data was done by calculating wealth 
points of households based on scoring items which are identified as important indicators
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for measuring economic difference (see Appendix Three). From these two sources of 
information, four groups or classes of households can be categorised -- the very poor (jon 
maak), the poor (Jon), the average (paan klaang), and the well-off (kawn kaang dee). This 
categorisation and the terms applied are based mostly on the perceptions of the majority 
of people I talked to. The term ‘kawn kaang dee’ for example, is preferred over the term 
‘ruay\ or rich, since villagers do not perceive any rural inhabitants in this area as rich.
By applying the above categorisation, none of households in Ban Nua Phru can be called 
very poor. All of them have access to land and other common property natural resources 
available in this area for their survival. The former phu yai ban who just retired in 1993 
noted:
‘No one in this village is starving (od yaahk). There are enough resources 
available in the swamp either fish or krajoot for them to survive. Every 
household own rice fields though some are small in size. They will not be 
starving if they are not too lazy’ (personal communication).
However, it is generally accepted that there exists a small group of households who are 
poor on one side and another group of similar size who are well-off on the other side. The 
majority of households in Ban Nua Phru have average access to resources. Considering 
the distribution of wealth points calculated from the surveyed data, households falling 
into the ‘poor’ category accounted for thirteen per cent of the total households at the time 
of this study, whereas households in the ‘well-off category were twenty seven per cent of 
total households. The majority households fall into the ‘average’ category. This shows 
that there is some degree of economic disparity among households in this village.
To the question which may be asked about the bases of the economic disparity in this 
village, available information reveals that there is a strong link between the economic 
status of households and ownership of land. Most well-off households hold a 
considerable amount of land. The survey data shows that there tends to be a positive 
relationship between size of landholding and wealth points. All the well-off households
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hold land over 30 rai as compared to the overall average of 16 rai per household. 
However, it is not the size of landholding alone that matters, but also the quality of land. 
According to a key informant, most of the well-off households have improved their 
economic well-being by means of the natural resources available on their land and the 
productivity of their land. These households are mostly among descendants of the early 
settlers whose ancestors had a better chance of selecting good quality of land which was 
then passed on to them. Insufficient good quality land for cultivation is common among 
the poor. Moreover, it was also observed that there is an association between types of 
primary occupation undertaken by household members and household economic status. 
All well-off households surveyed had members involved primarily in occupations outside 
farming and fishing, especially in small-trading, while the households still maintain 
farming and fishing activities. Though combining farming and fishing with other 
activities was also not uncommon among households in the poor and the average 
category, types of work outside farming and fishing undertaken by members of these 
households were mainly labouring and relatively low-paid. The difference in the type of 
non-farm work was observed to relate to the difference in the opportunity to seek jobs 
between members of the well-off households and the others.
Table 4.9: Distribution of wealth groups among households in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon 
Lay and Bueng Yai community
Unit: percentage






1. Very Poor - (0) 0 7 4
2. Poor - (1-3) 13 13 23
3. Average - (4-7) 60 73 61
4. Well-off - (> 8) 27 7 12
Total 100 100 100
Sorce: PSU-CDS survey.
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Table 4.9 shows that although the majority of households in Ban Bon Lay belonged to the 
average economic status which was similar to Ban Nua Phru’s, the proportion of poor 
households was significantly higher than of well-off households. About twenty per cent 
of the total number of households fell into the poor category, whereas only about seven 
per cent of the total number of households fell into the well-off category. Among the poor 
households, about one third of them or seven per cent of the total number of households 
in the village can be considered as very poor. Interestingly, all of the very poor 
households were observed to be landless, but not all landless households were included 
among the very poor, as they were also found in the average category.
The difference between the very poor landless households and the average landless 
households is their occupational access. All the very poor households included in the 
survey depended solely on fishing and handicrafts, and again their ability to invest in 
these activities was limited. Their fishing was limited in types and scale of gear used. 
Most of them depended on a few pieces of gill net. At the same time, their handicrafts 
were limited mostly to simple mat weaving, the most basic form of handicrafts with the 
lowest price. Their capital shortage together with their limited access to credit, either 
from formal or informal sources, form an important factor in restraining them from 
improving their investments in these activities. On the contrary, the ‘average’ landless 
households had their members involved in other activities outside the villages which 
generated a better cash income than fishing and handicrafts alone. It is worth noting from 
my observation that joining in other jobs outside the village is not only limited by the 
scarcity of jobs available, but also by the availability of members who are able to 
participate and their connections with the sources of work as mentioned earlier.
The ownership of land and types of occupations of household members are also major 
factors in the differentiation between other categories. According to key informants, the 
ownership of land, which to a high degree is related to its inheritance — the major means 
of land transfer among villagers — determines the difference in the status between the 
average and the well-off households. In other words, those who inherited a large amount
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of land from their parents and ancestors are very fortunate, and likely to be well-off. An 
elder explained that in the past twenty to thirty years, when rice cultivation was still 
profitable, villagers with large landholdings were advantaged, as they could accumulate 
capital from selling their excess produce. From this they could make savings which then 
transferred to the investment of more land, other valuable assets, businesses and even 
education for their children. This explanation is supported by the data derived from the 
survey and observations that households with a considerable landholdings (i.e. over 10 
rai which is considered to be the sufficient level of landholding) fell into the average and 
well-off wealth score ranges. Moreover, most of those who had high wealth scores were 
engaged in some forms of business, especially operating their own grocery stores in the 
village, and their children received a better education when compared to others. It was 
also observed that members of these households were unlikely to migrate out of the 
village unless they obtained good jobs. This finding indicates not only the likelihood of 
an association between the economic status of households and their landholding size, but 
also the interrelationship between their economic status and occupations of their 
members. Further analysis reveals that there exists an association between the economic 
status of households and primary occupations undertaken by their members: The very 
poor households were found to be involved primarily in fishing and handicrafts; the poor 
households mostly concentrated primarily in either farming or fishing together with 
handicrafts; the average households concentrated primarily in both farming and fishing at 
the same time, and took handicrafts as a subsidiary occupation. None of the well-off 
households practised fishing as their primary occupation. They considered either farming 
or non-farm work, excluding handicrafts, as the primary occupation of their members.
4.5 Religious Institutions
The importance of religious institutions in Thai society is well recognised by many social 
scientists, for example, Frank J. Moore, Angela Burr, S. J. Tambiah, Ernst W. Gohlert 
(Moore, 1974; Burr, 1972; Tambiah, 1976; and Gohlert, 1991). In rural areas of Thailand, 
almost all aspects of life have some connection with religion and other forms of belief.
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Hence religious leaders hold a high status in rural communities. Among Buddhists who 
comprise the vast majority of the country’s population, monks {phra, bhikkhu or piksu) 
are revered and central to all groups in the society. In rural Buddhist communities, 
Buddhist temples not only function as the religious centre, but also as the social centre of 
each community (Wijeyewardene, 1967). Given the high status they hold, religious 
leaders who are active and able to combine ritual activities with secular activities can be 
very influential in the politics and development of the rural communities in which they 
reside or serve. Though the close relationship between monks and community is a 
common phenomenon in rural areas, patterns of their relationships may be dynamic and 
vary from place to place. It is often argued that most monks concentrate on the spiritual 
aspects of Buddhism and therefore are unlikely to be concerned with worldly affairs such 
as political movements and development activities. This argument can only be partly true 
as evidence indicates that some Buddhist monks are also active in political and 
development activities. Moreover, the trend has been changing also in recent years with a 
growing number of Buddhist monks taking part and forming a significant driving force in 
development activities (see Tambiah, 1976; Suksamran, 1984; Gohlert, 1991; Taylor, 
1993; Judd, undated). The influence of this changing ideology may vary among different 
monks, which in turn affects patterns of the relationship between monks and the 
communities in which they reside or serve.
Both villages in this study are Buddhist communities. There are no adherents of other 
beliefs residing in both villages. Nevertheless, patterns of relationship between the 
communities and their religious institutions appear to differ considerably. The bond 
between the religious institutions and the community is much stronger in Ban Nua Phru 
than in Ban Bon Lay. Ban Nua Phru has its own temple, namely Wat Nua Phru, where 
regular attendants of the temple are mostly members of this community, whereas in Ban 
Bon Lay, no temple is located in the village itself. The villagers of Ban Bon Lay are 
divided in their regular attendance between two temples -- Wat Bueng Yai which is 
located in the middle of Bueng Yai community, and Wat Dawk Pradoo which is located 
in a neighbouring village of Ban Rim Na. The majority of villagers attend Wat Bueng Yai
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which is the larger and older one. Apart from the difference in physical attachments of 
these communities to their religious institutions, the functional aspect of religious 
institutions towards these communities also differs. Though the difference in their 
physical attachments seems to determine the functional relationship between the temples 
and the communities in these two villages, it is also apparent that the difference in the 
perceptions of individual monks, especially the abbots (chao aawat) of these temples, 
about their roles with respect to secular activities is substantial.
In Ban Nua Phru, Wat Nua Phru not only serves the community in ritual manners, but 
also functions as the community centre to serve secular activities. All formal communal 
meetings are held in the temple, in which the abbot himself frequently participates. 
Moreover, the abbot of this temple is very concerned with the development and the well­
being of the community. He habitually makes use of his spare time discussing secular 
matters with leaders of the community. His personal background is of importance. He 
was bom in the community as a grandson of the first leader of the village and was 
ordained at an early age in the nearby temple. After being ordained, he spent sometime in 
other monasteries studying Buddhism before receiving the invitation to return to this 
temple to take up the post of abbot. Recently, he has acted as the ecclesiastical leader of 
Tambon Thung Samet {chao khana Tambon Thung Samet). He is in his mid thirties, 
which is very young compared to others who hold such a position. To villagers, he is 
among those very rare monks who are active in both religious and secular activities. He is 
respectfully called ‘phra nak pattana’ or ‘development monk’ among villagers. It is 
believed that his thinking is influenced by the revival Buddhist ideology promoted under 
recent movements in Thai Buddhism, including the teachings of the late Buddhadasa 
Bhikkhu, the most prominent contemporary philosophical monk in Thailand. The 
movements are popular among young and well-educated monks (see Tambiah, 1976; 
Gohlert, 1991). His involvement in the development of the village is not merely to 
strengthen the spiritual drive of leaders in bringing betterment to the community, but also 
in providing constructive ideas and financial support from the temple’s purse for 
development work. Combining his roles in both in religious and secular activities, he is
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highly respected and central to all parties in the community. In turn, he is very influential 
behind the development drive of the community.
Unlike Wat Nua Phru, both Wat Bueng Yai and Wat Dawk Pradoo serve the surrounding 
communities almost exclusively on religious matters and education, and appear to be 
detached from any political or other secular concerns. Even though the temples may be 
used for social gatherings, some of which can be political, it is done without the actual 
involvement of the monks. Though a question may arise about the role of lay committees, 
or kammakaan wat, who may involve the temple in secular activities (as noted by 
Pongquan, 1988), there appears no evidence of such incidence in Ban Bon Lay and in 
Bueng Yai community as a whole. Moreover, even though some leaders sit on the 
committees of both temples, the committees are dominated by respected elders who have 
long been involved in religious activities. It is these elders who direct that functions of 
the lay committees be detached from secular activities. At the same time, formal leaders 
are reluctant to disturb them as they also perceive the practice as appropriate. Available 
information reveals that the specification of the temples’ roles in only religious and 
educational activities has existed here for a long time. An elder who has served as the 
chair of Wat Bueng Yai lay committee for many years pointed out that the practice 
follows the conventional interpretation of Buddhist ideology which emphasises the 
preference of monks avoiding secular or worldly affairs. Such a perception is widespread 
in Thai Buddhism (Suksamran, 1984). The fact that the abbots of Wat Bueng Yai and 
Wat Dawk Pradoo are both very old monks who are very conservative, also supports the 
exclusion of the temples from secular activities. It was also observed elsewhere in 
Thailand that many older monks are very conservative and are not influenced very much 
by the new trends of changes in Buddhist ideology (Tambiah, 1976; Gohlert, 1991).
4.6 Politics and Administration
Since 1892, during the reign of King Rama V, the reform of the state administrative 
structures has co-opted all villages into the formal administration system. The reform
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marked the new era in the Thai administration system and introduced the foundation of 
the present administrative structures. Under the new system, an administrative village 
(later will be referred as ‘village’) or ‘moobarf is assigned to be the lowest administrative 
unit led by the village official leader (phu yai ban) who is recruited through the village 
election. This rule superseded the previous arrangement of rural settlements which were 
based mainly on a hamlet unit (ban), and its leader was drawn from natural leaders or 
elders. The establishment of a village under the new system is based mainly on the size 
and the degree of physical attachment of each settlement to other settlements nearby. This 
implies that if the size of a settlement in terms of household numbers is large, it can be 
divided into more than one village. From the administrative point of view, a village 
should not comprise more than two hundred households. At the same time, a small 
settlement can be established as a separate village, if it is isolated from it nearest 
settlement and the communication between the settlements is inconvenient (see STU, 
1983a). Therefore, a variation in sizes and patterns of settlements can be found among 
different villages in Thailand. They range from a small single settlement, a large 
settlement of several hamlets, to a portion of a very large single settlement which is 
divided for administrative purposes. Because of this variation, researchers seem to have 
different perceptions about the village units selected in their studies (see Wijeyewardene, 
1967, pp. 69-72). It is not my intention to discuss the differences in size and type of 
villages in Thailand in detail, but the existence of such differences among villages and 
their potential influence on the patterns of their politics and administration, should be 
borne in mind.
The administrative structure presently applied to rural Thai villages is recognised as being 
dominated by formal leaders, i.e. phu yai ban and his colleagues in the village committee 
(kammakaan mooban) (see Rubin, 1974; Moerman, 1979; Rigg, 1991). The village 
committee comprises phu yai ban as the chairman, two deputy phu yai ban for 
administrative affairs (phu chuay phu yai ban fa i pokkraung) as appointed members, and 
at least two elected members from within the village. Generally, there are between five 
and nine elected members in each village committee. Each of these members is
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responsible principally for one of the various aspects of the village administration such as 
security, treasury, health, social welfare, education, occupational development, culture, 
etc. The designated role of the village committee is broadly described as ‘to provide 
advice (kam preuksaa) and suggestions (ham naehnam) to, as well as to assist (chuay 
leuah) phu yai ban in conducting his administrative duties’ (Department of Local 
Administration, 1991). This formal leader group is the only group officially recognised 
by the state as having the authority to deal with village administrative matters. Other 
groups may be established by different state agencies to promote their development work 
at the village level, however, their roles are more specific and their activities are attached 
to the village administration. The village committee functions in accordance with 
administrative laws and commands directed by the Department of Local Administration 
(krom kaanpokkraung) under the Ministry of the Interior. Each village committee is 
independent in the administration of their own village from other villages. Although this 
rule looks reasonable in an administrative sense, its application can be problematic in 
dealing with matters which extend beyond the boundary of a single village. Moreover, the 
recognition that only the village committee should play a role in all aspects of village 
administration can also undermine the importance of other local actors, including 
spiritual leaders and leaders of interest groups, who have the potential for making 
contributions to the development of the community. In the following discussion on the 
politics and administration of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, the issue of the village 
boundary and the involvement of other actors will also be taken into account.
With respect to the issue of the village boundary and the village administration, the 
difference between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay as mentioned earlier is that Ban Nua 
Phru is a clearly demarcated unit served by a school and temple, whereas Ban Bon Lay is 
part of Bueng Yai community where schools and temples are shared among different 
villages. Although Ban Nua Phru settlement is not far away from adjacent villages, its 
political boundary and its communal boundary (i.e. the boundary which distinguishes its 
community socially from other communities nearby) is commonly understood and quite 
clear among villagers. Even the village settlement is scattered and can be divided into
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four clusters, these clusters join together in all aspects of communal activities and share 
all communal resources. Sharing of communal resources such as fishing grounds, swamp 
forest, grazing fields, and krajoot from the swamp, occurs almost in an exclusive manner 
among these four clusters. Being a clearly demarcated unit, Ban Nua Phru administration 
is quite independent from other villages. The condition makes it easier for the village to 
operate its administration in general as well as in relation to the management of common 
property resources.
Unlike Ban Nua Phru, the settlement in Ban Bon Lay is physically inseparable from 
Bueng Yai community. The political boundary of the village has resulted from the 
official delineation in order to make it a unit of manageable administrative size, since 
Bueng Yai community has a large population. However, this delineation does not 
necessarily correspond to patterns of social interaction and resource sharing within the 
community. The occurrence of many social interactions and the sharing of common 
property resources were observed to relate to the community as a whole, rather than being 
limited within each individual village boundary. As Bueng Yai community is quite large, 
comprising seven villages and divided between two sub-districts, some complications 
arise with respect to the administration of each village, especially in dealing with 
common property resources which are shared by the whole community.
With respect to actors’ involvement in the village politics and administration in 1994 and 
1995, the situation in Ban Nua Phru was of particular interest. Although the village 
administration is formally led by the present phu yai ban, Mr. Ruam, it cannot be said 
that he plays the leading role in all aspects of the village administration. Other actors, 
especially the former phu yai ban (Mr. Jai), who has recently retired but is still active in 
development work, and the abbot of Wat Nua Phru (Sompam Chayanto) are also very 
influential. There are two other figures who are also active in the village administration 
and development — a deputy phu yai ban (Mr. Luang) and the village phu song 
khunnawut representing the village at the sapha tambon of Tambon Khuan Samet (Mr. 
Suk). Mr. Jai, Mr. Luang and Mr. Suk appear to be congenial. They have been working
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together for sometime and have had a good relationship since the time when Mr. Jai was 
in the leadership position. They are all well regarded by villagers as being morally good, 
active and competent in administrative and development work. Interestingly these leaders 
have all had some experience of working outside the village when they were young. The 
newly elected phu yai ban, Mr. Ruam, receives support mainly from a few young 
members who have been elected recently to the village committee. However, these young 
members do not seem to be experienced and influential in administrative and 
development work. Being the religious leader, Sompam Chayanto appears to keep his 
involvement as neutral as possible. However, he is well known as being an active and 
progressive monk who is interested in combining spiritual work and secular work. At the 
same time, he has been working closely with Mr. Jai, Mr. Luang and Mr. Suk. Apart from 
these leaders, there are no other obvious leaders involved in development work in the 
village.
Although the present phu yai ban has the authority to lead the administration in the 
village, his recent recruitment together with his lack of direct experience seems to weaken 
his ability to dominate the village administration. At the same time, the active 
involvement of the former phu yai ban, who has a great deal of experience and is well 
known for his administrative reputation, makes the present phu yai ban less independent 
in exercising his power. The influence of the former phu yai ban also goes through Mr. 
Luang and Mr. Suk, who still hold their official positions. Though there seems no serious 
conflict emerging between the present phu yai ban and the former phu yai ban and their 
supporters, there appear some tensions in their interactions which shape the politics of 
decision-making in the village organisation. It is the abbot who by virtue of being the 
religious leader, stands in the midst of these tensions and acts as intermediary between 
these two parties. Moreover, a wide knowledge of development work which the abbot has 
accumulated through his experience of serving and studying in various temples before 
returning to his home village to accept the post, allows him to apply in his interactions 
with both parties. It can be said that the politics of administration and development in this 
village is dominated by the exercise of power between the former phu yai ban and the
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present phu yai ban, while the abbot plays a role as the influential arbitrator and resource 
person.
Actors from outside who have connections with the community through their work or 
authority are also influential in some respects. In particular, the field Community 
Development Officer (pattanakorn) responsible for the area seems to have the most 
influence among outsiders on the decision-making regarding development activities in 
the village. Most state-led development activities in rural areas are channelled through the 
field level pattanakorn, and it is his duty to promote such activities by persuading village 
leaders to adopt them in practice. Consequently, many development activities in the 
village were initiated by the state and were channelled through the pattanakorn. 
Frequently the adoption of such activities results from the successful attempt of this 
official to persuade the village leaders’ team, which may not necessarily correspond to 
the needs of villagers. The influence of other officials such as the kamnan of Tambon 
Thung Samet and the headmaster (khru yai) as well as other teachers in the village 
primary school, are not significant in this village, though elsewhere they seem to be very 
influential (see for example, Moore, 1974; Turton, 1987, Chapter 5). They are not 
actively involved in the village administration and in decision-making. Their involvement 
in village politics can be considered as quite neutral and not beyond their routine work. 
Even with the kamnan who can be politically influential, there is no evidence of his 
domination in the politics of this village. Perhaps the village’s achievements under the 
leadership of Mr. Jai, which are well known in the area, makes the kamnan so hesitant in 
intervening in the village administration. On most occasions, these ‘actors from outside’ 
are likely to play roles in facilitating the village leaders in their attempt to overcome 
problems related to their duties.
The political environment of Ban Bon Lay differs significantly from that of Ban Nua 
Phru. The village administration is centred on the village official leader, Mr. Naam. Apart 
from Mr. Naam, other important actors within the village include his four assistants who 
were selected by him, the village formal elder (phu song khunnawut) and a few members
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of the village committee who were elected by villagers. Nonetheless, none of these actors 
can be considered as very active, and they do not seem to have a close personal 
relationship with Mr. Naam. There are no distinct elders or religious leaders who are 
influential in village politics. At the same time, there is no apparent opponent challenging 
Mr. Naam’s power in running the village, but there appear to be a few villagers who can 
be considered as having the potential to be leaders, and who sometimes create difficulties 
for Mr. Naam’s administration. Therefore, the phu yai ban of this village can be 
considered as playing the most dominant role in the village administration. Yet, despite 
his active involvement in administrative activities, he does not seem to be very 
influential; not only on his colleagues but also on ordinary villagers. There is not a strong 
tie between him and his colleagues, either as part of historical influence or as related to 
kinship and cultural connections. There are also no prominent traditional leaders central 
to the majority of villagers, comparable to the position of the abbot in Ban Nua Phru. All 
the problems facing the politics of the village administration rely highly on the effective 
application of the modem system of village administration, which is led by the phu yai 
ban. Nevertheless, the application of the modem system of administration in this village 
is also problematic, due to lack of co-operation among members of kammakaan mooban.
The involvement of actors from outside the community does not differ significantly from 
that of Ban Nua Phru. Only the pattanakorn responsible for Tambon Bueng Yai makes 
frequent contacts with the community. As in Ban Nua Phru, the role the pattanakorn 
plays is concentrated on promotion of activities related to the community development 
work he is in charge of. The best example appearing in this village is the establishment of 
the krajoot product development group (klum pattana palittapan krajoot) as part of an 
occupational development programme for villagers. The decision to establish this group 
was highly influenced by the pattanakorn, and through his advice and co-ordination, a 
variety of krajoot products have now been developed. However, the pattanakorn does not 
seem to be involved in other aspects of the village administration. There do not appear to 
be any other officials or school teachers who are actively involved in village politics or 
who are influential on the performance of the phu yai ban and his colleagues. The fact
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that the village does not have any school located within the village may abridge a strong 
affiliation between teachers and village leaders. The involvement of the kamnan of 
Tambon Bueng Yai also appears to be minimal, despite the fact that the present kamnan 
is a long time friend of the phu yai ban of this village. Further discussion about the 
involvement of the kamnan will be included in the following section.
Outside the village of Ban Bon Lay, it is important to consider the political situation in 
Bueng Yai community and its potential effects on the politics of Ban Bon Lay. Since 
Bueng Yai community is administratively divided between two sub-districts — Bueng Yai 
sub-district and Khuan Phanang sub-district — the structure of power in this densely 
populated community is quite complex. Moreover, given the fact that the community is 
large and densely populated, its population was observed to be heterogeneous in social 
and economic backgrounds, and the pressure of population over natural resources is also 
high. These two conditions, coupled with the administrative division of the community 
between two sub-districts, have caused administrative and political tensions within the 
community. Conflict of interests was observed among formal leaders as well as between 
formal leaders and leaders of interest groups. Though their conflicts may have several 
causes, their conflicting interests in controlling resources, either those available in the 
area or those provided by the state for development purposes, appear to be among the 
main causes. Factions have emerged in this community, and three are predominant — the 
faction led by the kamnan of Tambon Bueng Yai, the faction led by the kamnan of 
Tambon Khuan Phanang, and the faction led by a charismatic well-off trader of Ban 
Talard. Conflicts emerge clearly between the group of the kamnan of Tambon Bueng Yai 
and the group of the kamnan of Tambon Khuan Phanang, and between the group of the 
kamnan of Tambon Khuan Phanang and the group of the charismatic trader. Though the 
group of the charismatic trader does not show any conflict with the group of the kamnan 
of Tambon Bueng Yai, it seems to operate independently most of the time. Members of 
this group use their personal connections with politicians and some high level officials in 
pursuing their interests. Much of the discussion about their conflicts is reserved for the 
next chapter, however it is worth noting that these conflicts cause division among
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villagers as well as among phu yai ban, which then shatter the co-operative spirit of the 
community. The split occurring among these leaders clearly forms one of the main 
obstacles to building co-operation among different villages for the common good of the 
community as a whole. This issue is crucial for the management of natural resources 
which are shared among members of different villages.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided a comparison of the backgrounds of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon 
Lay where most of this study was undertaken. In the case of Ban Bon Lay, a comparison 
was also made with Bueng Yai community — the larger community from which Ban Bon 
Lay is administratively separated. Several aspects of these communities have been 
discussed and compared. They include physical and historical settings, population, 
households, out-migration, economic condition and structure, religious institution, and 
politics and administration. It can be seen from the discussion so far that there are some 
similarities as well as differences between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, and even 
between Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community. In this concluding section, I will 
highlight some of these similarities and differences which are crucial for the 
understanding of the organisation of these two village communities, and the roles of their 
official leaders. The focus here will be only on the comparison between Ban Nua Phru 
and Ban Bon Lay, as the inclusion of Bueng Yai community in the above discussion was 
mainly for the purpose of clarifying the conditions of Ban Bon Lay, which in many 
respects cannot be treated as separate.
The similarities between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are found in the size of the 
communities, types of natural resources available, the size and structure of their 
population and households, and types of prevailing occupations. Both villages can be 
considered as large villages by Thailand’s standards, and the size of their populations is 
not significantly different. The structure of their populations is also similar, both in terms 
of sexual and age group compositions. They are both composed of about equal
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proportions of male and female population. In terms of age structure, both villages are 
dominated by members in the work force age-range, representing over sixty per cent of 
the total population of each village. Though the difference exists in proportions of those 
below and above the work force age-range, it is not significant. The majority of 
households in both villages are of nuclear type with a considerable proportion of joint 
households. Moreover, the average size of households in these two villages is also very 
close. Out-migration is also a common phenomenon in both villages, where a 
considerable number of villagers migrate out to seek jobs outside the communities, both 
on a temporary and permanent basis. With respect to types of natural resources available, 
they both have similar types of main natural resources including rice land, grazing land, 
swamp and other waterbodies, and sedge grasses. These main natural resources determine 
the types of occupations performed by the majority of their populations, which are also 
similar. The types of occupations commonly found in both villages are rice farming, 
fishing and handicrafts. All these occupations are based mainly on natural resources 
available in the communities or in surrounding communities.
The main differences between these two villages include the level of population pressure 
over natural resources, the history of their settlements, the form of their settlements, the 
relationship between communities and their religious institutions, and their political 
patterns. When considering the population pressure over natural resources, it is quite clear 
that the level of the overall population pressure over natural resources available is lower 
in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay, as the population density in Ban Nua Phru is 
much lower than in Ban Bon Lay. Moreover, the availability of land and sedge grasses 
which are among the main resources are clearly higher in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon 
Lay. With respect to fish resources, though a clear comparison cannot be made either 
qualitatively or quantitatively between these two communities, it appears that the level of 
competition over the resources is lower in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. The 
difference in the history of settlements between these two villages seems to determine 
their difference in the patterns of social relationships and leadership in the communities. 
The higher degree of cohesiveness among villagers and leaders found in Ban Nua Phru as
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compared to Ban Bon Lay, seems to relate to the historical ties the villagers and leaders 
have among themselves. The difference in the level of their cohesiveness is also related 
to the difference in their relationships with their religious institutions. The active 
involvement of the chao aawat of Wat Nua Phru in secular activities contributes 
significantly to the more harmonious political environment observed in Ban Nua Phru 
than in Ban Bon Lay. With respect to forms of settlement, being a demarcated unit allows 
Ban Nua Phru to be more independent in its politics and administration than Ban Bon 
Lay, which is attached to Bueng Yai community in various aspects. The final point 
concerns the difference in their political patterns. It is quite clear that the political 
environment in Ban Bon Lay is more complex than in Ban Nua Phru. Though the main 
cause of the complexity in the politics and administration in Ban Bon Lay seems to be 
related to the complexity of the administrative division of Bueng Yai community itself, 
the difference in various aspects between Ban Bon Lay and Ban Nua Phru mentioned 
above also determines their difference in political environment.
The similarities and differences between these two village communities are important in 
analysing the attributes of these communities in dealing with the implementation of 
policies at village level, since it is argued that the role and attributes of the community is 
crucial for its achievement (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992). Moreover, the 
strength of community organisation should also play a vital role in the achievement of 
community-based resource management system, if this system is to be promoted.
CHAPTER FIVE
COMMUNITY ORGANISATION AND POLITICS 
OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT
5.1 Introduction
In contemporary rural societies in developing countries, the ways rural communities are 
organised and administered are likely to be a compromise between the evident social 
tradition of each society and modem forms of administration brought in by the national 
government of each individual country. However, the extent to which traditional and 
modem systems are integrated varies depending on the stage of political development 
which each society has reached. Riggs (1964) states that in ‘old’ societies a model of 
administration existed which fitted their socio-cultural and economic systems. Any new 
model or administrative system to be established or introduced can only displace but 
not replace the traditional systems, especially at the village level. As a society enters 
into the process of modernisation and industrialisation, it moves to a transitional stage 
in which the old and new systems exist side by side in a heterogeneous mixture. This 
creates a situation in which some overlaps and cross influences between the two 
systems are inevitable.
In the case of rural communities in Thailand, penetration of the modem administrative 
system brought in by the state, is regarded by some academics as unique (Nartsupha, 
1986; Dilokwittayaratana, 1986). The level of state penetration may differ locally in its 
intensity, subject to differences in levels of attachment with state governing bodies 
among different localities. This creates different effects on the relationship between 
villages and the wider community in which they are located. The implication of these 
arguments for the study of rural communities is that any understanding of the ways
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these communities are organised must take account of interactions between the 
traditional and formal system, and the ways they effect rural communities. This requires 
an understanding of the historical perspective, physical characteristics, and the stage of 
development of different communities. Hence, exploration of historical and physical 
influences, as well as of social and political changes within each community, is crucial 
to the understanding of the contexts in which development policies are implemented at 
the village level.
Earlier in Chapter Two, I proposed a framework for the analysis of development policy 
in rural Thailand. In this framework, I argued that the implementation of policy at the 
local level must be seen as occurring in both organisational context and local societal 
context. However, the influence of the organisational context is unlikely to be strong, 
due to complications within the local political environment and the lack of competence 
of local implementors or official actors in dealing with local conditions. Rather policy 
implementation is likely to occur in a form of ‘implementation structures’, in which all 
actors, including official actors and local actors from various groups, interact with each 
other. Policy outcomes are, therefore, strongly determined by the interactions of these 
actors under given conditions. In applying this framework to this study, which focuses 
on policy implementation at the village level, it is necessary to locate the village 
community which is used as a unit of analysis within the proposed framework, and 
compare its status with the implementation structures.
This chapter will discuss the organisational aspects of two communities under this 
study. It will cover a discussion of the relationship between the villages and the state, 
which determines organisational arrangements in the villages, as well as considering 
situational factors behind the differences in their organisational arrangements. There are 
two main purposes of this discussion. Firstly, it will allow us to locate the position of 
the village community organisation in the framework of policy implementation at the 
local level. Secondly, it will provide a better understanding of the attributes of 
community organisations within these two villages. These two domains of community 
organisations form two important grounds for the analysis of the role of phu yai ban, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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5.2 Village Communities, the State and the Management of CPRs
Common to the conventional analysis of rural differentiation and the relationship 
between a rural community and the state, is the adoption of the encapsulation paradigm. 
Central to this model is the assumption about the emergence of two different political 
structures at the different ends of the ‘tradition-modemity continuum.’ These two 
structures are referred to as the ‘encapsulated structure’ representing the structure of 
the village at one end, and the ‘the encapsulating structure’ representing the structure of 
the state at the other end. The cleavage of these two structures marks at the boundary of 
the village (Wood, 1976). The existence of this dichotomy is viewed as creating 
structural tension in the development towards modernisation, and rural institutions are 
seen as ‘obstacles.’ To bring about modernisation, it is believed that this structural 
tension needs to be resolved through the dissolution of the encapsulated structure into 
the encapsulating structure. This conception forms the cornerstone of the political 
process of development and nation-building in most developing countries influenced by 
modernisation theory (Wood, 1976; see also Wood, 1974). The application of this 
conception also dominates the contemporary development and political process in 
Thailand. Nevertheless, as with its application in other developing countries, this 
conception seems to be controversial. This is because the model’s assumptions 
regarding the characteristics of rural communities and their relationships with the state, 
seem to be misguided (see Wood, 1976; Harriss, 1982; Nartsupha, 1986).
With respect to the conceptualisation of the differentiation of village communities in 
Thailand, only limited literature is available. Apart from the notion that village 
communities have an encapsulated structure, which seems to be blindly adopted by 
some academics and political elite in the government, there exists a claim that 
characteristics of village communities in Thailand are unique. This view perceives the 
existence of a high degree of local independence, self-reliance, and internal solidarity in 
Thai village communities. These characteristics are argued to be derived from the 
system of traditional village organisation in the pre-modem period of Thai society, 
where the village was an ‘autonomous society’ (see Thongyou, 1986; Nartsupha, 1986).
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This view was challenged by some scholars as being too idealised, since a village 
community with these features has never existed in the history of Thailand. This is due 
to the influence of the Thai feudal system (rabob sakdina) in the past, and the more 
recent penetration of modernisation and capitalist ideologies, which followed the 
collapse of the sakdina system (Kemp, 1989; Kemp, 1991; Hong, 1984). Nevertheless, 
protagonists of the idea of village autonomy seem to be confident about their views, as 
they see that the impact of the sakdina system and modem administration system on 
village communities in Thai society have not occurred in the same manner as in western 
societies. They argue that state control over the village and penetration of modem 
systems into village communities, have been limited, and the essence of tradition has 
been largely undisturbed. The extent to which interference from outside impacts on a 
community varies, depending on its physical distance, and on its social as well as 
individual connections with centres of power, i.e. cities and elites (Nartsupha, 1986). 
This observation is consistent among those who closely observe changes within rural 
communities in Thailand, as variations in the degree of traditional-modern integration 
are seen between more remote communities and less remote communities, even today 
(Kemp, 1989; see also Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994; McVey, 1984).
Though there appears to be no definite agreement about the characteristics of rural 
communities in Thailand, both with respect to their internal social structures and their 
relationships with the state and wider societies, there seem to be some consensus on the 
perceptions about variations in the degree of integration between the traditional system 
and modem system among different communities. Moreover, variations in physical and 
social attachments with centres of power appear to be the major factor behind the 
difference in levels of traditional-modem integration. These are important points to 
discuss here in relation to the conditions within Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. 
However, before entering into a detail discussion about the actual integration of 
traditional and modem system apparent in these two communities, I would briefly like 
to clarify the essence of traditional and modem systems of organisation, as applied to 
the village level in this area. The discussion is based on information gathered through 
informal discussions with elders, and from my observations in several villages in the 
study area.
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Although a full application of the traditional system of community organisation at the 
village level can no longer be observed in this area, by asking elders to recall their 
memories about the recent past when the village organisation was still highly 
traditional, a valuable picture can be discerned. In brief, when the traditional system 
dominated the village administration in the past, elders played a dominant role in 
maintaining law and order in rural communities. In each community, there were a few 
elders who were regarded as leaders. These leaders gained power through their merits 
of good deeds or specialisation in certain areas, such as traditional medicine and 
religious or ceremonial affairs. Some leaders might be bandits or nakleng who are 
powerful and believed to be strong men who can protect the community from 
unpleasant interruptions from outside (see Johnston, 1980). These leaders respected 
each other. Seniority was very important in their relationships; the most senior one was 
likely to be the most respected and regarded as the top leader. They normally 
communicated through face-to-face contact. However, there could be conflict among 
these leaders, and serious conflict could end up forcing the weaker leaders out of the 
community.
Governing the community was mainly based on norms passed from one generation to 
another, with state rules and regulations having little influences. When major issues 
needed to be resolved, the traditional leaders would form an informal council to make 
decisions. Rules in managing common property resources (CPRs) were also developed 
in this way. Most of the rules were also bound up with spiritual beliefs which 
functioned in controlling people’s behaviour through supernatural powers (see 
Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994; Moerman and Miller, 1989; Vallibhotama, 1989). This 
strong link between norms and spiritual beliefs created strong links between these 
leaders and monks, as most ceremonial work was led by monks. Hence, the relationship 
between religious institutions and the community were very strong and interdependent. 
Although this pattern of community organisation has been weakened by the attempt to 
‘encapsulate’ the village community into the modem system of administration, it has 
remained very significant and has been recognised by local government officials in the 
past few decades. Indeed, it is a feature that remains in the memory of today’s elders.
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Interestingly, most official leaders such as kamnan and phu yai ban, in the past, were 
drawn from these leaders rather than through actual elections in the democratic sense. 
In the view of elders, the way the leaders were recruited in the past meant they were 
naturally very influential, both in official and cultural senses. People followed them not 
only because they had authority, but also because people respected them.
Under the modem system, which is currently applied to village administration in this 
area, only official leaders’ groups led by kamnan and phu yai ban are recognised by the 
state as having authority to deal with administrative affairs at the tambon and mooban 
levels. Unlike in the past, these leaders, especially kamnan and phu yai ban, are 
recruited through elections. Although it is possible for natural leaders or elders to enter 
these elections, this is only likely to happen on rare occasions. In cases where some 
traditional leaders enter the elections, only those who are young are likely to contest 
them. Normally the most senior traditional leader does not show his desire to be in one 
of these positions. In this sense, it is less likely that official leaders, especially kamnan 
and phu yai ban, will be recruited from among influential traditional leaders. Therefore, 
the actual status of kamnan and phu yai ban nowadays, with respect to their 
relationships with their people, is not the same as leaders in the past. It can be said that 
traditional leaders nowadays are generally excluded from the official domain under the 
formal administrative arrangement. Though a few traditional leaders are observed to sit 
on the village committee in each village and in the sapha tambon of each tambon as 
their elected members, they do not at first appear to be very influential as they hold 
only a subordinate status in these two bodies. In most cases, their status can be 
described as advisors to kamnan and phu yai ban, who lead these two official bodies. 
At the same time, it is also possible to find cases where kamnan or phu yai ban are in 
conflict with traditional leaders who are elected to these bodies, due to their different 
interests. Outside these bodies, elders still hold influence, and are respected by 
individual villagers. Many villagers still seek advice and help from them, though much 
of this appears to relate to personal matters, and has little connection with politics and 
administration. It seems that the traditional leaders themselves realise that changes in 
the power structure of local organisations have occurred, which means they are no 
longer in a politically influential position.
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The above discussion illustrates the difference in structures of power between the 
traditional system and modem system of administration at tambon and mooban levels 
in Thailand, and with reference to the study area. Although the full operation of the 
traditional system may no longer exist, since it has been displaced by the modem 
system of administration, I would like to argue that this modem system has not also 
been fully applied. Both mooban and tambon current administrative patterns within the 
study area are composed of both traditional and modem components standing side by 
side with different levels of integration, as stated by Riggs (1964). This difference in 
the extent of integration can also be seen in Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay.
As far as Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are concerned, there are two important 
factors which determine the difference in organisational arrangements in these two 
village communities. These two factors are the historical and geographical perspectives 
of their settlements. Since most of the details relating to the differences in these two 
factors were discussed in the preceding chapter, this section will only take account of 
those elements which appear to be associated with patterns of organisational 
arrangement of these two village communities.
5.2.1 Historical Factors and Community Organisation
It was mentioned in Chapter Four that settlement of Ban Nua Phru occurred quite 
recently. Their pioneer settlers have been regarded as their leaders, and are highly 
respected by the current settlers. The emotional tie the villagers have with these leaders 
is still strong in today’s community life. Part of this respect is reflected through the 
tmst they have given to these leaders and their descendants to lead the community since 
its establishment. At the present, the abbot, the village phu song khunnawut, and the 
former but still highly influential phu yai ban, are all immediate descendants of those 
pioneer settlers. Although all these leaders are competent, which should be the most 
important criterion for their recruitment, being descendants of respected pioneer settlers 
is certainly a benefit for them, gaining them support to lead the community. The 
historical ties which these leaders have create good relationships among themselves and
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between them and villagers. This is a major contribution to the high degree of solidarity 
observed within the community, and one of its most important attributes in handling 
administrative problems effectively. Additionally, this high degree of community 
solidarity appears to play a major role in maintaining the high degree of political 
independence observed in this community. Consequently, the organisational 
arrangement of this community was observed to be less influenced by the state, as 
compared to its neighbouring communities and Ban Bon Lay. At the same time, village 
harmony is better maintained through the combination of modem and traditional 
approaches that these leaders employ in handling their administrative work. Formal and 
traditional leaders, especially the abbot of Wat Nua Phru, work closely in various 
activities undertaken in the community. The active involvement of the abbot in secular 
activities cannot be seen as solely a matter of individual interest. His status as a 
grandson of the founder of the village, appears to be behind both his motivation to be 
involved in the development work of the community, and also the respect he receives 
from all parties in the community. Interestingly, the mutual contribution between 
spiritual and secular leaders in bringing harmony and prosperity to the community in 
this village which emerges from the internal drive of this community, helps in creating 
a promising atmosphere in the village administration. In other words, through active 
participation of both traditional and official leaders, the organisational arrangement of 
the community is likely to move to become better integrated with respect to traditional 
and modem components. This significance has been rarely pointed out in previous 
studies related to rural community organisation in Thailand.
Unlike in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay community does not have a strong tie with a 
glorious history of settlement. Being part of the very large and old settlement of Bueng 
Yai community, the social structures of the village appear to differ considerably from 
those of Ban Nua Phru, especially with respect to leadership of the community. The 
nature of the settlement in this village, which forms an extension of the larger 
community of Bueng Yai, has complicated the social structures of this village where 
settlers do not necessarily have strong kinship ties, nor a long harmonious relationship 
among them. Many settlers moved in from other communities and are quite isolated 
from these traditional connections. In other words, the nature of the settlement in this
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village is more cosmopolitan than in Ban Nua Phru. The lack of strong socio-cultural 
connections among villagers and the cosmopolitan characteristic of the village, seem to 
determine its organisational arrangement and its leadership pattern. Together with the 
long experience of contact with the state, the present organisational arrangement in this 
village is more influenced by the modem system than in Ban Nua Phru. This can be 
seen from the recruitment of leaders, especially phu yai ban and phu song khunnawut, 
which are clearly bound to the election system prescribed by the state regulations. The 
present phu yai ban and phu song khunnawut came to their positions through elections, 
with no sign of any historical influence. Rather, they were elected as a result of their 
perceived personal qualifications and campaigns, similar to the recmitment of members 
of the village committee. The recruitment of phu chuay phu yai ban, which is based on 
the decision of the phu yai ban, also did not reflect any sign of historical influence. The 
selection appears to have been based on the personal qualifications of individuals in 
dealing with administrative work anticipated by the phu yai ban. In the absence of a 
strong connection with a religious institution which may influence the organisational 
arrangement of the community, the village administration appears to rely largely on the 
modem system of administration.
Nevertheless, the clear domination of the modem system of administration seems to 
have taken place only quite recently. Additionally, the domination of the modem 
administration system in this village cannot be said to be a sign of great improvement 
in the village administration. The discrepancy between the modem and traditional 
components of its community organisation creates complications and ineffectiveness in 
the modem system currently employed. As official leaders attempt to apply most of the 
formal rules of administration, many villagers still prefer to employ many traditional 
rules to solve their problems and fulfil their needs. For example, village leaders expect 
villagers to inform and consult them with problems, so that they can proceed to the 
higher levels of government in order to seek help. Most villagers, on the other hand, 
prefer to discuss these matters with relatives and neighbours, rather than informing their 
official leaders. In the first instance, villagers attempt to solve disputes that may arise 
between themselves or through traditional leaders, before involving official leaders. 
Similarly, they rarely make direct propositions about their ideas or needs relating to
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development of the village community to official leaders. The fear of being rejected by 
official leaders, which results in ‘losing face’ (siah naa or khaai naa), makes them 
prefer the more traditional path of informal consultation with neighbours, friends, and 
elders (see Mulder, 1994). However, these practices have their own limitations under 
the present day’s village administration. Elders and informal leaders are no longer in 
the position of being able to effectively calm disputes and allocate resources to serve 
the villagers’ needs. This is because the action of these leaders is often neglected by 
official leaders or higher level officials, except if they work together with official 
leaders.
5.2.2 Geographical Factors and Community Organisation
The difference in the location of these two villages in relation to surrounding 
communities and natural resources they share with other communities has the main 
influence on the difference in the organisational arrangement of these communities. To 
clarify this point, it is essential to recall the difference in the settlements of these two 
villages described earlier in Chapter Four.
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the settlement of Ban Nua Phru comprises clusters of 
households stretching out over the area delineated as its administrative boundary. 
Surrounding these household groups are privately occupied land, either on a formal or 
informal basis (i.e. with land titles or without land titles), and the swamp area which is 
communally owned. Although the settlement is scattered within its political territory, it 
is clearly demarcated from the neighbouring villages. The physical demarcation of the 
village appears to determine the pattern of resource sharing, which is almost exclusive 
to the members of the community. This applies to most major natural resources, 
including swamp forest, sedge grasses, and fishing grounds. These resources are 
customarily shared only by members of the community, therefore they can be 
categorised as CPRs. Similar practices were observed in other communities settling in 
this part of Phru Thung Samet swamp, with each community drawing its territorial 
boundary over the CPRs used. Although the delineation of each CPR territory does not 
strictly follow the political boundary of each village, as some natural resources are
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located across areas governed by different villages, political boundaries are nevertheless 
used as the main basis for delineation. The rule that applies to this system is simple and 
based on the value of mutual respect, that is, each community must respect other 
communities by utilising only CPRs available within its own political boundary. In 
cases where some natural resources are located beyond a single community boundary, 
sharing these resources is limited to those communities within which the resources are 
located. Taking into account of two major CPRs — krajoot which is used for 
handicrafts, and the swamp area which is used as the main fishing ground — Ban Nua 
Phru has a clear territory of its own for utilising these resources exclusively for 
members of the community. Sharing CPRs only among members of one village makes 
it easier for them to manage the resources under the present administration system, as 
decisions on related issues could be taken within one village. This means that the 
village administrative body has to deal primarily only with the interactions of actors 
within the village, while actors from outside the village are excluded. This condition 
makes the politics of natural resource management in this village less complicated than 
when actors from both inside and outside the village are involved.
In contrast to Ban Nua Phru, the physical and social attachments of Ban Bon Lay with 
its neighbouring villages, which are aggregated as Bueng Yai community, make its 
political boundary less significant for the actual village administration. There are a few 
matters, including the management of CPRs, which cannot be manipulated 
independently on a single village basis. Most CPRs used by members of Ban Bon Lay 
are located across the political boundaries of different villages, and shared among users 
throughout Bueng Yai community. Taking into account the fishing grounds including 
Bueng Yai lake, the surrounding swamp, and even the floodplain area which is 
transformed into a fishing ground when flooded, no clear territorial boundaries are 
drawn among users from different mooban. However, there exists an intangible division 
among fishermen using Bueng Yai lake, the most important fishing ground for the 
community, which divides them into two groups -- fishermen living on the edge of the 
west bank of the lake, and fishermen living in the inner part of the community. 
Fishermen who live on the edge of the west bank of the lake occupy the south-western 
half of the lake, while fishermen residing in the inner part of the community, including
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Ban Bon Lay, occupy the other half of the lake (see Map 1 and Map 4). There is no 
clear physical boundary drawn among different groups. Additinally, evidence shows 
that the division emerges through the internal evolution of a customary system of 
resource allocation to cope with changes in the level of resource scarcity, since it 
appears to be a recent phenomenon. There is strong evidence that this waterbody used 
to be an open access fishing ground where fishing was not limited only to members of 
the community. Even under the present arrangement, the division of the waterbody 
between different groups of fishermen is quite loose. According to key informants, the 
division happens as a matter of respect among fishermen themselves. There is no 
specific collective agreement about using communal sanctions as a means of 
punishment for contenders; control occurs through the common norm of mutual 
respect, and sharing the benefits from communal resources, either between individual 
fishermen or between groups of fishermen. However, some forms of personal 
interference were observed to be used towards contenders. The most common form of 
interference is the stealing of fishing gear by fishermen occupying the area, if fishermen 
from the other group intrude into their territory.
No matter how the lake is divided, fishery resources are still shared by all fishermen 
within the larger community of Bueng Yai. Hence, the community as a whole should be 
responsible for the management of the waterbody. Though this pattern of organisational 
arrangement sounds appropriate for the nature of resource allocation in this community, 
the way the present formal management is arranged is based on the conventional rule of 
local administration, in which each village is responsible for managing the resources 
located within its political boundary. This implies that each village can only deal 
formally with problems occurring within its own political boundary. For instance, if 
problems related to CPR management occur outside Ban Bon Lay, though still within 
Bueng Yai lake, they fall under the direct responsibility of the administrative body of 
the village where the problems occurred. If the administrative body of the village where 
the problems take place is reluctant to take action to solve the problems, Ban Bon Lay 
and other villages do not have direct authority to interfere. Considering the concern of 
Ban Bon Lay administrative body in handling problems related to fishery resource 
exploitation, its official leaders nevertheless hesitate to take any action if the problems
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occur outside the village, and do not involve any members of the community. Although 
most official leaders in Bueng Yai community are personally concerned with the future 
of fisheries in their villages, and most of them are fishermen themselves, they do not 
believe they have the right to intervene in the administration of other villages. Similar 
situations were observed in other villages in Bueng Yai community. On the whole, 
effective management of CPRs depends on mutual agreements and aggregated actions 
of all villages in Bueng Yai community, rather than on the strength of any single 
village. This makes the task of managing the CPRs more complicated than a single 
village such as Ban Bon Lay alone could handle effectively, even if its administrative 
body is energetic. It may be argued that all villages can work together in solving 
problems affecting the whole community. However, this is unlikely to happen 
automatically in a community where the administration is divided not only into many 
villages, but also between two sub-districts. If all the villages are in the same sub­
district, the conflict between villages can possibly be sorted out easier through the 
function of sapha tambon.
The complication emerging in relation to CPR management at the local level discussed 
in this section, is determined not only by basic characteristics of the resources 
themselves, but also by the organisational arrangements of management bodies at the 
local level. From the above discussion, it is clear that assuming CPR management can 
be done effectively under formal administrative arrangements, while ignoring various 
forms of traditional arrangements existing in different local communities, can be 
misleading. This is because patterns of resource allocation can vary across 
communities. Ideally each pattern should reflect the evolution of community-resource 
relations in each community. Any new approaches introduced by the state can be 
problematic without seriously considering integrating the traditional arrangements that 
already exist in particular communities. Generalising a certain approach to CPR 
management from outside the community as a ‘ready-made package’ for wider 
application, may force users’ communities to adopt an ‘incompatible system’, which 
may result in displacing or weakening the existing traditional system in their 
communities.
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In Thailand, the state’s assumption that CPR management at the local level should be 
handled through the formal administrative system, where each tambon and mooban 
governing bodies should be responsible for problems arising in their own political 
territories, can be problematic. This is especially difficult when their political 
boundaries are inconsistent with the territorial boundaries of CPRs in question, as 
illustrated by the case of Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. Since the political 
boundary of each administrative unit is drawn mainly to serve general administrative 
purposes, with the size of population in each unit appearing to matter most, the chance 
of this arrangement being appropriate for CPR management may be very rare. The 
arrangement may be appropriate for CPR management in demarcated villages, and 
where CPRs are used exclusively within each village as in Ban Nua Phru. However, it 
is likely to be difficult to apply in villages which form part of the larger community and 
where CPRs are shared by members of the larger community, as in Ban Bon Lay. Even 
in the case of demarcated villages, the application of the formal arrangement alone is 
also doubtful. The case of Ban Nua Phru illustrates that a combination of traditional and 
formal systems appears to work best. In a large community which is divided into 
different units of administration, whilst CPRs are still shared within the large 
community, the conventional state’s arrangement is unlikely to work. Specific 
rearrangement is necessary, if the management of CPRs is to be effective.
5.3 Economic Change, Resource Pressure, and Political 
Environment
Besides the state’s attempts to transform the village’s political and social systems into 
the modem system of administration, as discussed in the preceding section, the 
influence of factors such as economic changes in the wider society which penetrate the 
village communities, and population growth which increases pressure on natural 
resources, are also important in understanding local political patterns. From the 
background description in Chapter Four, there appears to be evidence which suggests 
some degrees of disparity in the stage of market penetration and the difference in 
population pressure on natural resources between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay.
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These differences will be analysed further in this section by focusing on how they 
influence the political patterns surrounding CPR management in these two villages.
To understand the economic difference between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, it is 
essential to examine and compare the difference in patterns of production of the 
majority households in these two communities. The discussion about the economy of 
these villages in Chapter Four revealed that although there is some similarity in the 
types of occupations of the majority households in both villages, the production 
orientation of each activity is apparently different. The three major economic activities 
are rice farming, fishing, and handicrafts; though rice farming in both villages is aimed 
predominantly for household food security, fishing and handicrafts have production 
patterns which are more market-oriented in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. The 
difference in patterns of production of fishing and handicrafts cannot be a matter of 
accident. It must link with the transition towards a market economy, which was 
observed to differ between these two villages. The better and longer established contact 
with outside communities of Ban Bon Lay, has meant the community economy and 
consumption patterns of its people have changed towards a market economy more than 
in Ban Nua Phru. Since the economic activities in these villages are highly dependent 
on the natural resources surrounding the communities, the more market-oriented the 
production patterns are, the higher the exploitation of natural resources is likely to be. 
This argument corresponds to the finding that the level of exploitation and the degree of 
depletion of major natural resources, are higher in Ban Bon Lay (and Bueng Yai 
community) than in Ban Nua Phru. This is clearly because the competition over these 
natural resources is higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Once the competition 
is higher, the politics of managing the resources is likely to be more complicated.
Taking into account fishery resources which are important for the livelihoods of both 
villages and have recently come under threat, the intensity of fishing activities was 
observed to be higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Although this difference 
is determined by the difference in the nature of their main fishing ground that 
determines the length of time they can fish effectively each year, there is clear evidence 
that fishermen in Ban Nua Phru do not employ as much effort, even when the
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conditions permit them to do so. Nor do they employ fishing methods which allow 
them to extend their fishing over a longer period. This is contrary to the situation in Ban 
Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community, where most fishermen were observed to put much 
greater effort into capturing fish throughout the year.
Clearly, the difference in the level of fishing effort between these communities partially 
reflects the difference in the cash dependency of their population, as well as the 
difference in the degree of importance of fishery resources in generating their cash 
incomes. It also reflects the difference in the pressure over the resources between these 
two communities. There is much evidence to support these assertions. For Ban Nua 
Phru, fishing could be carried out more intensively than was actually occurring at the 
time of this study, but fishermen were hesitant to do so. Considering the capacity of 
fishery resources, there is evidence which suggests that greater effort can be made. It 
was observed that some fishermen in neighbouring villages who fish in the same 
fishing environment could generate a significant amount of income by employing 
different types of gear and by fishing in different surrounding waterbodies throughout 
the year. This signifies that most fishermen in this village have not yet faced the high 
economic pressure to increase their level of exploitation of fishery resources in order to 
meet their needs for cash. Compared to Ban Bon Lay, where fishing is more intensive 
and much greater effort is made by fishermen in order to earn a living, the 
circumstances in Ban Nua Phru suggest that their needs for cash in their livings are not 
as high as in Ban Bon Lay. Not only fishing in which less effort is made, other cash- 
generating activities, particularly handicrafts, were also found to be less intensive in 
Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. For Ban Bon Lay as well as Bueng Yai 
community, there is evidence indicating that the need for cash has increased rapidly in 
the last two to three decades. In the past when cash was not as important as nowadays, 
fishermen did not put much effort in their fishing either. A key informant in his early 
seventies recalled the situation when he was around forty years old: ‘Though fish were 
abundant in the past, we did not catch much of it, it did not have a high value at that 
time.’ Another much younger key informant insisted: ‘The decline in fishing in this 
area is not a matter of a decrease in amount of fish caught each time (catch per unit 
effort) alone, but also because fishermen need much more cash nowadays than before.’
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These assertions contradict the claim of some fishermen that fishery resources are 
scarce and inadequate for the needs of fishermen. The claim might not necessarily 
reflect the actual phenomenon. Evidence available from a biological estimation under 
the PSU-CDS project also does not support the claim that fishery resources in the area 
are in a condition of over-exploitation (Heady et al., 1995). Therefore, it can be said 
that the difference in the degree of fishery resource exploitation between Ban Nua Phru 
and Ban Bon Lay has a strong linkage to the difference in the degree of market- 
orientation of the economy of these two communities. The higher dependency on cash 
of fishermen in Ban Bon Lay means that the exploitation of fishery resources is higher 
than in Ban Nua Phru. In other words, the pressure over the fishery resources is higher 
in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru, as the resources are among the main bases of 
cash income of the majority population. The relationship between the extent of market 
orientation and the level of natural resource exploitation of different communities is 
reflected in the analysis of various traditional societies in different parts of the world by 
Sahlins (1974). The difference in the level of natural resources exploitation among 
different communities is observed to be influenced not only by different modes of 
production employed by these societies, but also the difference in social relations 
among members of these societies. In ‘primitive communities’, the sense of community 
is likely to be stronger than in ‘modem industrial communities’ where the relations are 
more individualistic. The difference in social relations among members of these 
communities determines the level of natural resource exploitation; the more 
individualistic the community is, the higher the competition over natural resources for 
individual benefits. Although Ban Nua Phru cannot be considered as a ‘primitive 
community’, and Ban Bon Lay is also not a ‘modem industrial community’ in a real 
sense, there are considerable differences in the extent to which they are involved in the 
market economy.
In general, it seems clear that there is a strong relationship between the extent of change 
towards the market economy and the pressure of resource use. Once the pressure of 
resource use is higher, the competition to utilise them is likely to be more intense. As a 
consequence, problems related to over-exploitation of the resources are likely to 
increase. The situation in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community corresponds to this
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view. Compared to Ban Nua Phru, problems related to illegal fishing are more common 
in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. Despite the belief in the need to ‘respect 
each other’ often cited by villagers, some fishermen behave in ways which are 
distressing and detestable to their fellow fishermen. It was observed that use of harmful 
fishing methods, especially by passing high voltage electric current from large batteries 
equipped with adapters, are critical. The method is denounced as being wicked and 
harmful for the future of fisheries in the area, as it destroys fish of all sizes and in great 
numbers randomly. Apart from this illegal method, fishing in spawning seasons, using 
brush piles to set fish traps in the lake, and setting barriers across water ways, which are 
restricted under fishery regulations (see Appendix Two), are also common. It is 
interesting to note that these practices are overlooked by most authorities and likely to 
be persistent, although the practices are perceived by many fishermen as threatening for 
the future of the fisheries. The persistence of such problems cannot simply be blamed 
on results from the insufficiency of the Department of Fisheries manpower to subjugate 
offenders and to control the situation. This is because apart from the District Fisheries 
Officer (pramong amphoe) who is directly in charge of fisheries management in the 
district as a whole, Bueng Yai community is also served by a police station equipped 
with more than ten officers, whose main priority is to maintain law and order in this 
particular community. This size of police force should be adequate for overseeing the 
community. Moreover the area, especially the lake, is recognised widely among 
officials as an important fishing ground to be maintained, therefore, it should receive 
priority from concerned bodies to consider its problems. Available information makes it 
more proper to assume that the persistence of problems involves the complication of 
politics, and the difference in perceptions and interests among authorities, especially 
between police and local leaders, which leads to inefficiency in applying the state 
mechanism in handling the problems. It was also observed that a lack of understanding 
and interests among powerful officials leads to a lack of co-ordination between them 
and local leaders in combating the problems. Additionally, lack of co-ordination is also 
found among local leaders from different villages, due to their different interests and 
political conflicts derived from other causes as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four.
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Problems of illegal fishing also exist in Ban Nua Phru, but to a lesser degree. Some 
fishermen were said to have attempted to set fishing gear in restricted areas and have 
used a poisonous chemical substance known as ‘luuk khao ' (white pellet), which is 
believed to be cyanide compound, to poison fish in refuge trap ponds or in remaining 
holes in the dry season. However, these problems have not persisted due to the firm 
action of local leaders against them. The low pressure on the resources together with 
the more harmonious and independent political environment in Ban Nua Phru, as 
compared to Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community, does help in restoring the 
situation.
It can be summarised that the difference in the degree of competition over natural 
resources, especially fishery resources, between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, 
appears to be linked to the economic changes of the wider society which affect these 
two communities in different ways. The more long-term contact Ban Bon Lay and 
Bueng Yai community have had with the outside, has led their economy to be more 
market-oriented than that of Ban Nua Phru. Coupled with their different population 
density, the difference in their levels of dependency on cash has driven these 
communities to face different levels of pressure over fishery resources which form a 
major source of cash income for the majority of their population. These differences 
determine the political environments of the communities, especially those concerning 
problems related to the management of CPRs. In Ban Nua Phru, where population 
density and dependency on fishery resources for generating a cash income are not so 
high, the political environment appears to be harmonious. Conflict resulting from 
competition among fishermen over resources appears to be negligible and controllable. 
In contrast, the situation in Ban Bon Lay is more complicated. A high degree of 
dependency on fishery resources to generate a cash income together with the pressure 
of population density, has led to greater competition over the resources. Many problems 
emerge in connection with overexploitation of the resources. These problems are much 
more complicated than in Ban Nua Phru, as a large number of people from different 
villages are involved. Solving these problems is also complicated, as they are 
frequently related to several villages. This means that various actors, including leaders 
from different villages, are involved. Complications emerge due to the various interests
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and commitments of these actors with relation to the problems. Even officials whose 
duties are directly concerned with solving the problems are also found to be negligent.
5.4 Participatory Aspect of Community Organisation
From the discussion in the preceding section, we can see that two village communities 
selected for this study differ considerably in the way the communities are organised. 
Based on this observation, it can be said that the patterns of integration between the 
traditional system remaining in the communities, and the modem system introduced by 
the state differ quite significantly, and result in the difference in their leadership and 
power structure. In connection with these differences, questions regarding the 
participation of ordinary people may arise, since the differences in leadership styles and 
power structures are likely to determine patterns of participation in community 
organisations (see Ross and Lappin, 1967: pp. 193-198). However, in investigating 
issues of popular participation in rural development at the local level, it is important to 
delineate forms of participation which are substantial for a specific subject of interest. 
Without making the subject specific, the investigation of popular participation will be 
too broad and difficult. A great variety of people’s involvement in rural development 
can be branded as ‘popular participation’ (see Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). As far as this 
study in concerned, only participation in problem identification and decision-making 
related to the development and management of community projects is emphasised. 
Other forms of involvement in development activities which have no substantial 
connection with understanding the political power of local people, such as contribution 
of labour and financial resources without playing any roles in decision-making, are 
excluded. This section will discuss the extent to which popular participation occurs in 
the two communities under study, by relating it to their types of organisational 
arrangements. It will also stipulate factors associated with the difference in the extent of 
popular participation observed in these two communities.
Considering the participation of ordinary community members in problem 
identification and decision-making related to community development, no clear 
distinction of patterns of participation was observed between Ban Nua Phru and Ban
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Bon Lay. In both villages, participation of ordinary community members can be 
considered to be very low. Even in Bueng Yai community, where the emergence of 
interest groups and non-official political actors is more apparent than in the other two 
villages, the situation which allows ordinary villagers to be induced into the political 
arena is still not very clear. Only leaders and a few key figures were observed to have 
access to actual participation in problem identification and decision-making regarding 
the development of the community. In order to have a clearer understanding of the 
degree of involvement of ordinary villagers in problem identification and in decision­
making related to community development, it is important to explore the ways these 
two tasks are operated. It is observed that there are two main ways in which problem 
identification and decision-making related to community development are made at the 
village level — through the village meeting and through the village committee council.
The village meeting may be called at any time by the phu yai ban of each village. In 
this meeting, every household should send at least one mature member to attend. In 
principle, the meeting should be held at least once a month, to correspond with the 
sapha tambon meeting and the monthly meeting for local leaders at the district office. 
This is to allow the leader of each village to formally identify problems and to assess 
needs concerning village administration and development for further considerations and 
proceedings in the latter two meetings. However, in practice not all villages in the study 
area organise the village meeting regularly every month. A clear comparison of these 
different practices can be seen from Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. Though the 
village meeting is organised regularly every month in Ban Nua Phru, the meeting in 
Ban Bon Lay only occurs occasionally when there are important issues to be discussed. 
Yet, it is not the frequency of the meeting which is crucially important for assessing the 
extent of participation of villagers, rather the formulation of the meeting, especially the 
interaction between leaders and villagers. Since most rural people in Thailand are 
socially underprivileged, a feature which is strongly influenced by the predominance of 
the hierarchical social system, active participation in such meetings, which are 
considered to be rather public and formal, is unlikely unless encouraged (see Cornish, 
1988). This assumption is reflected by findings through observation made in a few 
villages in the study area.
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From my observation in a few village meetings in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and two 
other villages, the way the meetings are structured does not promote participation of 
ordinary villagers in problem identification and community decision-making. All 
formal meetings were dominated by either phu yai ban or officials from district offices 
who are responsible for related activities in the area where each village is situated. In 
these meetings, field officials including Community Development Officers and Public 
Health Officers, attended the meetings to promote government policies related to their 
areas of work. They informed and clarified related policies, which are commonly 
referred to as ‘state commands’ (kamsang khong taang ratchakaan), and finished with 
calls for co-operation (kwaam ruammue) from leaders and villagers to follow these 
commands. In the case of Ban Nua Phru, the abbot of Wat Nua Phru was present in the 
village meetings. I was told that he is always present in the village meeting, except 
when absent from the village because of official duties. In two meetings which I 
observed, he was present and stayed in the meetings for most of their duration. On both 
occasions, he was asked to preach to the gatherings at the beginning of the meetings. 
His preaching was strongly related to village development issues discussed in the 
meetings. In addition, he also suggested possible solutions to the issues. Apart from the 
presentations from officials and the abbot, the rest of the meetings were dominated by 
the phu yai ban. Other leaders, including phu chuay phu yai ban and village committee 
members, only played supporting roles by adding some information or comments when 
asked to do so by the phu yai ban. Most ordinary villagers did not actively participate in 
discussions, nor did they seem to be very keen of proposing ideas or asking questions. 
Only a few villagers asked some questions. Even when there were important issues to 
debate, no substantial discussions were observed. It was the phu yai ban who often 
raised questions he had heard from outside the meetings. The former phu yai ban and 
the present phu chuay phu yai ban occasionally played the leadership role in the 
meetings. Normally villagers were asked for comments before any decisions were 
made. However, very few of them appeared to be courageous in making comments or 
raising questions.
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The village committee council is generally informal. A phu yai ban may call the village 
council at any time to discuss matters related to village administration and 
development. In principle, the council involves the phu yai ban, the assistant phu yai 
ban, the village phu song khunnawut, and members of the village committee. However, 
in practice some of these members may not be called regularly when the council takes 
place. Quite often the council is held between the phu yai ban and his assistants. The 
council is generally not less important than the village meeting. This is because many 
decisions can take place without going through the village meeting, especially when 
dealing with urgent issues.
In Ban Nua Phru, the phu yai ban, his assistants and the village phu song khunnawut, 
were observed to use the council for preparing the village meeting, for further 
discussion after the village meeting, and for consideration of urgent issues. 
Occasionally, the former phu yai ban and the abbot were also invited. The discussion 
taking place in the council was more technical and involved more details than in the 
village meeting. Many decisions took place in the council. Some of these decisions 
were processed further without going through the village meeting, and others were used 
as guidelines for discussions in the village meeting.
In Ban Bon Lay, the council played a more significant role than the village meeting, 
since no regular village meeting was held. The council is generally composed of the 
phu yai ban, his assistants, and the village phu song khunnawut. Only occasionally 
were the village committee members called to join the discussion, when very important 
issues were involved. Most decisions in this village came from the council.
As mentioned earlier, ordinary villagers do not actively participate in formal 
discussions, such as in the village meeting, which is supposed to be the most important 
floor for them to express their ideas and problems related to the development of their 
community. It is important to further explore this particular characteristic of rural 
people in this area. It is also crucial to investigate how leaders gather information to 
assess problems and the needs of their fellow villagers, and how they use these 
assessments in the planing process.
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It is often argued that attempts to introduce a participatory approach in rural 
development in Thailand face many obstacles and are unlikely to be successful. Hirsch 
(1990) concludes from his study in two villages in the Lower Northern region of 
Thailand that obstacles to participation for the rural poor can be described in terms of 
obstacles to control over production which result from the problem of fragmentation. 
Two common characteristics are found to contribute to this fragmentation; lack of 
control over basic resources for production, and intensification of work. Because of the 
lack of control over basic resources, many poor villagers are forced to migrate out, 
either temporarily or permanently, to seek opportunities outside the village. At the same 
time, many poor villagers are committed to intensification of work, in order to 
overcome financial problems often faced in connection with capitalisation of 
agricultural production. Such fragmentation affects participatory initiatives by reducing 
the time available for the organisational aspects of participation, and undermining the 
potential communality of interest. There is another set of obstacles to participation; the 
obstacles which are connected to the traditional values that determine the power 
relationships between master and follower. In brief, there exists a system of patron- 
client relationship in traditional Thai social structure, which divides the village 
community into two different groups based on their power status; the patrons and the 
clients. An important effect of this system is that it generates a feeling among the 
powerless majority that ‘certain domains remain the affairs of others’ (Hirsch, 1990, p. 
227).
All the above obstacles are found in Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, and out­
migration is also a common phenomenon in both villages. Out-migration is dominated 
by mostly young villagers, who otherwise could make significant contributions to the 
development of the community. On the other hand, the majority of those who remain in 
the village are busy with their work, and do not concern themselves very much with 
public affairs. The master-follower values also remain and affect the perception of the 
majority villagers about their involvement in development affairs. Though these types 
of obstacles are similar to those found by Hirsch (1990), their effects on participation 
were observed to be different. Hirsch seems to stress powerlessness caused by the lack
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of control over basic resources and intensification of work as being more significant 
than the master-follower values. However, the findings in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban 
Bon Lay do not support Hirsch’s view. The differences in the control over resources 
and intensification of work do not appear to be significant between the majority 
villagers and their leaders. At the same time, only a few economically advantaged 
villagers actively participate in village politics; most of them appear to concentrate on 
their businesses and ignore village politics. Most leaders and politically active villagers 
are from the average economic class, rather than from the well-off group. Those who 
are from the poor economic class are also found to be politically inactive. In 
comparison with the effect of fragmentation, the influence of traditional values appears 
to be stronger. Most villagers see that it is their leaders who should play a dominant 
role in decision-making and initiating development activities. They see their duties as 
followers, who should anticipate calls from their leaders to promote the common good. 
Even to express their ideas or disclose their problems publicly is unfamiliar to most 
villagers. The feeling of being subordinates who should show deference in dealing with 
their superiors discourages these villagers from interacting vigorously with their 
leaders, especially in public places such as the village meeting. Rather they prefer to 
form circles among their close friends and relatives, where they can discuss a wide 
range of subjects more openly. The fear of ‘losing face’ (siah naa), which is often cited 
in explaining why they do not propose ideas in the meeting, reflects the feeling of 
subservience in interacting with their leaders. They are afraid of being refused or 
ignored by their leaders, which is considered to be embarrassing. Under the conditions 
explained here, active participation in problem identification and decision-making 
related to village development is unlikely to occur easily among ordinary villagers. The 
tasks of problem identification and decision-making are therefore likely to be 
undertaken predominantly by the leaders’ council. The question is how the leaders 
gather information to be used as the basis for their decision-making?
According to my observation, most information used by the leaders is gathered by 
means of informal communication and observation. Informal discussion in social 
circles such as the drinking circle (wong lao), and the chatting circle {wong sontana) at 
village grocery stores or tea shops (raan khaai khaung or raan naam chad) , is common
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in these two villages. These two forms of informal gatherings are also common to rural 
areas elsewhere in southern Thailand. The drinking circle is organised on a casual basis 
among close friends and relatives where drink, mostly cheap liquor known as ‘lao 
khao ’, is shared. This is common only to males, since females do not normally drink. 
However, females who are members of the host family may join the circle and serve 
snacks (kab klaem). Because the circle is generally composed of close friends who 
know each other well, the discussion taking place is open, varied in its subject matters 
and very informal. The chatting circle is looser in its structure than the drinking circle. 
It is more flexible in its participants, although some members regularly attend. It may 
involve drinking, but the drink is not necessarily shared. As it normally takes place in a 
more public space and involves a wider range of participants, the discussion was 
observed to cover fewer subjects. However, it seems that only the discussion on 
personal matters is limited, whereas the discussion on public matters is unlikely to be 
different from that in the drinking circle. These two types of informal gatherings form 
good sources of information for leaders. Though not all subjects discussed are valuable 
for the village administration, some topics contain very useful information. Official 
leaders receive information from these two circles either through their participation in 
the circles themselves, or through observing the wider conversations connected to 
matters discussed in the circles. Matters which are found to be important are then 
compiled and brought into the village committee council and the village formal 
meeting.
General observation is also an important means of gathering information for leaders. 
Most leaders see general observation as essential, because many villagers behave in a 
reserved manner; they do not join any social gatherings mentioned above, or discuss 
problems with others. Moreover, many communal issues may be considered by the 
majority of villagers as being not critical, or may be too complicated for them to think 
about; examples might be issues of forest degradation, or restricting certain fishing 
methods. Through general observation, these problems are compiled and sorted in a 
similar way as received from social gatherings, before processing to further steps of the 
village planning. The process may be called ‘problem formation’, in which leaders may 
make their own judgements about the significance and priority of problems.
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It can be seen from the above discussion that ordinary community members are 
unlikely to participate actively in problem identification and decision-making related to 
village administration and development, although the space has opened for them to do 
so in the village meeting. The duty of problem identification and decision-making is 
left mostly to official leaders. In playing their role, it is unavoidable for official leaders 
in making their own judgements in selecting, prioritising problems, deciding how to 
proceed with them, and even to make final decisions themselves on some issues. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the accountability of official leaders on the actual 
problems and needs of the majority village members.
In order to assess the accountability of official leaders with regard to the actual 
problems and needs that are common to their communities, attempts were made to find 
out the extent to which they care about the problems faced by different groups of 
villagers, and how villagers perceive the characteristics and performance of their 
leaders.
In Ban Nua Phru, a few official leaders, including the formal village elder, an assistant 
phu yai ban and the former phu yai ban, were observed to be very active and concerned 
with the well-being of their fellow villagers. They were described by their villagers as 
very knowledgeable, trustworthy, and highly concerned about the well-being of others. 
Moreover, they were seen as very influential in the decision-making of the present phu 
yai ban. The present phu yai ban was also seen as very active. However, because he 
was still new to the position, he was also seen to be still at the learning stage. More 
importantly, the active role of the abbot and his influence must not be overlooked. His 
interview responses verified his commitment to improving the well-being of the 
community by combining material and moral development. His involvement is derived 
from his feeling of belonging to this village, and his concern over unfavourable changes 
in the community, which confirm his knowledge of the problems facing the 
community. By working together and interacting with other leaders, the outcomes of 
problem identification and decision-making in this village are likely to correspond 
greatly to the real needs of the majority villagers.
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The situation was observed to be rather different in Ban Bon Lay. Although the phu yai 
ban himself was observed to be quite active, other official leaders are not. Most of them 
are only concerned with routine work passed to them by the phu yai ban, but do not 
seem to contribute much to development initiatives in the village. As there were neither 
Buddhist priests nor other types of informal leaders who were active and influential in 
this community, the tasks related to problem identification and decision-making were 
undertaken predominantly by the phu yai ban. Consultation with some of his colleagues 
and a few elders in the community was merely to help him to exercise his power. Based 
on the brief assessment of a few development projects undertaken in this village, most 
of them were found to be initiated by concerned officials, and the phu yai ban was only 
asked for approval. Other projects, mostly infrastructural projects, were initiated by the 
phu yai ban himself and then later other leaders were consulted. A few villagers 
interviewed provided mixed feelings about their leaders’ role. Although the majority 
have positive views about their leaders, they also have some questions about the 
truthfulness and prejudice of their leaders. In the absence of clear opposition, it is likely 
that some decisions made by the phu yai ban and his colleagues involve prejudice. This 
is in contrast to the circumstance in the larger community of Bueng Yai where a few 
informal leaders are active and influential, and many of them disagree among 
themselves and with some official leaders. The conflicting interests that emerge among 
these leaders divide them into three main groups as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four; 
two of these groups are led by the kamnan of each tambon. This division creates 
competition between the groups to control available resources and to direct the 
development of the community. In principle, this competition should benefit the 
majority of the population if it is constructive and aimed primarily to improve the living 
conditions of their people. But evidence shows that some of these leaders are more 
concerned about their personal benefits. Moreover, because the movements of each 
group were least constrained by the movements of the other group (since they are led 
by the leaders of different sub-districts which are administratively independent), each 
group seems to concentrate only in attracting people within each territory, while 
ignoring the unity of the whole community. As a result, many projects undertaken in
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Bueng Yai community faced conflicting reactions from different groups of community 
members, which caused difficulties in their management.
Comparing the differing circumstances of interaction among leaders between Ban Nua 
Phru and Ban Bon Lay, it can be said that the situation in Ban Nua Phru where different 
leaders interact substantially and constructively for the benefit of the community is 
likely to account for actual problems and needs of the community, more than in Ban 
Bon Lay where the phu yai ban's role is more dominant. The situation in Bueng Yai 
community is neither similar to that in Ban Nua Phru nor in Ban Bon Lay. The 
administrative separation of the community into two sub-districts has meant that the 
influence of different actors with conflicting interests, is less effective than it should be. 
Consequently, problem identification and decision-making done under conflicting 
leaderships as far as this community is concerned, are likely to be difficult and 
disintegrated rather than integrated.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the analysis of links between historical and physical settings 
of the village communities under study, and their organisational arrangements. It also 
analysed how changes in the wider society and the state’s attempt to encapsulate village 
communities induce changes in the organisational arrangements of these communities. 
Ultimately, it explored how different changes in the organisational arrangements of the 
communities affect the management of the CPRs that are at stake.
The findings showed that their historical and geographical variations influence the 
organisational arrangements of these two village communities. The more isolated 
location of Ban Nua Phru, coupled with its history of less intensive exposure to 
commercialisation of its production system and modernisation of its administration 
system, have led the village community to differ considerably in its economic 
orientation and organisational arrangement from Ban Bon Lay. Ban Nua Phru economy 
is more subsistence-oriented whereas Ban Bon Lay economy is more market-oriented. 
The organisational arrangement of Ban Nua Phru community is more integrated
198
between the traditional system prevailing in the community and modem system of 
administration introduced by the state. Its official leaders and cultural leaders,
i
especially the head priest of the village Buddhist temple, work together and consult 
each other in almost all aspects of the community administration. Therefore, any 
outcome of decision-making related to community development is likely to result from
i
cumulative agreements among them, rather than from the domination of either group. 
On the other hand, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community’s organisational 
arrangements closely follow the modem form of administration. Religious institutions 
and traditional leaders are excluded from the formal decision-making process. 
However, only religious and traditional leaders are clearly excluded; interest groups 
were observed to be influential, but are in conflict due to their different interests.
The differences in economic orientation and administrative arrangements of these 
communities were observed to create different impacts on the CPRs they have 
exploited, and on their management. Considering fishery resources alone, the 
competition over the resources was much higher in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai 
community than in Ban Nua Phru. This was not only because of their differences in 
population pressure on the resources, but also because differences in economic 
conditions between these communities. The higher competition over the resources and 
the more market-oriented its economy has brought about higher resource exploitation 
and more serious conflict among resource users in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai 
community than in Ban Nua Phru. When it comes to the management of fishery 
resources, the more integrated form of administration that exists in Ban Nua Phru was 
observed to run more smoothly than the conflicting modem form of administration that 
exists in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community.
\
These findings confirm that even at the lowest level of administration in Thailand, 
analysis of policy implementation cannot be based on the conventional assumption that 
policies will be effectively implemented by official implementing bodies according to 
what has been decided, as proposed in the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 
Two. The formal administration at this level does not function in a vacuum. It exists in 
the context of historical, geographical, social and cultural environment, both at micro-
199
social and macro-social levels. These surrounding environments influence as well as 
interact with the organisational arrangements of the community in implementing 
policies related to CPR management. In other words, the difference in the surrounding 
environment of different localities determines the performance of local implementing 
bodies and the outcomes of policy.
CHAPTER SIX
THE ROLE OF PHU YAI BANIN LOCAL COMMON 
PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, the discussion focused on structures of community organisation 
in the study villages and their influence on village administration and management of 
natural resources, especially CPRs. It revealed the interactions between different 
components of the organisational structures which provide the context in which different 
actors interact to exercise power in order to utilise, as well as control the resources 
available in the community. Among different actors within each village community, the 
position of phu yai ban or the official village leader is particularly important. Being the 
official leader of the village, he/she is given the authority not only to administer the 
community in general, but also to manage natural resources available in the community 
in accordance with policy guidelines.
As stated earlier in Chapter One, the importance of natural resources for rural inhabitants 
in Thailand is still crucial, even though it is decreasing. This is because the rural 
inhabitants still represent the majority of the country’s population, and most rural people 
base their livings on natural resources available in their communitie. Despite their 
importance, many natural resources, especially CPRs, in rural areas are at risk, mainly 
because of the oversight of government policies in the past and the ignorance of local 
people with regard to the consequences of exploitation. For this reason, natural resource 
degradation has recently become an important issue in national political debate and is 
viewed as strongly related to the country’s development policies, which predominantly 
emphasise economic growth without careful consideration of the environmental 
consequences. The issue of natural resource degradation has caused many concerned
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bodies to feel apprehensive and concerned about the effects on Thailand’s long-term 
development. The Siam Society, a leading national organisation working in the area of 
culture and environmental conservation, gives a warning:
‘The speed of change in Thailand is causing the country to face 
environmental problems of unprecedented severity which have the potential 
o f severely undermining the benefits of economic development, and which 
may debase the quality of life for future generations and have disturbing 
implications for the future evolution of Thai culture.’ (Moerman and Miller,
1989, p. 304).
The increasing pressure and awareness of environmental problems have led the state to 
include them in policy agendas. Recent development policies, as guided by the country’s 
national five-year economic and social development plans, have included environmental 
and natural resource conservation among their prime concerns. According to these 
policies, the battle over issues of environmental degradation and natural resource 
depletion, is viewed as not only the concern of macro-social actions, but also the micro­
social actions at various local levels. This has brought about a marked cabinet decision in 
1989 to assign every provincial government to encompass in its guidelines, ‘the 
management of natural resources and the environment’ as part of the provincial rural 
development plan. As a result, provincial and district level development administrative 
bodies should extend their rural development plans to cover the management of natural 
resources and environment (CBAMNREP, 1990). Though the primary emphasis of this 
new idea is to encourage provincial and district administrative bodies to develop and 
implement the plans, the process of planning and implementation at the local level also 
involves sapha tambon and village committees. It is at the village level that this study 
investigates how the issue of natural resource and environmental degradation is handled.
Earlier in Chapter Three it was mentioned that the present Thai administrative structure 
as applied to the administration of development policies, requires the village committee 
(VC) to play dominant and official roles in any activities related to administration and 
development taking place in each village. These include managing natural resources and 
the environment either as the executive body or as a facilitator to concerned agencies in 
undertaking related projects within its political boundary. The VC is chaired by the phu
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yai ban of each village, and consists of elected and appointed members from within the 
village. As the official leader of the village, the chairman of the village committee, and a 
member of sapha tambon, the role of phu yai ban in dealing with the management of 
natural resources and the environment at the village level and sub-district level, cannot be 
underestimated. Although the phu yai ban is not the only actor involved in the 
management of local CPRs, observation suggests that the phu yai ban is the central 
figure who should be emphasised in the analysis of the role of local leaders in the 
management of natural resources and environment at the village level.
In general, roles assigned to phu yai ban are wide ranging, the role in natural resource 
— and environmental management forming only part of their wider roles. Hence, when 
considering the phu yai ban’s commitment to natural resource management, an 
understanding of their general roles cannot be omitted. Because natural resource 
management provides a new dimension to the roles officially designated to phu yai ban, 
several limitations may be apparent when compared to their wider and well-established 
role in general administration. Moreover, assigning phu yai ban to oversee natural 
resource management on top of their already abundant administrative work means 
understanding the relationships between the two cannot be avoided, if  the role of phu yai 
ban in natural resource management is to be clearly understood. For this reason, this 
chapter will also discuss roles of phu yai ban in general administrative work, although 
much of the discussion will emphasise their role in natural resource management. 
Additionally, the chapter will also contemplate expectations of both higher officials and 
villagers, phu yai ban’s responses to these expectations, and their interactions with other 
actors. Two case studies related to natural resource management, one from each village, 
will be used to support the analysis.
6.2 Recruitment of Phu Yai Ban
The phu yai ban post and its recruitment are bound up in the long history of Thai 
administration. The origin of the post can be traced back to the Ayudhya period (AD 
1351-1767), but no particular time within the period is indicated in the available 
literature. The recruitment of the post has involved changes along with the evolution of
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the Thai administrative system until the present day. These changes will be briefly 
presented here, together with the present recruitment system which is generally applied 
to the post.
In the Ayudhya period, the smallest unit of administration was ban, which referred to a 
cluster of households settling together in the same locality. The ban headman was called 
phu yai ban, and was recruited through an appointment made by each provincial ruler 
(chao hua muang). This system continued until the reign of King Rama V in the 
Bangkok period, when a marked reform was introduced to the Thai administrative 
system. Following this reform, the first local administrative act was introduced in 1897. 
Then-in 1912, during the reign of King Rama VI, the second local administrative act was 
introduced. This act is still in use today with some modifications, and in conjunction 
with other related acts. According to this act, the smallest unit of administration was 
changed from ban to mooban, or village, as it remains in the present. A mooban can be 
established and re-established based on the size of population and/or the geographical 
isolation of a settlement. In general, the population of not less than 200 households is 
used as the main criterion in establishing a new village, together with the isolation of the 
settlement. Each mooban is led by the phu yai ban, whose recruitment comes through the 
village election from qualified candidates within the village (for detail see STU, 1983a 
and 1983b).
There are several criteria in the act which a candidate of the phu yai ban post must fulfil. 
A candidate must be aged between 25-60 years old and must have been residing in the 
village of nomination for not less than six months. The lowest educational attainment is 
grade four primary school or other equivalent certificates. It is also stated in the act that a 
candidate must have a good moral reputation and must not have been imprisoned, unless 
he/she had been released at least three years before. Finally, a serving clergy man, 
religious priest, or government official, cannot be a candidate for the phu yai ban 
position. All criteria are applied to most other formal leader’s positions at the village and 
sub-district levels. It should be noted that for the most part these criteria are quite basic 
and so can be met by the majority of villagers. In practice, as will be discussed, other 
credentials are also important for a candidate to be elected.
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As was mentioned earlier, the phu yai hart position is attained through the village 
election. It is important to briefly discuss the form of election taking place, the type of 
candidate who is likely to be elected, and other characteristics which are relevant for a 
candidate to be elected. There is no particular form of election mentioned in the act. It 
only states that the election must be ‘democratic in which every eligible voter has one 
vote, and a candidate receiving the highest vote will be officially appointed to the post’ 
(STU, 1983a). The official appointment is made by the provincial governor of each 
province after the result of the election is given to him by the district officer. With 
respect to the type of candidate to be elected, most literature related to the subject 
frequently mentions that the phu yai ban position, as well as other local formal 
leaderships, is held by members of the upper stratum, in social or economic terms, of 
each community. There exist also some arguments which suggest that the post is likely to 
be taken by a powerful figure (nakleng or phu mii ittipol), within the community (see for 
example Rigg, 1991; Turton, 1987). These arguments appears to be true in most cases, as 
being socially or economically well-off and being a powerful figure are among the main 
bases of an individual power in local Thai communities. There is evidence which 
supports the view that the power of nakleng or phu mii ittipol which is derived from less 
legitimate or even criminal means, has long been recognised in local Thai communities, 
not only by local people but also by local officials (see Johnston, 1980; Turton, 1987). 
Moreover, the high level of competition of the present day election system provides a 
better chance for these people to attain the post than traditional leaders. However, it is 
important to note that there are also some respected traditional leaders who hold the 
position of phu yai ban (see Wetchaphitak, 1991), but this is very rare. Moreover, it 
appears that phu yai ban who come from different backgrounds have different qualities 
in dealing with development work in their villages. In order to provide a better 
understanding of phu yai ban in the study area, an investigation should be made into their 
backgrounds and the ways by which they came to the position.
Based on the investigation in two villages under this study, and in other villages nearby, 
it was found that the recruitment of phu yai ban does not always follow the rules stated in 
the Local Administration Act. The way these rules are actually applied seems to evolve .
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over time, and varies from one location to another; adherence to these rules appears to 
improve with time. For example, the first phu yai ban of Ban Nua Phru was drawn from 
prominent leaders among the earliest settlers. An elder aged over 70 in Ban Nua Phru 
recalled of appointing the phu yai ban over 40 years ago:
‘The first phu yai ban I knew was appointed by the nai amphoe at that time.
There was no election. It took place when the village was large enough to be 
separated from the village we used to be part of. The nai amphoe and his 
followers came to the village and asked a few elders to name a person 
suitable for the job. If there were more than one name given the official 
would further search the most suitable among them. Then the nominated 
person was appointed.’
This case is not exclusive to the area under the study as similar information was found in 
nearby villages. A retired phu yai ban in a neighbouring village of Ban Nua Phru who 
was in his early 70s mentioned that he was also appointed by the nai amphoe in a similar 
way. He stated:
‘I was asked by the nai amphoe of this district whether I would accept the 
position or not. The nai amphoe mentioned that he had consulted some elders 
in the village and they suggested me to be the phu yai ban. When I agreed, he 
said that he would send my name to the changwat for official appointment.’
An elder in Bueng Yai community asserted that in the past phu yai ban and kamnan were 
not recruited through election. Rather they were appointed through the process of 
selection made by officials from the district office. In most cases, persons selected were 
drawn from informal leaders within individual communities. It is important to note that 
elders in each community played a significant role in the selection process, as mentioned 
above. Although their role was only to advise the district officer, their comments were 
important in influencing him. Selection criteria were said to be made simply on the basis 
of getting ‘someone workable’ — that is, someone who could communicate easily with 
both officials and villagers. The educational attainment criterion was not strictly applied 
as most rural leaders at that time seldom completed primary education. The turning point 
occurred around 30 years ago, when the system of election was introduced. All the 
present phu yai ban in the area came to the position through elections which took place 
after this time. However, the types of election varied with time. In the early stages of this
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type of system, nominations were made at the meeting specially organised for the 
election purpose, and an open vote was applied. More recently, the method was changed 
to that which is presently applied, with candidates having to nominate themselves, and a 
secret vote rule being used. In addition, the competition is higher. Nowadays, elections 
are commonly accompanied by big and often costly campaigns.
According to Mr. Jai, who had just retired from the post in Ban Nua Phru in 1993, the 
recent election in this village was quite exciting and very different from when he was 
elected over 30 years ago. At that time, there were only three candidates nominated by 
villagers at the meeting organised by the district office. There was no formal campaign 
as4he-time^adopportunity did not allow for it. Neither was there any expense involved 
in campaigning. However, an informal approach to seeking support was practised. Such 
campaigns were undertaken informally by supporters of each potential candidate, rather 
than by the candidate himself. This does not mean that potential candidates did not 
accede to such a campaign, but rather they preferred to remain unresponsive. By keeping 
silent, tension between candidates could be avoided, which was suitable for the social 
atmosphere at that time. Over 30 years, the situation has changed dramatically. In the 
latest election, three self-nominated candidates staged substantial campaigns, which were 
said to be quite costly for such a small election. The costs were estimated to vary from 
around 15,000 baht to over 30,000 baht (approximately £375 to £750) for each candidate. 
The most common form of the campaign was organising campaign parties in which food 
and drinks were served at the expense of each candidate. In each campaign party, the 
candidate who paid for it gave a talk about his intentions and promises. The talk often 
included some attacks on other candidates. In general, such parties do not only give each 
candidate the chance to convey his message and promises, they also show how generous 
(jai kwaang, ja i yai) the candidates are. It is commonly perceived in this local 
community, and also in rural communities elsewhere in Thailand, that the more the costs 
involved, the more generous the candidate is to villagers.
Costly campaigning for the post was reported to be a recent phenomenon, beginning 
around 10 years ago. Prior to that, only verbal campaigns were employed. The recent 
popularity of this excessive form of campaigning was said to be influenced by the
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practice widely adopted in higher level political campaigns, both for seats at provincial 
councils {sapha changwat) and at the house of parliament {sapha phutaen ratsadorn). 
This view is shared by many key informants in both Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and in 
Bueng Yai community. Mr. Naam, the phu yai ban of Ban Bon Lay, noted that none of 
candidates in the election he won in 1983 organised such parties before the election. 
Such costly campaigns mentioned above were observed to be effective as it was found to 
be the case in the three most recently elected phu yai ban in the study area, including Ban 
Nua Phru, where those who spent the most money on campaigns were elected. Two of 
them were observed to be from well-to-do families, another was from an average family, 
but he sold his cattle for the campaign. Therefore, it can be said that the economic status 
of a candidate can be-an-important means by which he is elected, though not necessarily 
the most important factor.
Mr. Jai, Mr. Naam and a few villagers noted that though competition for election is very 
fierce, and campaigns are very costly, candidates are nevertheless prepared to make this 
investment on the basis of the potential benefits if successful. Being phu yai ban or 
kamnan nowadays often means a better opportunity to get access to benefits from 
resources available in the area they govern. In areas where valuable resources are 
abundant, phu yai ban and kamnan may join powerful officials or merchants to exploit 
resources for their own benefit. This can occur easily in Thai society, where abuse of 
power and corruption are widespread.
Other factors which are also influential include communication skills, contributions to 
the community and having experience outside the village. The present phu yai ban of 
Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are both skilful in public communication, as are two 
newly elected phu yai ban in two neighbouring villages. All of them are among those 
who have wide experience of working outside their own villages, mostly in towns. All 
except one were reported to be actively involved in communal social activities before 
they were elected. Two of them used to serve as members of their village committees. 
These factors are viewed by many villagers as being important for their leaders to fulfil 
their duties, either those assigned by the government or those expected by their fellow 
villagers.
208
The historical perspective of the phu yai ban post and their recruitment system discussed 
here so far, provides an insight into their power in the administration of their villages, 
and their relationships to both their communities and the state. Changes in the 
recruitment from the less formal selection system, where candidates were drawn from 
among existing traditional leaders, to the more formal type of election based on 
competition, increases the formality and democratic status of the position under 
democratic perspective. On the other hand, it creates a clearer division between 
traditional leaders who are naturally influential, and formal leaders whose power is 
legitimised in  governing the village community. A clear division between these groups 
of leaders-is not beneficial for phu yai ban in their roles to govern their villages, since not 
all matters can be dealt with effectively, without the advocacy of traditional leaders.
6.3 General Roles of Phu Yai Ban
The extent of phu yai ban's role is very broad, and can be roughly categorised into two 
areas: general roles and specific roles. The former refers mainly to their role in general 
and routine village administration, whereas the latter refers to their role related to specific 
issues, such as natural resources management. In playing these roles, a phu yai ban is 
placed in between higher officials who are their superiors or masters, and villagers who 
are their subordinates or clients. Being in such a position, the phu yai ban must take into 
account the expectations of these two groups, as well as his/her formally assigned roles. 
Therefore, the discussion about roles of phu yai ban should consider both aspects of their 
roles, which I would like to call ‘roles in official perspective’ and ‘roles in villagers’ 
perspective.’ Moreover, it is important to investigate how phu yai ban actually adjust 
themselves to deal with expectations of both officials and villagers in performing their 
duties. The discussion in this section will deal with general roles of phu yai ban in both 
perspectives mentioned above, and as actually performed by phu yai ban, with reference 
to the study villages.
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6.3.1 Roles of Phu Yai Ban in Official Perspective
From an official point of view, a phu yai ban is regarded as an official representative 
who, by the line of administration, is a state official under the Ministry of Interior’s 
Department of Local Administration. However, his/her status and roles relate not merely 
to work undertaken by the Local Administration Department, but also relate to activities 
of several central ministries and departments taking place in the village under the 
responsibility of each phu yai ban. In general, roles of each phu yai ban are broadly 
stated as ‘to rule people in his own village, and to maintain peace and order of villagers’ 
(STU, 1983a, p. 27J. From this statement, the primary roles of each phu yai ban can be 
viewed as the ‘top leaderV^peace keeper’ as well as ‘peace maker’ of the village he/she 
leads. Apart from being the official peace keeper and peace maker, the Local 
Administrative Act includes other roles such as roles in village occupational 
development, sanitary maintenance and promotion, and village development planning. 
These stated roles form guidelines for every phu yai ban to perform his duties as both an 
agency of the state and the most important representative of villagers he/she serves in 
communicating with the state. In practice, as the official representative at the village 
level, every phu yai ban is expected to follow and oversee any official policies and 
commands related to village administration and development issued by the central 
government (STU, 1983a; Department of Local Administration, 1991). In relation to 
these expectations, several duties are designated to all phu yai ban. These duties can be 
summarised as follows (STU, 1983a). Firstly, they are mandated to promote government 
policies and to abide by commands and other similar rules applied to their villages. 
Secondly, they are expected to notice and inform concerned state officials at higher 
levels of any incidents which affect, or may affect, the well-being of their villagers. 
Thirdly, they are entitled to apprehend any wrongdoers or anyone suspected of 
committing a crime within their administrative villages, before sending them for 
prosecution. Fourthly, they are required to assist the state services as well as to help their 
villagers in making access to the state services. This includes helping any official work 
or projects taking place within their villages. Finally, they are obliged to care for any 
public properties situated in the villages. This wide range of duties appears to be a 
burden for phu yai ban, as they have other roles to play in order to meet expectations
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outside the official arena. The burden of office seems to be recognised by their superiors 
especially kamnan and nai amphoe, who work closely with phu yai ban.
Discussions with the present kamnan of Tambon Bueng Yai and the former kamnan of 
Tambon Thung Samet who had just recently retired in 1993, revealed that they both 
agreed that phu yai ban are overburdened by roles and duties assigned to them by the 
state, as they are abundant and very broad. To perform all their duties actively can be 
very costly and contrast with the very low stipends available to them. Hence, fulfilling all 
required duties are beyond their capabilities. To them, the basic requirement for phu yai 
ban is to have a good grasp of situations and problems facing their villagers, so that they 
can give immediate responses to higher level officials whenever they are needed. 
Moreover, they see that being active in administrative work, and honest in dealing with 
development work, are among the most important characteristics of all phu yai ban. 
Nevertheless, they both confessed that less than half of phu yai ban in their tambon meet 
these qualities.
In a meeting with the nai amphoe of Khuan Mangkhud district together with his Senior 
Under-Secretary, similar views were expressed regarding the duties of phu yai ban. The 
nai amphoe admitted that great responsibilities are assigned to phu yai ban, but not to 
other officials and leaders. He mentioned that their responsibilities have extended even 
further over time. This change has resulted from both structural reforms of the 
administrative systems and changes in society, leading to more problems and more 
complexity in their work. He stated; ‘To be a good phu yai ban at the present time is 
more difficult than in the past, many forces exist that challenge phu yai ban in their 
attempts to exercise power effectively and correctly.’ Because of the great deal of 
responsibilities phu yai ban have, the nai amphoe and his Senior Under-Secretary make 
allowance in their expectations of the performance of phu yai ban. They perceive that it 
is very difficult for every phu yai ban to fulfil all requirements given by the state. From 
his experience the nai amphoe sees that on average, the phu yai ban's performance with 
respect to official expectations is satisfactory. He finally confessed, ‘Most of them (phu 
yai ban) sacrifice a lot for their work, though their stipends are very low.’
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The above discussion covered the broad official expectations of the roles of phu yai ban, 
both as related to the Local Administrative Act and as perceived by higher officials who 
are in close contact with phu yai ban. It indicates how important phu yai ban are for local 
administrative work. At the same time, it shows how much the work is prescribed by the 
state. The abundance of official duties makes it difficult for phu yai ban to handle 
effectively all duties assigned to them. Apart from the duties and expectations discussed 
above, there exist other duties prescribed under other regulations, which are more 
specific, and roles expected by the villagers they represent. The former includes duties 
with respect to the management of natural resources and the environment, and other 
specific duties in connection with functions of several ministries. The latter is related to 
expectations of villagers who nare-subordinate to phu yai ban, and who elect them to the 
post . Villagers’ expectations of the role of phu yai ban’s will be discussed in the 
following section. Later in this chapter, a specific section will be dedicated to the role of 
phu yai ban in relation to natural resources and environmental management.
6.3.2 Roles of Phu Yai Ban in Villagers’ Perspective
As the official leader of the village, every phu yai ban is also expected to represent their 
fellow villagers in interacting with the state. Being elected by his/her fellow villagers, a 
phu yai ban is regarded as the most important official representative who should act on 
the villagers’ behalf in communicating with the state. This aspect of roles places all phu 
yai ban in a position different from other officials who are appointed by the state.
Being resident in the village he/she leads, it is generally seen that every phu yai ban is 
the official who has the closest relationship with villagers in his/her village, and 
understand their conditions, problems and needs best. Therefore, he/she is in the best 
position to report any problems occurring in his village, in order to seek solutions. With 
respect to development planning, a phu yai ban is seen to be in the best position to 
identify the needs of his/her people so that they can be included in development plans. In 
the day-to-day administration, he/she is expected to help his/her people to making 
contact with the state in any related matters. Moreover, villagers also expect their phu yai 
ban to deal with many personal and social problems they face. Helping his/her people to
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meet their needs is often complicated as different needs and interests often emerge. 
Ideally, each phu yai ban should react in response with needs and problems of the 
majority. However, the existence of different classes and the resultant inequality of 
power among them creates difficulties for each phu yai ban to make decisions, 
especially when needs of different groups are in conflict.
Based on informal discussions with people of different socio-economic status in the 
villages under the study, it was found that though some expectations are common, there 
are also differences in villagers’ needs and interests. In both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon 
Lay, all the respondents regard their phu yai ban as the top leader of the villages, despite 
the existence of other leaders whom they respect in different ways. They expect their phu 
yai ban to bring about development in their villages, to ease problems that emerge in the 
villages, and to resolve disputes among villagers. They also expect their leaders to be 
trustful (suesat) and honest (sujarit) in dealing with all development activities. The terms 
suesat and sujarit are often used together as ‘suesat sujarit', referring to a lack of 
corruption in managing resources available for development activities, and a lack of bias 
in mediating conflicts. These attributes form the broad expectations of villagers with 
regard to their leaders. Nevertheless, both suesat and sujarit values are very subjective, 
because it is technically very difficult to measure their qualities. At the same time, the 
acceptability of the qualities of their leaders with respect to these values can vary locally. 
It was observed that villagers’ overall weighting of the quality of their phu yai ban 
matters most in the relationship between each phu yai ban and his people; no particular 
attributes receive main priorities in their assessment of their leaders’ quality. Most 
villagers I talked to are happy with the qualities of their present leaders in relation to 
most of these expectations. They see their phu yai ban as being among the more active 
when compared to phu yai ban in neighbouring villages. The only difference in the 
perception was found with respect to the stance of their leaders in calming conflicts 
emerging among villagers, and in distributing help provided from outside the village. All 
respondents from well-to-do households in both villages did not make any complaints, 
and were not so concerned about issues of calming conflicts and distributing help from 
outside the community. Among respondents from poor and average households, 
perceptions are divided. In both villages, the majority agreed that their phu yai ban are
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just in dealing with these issues, and confessed that dealing with the issues is very 
difficult to satisfy everyone. Only a small minority were unhappy with the way their 
leaders deal with the subjects as they perceive some biases in the act of their leaders 
towards ‘phak phuak ’, those who have a close social relationship with the leaders, and 
their relatives (pee naung). Nevertheless, there exists evidence which contradicts the 
claim that phu yai ban acts in favour of their relatives. For example, some villagers in 
Ban Bon Lay who are relatives of the phu yai ban mentioned that they experienced 
biased treatment from him in disputes they had with their neighbours. Complaining about 
unfair distribution of help and gifts from outside was also received from poor villagers 
who view that they were not given priority. This is the consensus of the majority who 
view that help received from outside is equally distributed among villagers regardless of 
their differences in socio-economic status. Because villagers from different socio­
economic status are disparate in their needs, undifferentiated distribution among them 
can be regarded as unfair, as the poor may feel they should have priority in receiving 
help.
When it comes to phu yai ban's role with respect to the advancement of the villages, the 
majority of villagers in both villages expect their phu yai ban and village committee 
members to play a dominant role in identifying problems and initiating ideas to be 
proposed. They perceive that their leaders and their colleagues are well aware of the 
needs and problems common to villagers, and therefore, there is no need for them to 
express these directly to phu yai ban and the village committee members. At the same 
time, a few villagers in Ban Bon Lay mentioned that they expected their phu yai ban to 
be more open minded about their complaints, and their propositions regarding detailed 
ideas related to village development planning, because they felt most of the time their 
phu yai ban are dictatorial. This dictatorial style of phu yai ban discourages villagers 
from active participation in development planning. Coupled with the familiarity of 
planning from above, planning at mooban level is dominated by phu yai ban and their 
colleagues in the village committees. Participation by ordinary villagers has yet to be 
improved.
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The above discussion outlined the expectations that villagers have with respect to the 
leadership duties of their phu yai ban. In reality, villagers also expect their phu yai ban to 
deal predominantly in social activities, which are not necessarily related directly to the 
position. Social events, either taking place within each village or in neighbouring villages 
which have a strong social connection with the village, need the phu yai ban's 
participation and contribution. Several forms of ceremonies are common in these two 
villages and other rural communities in Thailand. Religious ceremonies such as ngaan 
taud kathin {kathin offering ceremony for Buddhist priests), ngaan taud phaapaa 
(phaapaa or robe offering ceremony for Buddhist priests), and ngaan songkraan (water 
festival), are commonly organised to mark different traditional and religious events every 
year. Ngaan taeng ngaan ('wedding),-ngaansop^ (cremation), and ngaan buat (Buddhist 
ordination), which are more personal social matters, are also common. In all these events, 
phu yai ban are expected to participate and contribute in different degrees. Financial 
contributions in the form of charity (tambun) and gifts, or what is often known as ‘help’ 
(khaa chuay ngaan), are inevitable and burdensome for phu yai ban, since they cost a 
considerably large amount of money every year. It is also common for phu yai ban to be 
expected to make financial contribution more than ordinary villagers in all these 
ceremonies. Failing to participate actively and to make reasonable contributions, can 
discredit and humiliate phu yai ban, which undermine their popularity and support from 
the villagers.
People’s expectations of the role their phu yai ban should play are very great, and 
comparable to thaose of officials. They cover not just those directly related to their duties 
as the official leaders of the villages, but also those which are personal and socially 
related. To respond to these expectations is demanding and requires a lot of energy and 
financial support. On the other hand, failing to react properly to these expectations can 
have a negative effect on their relationship with people. Taking into account these 
expectations and those of their official role, it is difficult for phu yai ban to manage to 
respond fully to all of them. Additionally, financial limitations also deter their response 
to these expectations. In connection with the values discussed above, some phu yai ban 
may seek opportunities to gain extra income from whatever channels are available to 
them; some of these channels can be morally unacceptable or even illegal.
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6.3.3 Actual Roles of Phu Yai Ban
In previous sections, the discussion has dealt with the roles of phu yai ban which are 
designated by the state, and those which are expected by their superiors and by villagers. 
They did not fully reflect what phu yai ban actually do or what activities they generally 
perform, in accordance with official prescriptions and expectations of both their superiors 
and villagers. Since the coverage of roles and expectations in both official and villagers’ 
perspectives are very broad, the question arises of what phu yai ban actually do in 
practice to respond to those prescribed expectations. In response to this question, it is 
important to note here that not all roles“and~duties-prescribed for phu yai ban happen on a 
regular basis in practical terms. Additionally, phu yai ban do not act to fully respond to 
all expectations discussed earlier, as it is hardly possible to do so under these given 
conditions. Rather, their actual performances reflect their best selections of roles to be 
performed based on their individual assessments. Based on several discussions and 
observations made with phu yai ban in the villages under study, important commitments 
each phu yai ban have were found to include attending a monthly meeting at the district 
office, attending a monthly meeting at the sapha tambon, calling for and leading village 
meetings, visiting the district office for various purposes, and providing consultations for 
their villagers as well as acting as a primary arbitrator in solving conflicts among 
villagers.
a) The District Monthly Meeting
All phu yai ban and kamnan are required to attend a monthly meeting at the district 
office. The meeting is organised early in the first week of each month. The day of the 
meeting is combined with the pay day for phu yai ban and his colleagues. It is regarded 
as the most important event, and one which phu yai ban and kamnan must give top 
priority. From this meeting they receive state policies, commands and other official 
information which they should then transmit their substances to their villagers. All these 
official directives are normally known as ‘khaw ratchakaan\ which is literally means 
‘official matters.’ These ‘official matters’ are regarded as very important for phu yai ban
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to keep in mind and apply to their administrative affairs. The meeting also provides a 
chance for them to inform and discuss any matters related to the well-being of their 
villagers. However, it seems that the function of transmitting khaw ratchakaan 
dominates the function of providing the chance for discussing administrative issues. 
According to both phu yai ban of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, the meeting forms the 
most important time of each month in which concerned officials, especially nai amphoe, 
have a chance to meet all local leaders to convey their messages and khaw ratchakaan to 
all of them. It is generally dominated by the nai amphoe who lead the meeting, and other 
concerned officials who attend the meeting, to formally convey their messages to local 
official leaders. Though in principle local leaders should relay any problems or raise any 
questions related to their administrative work-, in practice this does not usually happen. 
Mr. Naam, the phu yai ban of Ban Bon Lay noted that only a few leaders often use the 
meeting to communicate with the officials, because it is too public and formal. 
Generally, these leaders prefer less public opportunities outside the meeting to discuss 
administrative matters with concerned officials. Mr. Naam added that most local leaders 
are not comfortable speaking in a public meeting place. Further analysis shows that it is 
the environment of the meeting where many high ranking officials are present makes 
local leaders feel uncomfortable to discuss or question openly (see Cornish, 1988). This 
type of atmosphere is not only common to local leaders like them, since it is observed to 
happen also at other levels of superior-subordinate relationships.
b) The Sapha Tambon Meeting
The sapha tambon meeting generally happens once a month at each sapha tambon office. 
All phu yai ban, as well as other members of a sapha tambon, must attend the meeting of 
their own sapha tambon. Officials who are involved in the sapha tambon are also 
required to attend the meeting. The meeting occurs after the monthly meeting at the 
district office. Primary functions of the sapha tambon meeting are to discuss problems 
related to administration and development of every village within each sapha tambon, 
and to find possible solutions among members. It also forms a part of the planning 
process of village and tambon development planning, as some of the problems discussed 
in each meeting will then be included in the tambon annual planning agenda. This agenda
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is then brought into the most important meeting of each sapha tambon, devoted to 
formulating the tambon development plan to be proposed for official approval. Based on 
discussions made with a few phu yai ban in the study area, as well as with the former and 
the present kamnan of Bueng Yai and Khuan Samet sub-districts, the sapha tambon 
meeting is regarded as the most important chance for local official leaders to express 
their perceptions of problems, and to propose their ideas related to development of their 
villages and their tambon. Because the meeting is less formal and involves only a small 
number of participants who mostly know each other quite well, it provides a better 
atmosphere for members to actually participate in its discussions, as compared to that of 
the monthly district meeting. Though some field officials affiliated to sapha tambon are 
often present, most of them are alsch familiar-tothese leaders as they work mostly at the 
field level.
In two meetings of sapha tambon Bueng Yai I observed in 1994, every phu yai ban in 
Tambon Bueng Yai attended both meetings, whereas one or two elected representatives 
were absent. Apart from the kamnan who led both meetings as the president of the sapha 
tambon, almost every phu yai ban participated in discussions brought up in the meetings. 
Nevertheless, less than half of phu yai ban could be considered as actively participating 
in the discussions. Based on their backgrounds gathered through this study, personalities, 
personal experience of contact with outside the community, and communication skills 
appear to determine their degree of participation. A few phu yai ban who participated 
actively in the discussions were those who have better experience of outside contact and 
who are personally talkative and communicative. Other members were not as active as 
phu yai ban in participating in the meetings, except for one or two who were said to have 
wide experience of outside contacts. Though some field officials, apart from those 
attached to the sapha tambon, were present in the meetings, they were concerned only 
with issues that needed to be clarified. Those who were attached to the sapha tambon, i.e. 
the Community Development Officer (pattanakorn) and the local teacher who was 
appointed as the secretary, did not show clear domination in the meeting. They act more 
as facilitators than full participants. The meetings were not technically very formal, 
therefore members were allowed to interrupt at any time. Additionally, the language used 
was mainly southern dialect which is familiar to all members and field officials.
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It can be concluded from two sapha tambon meetings I observed that the meeting forms 
an important event where phu yai ban can play their role of discussing problems related 
to development and administrative work, and construct solutions suitable for each 
locality. It provides an opportunity which they did not have before the introduction of the 
sapha tambon under the present structure. Because the number of participants in the 
meeting is quite small, and participants are familiar to each other, the atmosphere of the 
meeting appears to be less formal, and is more suitable for local leaders taking part in its 
discussion. Moreover, the meeting also functions as the most important opportunity for 
phu yai ban to participate in the planning process, which is marked by the special annual 
meeting allocated for the planning purpose. Although the chance to attend this special 
sapha tambon*s planning meeting was not available to me during the time of this study, 
it can be assumed from discussions with phu yai ban, kamnan, and some members of 
sapha tambon Bueng Yai, that the atmosphere of the meeting should not be very 
different from the regular monthly meeting . The formal status of kamnan and phu yai 
ban allows them to dominate the meeting. While the meeting provides a good chance for 
kamnan and phu yai ban to participate more actively in making decisions regarding 
development administration, it does not affect the participation of other members very 
much. Elected members whose status is not as important as that of kamnan and phu yai 
ban, are less active in participation. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that full 
participation operates and the decisions that are made are fully responsive to the needs of 
local people.
c) The Village Meeting
Organising the village meeting is in the hands of the phu yai ban of each village. As 
mentioned in Chapter Five, the village meeting should be organised regularly at least 
once a month, and extra meetings can also be called for whenever necessary. However, in 
practice not every village in the study area organises the village meeting regularly. As a 
matter of fact, none of the villages in Bueng Yai community had their regular meetings 
during the time of this study, whereas two villages observed in Tambon Khuan Samet 
have their village meetings every month. According to the phu yai ban of Ban Bon Lay,
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the meeting is called only occasionally when there are important issues to be discussed 
and decided by villagers as a whole, rather than by the village committee. The village 
meeting is organised for several purposes. Its main purpose is to inform the villagers of 
policies, commands, and any official matters received from the state, and to discuss 
problems related to village administration and development. Moreover, the meeting can 
be called for specific purposes such as to organise public works, to distribute materials 
provided by the state after the flood, and to inform urgent official matters, etc.
As discussed in Chapter Five, phu yai ban play a dominant role in the village meeting. 
The meeting’s atmosphere is mainly in the hands of phu yai ban. By chairing the meeting 
he/she can control its direction and discussions. Although participation of villagers is 
encouraged under the present concept of rural development planning, the continuing of 
master-follower tradition does not encourage ordinary villagers to take part in the 
discussion. As an effect of this tradition, the village meeting concentrates more on the 
function of informing, rather than discussing matters. Although it is important for the 
village to have regular meetings, these do not serve the purpose of directly promoting 
people’s participation. Other means must also be used in helping phu yai ban to identify 
the problems and needs common to his/her villagers. These include participation in social 
circles, such as the drinking circle and the chatting circle, and the use of informal 
observation, as already mentioned in Chapter Five.
Making contact with the district office, providing consultations to villagers, and 
arbitrating disputes among villagers, form other routine work of phu yai ban which 
consumes a great amount of time. Visiting the district office happens weekly to each phu 
yai ban in the study area. Most of them mentioned that it happens about twice a week for 
different purposes. The visit is commonly used to help villagers to make contact with 
various concerned bodies in the district office. Sometimes phu yai ban are called by 
concerned officials to discuss matters related to their work. These frequent visits form an 
inevitable task for phu yai ban to respond to expectations of both villagers and officials. 
Additionally, they are often visited by their villagers when they are at home, to discuss 
various subjects. Villagers may bring problems they face and ask their leader for help. 
Common problems are disputes on various subjects with others, either occurring within
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the village or with outsiders, in which the phu yai ban must arbitrate. Most villagers do 
not want any cases to end with formal legal actions as they involve complicated 
processes and high costs. Thus, in most cases they would expect their phu yai ban to seek 
solutions or agreements between them. Quite often villagers come to see their leaders to 
complain about unlawful things that have happened to them, expecting phu yai ban to 
take further actions to solve the matters. Concerned officials also visit phu yai ban to 
seek help in mediating official activities undertaken or anticipated to be undertaken in 
their villages. Sometimes they bring ideas of ‘development projects’, which form part of 
their central departments’ policies, to see if  they can be introduced to the villages. At 
other times, they bring routine work taking place at the village level to seek co-operation 
from the village committee members to accomplish.
Overall, though being a phu yai ban is seen to be quite low in its official status, it does 
involve a range of responsibilities. Each phu yai ban has to cope with abundant official 
directives and expectations of both their superiors and their villagers. Counting all the 
roles he/she has to perform in order to respond effectively to all directives and 
expectations, it is certainly difficult for each phu yai ban to cope under the current 
circumstances. Therefore, it is common that the phu yai ban concentrates primarily on 
various aspects of routine administrative work. Other types of work which are more 
specific to certain subject matters are given less priority. Duties in relation to natural 
resources management form part of these types of work, and are also new to phu yai ban. 
It is not uncommon for many problems to emerge when dealing with newly assigned 
duties. Some of these problems cannot be treated in isolation from the abundant general 
commitments phu yai ban have already had in general administrative affairs.
6.4 The Role of Phu Yai Ban in Natural Resource Management
The change in organisational aspects of natural resource development planning 
management is one of the most important reforms in the Thai administrative system 
which have been recently introduced by the state, and which are in the interest of 
concerned bodies. Apart from establishing new organisations to battle with the overall 
problems of natural resources depletion, the inclusion of local organisations in natural
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resource and environmental planning and implementation is seen to be crucial. It is the 
first time in the history of Thai administration that local level administrative bodies, 
especially the sapha tambon and village committee, are viewed as important for the 
management of natural resources. However, because various administrative bodies are 
unfamiliar with the devolution of power to local organisations and the prevailing 
traditions of the Thai bureaucratic system, dealing with the issues related to natural 
resource management is difficult for local organisations and their leaders. Based on 
investigations related to attempts to manage natural resources in the study area, this 
section will highlight consequences of state attempts to include local official leaders, 
especially phu yai ban, in managing local natural resources, especially those of CPRs. It 
will begin with the commitment of local leaders on natural resource management in 
general. Then it will elaborate the involvement of phu yai ban in planning and 
implementing projects related to CPR at village and sub-district levels.
6.4.1 The Commitment of Local Leaders to Natural Resource Management
In the past, management of natural resources and the environment was divided among 
various central departments, and their responsibilities were quite independent. However, 
this system was later found to be complicated and ineffective in dealing with this subject, 
mainly due to a lack of co-ordination among different central departments and their 
subsequent agencies, and the fact that there was an overlapping of some work 
(Wirajnibhawan, 1992). Moreover, the system of dividing responsibilities proved to be 
inappropriate and unrealistic, as the management of natural resources and the 
environment is frequently related to several departments, and therefore requires 
integration between departments. These are the main reasons behind the change in the 
organisational structure related to natural resources and environmental management 
introduced by the state in the late 1980s under the Sixth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan as mentioned in Chapter One. Under this new structure, every 
province is responsible for drawing up its own plan for managing natural resources and 
the environment within its political boundary. The plan is included under the provincial 
development plan, and the rural development administrative structure is applied in the 
implementation of the plan in rural areas. This means that the involvement of local
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bodies is stressed in the policy process following the new concept of development 
planning. However, unlike the process of rural development planning where the role of 
the sapha tambon and the village committee are emphasised, natural resource and 
environmental planning stresses the importance of provincial and district level planning 
bodies. This does not mean that the involvement of the sapha tambon and the village 
committee is excluded. There is a possibility of including planning bodies at these two 
levels, but no firm arrangement has been made (CBAMNREP, 1990; see also DEQP, 
1994).
As far as the sapha tambon and the village committee are concerned, it can be assumed 
that their roles with respect to natural resource and environmental planning should not 
differ from those in the process of rural development planning. This implies that these 
two local organisations are entitled to propose their plans related to the management of 
natural resources and the environment, and to implement them within their political 
boundaries. Thes should happen in a similar manner as they do for the rural development 
plan. At the same time, it is part of their general duties to enforce existing legislation 
related to the management of natural resources and the environment, to keep peace and 
order among resource users, as well as to assist any concerned bodies in implementing 
related programmes and projects in their administrative territories (Wirajnibhawan, 
1992). Nevertheless, the extent of their actual concern with these tasks depends upon the 
level of importance of problems and activities related to the subject taking place in their 
administrative areas. In two villages under the study, the level of problems related to 
natural resource management differs significantly as already discussed in Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five. Their difference seems to affect the role played by their official 
leaders, in dealing with natural resources in the villages. To illustrate what actually 
happens, further analysis will be made in this section. The emphasis will be on CPRs, 
especially fishery resources, which are important to the livelihoods of people in these 
communities.
There are several natural resources important to the livelihoods of the inhabitants of the 
area under this study. Some of these resources are viewed by local people and concerned 
officials as being at risk, particularly fishery resources. Since fishing forms an important
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part of the livelihoods of the majority of the population, sustainable management of 
fishery resources is crucial for their well-being. In connection with fishery resources, the 
condition of the swamp forest is also crucial, and determines the condition of the 
fisheries. The poor condition of the swamp forest is an important cause of the decline in 
fishery resources in this area. These two types of natural resources are perceived to be 
under threat not only by people who depend on them, but also by concerned officials. 
Despite their useful knowledge about problems and the relationships between these two 
resources, proper management of these resources appears to be problematic and 
complicated. It involves issues related to the ownership and control over these resources, 
and the overall physical and social changes occurring in the villages and in the wider 
society to which they belong, as described in Chapter Four. Though these two types of 
natural resources should in principle be CPRs, the fact that most of the land available in 
the area is owned by their residents provides some rights over the resources. 
Additionally, the increasing scarcity of the resources against the increasing numbers of 
population and livelihood demands creates conflict in the competition over the resources. 
From a legal point of view, issuing regulations to control the use of these resources in 
order to prevent overexploitation and promote conservation is essential.
There are two sets of regulations which are applied to the management of swamp forest 
and fishery resources in the area: fishery regulations and forestry regulations. The fishery 
regulations cover subjects such as licensing of fishing, seasonal restriction of fishing, and 
restrictions of types and scales of fishing gear (Rientrairat, 1983; Department of 
Fisheries, 1980; see also Appendix Two). Under forestry regulations, any activities 
harmful to the forest and wildlife (with the exception of fish) in both public and reserve 
land, are prohibited (personal communication with a senior forestry official). In principle, 
all local leaders in this area, including kamnan and phu yai ban, are responsible for 
maintaining these rules within their political boundaries. Given that each kamnan also 
acts as the head of the village he represents at the same time, the role of phu yai ban in 
this respect also reflects the role of kamnan. Considering the actual role of phu yai ban in 
maintaining the above regulations, it appears that though he has much authority, he does 
not always use this fully. Moreover, the extent to which phu yai ban exercise their power
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was not observed to be associated positively with the level of problems existing in their 
communities.
In Ban Nua Phru, only a few problems related to unlawful exploitation of fishery 
resources were evident during the period of this study, whereas no single problem related 
to the exploitation of swamp forest was evident. This does not mean that there are no 
offences against forestry regulations taking place in the village; minor offences may take 
place but they are regarded as being insignificant. Cutting a small number of trees for 
domestic purposes, such as fire wood, house repair, and livestock fencing, is not 
restricted in this area, though it is illegal. Construction of refuge trap ponds (baw law 
pla) in parts of the reserve forest area is also acceptable, although it is illegal. Therefore, 
neither their leaders nor local officials who work with the local forest protection unit take 
any action against these activities. All the problems related to fishery resource 
exploitation, were observed to be connected with the use of harmful fishing gear and 
methods in fishing. Though the problems are not yet widespread, poisoning of fish in 
private refuge-trap ponds, and setting fishing gear in prohibited areas such as by blocking 
waterways or in the temple reserve area (khate sanghataari), were evident. Moreover, 
construction of refuge-trap ponds in so-called public lands which are unofficially 
occupied is also commonly practised, regardless of any official permission.
It is particularly important to note that not all of the illegal practices mentioned above are 
perceived as wrongdoing by villagers and their leaders. The case of constructing refuge 
trap ponds is very clear. More than half of villagers own the ponds of which a 
considerable number are located in public lands informally occupied. A nation wide 
regulation of issuing licences for fishing in natural waterbodies is not yet officially 
enforced in the area, and most fishermen do not realise that such a regulation exists. It 
was observed that some official regulations may look good on paper, but they contradict 
traditional practices which are part of the livelihoods of local inhabitants. The practices 
of cutting trees and constructing refuge trap ponds illustrate conflicts taking place 
between common traditional practices and official rules which are based on an absolute 
perception of conservation. To local inhabitants these practices are morally acceptable as 
they do not perceive conservation in the same manner as does the state.
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The conflict between official rules and people’s perceptions in managing CPRs creates 
significant effects on the actual application of some policies. Because of these conflicting 
conceptions, villagers and local leaders do not pay much attention to rules they do not 
consider to be important. As a consequence, no attempt is made to control the practices 
and to arrest villagers who break these rules. However, activities which are perceived to 
be harmful for their resource conditions, such as fish poisoning, fishing in the temple 
reserve area, and using some types of fishing gear to block water ways, are seriously 
opposed. Personal warnings for those who are suspected of breaking these rules, and 
general public warnings in the village meeting, are frequently practised by phu yai ban as 
early steps of enforcement. Further action is likely to be taken if these early steps do not 
work. However, formal legal actions are preferably to be avoided in such a small 
community as this village. Rather social sanctions, such as through public condemnation 
of such practices and personal warnings by leaders, are preferred. Consequently, 
practices which are perceived to be unacceptable are seldom found. There were only two 
cases during the time of this study in which formal legal action could not be avoided, and 
two young fishermen were prosecuted by policemen who were called to the village. 
These two fishermen were described as being pigheaded {due, hua khaeng); they 
challenged the first attempt to stop them from setting their barriers across a water way in 
the village. The cases ended up with the offenders being fined and their fishing gear 
being destroyed. According to the former phu yai ban, such cases are very rare. He 
stated; ‘Once it is taken, it gives warning to others not to challenge the law when their 
leaders give warning.’ This indicates that enforcement of official regulations in relation 
to CPRs depends very much on the phu yai ban deciding to what extent he should 
exercise his power and authority. The decision of phu yai ban is determined also by 
perceptions of local values regarding the practices. Where restrictions are placed on 
practices which are perceived to be acceptable, they are likely to be ignored by local 
users as well as leaders. Failing to take proper action does not merely affect the effective 
enforcement of any particular regulations, but can also affect the leaders overall power in 
the village administration.
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In Ban Bon Lay and the larger community of Bueng Yai, fishery resources are also more 
problematic than forest resources. Because fishery resources are more important to the 
economy of the community than forest resources, competition over the former is greater 
and leads to apparent overexploitation. As a consequence, various problems related to the 
deterioration of fishery resources are more apparent than those related to forest resources. 
As with the forest resources, perceptions of the use of the resources in this village are 
similar to those in Ban Nua Phru. Use of resources for certain purposes are acceptable by 
the community, even though this may contradict forestry regulations. Since the forest 
does not currently appear to be cut for predominantly commercial purposes, problems 
related to the exploitation of forest resources are overlooked.
The situation is different for fishery resources. Although not all activities stated under 
fishery regulations are perceived by local people as criminal, some practices are deemed 
to be unacceptable. A few prohibitions such as electric fishing using high voltage 
electricity adapted from a car battery (chot pla), setting barrier traps and other gear of a 
similar kind in the lake, and fish poisoning (buea pla), are generally perceived as 
criminal. Perceptions about other illegal activities, including using of fine-meshed gill 
nets, building brush piles in the lake, setting barrier traps across water ways, and use of 
some types of gear in spawning seasons, are mixed (for more details about fishery 
regulations, see Appendix Two). Most fishermen do not consider such activities to be 
unlawful, and they are therefore widely practised. On the other hand, the phu yai ban and 
his colleagues do perceive these activities as criminal, but not serious. As a consequence, 
little attempt is made to control such activities by the village administrative body apart 
from occasionally giving general warnings through the village loud speaker, the effect of 
which is marginal. The phu yai ban and his colleagues pay more attention to controlling 
activities which are commonly perceived as criminal. Besides giving warnings as the first 
step of taking action, they also report to the District Fisheries Office in order to take 
further action. Though the phu yai ban is authorised to prosecute offenders by himself, 
he seems to avoid this unless strong evidence is available, and co-operation from related 
bodies including the District Fisheries Officer and the head of the local police station is 
assured. There was no evidence during the time of this study that formal legal action is 
undertaken in Ban Bon Lay with respect to offences against fishery regulations, even
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though such offences are commonly reported. However, there were two cases occurring 
in one of the adjacent mooban in which two fishermen were arrested. The arrest was 
made by local policemen who were accompanied by two village committee members.
Acting as a prosecutor in enforcing government regulations can be risky for phu yai ban, 
unless co-operation is assured by concerned officials, particularly the chief of local 
police. It is not uncommon that concerned officials, especially policemen, abuse their 
power in favour of offenders who have a close personal relationship with them, and come 
into conflict with local leaders. The phu yai ban of Ban Bon Lay recounted a bitter 
experience a few years ago, when he accompanied the newly appointed pramong amphoe 
to arrest a fisherman who was setting barrier traps in a restricted area in Bueng Yai lake. 
After the arrest, he and the fisheries officer destroyed fishing gear and sent the offender 
to the Bueng Yai Community Police Station, to proceed with the case. As the offender 
was later found to be among close companions (phakphuak) of local policemen, the case 
was treated by police in favour of the offender. Conversely, the phu yai ban and the 
pramong amphoe were accused of destroying the offender’s fishing equipment. The case 
ended up with a compromise unofficially mediated by a powerful official from the 
district office. The offender was not charged and no further prosecution was undertaken, 
and the pramong amphoe, who was new to the area, was later transferred to a distant 
region. The phu yai ban admitted that he was embarrassed and began to be disillusioned 
with the legal system because it was unjust. Such a strange situation can happen when 
bribery is involved or an offender has a close personal relationship with influential 
officers. This reflects the practice of patron-client relationships which abuses the justice 
system and creates negative impacts on local administrative affairs. Some villagers and 
informal leaders revealed a few stories of biased and unjust threats made by officials, 
especially policemen, in relation to prosecution of fishery regulations as well as other 
crimes. In Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai community as a whole, there are a 
considerable number of villagers who have close ties with policemen either through kin 
lines, as some policemen are locals or married to locals, or through the drinking circle 
(wong lad). Some of them are suspected of committing crimes because they have been 
seen doing so in the community, including breaking fishery regulations. Knowing that 
these people are among suspected criminals makes local leaders scared to take further
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action, unless the ‘green light’ (fai kheow) is given by powerful policemen or powerful 
concerned officials, such as nai amphoe.
One of the main factors behind ineffective enforcement of official regulations is the 
limitation of phu yai ban* s authority to deal with natural resource management issues. 
Compared to policemen, the power of phu yai ban in dealing with the overall prosecution 
process is minimal. Even the pramong amphoe, who has direct responsibility for 
enforcing fishery regulations, does not have power comparable to that of the police. The 
complicated power relations among different concerned officials, and the emergence of 
corruption and paternalistic practices between powerful officials and their clients, create 
an unpleasant environment for phu yai ban to play their role effectively, even if they are 
willing to do so (a detail discussion about corruption in Thailand can be found in Scott, 
1979). Many of them prefer to choose more delicate ways in dealing with problems such 
as informing the pramong amphoe in writing when a series of offences are apparent, 
placing the decision to take further action on the officer. Under such difficult 
circumstances, most regulations related to fishery resource management appear good 
only on paper, but in practice are poorly applied. The fate of the resources therefore 
depends mainly on the mechanism of traditional systems of resource allocation, with 
phu yai ban not having a direct role to play.
It is indicated in the above discussion that local official leaders, especially phu yai ban, 
are responsible for delivering any government policies related to sustaining and 
conserving valuable and scarce natural resources available at the local level. However, 
there are some complications in the delivery of these policies, mostly related to 
regulations and commands. Two common sources of these complications are: firstly, the 
disparity between official regulations and local perceptions of particular resources; and 
secondly, a lack of co-ordination in enforcing regulations related to these resources. 
Conflict then arises because regulations which are centrally designed for nation-wide 
application are frequently incompatible with deeply rooted traditional local practices. In 
such circumstances, though phu yai ban and other local official leaders are obliged to 
strictly oversee regulations, no effective enforcement should take place unless the matters 
are generally perceived to be important under given circumstances. Living among people
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who share their social values, it is difficult for these leaders to act against perceptions 
prevailing among their fellow villagers in enforcing regulations which contradict their 
values and way of life. Consequently, only some regulations are seriously taken into 
account by local leaders, whilst others are ignored. This depends on the circumstances in 
a particular locality, with both traditional practices and the relationship between resource 
conditions and economic dependency of the people on those resources are counted. As 
with the co-ordination between concerned bodies in enforcing regulations, phu yai ban 
hold much lower status and power as compared to other concerned officials. Lack of co­
ordination and support from other officials, especially policemen, is not uncommon and 
leads to disastrous and discouraging consequences, making it difficult for local leaders to 
perform their duties effectively. The lack of interest of concerned officials and the 
emergence of unjust treatment in the system of prosecution leads to deterioration in the 
actual practice of implementing CPR management in the study area. As a consequence, 
full enforcement of related regulations does not take place. In the case where official 
regulations and local perceptions are in conflict, the extent to which regulations are 
enforced depends very much on the determination of local official leaders, especially phu 
yai ban, to alter them under given circumstances and limited conditions. It can be 
concluded that the actions of phu yai ban are similar to the actions of ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ in general, as suggested by Lipsky (1980). Even if they are ambitious in 
putting policies into practice, several limitations confront them when trying to do so.
6.4.2 Phu Yai Ban and Natural Resource Planning
The present structure of natural resource and environmental planning at the local level is 
integrated into the process of rural development planning. This means that each sapha 
tambon can participate in the process by including its own natural resource and 
environmental management plan into its annual development plan. As the tambom plan 
is mainly derived from several moobarCs proposals, each phu yai ban is also entitled to 
propose projects related to natural resource management of his/her own mooban to be 
considered by the sapha tambon, and then formulated into the tambon development plan. 
The concept is theoretically sound, but its application is substantially inconclusive. A 
few questions arise concerning the application, both in terms of the legal context of
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participation of local leaders and the understanding of the subject itself, which is rather 
new to local administration.
Considering the legal context of participation, there is no doubt that there is recognition 
of the importance of local organisations in the planning process with respect to the 
management of local natural resources and the environment. As mentioned earlier, the 
sapha tambon acts both as an advisory body to the district committee in preparing the 
district natural resource and environmental plan, and as an active body to propose its own 
projects related to natural resource and environmental management as part of its annual 
— rural development plan, which are later to be integrated into higher level development - 
plans.
However, further investigation illustrates that the role of the sapha tambon in the first 
respect, i.e. as an advisory body to the district committee, is not clearly predetermined. 
Each sapha tambon and its contributory village committees do not have a direct role in 
the planning process. The extent of their participation depends on the view of the district 
committee of their inclusion into the process. Even if their inclusion is seen to be 
advantageous, their influence on the overall decision-making process should not be great.
In other words, their involvement can only be partial, based on the wish of the district 
committee. This means that it depends on the district committee or concerned officials 
who sit on the district committee to decide upon the extent to which the sapha tambon 
and the village committee should be consulted. Combined with the perception of 
superiority existing among higher officials as often argued, the influence of local official 
leaders on the overall decision-making regarding natural resource and environmental 
planning in this respect is very low. This is demonstrated by a few natural resource 
related projects undertaken in the area, where only minor involvement of the sapha 
tambon and village committee was observed. The decision to have or not to have projects 
was determined predominantly by the district and higher level executive committees. 
Only some details of the projects, such as details about its location, problems related to 
the projects and solutions, were discussed with local leaders. Ultimately, problems 
related to property rights, especially the rights over land which was allocated for the 
projects, were left for local official leaders to sort out. The overall design of the projects
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was based on existing regulations which do not allow for major adjustment. This implies 
that the chance to introduce self-generated regulations, which are often argued as 
important for community-based resource management projects (see Ostrom, 1990; 
Pomeroy, 1993), is very limited.
The recognition of sapha tambon as an active planning body in natural resource 
development is more meaningful than as an advisory body in a participatory sense. 
Under the present rural development planning process, each sapha tambon is entitled to 
draw its own annual development plan to be funded by the state under the rural 
development scheme. A fixed budget is allocated equally by the central government 
every year to every tambon throughout the country. This budget is then allocated to 
tambon and mooban level projects which are approved by each sapha tambon. Generally, 
the tambon development plan is generated from several village development proposals 
submitted to each sapha tambon. The sapha tambon then reformulates these proposals 
into the tambon level plan. Every phu yai ban has two important roles in this planning 
process: as the leader of his own village committee who oversees the preparation of the 
village development proposal; and as a key member of the sapha tambon who 
contributes to the tambon level decision-making. These two basic roles place the phu yai 
ban in a good position to include issues concerned with natural resources that emerge in 
his/her village onto the planning agenda, and to defend their importance both at the 
mooban and tambon levels. However, the question is whether they actually play these 
roles? And, does the surrounding environment permit them to participate actively in the 
planning process?
Observation in the two villages under this study reveals that there is no doubt that phu 
yai ban play these two important roles in the rural development process, but their 
perceptions of the importance of natural resource management in the development are 
dubious. Most development projects undertaken were observed to be stereotypical and 
limited to infrastructural and small group development. Construction of roads, bridges, 
meeting places, clean water storage tanks and wells, and establishment of village savings 
groups as well as small occupational development groups, are common to most villages. 
These conventional types of project dominate rural development ideas, not only in this
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area, but also elsewhere in Thailand. More importantly, they form a continuum of 
government initiated development schemes. One of the reasons is that rural development 
(kaanpattana chonnabot) is often interpreted as ‘bringing advancement and 
modernisation to rural areas’ (kaan nam kwaamjaroen kaonaa su chonnabot). To 
advance and modernise the villages, infrastructural development and establishment of so- 
called interest groups are seen as major components. This perception of advancement and 
modernisation still dominates the views of phu yai ban and other formal leaders in the 
villages under study, as they usually refer to infrastructural development when replying 
to questions about rural development projects. The fact that none except one project 
recently proposed to sapha tambon of both sub-districts in which the study villages 
belong, is related-to natural resource management, provides support for this argument. 
The dominant view of state-led rural development in the past still has a strong influence 
on the present system, and cannot be underestimated in explaining this phenomenon. The 
domination of this view certainly influences the way of thinking of concerned field 
officials and local official leaders in dealing with development planning. Both field 
officials and local official leaders gain this viewpoint through their training, government 
publicity, and interactions with their superiors whose concept of development has 
changed very little, despite the attempt of central policy making bodies to introduce the 
new concept of planning. Moreover, the new concept of planning which encourages the 
participation of local leaders in initiating development planning is also not fully 
operational. Many tambon and mooban level projects proclaimed as a product of purely 
sapha tambon decisions were observed to be controversial. Frequent contact and 
interactions between local leaders and concerned field officials, either formally or 
informally, significantly influences local leaders’ development initiatives. Since the 
understanding of field officials about rural development does not appear to have changed 
very much, their influence on local official leaders’ initiatives has consequences on the 
tambon and mooban development planning, which undervalues natural resource and 
environmental problems. Projects such as the construction of clean water storage tanks, 
the establishment of savings groups, the construction of meeting places, are examples 
where the influence of officials is implied.
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The limitations facing rural development planning which lead to a lack of emphasis on 
natural resource management, are also subject to the complexity of the content o f natural 
resource management itself. Although phu yai ban and other local leaders realise the 
existence of natural resource management problems, they do not have a clear 
understanding of the causes. Clearly they have an idea about what the causes are, but 
they have difficulties in ordering their importance and in understanding linkages among 
different causes. Taking fishery resources into consideration, some leaders see over­
fishing as the main cause, whereas other groups view environmental degradation in 
broader terms. Villagers blame the use of harmful fishing gear and fishing methods, 
such as small-meshed monofilament gill nets, spears connected with electric current, 
seine nets, brush piles, and long bamboo barriers, as not only destructive to fishery 
resources in the short term, but also affecting the sustainability of fish stocks in the long 
term. Environmental problems, such as change in water quality and water flow system, 
shallowness of waterbodies, and deforestation of swamp forest, are seen as having 
connection with degradation of fishery resources. Moreover, in very dry years a lot of 
fish in the swamp die from drought and forest fire. The overexploitation of fishery 
resources through the use of harmful fishing gear and fishing methods is apparent, 
whereas villagers’ explanations of broader environmental degradation are less clear. This 
is mainly because environmental degradation in this particular ecosystem is complicated 
and also related to changes occurring over time. This causes difficulties not only for local 
leaders but also concerned officials in developing a consensus view about its real causes 
and consequences. Hence, to address problems of environmental degradation effectively 
is a difficult task; even if more information is available, it will not necessarily result in an 
effective solution.
The complexity of problems related to CPR management, as illustrated in the case of 
fishery resources above, can deter local official leaders from pursuing environmental 
management. The effect of policy content on policy implementation corresponds to 
Grindle’s assumption of the importance of policy content on the reaction of policy 
implementors which affects the outcome of a policy (Grindle, 1980a). Traditional leaders 
who have an interest in the issues also face similar obstacles. Although all these leaders 
realise the existence of the problems and their anticipated impacts if  the problems are left
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unsolved, they also face difficulties in finding solutions to the problems, because a wide 
range of causes are involved, and some are interlinked. Furthermore, many of these 
causes, especially those concerned with ecological changes, are beyond their 
understanding, for example changes in water flow system and their relationships with 
shallowness of waterbodies, consequences of improperly designed infrastructural 
development on water flow system, and so on. Even concerned field officials also have 
limited knowledge about them. Some problems are strongly perceived to be the main 
cause of declining fisheries, such as use of harmful fishing gear and shallowness of 
waterbodies, and therefore most phu yai ban and traditional leaders have shown their 
willingness to use appropriate strategies to combat them. Nevertheless, the existing 
strategies employed by the state, which appear mainly in the form of imposing 
regulations to prevent and control fishing activities, are perceived to be ineffective and 
not completely reliable. If  the conventional practice of enforcement which is perceived as 
corrupt and unjust remains unchanged, this implies that conventional management 
strategies in the short run will not work, since dramatic changes in the enforcement 
system are unlikely to take place easily. To battle with the increasing shallowness of 
waterbodies, they believe that a large project of re-excavation, especially of the lake, is 
the only effective solution. However, such a project requires a great amount of money, 
which is unlikely to be forthcoming through the normal procedures of development 
planning, where only a limited annual budget is assured for each tambon. All these 
perceptions deter phu yai ban from including CPR management issues into village 
development planning.
Realising the above obstacles makes some informal leaders, who are very concerned 
about these issues (especially a group led by a charismatic trader in Bueng Yai 
community), struggle for support from outside the official arena to deal with these 
problems. They joined NGOs working in other fishing communities, in campaigning for 
community-based sustainable fishery management in the Songkhla Lake complex as a 
whole. They also made direct contact with powerful local politicians in seeking support 
from special budgets which these politicians have access to. So far, these attempts have 
not yet achieved any significant success.
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Fishermen are more directly affected by the problems of fishery resource depletion than 
officials and their leaders, because to many of them the resources are their main source of 
livelihoods. However, whilst there is widespread acceptance that problems exist, there 
are a variety of opinions regarding their causes. The majority of them see the overall 
changes in the ecological system, together with an increase in the exploitation of the 
resources, as major causes. As with ecological changes, the shallowness of waterbodies 
caused by siltation is perceived as the most important cause. Hence, they share the 
common perception with their leaders that the conditions of the fisheries cannot be 
substantially improved unless re-excavation of waterbodies is undertaken. With respect 
to the exploitationoTresources, the use of harmful fishing gear as described earlier is 
denounced. However, there are mixed views with respect to the use of some types of 
illegal fishing gear, especially small-meshed gill nets, and small brush piles, which are 
most common. Many fishermen see the use of these types of fishing gear, despite their 
illegality, as reflecting the economic pressure fishermen face in their struggle for their 
survival. Therefore, they agree to compromise with the use of these types of fishing gear, 
as they see many fishermen having to depend on them, and these types of gear are not 
perceived as having a particular negative impact. The majority of them presume that the 
rapid population increase in the community, and hence the increase in fisher population, 
is the main factor behind this pressure. However, some of them see that this pressure is 
also driven by the increasing needs for cash following the recent changes in lifestyle as a 
result of the shift towards a market economy and modernisation of the community. This 
argument is sensible as expansion of capitalism can create pressure on rural communities 
when job opportunities in the non-rural sector are limited, whereas the need for cash 
increases (for a detailed discussion on this subject with particular reference to Southeast 
Asia, see Evers and Schrader, 1994). In order to reduce these problems, even though 
most of them agree to stricter enforcement of existing regulations, they do not see the 
capacity of their official leaders to pursue these objectives under the present conditions. 
At the same time, they do not believe in the ability of their official leaders to create new 
projects to cope with the problems. To them, if the existing regulations are effectively 
enforced, these problems will be diminished dramatically.
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Though issues related to the management of CPRs are complicated and receive a low 
priority in village and sub-district planning, it is not impossible for village or sub-district 
administrative bodies to initiate projects related to CPR management. However, initiating 
projects dealing with such complicated issues needs mutual support from various leaders 
whose strengths are recognised. By working together with shared interests, the strengths 
and power of these leaders can be pooled in constructing ideas to eliminate, or at least to 
diminish existing problems. Though this proposition may be argued as rather idealistic, 
as barriers between official and traditional leaders are likely to emerge, having a leader 
who is perceived to be politically neutral and culturally respectful, thus bridging the gap 
between them, will be helpful. The case of the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru 
provides a good example of this type of co-operation, originating from within the village 
community. Both official and traditional leaders joined together in designing the project. 
Behind this co-operation is the interest and active involvement of the abbot of the 
village’s temple. The abbot, whose merit is recognised and central to all community 
members, is very influential to the project initiation as he sees that the links between 
forest, water and fish must be taken into account in maintaining fishery resources in this 
area. By working closely with the former phu yai ban, who is recognised by the state as 
an active phu yai ban, and the official village elder, who is known to be knowledgeable, 
the project was made possible by starting with the simple idea of planting trees in public 
land covered by the already degraded swamp forest. Though the idea was also discussed 
with concerned officials, no positive response was received until after the project was 
started through local efforts. This instance indicates that local initiation of projects 
related to natural resource management under the given structural conditions is feasible 
under mutual co-operation of both official and traditional local leaders, providing they 
have a common understanding of the subject. Moreover, the charismatic property of local 
leaders is important in influencing villagers and attracting support from official bodies. 
The detail of this case project will be discussed later in this chapter. This finding 
indicates how important characteristics of leaders and cohesiveness among different 
leaders in the achievement of the community project. The cohesiveness of these leaders 
is then transformed into the cohesiveness of members of the community. In economic 
terms, high cohesiveness among members of the community means low transaction costs
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in pursuing natural resource management, which is promising for successful management 
(see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).
It can be concluded from this section that although the importance of phu yai ban is 
recognised by the state in dealing with natural resource and environmental planning, both 
at the mooban and tambon level, several obstacles exist which hamper their active 
involvement. These obstacles emerge in relation to the organisational structure of natural 
resources and environmental planning, the persistence of conventional perceptions of 
development, and the unfamiliarity and confusion of local leaders on the subject. These 
obstacles obstruct phu yai ban's ability to prioritise issues related to CPR management in 
village development planning. Therefore, initiation of projects related to CPR 
management at mooban and tambon levels is unlikely to take place easily through the 
effort of phu yai ban alone. However, there is still a chance of having projects related to 
CPR management at the local level, either through the initiation of higher administrative 
bodies or through the mutual co-operation of various leaders who are concerned about 
the issues. In any case, local leaders must be responsible for taking part in implementing 
such projects once they are established. The achievement of these projects depends also 
on the commitment of local leaders, especially phu yai ban, in implementing them.
6.4.3 Details of Case Projects
Earlier I mentioned about projects related CPR management in this area, and two 
projects were selected as study cases for an in-depth analysis of the roles o f local 
organisations and local leaders in CPR management. The two projects selected are the 
Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community and the Forest Reserve Project in Ban 
Nua Phru. This section will present detail backgrounds of these two projects.
a) The Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai Community
In May 1993, the Phatthalung Provincial Fisheries Office issued a declaration to establish 
‘The Fishery Reserve Area’ in part of Bueng Yai lake. The coverage of this area is 605 
rai (0.97 sq. km.). Legally, this project is allocated as a sanctuary area categorised as
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‘aquatic plants and animals protection area’ (khate raksapeutpan sat naam), in which all 
plants and animals inhabiting the area are legally protected, and all fishing activities are 
strictly prohibited. Similar types of declaration have been issued twice in the lake prior to 
this declaration.
The first declaration was in 1934, covering an area of about 1,650 rai (2.64 sq. km.). 
This declaration was said to be based on the traditional practice existing in this area at 
that time. The management of this project lasted several years, under an integration of the 
traditional system existing in the community, and the formal system introduced by the 
state. However, it was said that the traditional system played a more dominant role than 
the formal system in its implementation. Unfortunately, the practice weakened, and 
eventually collapsed around twenty years ago. The blame was placed mainly on the 
pressure over resource use and the marked decline in traditional values emerging in the 
community. The second declaration was released in 1990 covering the area of 415 rai 
(0.44 sq. km.). According to key informants, this declaration completely failed to achieve 
its objectives, as no effective enforcement took place.
The present declaration was made to cover the area under the second declaration, but 
with some extension. The main purpose of the present declaration is to provide an 
undisturbed shelter where fish can seek refuge and breed the whole year round. 
Allocating some area for this purpose is believed to enhance and retain fish stocks in the 
lake, which will then benefit fishermen in this predominantly fishing community. Under 
this project, restocking some non-native species is also seen as an important supporting 
action.
The initiation of this project cannot be considered as local, though all parties in the 
community have no objection to the idea. This is because it commenced from the District 
Fisheries Officer (pramong amphoe) of Khuan Mangkhud district, who is directly 
responsible for fishery management in the area, putting forward a proposal to continue 
the idea of having a reserve sanctuary again after the failure of the previous declaration. 
The idea was then passed to both sapha tambon of Khuan Phanang and Bueng Yai sub­
districts, in which the community falls, to ask for comments. Furthermore, a public
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meeting was also called for in which most formal and traditional leaders and some 
villagers attended. The meeting was led by the pramong amphoe of Khuan Mangkhud 
district, and a few officials were presented, including the head of the Wildlife Protection 
Unit situated in the community.
According to key informants and some formal leaders who attended the meeting, the way 
the meeting was organised did not allow for full participation of local leaders and 
villagers, as it was dominated by the officials, especially the pramong amphoe. In the 
meeting, the pramong amphoe explained the concept of the project and its importance in 
some detail, and made his proposal for the project. Participants were given a chance to 
comment only about the project’s size and location, after the pramong amphoe made his 
proposal. A brief discussion took place, as a few participants made some inquiries 
regarding the size and location, but most of them agreed with the proposed idea to keep 
the previously declared area, but with some extension. Although it appeared that the 
meeting aimed to use a participatory approach to decision-making, available information 
suggests that the participation of villagers in the meeting on the overall decision-making 
was minimal, as they were given only a limited chance. This is not surprising since this 
type of meeting and its non-participatory atmosphere is common to formal meetings 
organised by the state officials. The presence and dominance of high ranking officials at 
the meeting deter the participation of local leaders and normal villagers who feel 
subservient to officials, unless a more suitable atmosphere is intentionally prepared for 
fuller participation. In this case, the rules of the game were controlled by the officials 
with only limited opportunities for feedback, so that no real participation occurred. Not 
long after this meeting, the project was officially declared by the Provincial Fisheries 
Office, and an official letter was distributed to every phu yai ban in the area seeking co­
operation for implementing the project, based on existing regulations and the general 
system of administration. No attempt was made to establish a special organisation to deal 
with the management of the project, despite the previous experience of failure when 
relying on the conventional state implementation system.
After the commencement of the declaration, the first step of implementation was to mark 
the boundary of the reserve area. An order was issued to every phu yai ban and kamnan
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to call for mutual labour contributions from villagers to help in placing markers to 
indicate the boundary. Most of the village committee members and some villagers 
participated in this task. After that, the action was undertaken to remove all types of 
fishing gear which were placed within the declared boundary. In undertaking this action, 
first of all, an order was given to every phu yai ban to inform fishermen within each 
village to withdraw their fishing gear and not to practise any kind of fishing within the 
area. All types of fishing gear remaining in the area were removed within a few days 
after the public announcement was made. This caused dissatisfaction among some 
fishermen who fished in the area prior to the declaration. Consequently, an informal 
protest against the project by these fishermen emerged, with support from relatives and 
close companions.
It was estimated that around twenty fishermen were affected seriously by the 
enforcement of the regulations, as they regularly fished in the area and their chances of 
finding proper fishing sites in other parts of the lake were limited in the short term under 
such competitive conditions. However, the overall number of those who were affected, 
either directly or indirectly, and those who did not agree with the project were estimated 
to be around one hundred. Some fishermen who are quite poor were said to have faced 
immediate hardship as they received no compensation, and the chance to properly 
relocate their fishing gear was not immediately available under the existing traditional 
arrangement. Three months after the declaration, a few fishermen left the village to seek 
labouring wage work in nearby towns because of the immediate impact of the project on 
them. The number of fishermen affected by the project was considered to be insignificant 
as compared to the total number of fishing households in the community. For this reason, 
most leaders do not see the negative impact as being serious. They believe that the claim 
that there is a lack of places for fishing is untrue, since fishermen are free to set their gear 
anywhere in the lake. Additionally, they deny the existence of norms which affect the 
relocation of fishing gear of these fishermen as they see the lake as an ‘open access 
fishing ground.’ They also believe that everything will go back to normal after a few 
months, and therefore they underestimate the immediate hardship facing these fishermen. 
Those who were affected by the project expressed the view that they were treated 
unfairly. A poor fisherman who used to set fish traps in the area asserted that he and his
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fellow fishermen should be reallocated a new place by their leaders, because finding a 
new place on their own is a difficult task in a situation where most suitable places are 
already occupied. Additionally, it is against the traditional practice to set fish traps too 
close to those already set. However, these limitations are not recognised by the leaders 
and concerned officials.
In terms of the importance of the project, all formal and traditional leaders view the 
necessity of having such a project. They perceive that if  the project is effectively 
implemented as planned, it will improve the stocking condition in the waterbody which 
will benefit all fishermen in the community. Some of them even think that the size of the 
area is not large enough, and that a larger area is needed in order to improve the stocking 
condition in the lake. What they concern is how effective the implementation is going to 
be. They are unsure about the effectiveness of the formal implementation structure to 
handle the project, as they have experienced the negligence of state officials in 
overseeing general fishery regulations.
Most villagers share a similar view to that of their leaders, as they also see that the 
project will enhance the improvement of fish stocks in the waterbody. Only a few 
fishermen expressed their feeling of uncertainty about the project because the area is so 
small. The feeling of uncertainty is also connected with the issue of the effectiveness of 
the existing implementation structure in dealing with the project management. A few 
fishermen believe that the situation will not be stable for long, because there will be a 
few fishermen who dare to challenge the authorities over the rules. If the authorities are 
unable to show their strength and fairness in enforcing the rules, the project is unlikely to 
last very long. To them, it is quite difficult for local leaders to be active in managing the 
project without greater co-operation of concerned officials at higher levels. They also see 
that co-operation between leaders of different villages in the community is unlikely to 
happen naturally, as they perceive several barriers will emerge between these leaders. 
Moreover, they believe that problems may occur because the bias which exists among 
some leaders in favour of their relatives and phak phuak in dealing with offences. 
Nevertheless they mostly agreed that if the project is implemented effectively, it will be 
beneficial.
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Even though the project is still in the early stage of its operation, its physical benefits are 
generally perceived to be positive. Local leaders and fishermen have consistent views on 
the increase in fish stocks in association with the implementation of the project. 
Frequently they expressed what they believe to be signs of improvement that they have 
witnessed. Some fishermen claimed to have seen the increase in amount of larger fish 
caught in the area around the project site, only a few months after the projects’ 
commencement. Others claimed to have seen a remarkable change in the amount of fish 
in the area within the project boundary. The expression ‘seeing plenty of fry’ {hen foong  
look pla tem pai mod) around the spawning season indicates the suitability of the place 
for fish to spawn peacefully. This is at promising sign for improving fish stocks in the 
near future. Because the area is left largely undisturbed by any human activity, except 
sailing in the limited routes provided, it provides a good nursery ground for fish. Leaders 
and fishermen are confident about the upholding of the project on the improvement of 
fish stocks in the lake. However, any positive feedback can only provide a rough 
indication of its physical benefits at the time of the study. Its actual benefits, both in 
physical and economic terms, need to be evaluated more accurately in the future, if the 
effectiveness of its implementation over a longer period of time can be achieved.
During the first few months of implementation, the project ran quite smoothly. Attempts 
at rule-breaking were minimal, even though official patrolling was not frequently 
undertaken. However, the situation soon changed as later there were a few fishermen 
attempting to challenge the authorities by sneaking into the area at night. Village leaders, 
police and pramong amphoe, were informed about the situation by some anxious 
villagers and traditional leaders, but no firm action was taken. Warnings were only given 
publicly through the village loud speakers, though sometimes on personal basis to 
suspected fishermen. This type of soft reaction did not work effectively, and the situation 
continued to deteriorate, until June 1994, when firmer action was first undertaken. Two 
offenders were arrested by two members of the village committee of Ban Talard and 
brought to the police. They were both fined and their fishing equipment was seized. This 
action improved the situation for a while, but then problems started to arise again. Since 
no further firm action had been taken, the problems had been getting worse, and in a
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short visit I made in August 1995, the problems were quite serious. A few leaders 
revealed that the number of offenders had increased. The project was abandoned by the 
authorities. Most leaders in the community were reluctant as they see the lessened 
interest of the leader of the village where the project is located. At the same time, neither 
the police nor pramong amphoe showed much interest in solving the problems. Some 
leaders and fishermen even believe that most of the offenders were among close 
companions or phak phuak of policemen and the head of the Wildlife Protection Unit. 
Hence, no one dared to take strong action against them. They also feel discouraged to 
inform the pramong amphoe and police, since they believe that none of them is fully 
reliable. Some informal leaders see that the situation will not improve under the formal 
organisational arrangement. To them the project will not work effectively unless 
reorganisation is made in the implementation structure. They see that the involvement of 
NGOs may be necessary for this kind of work, as their specialisation is well recognised 
in empowering and enhancing co-operation of the grassroots in solving problems through 
the revival of cultural values.
b) The Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru
In the early part of 1993, there emerged an idea to replant and conserve part of the 
swamp forest in public land covered with secondary swamp forest in Ban Nua Phru. The 
idea was generated from informal consultation between the abbot of Wat Nua Phru, Mr. 
Jai who was the phu yai ban at that time, and Mr. Suk, the village phu song khunnawut. 
The initiative came from Sompam Chayanto, the abbot, who was bom in the community 
in a highly respected family descended from the founder of the community.
The abbot is known as a young active monk in this area, and is respected by other monks. 
His status allows him to be selected as the tambon head priest (chao khana tambon). He 
is believed to be among the ‘reform monks’ who have been known as a progressive 
group of Buddhist monks in contemporary Thailand. As a reform monk, he is interested 
not only in the spiritual aspects of Buddhism, but also in other philosophical aspects, 
especially with respect to the well-being of the community and its relationship with 
ecological changes. By observing changes in ecology and the livelihoods of villagers in
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this community, as well as surrounding neighbourhoods, he perceives that ecological 
deterioration is a major factor behind the deprivation of rural life.
i
i
The abbot proposed an idea of conserving forest to improve fishery resource conditions 
in a discussion with Mr. Jai and Mr. Suk on one day when these two leaders came to 
consult him about their worry over the decline of fishery resources in the community. 
Through the exchange of their ideas, they eventually agreed to reconstruct a proper 
environment appropriate for fish to shelter and spawn. The abbot, who has a good grasp 
of the village geographical conditions, proposed to make use of public land informally 
occupied by villagers but under-utilised by claimants, for rehabilitating the swamp forest 
and making it a ‘community forest project’, in which conservation and utilisation 
purposes are combined. He suggested that Mr. Jai and Mr. Suk develop such a project 
under state support, since the government has been recently recognising natural resource 
issues as an important element of rural development. The idea was then brought into the 
discussion in a village monthly meeting to inquire about villagers’ perceptions. It 
received a majority support in the meeting, and this marked the beginning of its formal 
action.
One of the first decisions made was about the size of the area to be covered. At the 
beginning it was decided to cover only about 25 rai of land, based on the availability of 
the land least disturbed by human activities. However, after a series of informal 
consultations among the community leaders, an area of 100 rai was agreed. Mr. Jai 
discussed the idea with the nai amphoe and the district forestry officer (paamai amphoe) 
of Thung Yaang district seeking possible support. The nai amphoe and paamai amphoe 
welcome the idea, but they did not assure formal material support as it had to go through 
the formal process of making a proposal. At the same time, they requested that Mr. Jai 
extends the area to cover around 500 rai. Though no objection was received from the 
abbot and his colleagues in the village committee, Mr. Jai mentioned that the expansion 
of the area created some difficulties in attaining extra land. The project was brought into 
the discussion at several village meetings, and eventually it was decided to cover 625 rai 
or 1 sq. km. Attaining this amount of land involved the difficult job of negotiating with 
some land occupiers who protested against it. It took a few months to clear up the
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problem, and several people were involved in negotiations with land occupiers. They 
include the abbot, Mr. Jai, Mr. Suk, the kamnan of Tambon Khuan Samet, Mr. Ruam 
who succeeded Mr. Jai after his retirement in April 1993, and some members of the 
village committee.
The co-operation among leaders in this village is crucial in driving this project, and Mr. 
Ruam follows his predecessor in supporting the project, working closely with the abbot 
and Mr. Suk. At the same time, Mr. Jai is still actively involved in the project even 
though he has retired. It is observed that having the abbot at the centre helps these leaders 
to work together on the project, despite some tensions emerging in the administration of 
the village after the change of the phu yai ban. The abbot plays an important role in 
generating ideas and in attempting to solve problems emerging among villagers. He gains 
a lot of respect from villagers not only because he is the head of religious institutions in 
the community, but also because of his strong commitment to secular activities in the 
village. There have been many development activities in which the abbot has acted as a 
patron, providing support spiritually and financially. Frequently he decides to allocate 
some of the temple income to support the activities. Similarly, this project also receives 
strong support from him. It was said that he urged the leaders to continue the project 
even if outside support could not be attained, and he was prepared to provide some 
financial support to the project. His support has enabled the project to be implemented 
prior to its official approval.
The actual implementation started in 1994, by surveying the area and collecting seedlings 
from natural sources and nursing them. Since then, there have been two planting actions 
undertaken. The first was done in July 1994, and was organised through mutual co­
operation of villagers without any support from outside. Necessary costs were gained 
through village collections, and lunch was mutually prepared by villagers on the basis of 
‘long khaek’, in which every household is entitled to prepare a set of meals (samrab) and 
then pools them together. It was said that almost every household sent its members to 
participate, and the abbot himself was present in the event and arranged for young monks 
to participate as well. A religious ritual was held at the opening session to bless the 
project. A hut was built for monks to reside in during the Buddhist Lent season (khao
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pansa), so that they could help to look after the area during its early stages of planting. 
These religious practices help in highlighting the significance of the project. The project 
was given the name ‘Suan Paa Sangha Pracha Raks which literally means ‘monks and 
people reserve forest.’ The name was given by the abbot aiming to symbolise the original 
ideology behind the project.
The second planting action was undertaken in August 1995, and 10,000 baht was granted 
by the Department of Forestry through the District Forestry Office to be spent on it. This 
was the first budgetary allocation received from outside, and it was spent mainly on food, 
both during the seedling preparation and on the day of planting, and on transportation of 
seedlings. This planting action was done in association with the commemoration of the 
50th anniversary of the King’s reign (chalerm phra kiart haasip pee siri ratchasombat). 
There were a few officials from the district office who came to observe, and about 30 
villagers participated in the planting, quite a small number when compared to the first 
planting in 1994. The reduction in number of participants from the previous planting 
action was partly due to the absence of some villagers who had migrated out seasonally 
to work outside the village.
Based on discussions with the abbot, the abbot explained his hope for the project. In his 
view, the project should include not only reforestation of the area, but also the 
construction of a surrounding ditch, and also a ditch across the middle of the site. This 
ditch will provide a good sanctuary for aquatic animals throughout the year and will help 
to protect the forest from fire. Moreover, it is possible to restock fish in these ditches. 
Fishing in these ditches may be prohibited completely or limited to a certain period only. 
If this plan is achieved, he believes the project will improve fishery resources 
significantly as the ditches will provide permanent waterbodies for fish to seek refuge 
and spawn, as well as being nursing grounds. He explained: ‘When floods come, some of 
fish will disperse throughout the swamp which allows swamp settlers to catch more fish. 
In the dry season, fish can seek refuge in the ditches which are undisturbed.’ He 
perceives that at the present a lack of permanent waterbodies in which fish can seek 
refuge during the dry season, significantly contributes to the decline in the fisheries in the 
area. Therefore, having proper waterlogged ditches would provide sufficient shelter for
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fish to survive over the dry season, complete its life cycle, and provide broodstock for the 
coming season. When the same cycle continually repeats, the condition of fish stock in 
the area will improve if overexploitation is under control. Moreover, he foresees the 
possibility of developing the area into a recreational park which is operated on the basis 
o f eco-tourism, and envisages the construction of a proper road for access to the area, and 
other basic facilities for visitors. He stated: ‘When the forest is grown to its maturity, 
there will be birds and other wildlife inhabiting the area. It will be a good place for those 
who love natural beauty to make a visit.’ This idea presents a challenge for the future 
plan for the management of the project, if all these targets are to be achieved.
A proper management plan has not yet been developed as the project is still in its early 
stage. According to the abbot, the original idea of the project was to manage on the basis 
of community forestry, combining the concepts of conservation and utilisation. However, 
the inclusion of formal conventional conservation practice in part of the area will be 
inevitable, as part of the project has been allocated for the purpose of commemorating 
the special royal event in which conventional rules of banning all activities in the area are 
applied. The rest should however remain with the original idea. All leaders, including the 
abbot, Mr. Suk, the former phu yai ban, and the present phu yai ban, have not yet 
discussed the management details. At present, they only have a broad idea of the 
community forestry concept which they receive through media, especially television. Mr. 
Ruam, the present phu yai ban mentioned that he plans to make visits to other 
communities which run successful community forestry projects, in order to discuss about 
their management rules and practices. The abbot views management as the key to the 
success of the project, especially in the long run. He sees the role of leaders, especially 
phu yai ban, as crucial in bringing about successful management in the present day 
system. This is because the phu yai ban has direct responsibility for overseeing the 
project management which is recognised by villagers and officials. Other leaders, 
including the abbot himself, can only be benefactors. He stated: ‘If the phu yai ban is not 
committed to the project, it is unlikely that the project will run smoothly or last very 
long. Moreover, without strong support from the phu yai ban, the efforts of other leaders 
may face many difficulties as conflict may arise among villagers.’ The abbot also sees 
that leaders, either formal or informal, are driving forces behind the participation of
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villagers in development activities. He further stated: ‘Only a handful of villagers have a 
positive perception and are willing to co-operate with the project voluntarily. The 
majority needs a strong push from their leaders. If leaders split, villagers are divided, and 
then there will be no real co-operation on the project.’
In the meantime, all village leaders work together in pursuing the project. In order to 
fulfil all anticipated targets, a large amount of funds is also needed. The present phu yai 
ban and Mr. Suk work together seeking support by dividing the whole idea into a few 
small sub-projects. The first priority is the construction of the ditches which was 
estimated to cost around 3 million baht or about £75,000 at the exchange rate in 1995. 
Support is sought from various sources including the normal development budget 
through the sapha tambon, a special budget from the Department of Forestry, a special 
budget from members of parliament representing the province (ngob pattana changwat 
khong soh-soh), as well as from the private sector. There is a possibility that they may be 
allocated some budget funds through the normal development budget, if  a small sub- 
project is proposed each year, as the annual budget for each tambon is limited. At the 
time of my last visit in August 1995, I was informed that a big oil company was 
interested in funding the road construction from the existing road to the project site, 
though this was not yet confirmed. Funding from other sources was in the process of 
being requested.
Though the project is still in the early stages of its implementation and its full operation 
is still far away, its origin and the motives of local leaders are very interesting. The fact 
that the project is locally initiated forms an important factor behind the motivation of 
local leaders to achieve its success. Moreover, the influence of the abbot on the project is 
another important factor which cannot be underestimated. The active involvement of the 
abbot, who is highly respected by all parties in the village and has a good reputation not 
only for religious activities, but also for secular activities, is crucial in securing co­
operation among leaders and villagers.
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6.4.4 Phu Yai Ban and Implementation of CPR Management Projects
It was mentioned earlier that projects related to CPR management at the local level 
which are officially recognised by the state, can occur in two ways: projects initiated by 
concerned government bodies above tambon and mooban levels and located in a 
particular area; and projects initiated by people within particular localities and approved 
by the state. The official point of view is that implementing projects of both types should 
be in accordance with existing regulations concerned with the particular natural resources 
with which each project is dealing. Special rules may be established locally but they 
should not contradict the existing regulations. Implementation of regulations and rules is 
under the responsibility of field officials who represent relevant central departments at 
the district level, and local official leaders at both tambon and mooban levels. However, 
because the number of field officials from relevant departments at the district level is 
generally limited to only one or two officers, and their duties cover a broad range of 
activities throughout the district, the main responsibility for enforcing regulations related 
to each project is placed primarily on local official leaders, especially the phu yai ban.
The main idea behind the designation of phu yai ban is not only because they are the 
lowest level administrative official whose main duty is to maintain law and order at the 
mooban level, but also because they are regarded as the only officials who reside in the 
mooban they serve. Therefore, they should have the closest relationship with their people 
and know the problems related to CPR management better than other officials. This idea 
is rational in the sense that they are based in their mooban most of the time, and have 
assistants to help them performing their duties. Moreover, each phu yai ban should be 
well informed and has an insight into matters happening within his/her territorial 
boundary. Therefore, he/she should be able to use his/her power and mechanisms 
available to him to enforce relevant regulations effectively.
In reality, full enforcement of rules and regulations related to CPR management is 
generally very difficult even with respect to specific projects which are rather small in 
scale. Apart from problems emerging from the inefficiency of the prosecuting system 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the extent to which local leaders are included in the
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project planning process is also very important for the achievement of project 
management. I would like to relate this to Ostrom’s (1990) view concerning the 
community commitment and the CPR management. Among several assumptions she 
made, three of them can be seen as having a strong connection with the commitment of 
local leaders in pursuing CPR management. First, rules applied to CPR management and 
expected to be followed must clearly define the set of users, or in her term 
‘appropriators.’ Second, the rules are ‘designed, at least in part, by local appropriators.’ 
Third, ‘they (the rules) are monitored by individuals accountable to local appropriators’ 
(Ostrom, 1990, pp. 185-186). These three assumptions will be used as the main basis for 
analysing the two CPR management projects which follows.
The detail discussion in the preceding section revealed that the Fishery Reserve Project 
which is located in Bueng Yai Lake was established to provide a reserve sanctuary in the 
lake for the benefit of fishermen in the whole Bueng Yai community. In administrative 
points of view, the project’s location which is at the south-eastern part of the lake, is 
under the administration of Ban Talard, village number 1 of Khuan Phanang sub-district. 
The establishment of the project was based on the idea that having a large reserve area 
will provide a protected nursery ground for fish, which will then improve fishery 
resources in the lake. Having such a protected area could in theory help to retain fish 
stocks for sustainable use, which is beneficial for fishermen in surrounding communities. 
The idea is not a new one as there have been such practices in the lake before, both 
through traditional and official arrangements. Though the idea is accepted by all parties 
in the community as well as concerned officials, local people and local leaders were not 
taken into account significantly in the decision-making process.
The project was initiated by the pramong amphoe with some consultations with 
community leaders and some villagers, through a meeting specifically organised for this 
purpose. According to key informants who attended the meeting, local participants were 
informed about the official plan to establish the project. Nevertheless, it was the pramong 
amphoe who proposed the present site of the project, instead of asking participants to 
propose. The main reason for proposing this particular site was because it used to be the 
reserve area before and it adjoins the office of the Wildlife Protection Unit which can
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provide some protection for the area. The new proposition also included the extension of 
the area from that previously designated, and there was minimal discussion at the 
meeting regarding the size of the area. Formulation of the project in detail was 
undertaken solely by the pramong amphoe. The project was designed as an ‘aquatic 
plants and animals protection area’ (khate raksa peutpan sat naam), a category of reserve 
area stated in the Fisheries Act (Department of Fisheries, 1987). Once the project was 
approved, local leaders were informed and requested to co-operate in managing the 
reserve area.
The enforcement of rules related to this management is assumed to follow the 
conventional administrative practice, in which each phu yai ban or kamnan is in charge 
of his own territory. Hence, it is the phu yai ban of Ban Talard and the kamnan of Khuan 
Phanang sub-district who are in charge primarily of overseeing it. This assumption 
presents a problem for managing the project as the resources are used by fishermen from 
the whole Bueng Yai community. Ideally, therefore, every village leader in Bueng Yai 
community should take part in the management. Because of this conventional 
arrangement and the lack of interest of the phu yai ban of Ban Talard and the kamnan of 
Khuan Phanang sub-district, the project has not been implemented effectively by local 
leaders in the community. It was left mainly to the pramong amphoe, who rarely comes 
to monitor the project. Some phu yai ban of other villages and the kamnan of Bueng Yai 
community are concerned about the problems facing the management of the project. 
However, in practice they are reluctant to seek ways of improving it. According to Mr. 
Naam, the phu yai ban of Ban Bon Lay, there is an administrative barrier which prevents 
him taking action to enforce the rules in the project area, as it is not within his 
administrative territory. Similar views were expressed by the kamnan of Tambon Bueng 
Yai. It was observed that co-operation between leaders of different villages in the 
community to address the problems, also does not occur, due to the already existing 
tensions among leaders. Considering the role of Mr. Naam, who is known as one of 
active phu yai ban in Bueng Yai community, while Mr. Naam realises the importance of 
the project to his community, he is not fully committed to taking an active action in this 
complex situation. His hesitation is also due to the fact that fishermen from his village 
rarely use the area adjacent to the project site for fishing. Moreover, because the
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organisational arrangement does not force official leaders of different villages to work 
together, it is difficult for individual leaders to play an active role on their own. Finally, 
because the design of the project was highly influenced by the pramong amphoe, and 
rules applied were based on existing regulations, affect the real commitment of these 
leaders to implement the project effectively.
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the management of the project 
according to the conventional administrative arrangement does not fit this type of project. 
Although the project site falls under the administration of one village, the resources are 
shared by members of the larger community. The conventional arrangement creates 
complications for the leader of any single village to deal with users from various other 
villages. Moreover, it also creates problems for leaders from other villages in taking 
action, if  the leader of the village where the project is located is reluctant to do so. 
Therefore, the conventional arrangement of CPR management in this case is 
unconvincing, and a new form of arrangement in which all leaders in the area must share 
the responsibility for managing the project is needed. It is also necessary to reconsider 
rules for controlling resource use to be suitable to local physical and socio-economic 
conditions rather than depending solely on existing regulations. Some existing rules need 
to be changed in order to allow rooms for new organisational arrangements and self- 
regulated institutions. Considering the social organisation and structures of power at the 
village and sub-district level in this study area the new organisational arrangements and 
self-regulated institutions should result from joint decisions among concerned officials, 
and all phu yai ban, kamnan, traditional and interest group leaders in the community.
According to Mr. Naam, it is important to have an arrangement in which clear roles are 
stated and divided fairly among phu yai ban in the community. He also believes there are 
mechanisms which can be developed in the community and applied to overcome the 
problems. But these mechanisms cannot function properly without a clear guidance from 
concerned bodies. Because the community and their leaders are conflicting and divided, 
he believes that what is needed is an official rearrangement to make use these leaders and 
available mechanisms effectively. In doing so, he sees that good intentions of officials 
are needed to stimulate change in the organisational structure of project implementation,
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and in co-ordinating local leaders. This is because under the present arrangement, re­
organisation is unlikely to be initiated by local leaders themselves
The Forest Reserve Project is a newly established project located in Ban Nua Phru which 
has no connection with any project of similar kind previously established in this 
community. It differs in its origin and its structure from the Fishery Reserve Project. It 
was initiated within the village and can be described as an outcome of mutual efforts of 
the abbot of Wat Nua Phru and formal leaders of the village, especially the former phu 
yai ban and the village phu song khunnawut. The present phu yai ban who came to the 
position after the idea was formulated, also follows his predecessor in working closely 
with the abbot and the village phu song khunnawut who is still in the position.
At the time of this study, the project was still in its early stages. Nevertheless, a few 
activities had been conducted to mark the starting of the project, including selection of 
the project site, negotiation with land occupiers to obtain the land for the project, and 
planting some trees in part of the project site. These activities were planned mainly by 
village leaders. Nevertheless, some forms of villagers’ participation in the activities were 
observed, both in forms of labour and general co-operation, including contributing food, 
preparing seedlings, and planting the trees. According to a key informant, the co­
operation of villagers in the project is due to their respect for their leaders, rather than 
their understanding of the importance of the project itself. The mutual influence of both 
traditional and formal leaders has meant problems arising in connection with the project 
have become insignificant. At the beginning of the project, there were a few people who 
occupied some land in the area where the project is located who objected to the project. 
This problem was then resolved by these leaders working together to persuade the 
protesters to sacrifice their personal interests for the benefit of the community as a whole.
The project area is primarily located within the village administrative boundary, and the 
natural resources available in the area are used almost exclusively by villagers from this 
mooban. As the village is geographically demarcated, problems emerging from conflicts 
over CPR use are less complex than those of the Fishery Reserve Project; most of the 
problems can be solved within the village through mutual co-operation of these leaders.
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The initiation of the project was also done through villagers’ contributions. Support from 
outside the village came later, after assistance was sought by the phu yai ban to formalise 
the project. Concerned bodies, especially the Forestry Department, showed their desire to 
formalise the project as a conservation project once the project was established. 
Nevertheless, there was disagreement among local leaders as they opposed undertaking 
the project solely for conservation purposes in the conventional sense. They prefer the 
idea of establishing a community forestry project, in which the resources can be used 
with some restrictions in order to sustain the use. A compromise had been reached in 
1994, with part of the project being allocated for conservation purposes to commemorate 
the 50th anniversary of the King’s reign, and the remainder was yet undecided.
Though final outcomes of the project implementation remain to be evaluated in the 
future, some achievements of the project were clearly indicated by the commitment of 
the phu yai ban and the mutual effort between the phu yai ban and other leaders in 
forwarding the project and solving the emerging problems. The smoothness of the village 
administration, as influenced by its geographical setting and the solidarity of the 
community organisation, is of benefit to the village in eliminating problems occurring 
during its implementation.
Comparing the management of the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru and the 
Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community, considerable differences were 
observed with reference to three of Ostrom’s assumptions brought in earlier in this 
section: (1) the definition of set of appropriators; (3) the involvement of appropriators in 
designing the rules; and (2) the accountability of individuals who monitor the project. 
The Forest Reserve Project involves a much smaller set of users with a more clearly 
defined boundary of the resources than the Fishery Reserve Project (assumption one). 
These two projects differed in the appropriators’ perceptions of their official leaders. The 
projects were also different in the involvement of their official leaders in the project 
design; the participation of official leaders is much clearer in the design of the Forest 
Reserve Project than in the Fishery Reserve Project (assumption two). As it is quite clear 
that the official leaders in Ban Nua Phru are accountable to villagers, members of Bueng
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Yai community are divided in their perceptions of the various official leaders of the 
communities and the leaders themselves are also in conflict (assumption three). Counting 
all these three points together, it is clear that why the Forest Reserve Project was found to 
be better managed than the Fishery Reserve Project. Although these three points cannot 
be separated clearly in the analysis of the achievement of these two projects, my main 
interest here is in the connection between the commitment of official leaders in 
implementing the projects and the extent of their participation in the project designs. I 
shall conclude that the strong commitment of official leaders in Ban Nua Phru in the 
implementation of the Forest Reserve Project is influenced by their active involvement in 
the project design. This is opposite to the case of the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng 
Yai community where the participation of official leaders in the project design was 
unclear and controversial. This finding can be explained in psychological terms; the more 
the leaders are involved in the planning of a project, the more they feel a part of the 
project. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of implementing CPR management projects is also 
related to the conventional organisational structure which limits the power of each phu 
yai ban only to his territorial boundary. This delineation of power does not always fit 
patterns of resource- sharing in rural communities, especially when the communities are 
large and divided into different administrative units, whilst the resources are still shared 
by the whole community. The apparent difference in the concern of local leaders between 
the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community and the Forest Reserve Project in 
Ban Nua Phru was observed to be highly associated with these two factors.
6.5 Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter has dealt with the status and roles of phu yai ban as the 
lowest official in the Thai administration. The discussion covered the historical 
perspective of the phu yai ban post and their recruitment, roles of phu yai ban both with 
respect to general administrative work, and the management of natural resources and the 
environment at the local level.
The phu yai ban position can be traced back to the Ayudhya period before the Bangkok 
period. The position is always given to the head of the smallest unit of the administration
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equivalent to village. Its recruitment has evolved over time. It was based on the selection 
made by officials in different ways until about a century ago when the election system 
was introduced. Nevertheless, the election system was not fully applied until recently. 
The change in the recruitment system from the selection system to the election system 
has had a significant effect on the status and power of phu yai ban. Based on the more 
recent phenomena recalled by elders in the study area, leaders recruited through the 
selection system were drawn among existing natural leaders, while in the election 
system, the opportunity exists for every qualified villager to contend. The result of the 
selection system was seen to assure qualities of those who were selected, while the result 
o f the election system is questionable. Leaders who come to the power through the 
election system may not have remarkable leadership qualities as they may be elected 
because of their effective campaigns rather than on merit or competence. Moreover, the 
election system as applied to the study villages appears to alienate traditional leaders who 
are naturally influential but do not like the formality of power. As a consequence, the 
present village level administration is highly formalised from an official point of view, 
but is not necessarily effective unless both traditional leaders and formal leaders work 
together on the basis of shared interests. A clear division between traditional leaders and 
formal leaders can provoke conflict and distress in village governance. Such a situation 
does not help phu yai ban in playing their roles in fulfilling their commitments to the 
development of their communities.
As the leader of the village, a phu yai ban has a tremendous amount of duties to perform. 
He/she is an agent of the state in charge of any state activities in the village, and at the 
same, he/she is the official representative of people in his/her village in dealing with the 
state. Being in this position, all phu yai ban should follow state orders and serve their 
people. Most of the roles in relation to both the state and the people are labelled as 
administration and development, which cover a very broad range of subjects. The vast 
amount of work covering such a broad range of subjects makes it difficult for phu yai 
ban to fulfil all requirements. In general, they mostly deal with routine activities clearly 
assigned to them, and select some activities perceived to be important for their position 
and for maintaining reasonable relationships with both officials who represent the state, 
and villagers. Their roles in dealing with specific issues, such as natural resource
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management, are only minor. In the past they only dealt with specific issues as a state 
agent to implement regulatory policies related to the issues. On this basis, their 
involvement was more of an administrative type in dealing with specific state regulations 
applied to situations in their villages. Recently, their role with respect to natural resource 
and environmental management has changed. The recent introduction of structural 
reform with respect to natural resource management makes their responsibilities greater 
than before. Their present role extends to also cover the participation in the planning 
process related to natural resource management.
By looking at both general responsibilities and commitments with respect to the new 
concept of natural resource management, empirical evidence gathered through this study 
shows some interesting findings. Under the old system which still remain in the area, 
most regulations related to the management of natural resources were ineffectively 
enforced. One of the main reasons behind this problem is the emerging conflict between 
some regulations which are centrally designed, and traditional practices and perceptions 
of local people. Though phu yai ban and other local leaders are supposed to enforce 
these regulations strictly, the prevalence of practices that contravene the regulations, 
together with the negligence of concerned officials and the emergence of biased practices 
in the system, discourages the active involvement of phu yai ban. As a result, many 
regulations that contradict the common practices of local people are largely disregarded.
The change toward the new system has not yet shown a remarkable improvement in the 
commitments phu yai ban have, both with respect to planning and implementing of 
projects related to natural resource management. In planning, their unclear role in the 
planning process and the complexity of the issues related to natural resource management 
hamper their appetite, despite the apparent importance of the issues. Moreover, their 
familiarity with the conventional development concept prevents them from fuller 
adoption of the new concepts. Since the priority is given to the district and provincial 
bodies to operate plans related to natural resource management, the involvement of 
sapha tambon and phu yai ban is at their discretion. If a village and sapha tambon 
initiate projects as a component of its rural development plan, they tend to face budget
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limitations, unless the projects are small in size. A special budget allocation is generally 
applied only to projects operated by the district and provincial bodies.
There are several obstacles in attempting to include local leaders in the planning process, 
though the new concepts of national development planning provide a better opportunity 
for them to be more involved in the policy process related to natural resource 
management than in the past. To what extent this chance is used depends not only on the 
state intention to promote the participation of local leaders alone, but also on the strength 
and conformity of each community organisation itself. The case of Ban Nua Phru 
provides a good example of the achievement of a harmonious village organisation in 
initiating a community-based project with minimal help from the outside, whereas the 
case of Bueng Yai community provides a contrasting picture. The difference between 
these two communities also appears in the implementation of their projects, in which the 
commitments of their leaders, including phu yai ban, contribute significantly to their 
achievement. The strong commitment of official leaders in Ban Nua Phru is not only a 
matter of accident and personal characteristics of leaders, but also determined by the 
extent to which they are involved in the planning process of the project.
Finally, the strong commitment of local official leaders and the harmonious relationship 
between official and traditional leaders are important elements behind the success of 
planning and implementing CPR management at the local level. This implies that co­
operation between these two groups of leaders should be encouraged, together with the 
effort to integrate formal and traditional institutions, in the management of local CPRs.
CHAPTER SEVEN
COMMUNITY ORGANISATION, 
PHU YAI BAN, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES
7.1 Introduction
In Thailand, as in most other developing countries, economic growth receives the 
highest priority in the country’s development, and natural resources are viewed as a 
possession to be used as a means of enhancing economic growth. In fact, natural 
resources are not only important for promoting the overall economic growth of the 
country, but also for the livelihoods of rural inhabitants who are the majority of the 
country’s population. Because of this, overexploitation of natural resources will 
certainly affect the well-being of the rural population.
The recent rapid economic growth of Thailand has been termed ‘uneven development’ 
(Pamwell, 1996) and has occurred at the expense of many natural resources. Some 
natural resources face problems of over-utilisation as a result of efforts to increase 
production, and others have been affected by the negative impacts that have been 
generated through the processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Though 
problems related to natural resource and environmental degradation have been 
recognised, as demonstrated by recent structural reforms to deal with these problems, 
some questions regarding the real application of these reforms still remain. There is 
still a question of the extent to which these reforms recognise natural resources which 
are important for local inhabitants but may not contribute significantly to the 
country’s economy as a whole. The state only seems to address the conservation of
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major natural resources which contribute significantly to the country’s economy, such 
as forest, coastal and marine fishery resources. Other natural resources which are less 
important for the national economy but significant for local inhabitants, such as 
freshwater fishery resources, appear to be neglected. Moreover, structural reforms 
which were intended to encourage the participation of local people in the development 
process do not seem to show a strong connection with the promotion of natural 
resource management at the local level, especially with respect to common property 
resources (CPRs).
The direction of the country’s development policies as outlined above, coupled with 
obstacles emerging as part-of the-frequently cited ‘bureaucratic culture’ in putting 
policies into practice has led to issues of natural resource management at the local 
level having been overlooked and poorly understood. By undertaking a detailed 
exploration of freshwater fishery resource management and its obstacles at the village 
level, this study has explored some aspects of the relationship between policy and 
practice as related to CPR management at the local level in contemporary Thailand. It 
seeks to provide an insight into change of development policies during the 
implementation stage, especially at the lowest level of the policy process. It also seeks 
a better understanding of the contribution of local organisations and local power, and 
how these affect the success or failure of applying popular participation concepts in 
natural resource management.
In this concluding chapter, I would like to start by briefly reminding the readers of the 
theoretical debates related to the subject under study as reviewed in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three. This will be followed by a discussion of the findings of this study in 
connection with the conceptual framework proposed. Finally, it will look at the 
prospects of sustainable CPR management in rural Thailand.
7.2 Theoretical Debates
The exploration of natural resource management at the village level was undertaken 
on the assumption that the success or failure of development policies cannot be
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understood by analysing the quality of policies alone. Instead, both the organisational 
and societal contexts in which policies are implemented must also be taken into 
account. Based on this fundamental assumption, a conceptual framework for 
analysing development policy was proposed. The framework which was presented in 
Chapter Two was adapted from the framework developed by Merilee Grindle to 
explain the relationship between policy, implementation, and outcome, based on 
evidence from various developing countries (Grindle, 1980c). This framework 
stressed the importance of policy implementation in directing policy outcomes. 
Following Grindle’s argument, the study does not deny the importance of policy 
qualities and the roles of bureaucracy in implementing development policies to fulfil 
their pre-set objectives, but it treats bureaucracy as located in the wider environment 
which can significantly influence its performance. At various levels of policy 
implementation, the bureaucrats or official actors who are in charge of it, are not 
viewed as the only actors, but they are surrounded by other actors who are involved in 
the implementation process for different reasons. In dealing with the organisational 
context which controls the original direction of each policy, official actors are bound 
to follow directives from above in their interactions with non-official actors whose 
ultimate aim is to pursue their interest.
The framework which was presented here also adopted the idea proposed by Hjem 
and his colleagues (see Hjem and Porter, 1993), which suggests that analysis of the 
policy implementation at the programme level should take place in the form of an 
exploration of implementation structures. In the implementation structures, all actors 
are more likely to proceed according to their individual interests, rather than being 
bound firmly by the framework of the organisations they represent. This study 
assumes that policy implementation at the project level in Thailand should be 
understood as taking place in a similar manner, but official actors are less independent 
than non-official actors in pursuing their interests. The official implementors are 
expected to implement the policy according to how it was designed by the central 
body, but at the same time they have to interact with local actors and more specific 
local environments. Local actors can include local official leaders, local interest 
groups, local opinion leaders, and resource users in general. For rural development
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policies, interactions between official actors and non-official actors should be more 
apparent at the local level than at higher levels. This is because access to participation 
of non-official actors at the local level should be far better than at higher levels. Also, 
local actors are assumed to react in a way which they believe that can prevent their 
loss, when they experience the direct impact of policies at this level. Hence, the 
context of policy implementation at this level is likely to be more significant than at 
higher levels in affecting the outcomes of development policies.
The study applies the above mentioned framework in analysing the implementation of 
policies related to CPR management at the local level. Based on problems facing CPR 
management as discussed in' Chapters Ofie^and Two, and as observed in the study 
area, the incompatibility of centrally designed policies with social and economic 
patterns of local communities is clearly a major problem for the effective 
implementation of state policies. Although these policies may aim to control the level 
of exploitation of CPRs for sustainable use, they tend to overlook patterns of 
relationships between local communities and CPRs. As stated by Ostrom (1990) and 
Berkes and Favar (1989), one of the most important characteristics of CPRs is their 
accessibility; to be a CPR, a resource must be shared among members of the users’ 
community. In relation to this basic characteristic, it is common for CPRs to rely on 
traditional systems of management for their survival, prior to introduction of modem 
systems of management by the state.
It is argued in this study that the ability of the state intervention to control CPRs 
directly via state policies depends largely on wheter or not the state realizes the 
importance of the existing traditional system in each locality, and the attempt by the 
state to integrate it into the policy framework. However, since it is unlikely that 
central policies can be designed by taking various problems existing in different 
localities into account, they are likely to face several obstacles during their 
implementation. To overcome these obstacles, many students of CPRs regimes such 
as Robert Pomeroy, Elinor Ostrom, David Doulman, and Fikret Berkes, have reached 
a consensus that opportunities should be given to local people and local organisations 
to participate in project planning (see Pomeroy, 1991; Ostrom, 1990 and 1992;
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Doulman, 1993; Berkes, 1989). The first step for the government is to recognise the 
importance of people’s participation in the planning process. This means that the door 
should be opened in the planning structure for local people to participate in the 
planning process. In order to have a better understanding of problems associated with 
the application of a participatory approach to the implementation of policies related to 
CPR management, this study takes the view that the investigation of CPR 
management projects at the local level is prerequisite.
In Thailand, the present structure of planning organisation formally recognises the 
importance of local participation in rural development planning. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, local people can participate'b^rproposing their ideas and needs through 
the village committee 0  led by the phu yai ban. Every year, the of each village 
formulates the needs and ideas proposed by villagers into the village development 
plan and submits this to the sapha tambon o f the sub-district in which the village is 
located. The sapha tambon of each sub-district then decides which projects should be 
undertaken each year, based on the fixed annual budget allocated by the central 
government. Based on this decision, the sapha tambon formulates the tambon 
development plan which is passed on to the district development committee (DDC). 
The DDC then includes and formalises several tambon plans into the annual district 
development plan submitted to the provincial development committee (PDC). From 
PDC, the plans are submitted to the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) 
for final approval. Although the final approval is made by NRDC, decisions made by 
each sapha tambon form the main basis for development activities undertaken at the 
tambon and mooban levels. This structure of planning applies also to natural resource 
development at the local level. Considering this structure alone, local participation 
appears to have its place in development planning. This leads many theorists to 
assume further that development planning should respond very well to the problems 
and needs of the majority of local people in each mooban, since the planning process 
starts at the mooban level. This assumption sounds theoretically reasonable. In 
practice, however, this assumption can only be partly correct, because there are 
several factors which may restrain effective popular participation, which is an 
essential means of identifying real problems and the needs of local people. Among the
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most important obstacles to full participation are the hierarchical and patron-client 
values that are so characteristic of Thai culture.
Hierarchical and patron-client values are believed to have originated from the ancient 
feudal system prevalent in Thai administration before the fall of the absolute 
monarchy system. These values are deeply rooted in Thai society and widely 
influence patterns of relationships between individuals. They affect not only the 
relationship between superiors and subordinates in the Thai bureaucracy, but also 
between officials and ordinary people, as well as among ordinary people themselves. 
The prevalence of these values is argued as hindering the promotion of people’s 
participation as ordinary peoplerure Kkelytcrbe submissive in interacting with their 
leaders and officials who are viewed as being superior to them (Samudavanija, 1987; 
Brahmanee, 1989). These values are unlikely to change in the short run, and hence 
effective participation is unlikely to occur among local people in the real sense, as 
they tend to perceive themselves as being powerless.
Despite the dominance of the above views, there is much evidence of active grassroots 
movements which indicates the potential of local communities to work together in 
attempting to protect their rights and to develop self-help organisations. Even though 
some of these movements receive support from outside, especially NGOs, it is 
observed that local traditional leaders also play an important role in the movements, 
and their attributes are important to the achievements of the movements. In these 
cases, patron-client relations between local traditional leaders and ordinary people at 
the local level can encourage active participation of local people, because local 
traditional leaders leads or at least support the movements. Clearly the role of local 
leaders is more profound than the role of ordinary people or followers in initiating 
grassroots movements in Thailand. Although the existence of this type of organisation 
may be seen to be contrary to the hierarchical and patron-client values mentioned 
above, the importance of local leaders in driving grassroots movements is logical, 
since ordinary people are likely to be submissive to their leaders.
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The emphasis of this study on the investigation of the role of phu yai ban or village 
official leaders in the management of CPRs is generated from several assumptions 
discussed above, which can be summarised as follows. From a policy point of view, 
policy outcomes are determined largely by the contexts of policy implementation. 
Based on the view given by Grindle and Thomas (1989), two different contexts can be 
seen in the analysis of policy implementation -- the organisational and the societal 
contexts. The organisational context refers to the organisational structure of the state’s 
implementing bodies, whereas the societal context refers to the wider social 
environment surrounding the implementation of each policy. Grindle and Thomas 
(1989) view the societal context as more crucial than the organisational context in 
influencing policy implementation in developing countries; its effect can shift policy 
outcomes away from those originally anticipated. Following this view, this study 
hypothesises that the performance of official actors at the local level, particularly the 
phu yai ban who is the lowest official actor in the hierarchy of Thai administration, is 
influenced significantly by the social environment surrounding him/her in 
implementing development policies passed to them. With respect to policy related to 
CPR management, the special characteristics of CPRs earlier discussed mean that the 
implementation of policies related to CPR management must recognise the nature of 
each CPR and its users. Because the relationships between different CPRs and their 
users are likely to vary locally, it is assumed that effective implementation of CPR 
management policies requires active involvement of local people and local leaders, 
not only in undertaking implementation activities as directed by the state, but also in 
the planning process of operational policies. Bearing in mind the hierarchical 
characteristics and patron-client tradition prevailing in the Thai bureaucratic system 
and Thai society as discussed in Chapter Three, the involvement of ordinary local 
people is unlikely to be great, as the structures of the Thai bureaucracy and society do 
not provide an environment supportive of public participation. However, recent 
reforms in the Thai administrative structure taking place during the Fifth Plan which 
aim to enhance local participation provide a better chance for and is more meaningful 
to local leaders, particularly phu yai ban, to take part in the process of development 
planning.
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Based on the above assumptions, the discussion which follows will focus on the 
findings from this study with respect to the effects of the organisational and societal 
contexts of policy implementation at the local level, especially their influences on the 
performance of phu yai ban in handling problems related to CPR management at the 
village level.
7.3 The Organisational Context of Local CPR Management
From the policy point of view, the management of any natural resources should be 
targeted by means of issuing regulations or setting programmes to control the level of 
exploitation and maintain the quality of each type of resource. According to the 
conceptual model proposed in Chapter Two, the design and formulation of 
‘implementing programmes’ and ‘problem solving regulations’ are generally done by 
national or regional bureaucratic chiefs of the administrative hierarchy. These 
programmes and regulations can be called ‘operational policies.’ In the conventional 
policy process, once these tasks are undertaken, they will be passed downwards to 
implementing bodies at various levels for actual implementation and enforcement. 
The implementing bodies at various levels are bound to follow directions from above 
in order to implement these operational policies according their pre-set objectives. In 
the process of implementation, two-way communication should occur so that 
responses can be made by these implementing bodies to the national or regional 
bodies if adjustments are needed. In supposedly more bottom-up approach currently 
being applied to the Thai planning process, the design and formulation of operational 
policies should be based on proposals made by various levels of planning bodies. 
Once the operational policies are designed and formulated, they are passed to 
implementing bodies at various levels for implementation.
However, it was observed that the present development programmes and problem 
solving regulations in Thailand are not solely designed according to proposals made 
by local level planning bodies. Many programmes and regulations form part of nation­
wide operational policies which are centrally designed to serve the overall 
development emphasis and problem solving throughout the country. Moreover, any
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projects proposed by local organisations should correspond to these nation-wide 
interests and are bound to follow existing regulations related to subject matters with 
which the projects deal. On this basis, it can be said that local organisations are not 
completely independent from the higher level planning bodies in developing as well 
as implementing their own plans. With respect to policies related to natural resource 
management, there is one important point which I would like to raise in this section in 
relation to the organisational arrangement of planning and implementation with 
particular reference to CPR management at the local level as observed in this study. 
This point concerns the actual status of local organisations, particularly the village 
committee (VC) and sapha tambon, in planning and implementation related to CPR 
management.
According to the current structure of planning organisations discussed in Chapter 
Three, both the village committee and sapha tambon function as local planning as 
well as implementing bodies in the development policy process. This means that they 
are responsible for both developing their development plans and implementing them 
in their administrative territories. At the same time, they are bound to follow 
commands from above and support programmes or projects undertaken by concerned 
state bodies in the areas they govern.
In developing their own plans, these local bodies must not develop projects which 
contain details that contradict the existing regulations related to the subject matter 
they deal with. Considering projects related to CPR management, there exist nation­
wide regulations related to natural resources (in the case of the two villages under 
study are forest resources and fishery resources) which contain some details which do 
not correspond to conditions of the resource use and socio-economic patterns of local 
users. As a result, difficulties emerge in preparing projects which are appropriate for 
local users and meet the requirements of existing regulations at the same time. Most 
of these regulations are concerned with the clear prohibition or restriction of activities 
in relation to the natural resources in question. As these regulations cannot be changed 
by local people, development of any projects which correspond with these regulations 
means that there is no room for local organisations to set their own rules
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independently, to meet with their perceived problems and needs related to the 
management of the natural resources they use, even if the existing regulations are 
inappropriate to the local conditions of resource use. Locally developed plans can 
only add further regulations on top of official regulations that already exist. This can 
be more burdensome to local resource users if the pressure over the resource use is 
already high. Consequently, it is difficult for local organisations to develop their plans 
or projects to reduce the problems facing the resources they use which do not 
adversely impact on their benefits from the resources. Even if new plans or projects 
are developed as in the case of the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community, 
no full implementation of the rules set takes place. In the case of the Forest Reserve 
Project in Ban Nua Phru where the village rummittee would prefer the project to be 
based on self-generated regulations, the project was not yet formalised at the time of 
this study, but the committee had already begun to worry that formalising the project 
would affect their intention to allow the resources to be used in accordance with the 
self-generated regulations.
The status of the sapha tambon and village committee in implementing policies, 
especially with respect to projects initiated by the state and nation-wide regulations 
related to natural resources management applied at the local level, is as an arm of the 
state. They are bound to enforce these regulations and oversee projects as directed by 
higher level implementing bodies. This means that in principle they are not allowed to 
adjust the direction of the projects or to modify the existing regulations according to 
their perceptions of local conditions. As existing regulations were observed to be 
mainly designed for nation-wide application, as illustrated in the case of the fishery 
regulations discussed briefly in Chapter Six (see also Appendix Two), and the state- 
led projects are generally developed based on existing regulations, these local 
organisations have some difficulties in enforcing regulations and managing projects 
effectively when facing regulations which do not correspond to local conditions of 
natural resource use and socio-economic patterns of local users.
It can be concluded that although the sapha tambon and village committee are 
recognised under the current structure of development planning as legitimate bodies to
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participate in the planning and implementation of policies related to natural resource 
management, their authority is limited and their role is still constrained by higher 
level government bodies and existing regulations. This condition does not permit 
these local organisations to have their full rights to seek their own means to tackle 
problems facing natural resources in their own territories.
7.4 The Societal Context of Policy Implementation at the Local 
Level and the Concept of the Implementation Structure
According to Grindle and Thomas (1989) and other students of policy analysis who 
are protagonists of society-centred concepts, the societal context is crucial to policy­
making and policy implementation, as it greatly determines the direction and outcome 
of policies. By the societal context, they mean interactions of different actors both 
inside and outside official bodies, and the political, social and economic environments 
within which policy-making and policy implementation take place. The societal 
context can be local, national, or even international in its coverage. However, as far as 
this study is concerned, the emphasis is given mainly to the local societal context of 
policy implementation, with particular reference to policies related to the management 
of local natural resources. Among the different components of the societal context, my 
interest centres on the interaction of different actors at the local level (as illustrated in 
the conceptual model presented in Chapter Two), and their influences on the 
achievement of policy implementation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to consider the 
actors’ interactions alone without considering the influence of the political, social and 
economic environments in which the actors are situated. Bearing in mind the 
dominance of patron-client tradition, the prevalence of corruption among officials and 
the hierarchical nature of Thai society, the context in which actors interact with each 
other should be analysed more carefully, with a mindful consideration of their 
influence.
In the discussion that follows I would like to synthesise patterns of actors’ interactions 
in implementing natural resource policies in the villages under study by treating local 
political, social and economic environments as situational factors which influence the
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interactions. Furthermore, I wish to relate and compare patterns of actors’ 
interactions observed in the communities under study to the concept of the 
implementation structures suggested by Hjem and Porter (1993), by taking the 
difference in societal contexts into consideration.
7.4.1 Local Actors and their Interactions
In Thailand, at the local level starting from the district downwards, there are field 
officials representing various government departments, and who oversee the 
implementation of development policies related to their departments. These officials 
were referred to as ‘official actorsMrr the framework proposed in Chapter Two. With 
respect to policies related to forest resources and fishery resources which are 
emphasised in this study, the District Forestry Officer (paamai amphoe) and the 
District Fishery Officer (pramong amphoe) are the field officers who are principally 
responsible for managing these two types of natural resources. At the tambon and 
mooban level, most responsibilities go to kamnan and phu yai ban who head these 
two administrative units. Although in principle, only these field officials and official 
leaders have authority to implement forestry and fishery policies at these levels, their 
performance depends greatly on patterns of relationships and interactions among 
themselves and between them and ‘non-official actors’, under the circumstances they 
face.
This study shows that, the achievement of implementation of policy related to CPR 
management at the local level, the pattern of relationship between local official 
leaders and non-official actors within each community is more important than the 
relationship between local official leaders and field officials. Harmonious 
relationships lead to constructive interactions among them, and form a positive drive 
to the achievement of effective CPR management, as illustrated in the case of Ban 
Nua Phru. On the other hand, conflicting relationships create tensions between them, 
which retard the progress of policy implementation, as illustrated in the case of Bueng 
Yai community. Additionally, different patterns of relationships among these actors 
affect patterns of communication among themselves and conformity among members
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of the communities as a whole, as these actors are generally influential members of 
each community. The better communication and conformity to social rules found 
among members of communities with harmonious relationships contribute to the 
strength of the communities, which is seen as an important factor to successful local 
CPR management (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).
Considering the difference in patterns of interactions among field officials, local 
leaders and local non-official actors, it is the economic pressure over the resources 
they use, their interests in the resources and their perceptions of management 
strategies, that matter most in their interactions. Conflicting interests and outlooks 
among these actors result in -negative-interactions among them. Although field 
officials and local official leaders are bound with the organisational structure of policy 
implementation, the influence of the organisational structure on their performance is 
minimal.
Compared to the situation under ‘the implementation structure’ described by Hjem 
and Porter (1993), the finding from this study shows that patterns of interaction 
among different actors at the local level are not the same as those in Western societies 
described by Hjem and Porter, although there is a similarity in the sense that different 
actors do interact with each other, based on the circumstances they face with minimal 
influence of the organisational structure. Traditional values of status difference (i.e. 
hierarchical and patron-client values) remain important in local Thai communities, 
and are still influential in the relationship between actors. The influence of these 
values makes some forms of interaction occur in a lesser degree than others, 
especially among actors of different status. The actors of lower official status perceive 
themselves as being subordinate to those of higher status and vice versa. The 
subordinates avoid negotiation and confrontation with their superiors, and tend to 
adopt a compromising and reticent position in their interaction during the 
implementation process. As a result, the local leaders dominate ordinary villagers, and 
field officials dominate local leaders. It can be said that full participation of 
subordinate actors does not take place in decision-making process, which is part of the 
implementation process, due to the influence of hierarchical and patron-client values.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the content of interaction among local actors in the 
policy process in Thailand, is profoundly shaped by hierarchical and patron-client 
values. This creates a situation in which unequal participation is almost inevitable. 
This situation produces outcomes which do not fully satisfy subordinate actors. In the 
face of unsatisfactory outcomes, especially when the outcomes appear in the form of 
rules to be followed, avoidance or ‘exit’ is preferred by subordinate actors as a 
common alternative to action. This type of response also happens in dealing with 
regulations and commands from the central government. It is evident from this study 
that, although official actors and official leaders are bound to follow official rules and 
regulations in their interactions with other actorsrit is common for them to avoid rules 
and use their own judgement in dealing with the conditions, especially when adverse 
conditions press upon them. This is why effective enforcement of some regulations, 
which are inappropriate to the socio-economic patterns of local users or commonly 
unacceptable to members of communities, does not occur. The behaviour of official 
implementors in this sense is comparable to that of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
characterised by Lipsky (1980).
7.4.2 Situational Factors and their Influences on Actors’ Interactions
The difference in the patterns of relationships between local official leaders and non- 
official actors is influenced by several situational factors, including the historical 
setting, and the socio-economic, cultural and political conditions of the communities. 
Based on the discussion on the background of the villages under study in Chapter 
Four, the effect of these situational factors can be summarised as follows.
a) Historical Factors
The difference in historical backgrounds between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay 
determines the solidarity of these communities. The strong tradition of solidarity in 
Ban Nua Phru has a strong connection with the history of settlement of the village. 
Official leaders and non-official leaders interact with each other harmoniously not
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only because they respect each other’s personal behaviour, but also because they are 
bound together by the history of the settlement and the struggle to build up the 
community. By remembering how hard their immediate ancestors worked together to 
build up the community, their interactions are more for the benefit of the community 
rather than to compete with each other based on their own personal interests. Even 
when conflicting ideas emerge among them, agreements can be met easily when the 
common good of the community is put at the centre of their interactions. Similar 
solutions cannot be made easily in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community where 
there is no common historical connection. When conflicts or disagreements emerge 
among actors, confrontation and bargaining take place based on personal interests 
rather than for the common good~ufthe“comnranxties. When compromise cannot be 
met, harmonious relationships do not occur.
b) Socio-economic Conditions
The difference in socio-economic conditions between communities as observed in the 
case of Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay as well Bueng Yai Community is illustrated by 
the degree of homogeneity among households in terms of socio-economic status, 
access to natural resources important for their livelihoods, and the extent of changes 
towards the market economy. All these factors differ considerably between Ban Nua 
Phru and Ban Bon Lay as well as Bueng Yai community. Households in Ban Nua 
Phru are more homogeneous in their socio-economic status (as measured by 
occupational and wealth score differences) and their access to natural resources 
(including land, fishery resources and krajoot), but slightly less affected by the market 
economy, than in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. As Ostrom (1990) and 
Taylor and Singleton (1993) observe, homogenous communities are more efficient 
than heterogeneous communities in managing their common property resources, as 
conflicts over the use of the resources tend to be minimal among members. Moreover, 
it is commonly agreed among CPR management students that the abundance of 
natural resources reduces competition over the resource. At the same time, the higher 
the communities orientation towards the market economy, the higher their 
dependency on cash and the more intensive their production patterns are, which
274
increase their level of exploitation of natural resources used in their production (see 
Parry and Bloch, 1989, especially paper by David Lan). When competition and 
exploitation over the use of CPRs is high, tensions and conflicts are high and 
compromise becomes difficult.
c) Cultural Conditions
Cultural factors influence patterns of interactions of different actors and local people. 
Traditional values of respect for traditional leaders and master-follower relations 
determine the way different actors interact each other. Observations from both 
villages show that the involvement-of traditional institutions in development 
activities, especially religious institutions, is beneficial in enhancing harmonious 
relationships among and between actors and ordinary people. In Ban Nua Phru where 
the religious leaders and the temple are highly integrated with its formal 
administrative organisation, resolution of conflicts related to development 
administration and CPR management can be done more easily than in Ban Bon Lay 
and Bueng Yai community where religious institutions are detached from 
development administration and ‘worldly affairs.’ The prevalence of master-follower 
values means that real participation of ordinary people in development planning 
cannot occur easily or automatically once the chance is opened, as formal and direct 
interactions between leaders and ordinary villagers are not common in rural 
communities. Therefore, participation is more meaningful to leaders than to ordinary 
villagers.
d) Political Conditions
Political conditions at the tambon and mooban levels as observed in the communities 
under study are not only related to power structures within the communities alone, but 
also the state administrative system at these levels. These two factors determine the 
organisational arrangements of the administration of different communities which 
affects their effectiveness in implementing natural resource policies.
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The existence of the traditional system standing side by side with the formal system 
makes the interactions between the power of traditional leaders and the power of 
official leaders unavoidable. Different forms of interactions between traditional 
leaders and official leaders create different power relations between them. 
Harmonious relationships between traditional and official leaders strengthen 
community organisations in solving conflicts over the use of CPRs shared by 
members as power from these two sources is pooled. In contrast, when traditional and 
official leaders are in conflict or when community organisations are clearly dominated 
by the formal administrative system, the importance of traditional leaders is ignored. 
These two different forms of power relations are illustrated by the case of Ban Nua 
Phru and Ban Bon Lay. A highdegree of Traditional-modern integration in the 
organisational arrangement of the village administration in Ban Nua Phru increases 
the village’s ability to control natural resource exploitation and to initiate its own 
project to improve CPR conditions. On the other hand, the organisational arrangement 
in Ban Bon Lay, which is clearly dominated by the formal system of administration, 
does not show enough strength to enforce regulations as well as to develop new ideas 
to reduce problems facing CPR exploitation within the community. Similar situations 
happen in Bueng Yai community.
With respect to the state administrative system applied to the tambon and mooban 
levels, the main problem concerns the administrative territory of each unit of 
administration and the management of CPRs. One of the most important 
characteristics of the present administrative system applied in Thailand is that every 
unit of administration has a clear political boundary which limits its power. Though 
several criteria are used as bases for drawing the boundary at each level, including 
geographical characteristics, historical characteristics, together with population, there 
seems to be no clear-cut rule about the priority of each of these criteria. At tambon 
and mooban levels, population size appears to be the most important criterion in 
dividing the units of administration. This is arranged to make general administration 
in each unit easy as the size of population does not vary greatly between villages, but 
it creates complications for more specific aspects of administration if no adjustments 




! be problematic for the application of conventional administrative boundaries, as the
administrative boundary of one mooban or tambon can be inconsistent with the 
territory of CPR utilisation. The case of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay illustrates 
two different examples of CPR management where different types of arrangement 
take place, and different achievements are observed, due to variations in the 
relationships between political boundaries and CPR territories.
The physical characteristics of their settlement described in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five, make Ban Nua Phru a demarcated village. This is in contrast to Ban Bon Lay 
which forms a small part of the larger community of Bueng Yai. Moreover Bueng Yai 
community is divided between two tambon; Tambon Bueng Yai and Tambon Khuan 
Phanang. The clear physical separation of Ban Nua Phru settlement from its 
neighbouring villages makes the community more autonomous in managing its CPRs 
which are divided quite clearly from their neighbouring villages. Though the division 
of CPRs may not strictly follow the political boundary of each village, all villages 
know their own and their neighbours’ resource territories. Together with social forces 
which can be sanctioned more easily within a community, problems related to 
unacceptable practices and overexploitation of CPRs appear to be minimal. Even 
when problems do occur, decisions about how to handle them can be made 
independently by the governing body of the community. On the contrary, the 
separation of Ban Bon Lay from other mooban within Bueng Yai community does not 
mean that territorial division of CPRs occurs in the same manner. CPRs, especially 
fishing grounds, are still shared among fishermen from different mooban in Bueng 
Yai community. Although traditional territories appear to exist, they are not based on 
the present village division, and are not as clear as the territorial division between Ban 
Nua Phru and its neighbouring mooban. Problems concerned with fishery resource 
management cannot be handled independently within each village community. Yet, 
the present management relies on the village-by-village approach: the approach 
which applies for general administration purposes. Coupled with problems of 
conflicting interests and high competition over resources, effective CPR management 
cannot be achieved under the conventional village-by-village management approach. 
The problem appears to be recognised by some concerned officials, since co-operation
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iI
[ from every leader was called for in overseeing the Fishery Reserve Project recently
[
I established in Bueng Yai lake. However, the call was observed to be fruitless in the
absence of a clear strategy to reorganise leaders from various communities, whose 
interests are also in conflict.
As far as the modem administrative arrangement is concerned, CPR management at 
the local level cannot be based only on the conventional administrative arrangement 
which delineates all administration activities within the boundary of each 
administration unit, either tambon or mooban. Rather, it should consider the 
appropriate territorial arrangement of each CPR to be managed. Because the territorial 
arrangements of CPRs vary depending on the nature of CPRs and types of settlements 
of users’ communities, reconsideration of special organisational arrangements to meet 
local variations is essential for effective CPR management.
7.5 Phu Yai Ban and Local CPR Management
In the previous section, I referred to local official leaders (i.e. kamnan and phu yai 
ban) as the most important official implementors in overseeing policy implementation 
at the tambon and mooban levels. However, I emphasised the importance of the policy 
implementation context, rather than the role and performance of phu yai ban who is 
placed at the centre of all actors. The discussion in this section will be more specific 
to the role of phu yai ban in handling problems related to CPR management, their 
performance and the conditions they face, as observed in the study villages.
The discussion in Chapter Six reveals that, from an official point of view, each phu 
yai ban represents the central government in dealing with any administrative matters 
in the village he leads. At the same time, he is entitled to represent people in his 
village in communicating with higher level officials and the government. All together, 
there are many responsibilities given to phu yai ban by the state, most of which are 
related to routine administrative work. However, recent structural reforms designed to 
promote a more decentralised approach to development administration have included 
phu yai ban and other local leaders in the planning process with respect to rural
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development. Natural resource management planning is also considered as a part of 
rural development planning. In the planning process, the phu yai ban is entitled to 
accumulate problems at the mooban level and formulate them in the village plan to be 
considered by the sapha tambon where he/she sits as an elected member. Moreover, 
he/she is also responsible for overseeing and assisting concerned officials in 
implementing policies at the village level. In principle, the position where the phu yai 
ban stands is critical to designing and implementing plans at the local level, as 
compared to higher level officials. Nevertheless, translating principle into practice 
appears to meet with several obstacles. These include those that emerge from the 
organisational structure itself, the persistence of culture which hampers active 
involvement of phu yai ban, and personal limitation of phu yai ban themselves.
Further analysis shows that in the planning process the role of the village committee 
led by phu yai ban does not appear to be clear, particularly with respect to natural 
resource management. The emphasis is on the sapha tambon as the lowest local 
organisation eligible for preparing its own plan, and advising the district committee in 
preparing the district plan. It is in the first aspect of planning where the sapha tambon 
should play an active role, while in the second aspect the opportunity for the sapha 
tambon to take part in the planning is insubstantial, since it depends solely on the 
decision of the district committee to consult the sapha tambon in the process. 
Considering the first aspect alone, it appears from this study that natural resource 
management issues receive a low priority in tambon and mooban development 
planning. The fact that rural development planning has for a long time emphasised 
infrastructural development, has meant that the importance attached to natural 
resource development has been minimal. The state itself does not provide any special 
mechanism to alert local leaders to consider natural resource development as having a 
high priority in rural development planning. Therefore, it can be said that the 
inclusion of local organisations, especially the sapha tambon and village committee, 
does not sufficiently promote the participation of local leaders under the present 
organisational structure. This is because planning related to natural resource 
management at mooban and tambon levels is not distinguished from more general 
rural development planning. Without strong encouragement from the state to prioritise
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natural resource management issues in rural development planning at the local level, it 
is difficult for phu yai ban as well as other local leaders to realise the significance of 
the issues which are new to the rural development agenda, as being more important 
than infrastructural issues which have long dominated the rural development agenda.
Cultural values, especially master-follower values, still remain strong in Thai society. 
They influence patterns of relationships between different levels of officials and 
between official leaders and ordinary villagers. In the relationship between phu yai 
ban and higher level officials in the planning process, the domination of these values 
means that phu yai ban hold subordinate status in their interactions with higher level 
officials. The superiority in the hierarchy of administration and educational 
qualifications of field officials enable them to dominate local official leaders easily. 
The effect of the master-follower values on the relationship between phu yai ban and 
ordinary villagers also occurs in a similar manner. Actual participation of ordinary 
villagers in the planning process is limited by their perceptions of being subservient in 
their interactions with their leaders, and the idea that development planning is the 
domain of their leaders. However, this does not always mean that ordinary villagers 
have no influence on the performance of phu yai ban in any manner, but their 
influence is rather indirect. Comparing the influence of field officials to that of 
ordinary villagers, the officials’ influence appears to be greater. This can be seen from 
the way the problem formation is undertaken at the village level in which phu yai ban 
plays a dominant role in interpreting problems received from villagers through their 
observations and based on their perceptions and judgements. The village meeting 
which is supposed to provide the most important space for participation purposes does 
not function efficiently to serve these purposes. Many decisions take place in the 
meeting of informal village council, where ordinary villagers do not directly 
participate. On the other hand, frequent personal contacts with field officials allow 
these officials to transfer many ideas related to development projects to local official 
leaders substantially.
Obstacles to improvement of CPR conditions at the local level are also related to the 
personal limitations of phu yai ban. Personal limitations of phu yai ban in initiating
280
ideas pertaining to CPR management can be explained in terms of their lack of 
knowledge about the complex natural characteristics of the resources and the causes 
of degradation. Although they have ground-level knowledge about the resources in 
their communities and their conditions, they still lack confidence about the real causes 
of resource degradation. This is due to the fact that changes in CPR conditions can be 
caused by several factors at the same time, including both natural and man-made 
causes. The latter may be generated from outside, as well as from within each 
community. To understand all these causes thoroughly is difficult even for natural 
scientists. Even though phu yai ban and other local leaders see that natural resource 
degradation is caused by several factors, they still have difficulties identifying levels 
of importance among different factors. Findings discussed in Chapter Six indicate that 
they perceive natural causes and man-made causes from outside as being more 
important than man-made causes from inside their communities. Because most man- 
made causes from outside and natural causes are complex, and costs involved in 
eliminating or reducing these problems (either by re-excavating waterbodies or 
minimising the negative effects of previous development projects) are high, they 
regard that it is beyond their ability to handle the problems. This kind of perception 
hinders phu yai ban's appetite and ability to solve the problems because of the limited 
mechanisms available to them.
The involvement of phu yai ban in the implementation of policy is more common 
than in planning. From a legislative point of view, policy implementation at the 
village level has always been part of phu yai ban's administrative duties. Any projects 
or activities derived from policies and undertaken at the village level should involve 
phu yai ban directly or indirectly, whether they are planned locally or not. It is part of 
Phu yai ban's duties to oversee policy implementation themselves or assist concerned 
authorities to undertake their implementation.
As stated earlier, policies related to CPR management appear as general regulations to 
control the exploitation of specific types of natural resources or specific projects 
which deal with problems emerging in specific areas. Dealing with general regulations 
means that each phu yai ban should work together with concerned officials in
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enforcing regulations in his/her administrative territory. The implementation of 
special projects also takes place in a similar manner, but instead of dealing with 
general regulations, specific rules may apply to specific projects. Although these two 
forms of policies may differ in the origin of regulations, the responsibility of phu yai 
ban is not different. Observation in the study villages suggests that duties of enforcing 
regulations related to fishery resources are left mainly to phu yai ban and kamnan, 
since the number of concerned officials at the local level are often limited. However, 
there are several obstacles that deter phu yai ban from enforcing state regulations 
related to CPR management. These mainly emerge in relation to the power of phu yai 
ban in prosecuting offences, the conflict between state regulations and local 
conditions of CPRs, and difficulties in dealing~with different interests that emerge 
among people.
Phu yai ban hold limited power in prosecuting offences. They are entitled to arrest 
offenders, but they need co-operation from concerned officials at higher levels, 
especially local police, in proceeding with a full legal action. Lack of co-operation 
from the police, whose role is often controversial in Thai society, limits phu yai ban *s 
active involvement. As a result, enforcement of most regulations is lax, even in 
situations where offences are widespread.
The conflict of some state regulations with local conditions of CPRs and patterns of 
resource use creates difficulties for phu yai ban in enforcing such regulations. Because 
most natural resource and environmental policies presently applied to rural areas are 
centrally designed and aim at nation-wide application, this problem is not uncommon. 
As illustrated in Chapter Six, some rules imposed by fishery regulations overburden 
local fishermen and are in conflict with the perceptions of local people. This finding 
corresponds to findings of previous studies in local areas in other countries (see for 
example, Pomeroy, 1991; Gibbs and Bromley, 1989). Dealing with such rules is 
difficult for phu yai ban, who on the one hand should enforce the rules, but on the 
other hand should consider the impact of enforcement of the rules on the well-being of 
their fellow villagers. As a result, such rules are often ignored by phu yai ban as well 
as kamnan. Even opinion leaders, who are highly interested in improving fishery
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conditions, are also reluctant to act against practices which are commonly perceived 
as not unreasonable, though they are against the law.
Finally, a phu yai ban is not the only actor in each community who is interested in 
controlling CPRs. As discussed in Chapter Six and earlier in this chapter, there are 
other actors such as opinion leaders and interest group leaders, whose aims and 
objectives can be different from those of phu yai ban. These actors can also be 
influential in policy implementation. Their interactions with ordinary villagers and 
phu yai ban affect the atmosphere of policy implementation, which in turn can alter 
the judgements of phu yai ban in dealing with CPR problems. Moreover, issues 
related to CPR management may go beyond a single village boundary, especially if 
resources are shared by users from more than one village community. Extending 
beyond a single village boundary means an increase in the number of actors who are 
from different units of administration, and more official leaders are involved. These 
actors and leaders can either act to support or oppose the existing directions of policy 
implementation. When different and conflicting interests emerge among these actors, 
constructive interactions are unlikely to take place automatically. If conflicts emerge 
among phu yai ban who lead different villages which share the same CPRs, the 
management of such CPRs is more complicated and less effective, unless proper 
rearrangements are made.
7.6 Towards Local CPR Management
The previous discussion in this chapter summarises general findings of this study 
related to the roles and performance of community organisations and local official 
leaders, especially phu yai ban, in implementing policies and dealing with problems 
concerning natural resource management at the local level. Much of the discussion 
stresses conditions which limit the performance of local organisations and local 
official leaders in tackling problems facing CPRs which are important to the 
livelihoods of members of their communities. In order to improve conditions facing 
local community organisations and local leaders, which is one of the ultimate aims of 
this study, I would like to make more specific conclusions which can be applied to the
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improvement of policy implementation related to CPR management at the local level 
in Thailand.
First, it should be understood that the conventional concept which assumes that the 
state organisational structure has clear domination of the process of policy 
implementation at the local level, and that policies are implemented by official 
implementors with minimum changes and adjustments to their directions, is not 
accurate as far as rural and natural resource development policies are concerned. The 
local societal context where policy implementation takes place has a significant 
influence on the direction of policies while they are implemented, which in effect 
helps to determine the outcomes of the policies in question. It is the influence of the 
societal context of social, cultural, economic and political environments which forces 
official implementors, including local official leaders, to adjust their roles to meet 
with the conditions they face, which in turn modifies the original idea of policies in 
question. This finding corresponds to the framework proposed by Grindle and Thomas 
(1989) which is used as a basis for the conceptual framework proposed in this study. 
An application of this finding is that it is important for concerned bodies and high 
level officials to determine carefully the local social, economic and political 
environments in designing programmes and projects to be undertaken at the local 
level. This does not only mean that the participation of local leaders is imperative in 
deciding what programmes or projects should be undertaken, but also how they 
should be designed to meet conditions in each locality.
Second, the influence of the local societal context does not apply only to official 
implementors, but also to non-official actors who interact with official implementors 
to shape policy implementation in the directions which respond to their interests. For 
non-official actors, the organisational context of policy implementation is less 
influential on their behaviour. While the official implementors, especially local 
official leaders, are bound to follow the organisational context, the pressure they have 
in their interaction with non-official actors leads them to show discretion and to adjust 
their performance to reduce the pressure. Therefore, it should not be viewed that 




manipulate their interactions with non-official actors in favour of the state’s policies. 
Rather both sides are almost equally important in forcing policy directions; a situation 
that is similar to ‘the implementation structure’ suggested by Hjem and Porter (1993). 
In this sense, it is important to understand that local official leaders are not merely 
state agents who will strictly follow policy directions and commands from above, with 
minimal discretion in playing their roles in implementing policies at the local level. It 
is also important to recognise the ability of local non-official actors, including interest 
groups and traditional leaders to manipulate policy implementation. Therefore, these 
traditional leaders must be included in the process of policy implementation, so that 
their needs can be formalised, and their ability can be used to promote the common 
good.
Third, cultural factors should be given an important place in implementing 
development policies at the local level, especially those concerning CPR management. 
Cultural elements such as the values of respect for elders and merits of religious 
leaders should be recognised and applied in enhancing community solidarity and 
resolving conflicts among resource users and actors. To integrate cultural values into 
the practice of CPR management in rural Thailand, it is important that religious 
leaders should be included and given a leadership position standing side by side with 
official leaders in the process of planning and implementing CPR management 
projects. Although there appears much evidence of the contribution of cultural leaders 
to the achievement of local resource management movements in Thailand and other 
parts of the world, the importance of including cultural leaders in planning and 
implementation is rarely stressed.
Fourth, it is important for the state to reconsider the organisational arrangements of 
CPR management organisations separately from that of general administrative 
arrangements which are based on the administrative territory of each administrative 
unit. This is particularly important when CPRs in question are shared among users 
from more than one village or unit of administration. The arrangements of CPR 
management organisations should be based on the territorial boundary of each CPR 
which may involve more than one unit of administration. In this reorganisation,
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official leaders from different administrative units should be assigned clear 
responsibilities which are different from those governing a single unit of 
administration. The emphasis of this rearrangement should be on the mutual 
contribution of personal abilities and official power to the ability of these leaders to 
oversee CPR management projects and to lead their followers to support the projects.
Fifth, with respect to the role of phu yai ban, it is important to realise that though the 
present status of phu yai ban is important for CPR management, we should not 
overlook the weakness of phu yai ban and the associated village administrative 
arrangements in dealing with the complexity of CPR management issues. Under the 
present administrative arrangements, it is unlikely that phu yai ban alone are capable 
of handling CPR management effectively, through mechanisms made available to 
them by the state. Their limited power, coupled with a lack of co-operation from 
officials at higher levels, hamper the phu yai ban’s ability to overcome the 
complexity of CPR issues and challenges from various actors and users in controlling 
and exploiting CPRs. To strengthen the power of phu yai ban in handling CPR 
management problems, the state must realise the importance of enhancing co­
operation between phu yai ban and traditional leaders, especially religious leaders. 
Moreover, the state should be sincere in allowing phu yai ban and other local leaders 
more independence from conventional rules in developing CPR management projects 
for the benefit of their communities.
Finally, while promotion of community-based resource management is perceived as 
imperative for moving the management of CPRs towards sustainable use, it is 
inaccurate to generalise that every community is capable of developing community- 
based management on its own. Additionally, it should be realised that in the face of 
changes resulting from the state’s concerted attempts to reorganise village community 
organisations, traditional organisational systems in rural communities have been 
displaced or weakened by new systems of administration. However, the degree of 
displacement varies from community to community. This implies that different 
communities may have different capabilities in developing community-based 
management by themselves. In developing a community-based resource management
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project, it is therefore important for concerned bodies to investigate carefully the 
strengths and weaknesses of each community. Moreover, a reconstruction of 
traditional arrangements by strengthening and modifying the traditional values that 
remain in each community is inevitable if  community-based management is to be 
achieved. However, this is unlikely to occur easily in the absence of assistance from 
outside. Once the concept is adopted, the role of the state should move from issuing 
regulations and developing programmes to control resource users, to supporting 
resources that enable users to develop their own strategies and for NGOs to strengthen 
local organisations.
APPENDIX ONE
Questionnaire for Household Survey
No. I I
Name of HH head......................... Sub-district Village no House no........................
Date of visit /-.......... -/-...........Interviewer.........................
Family tree: (those who sleep most of the time in this house, including non-family members).
□  O OKey: male = , female = , sleeps elsewhere = /  " , age = 24
Income-generating occupations of residents fin order of importance to the household  ^
(include non-resident unmarried children o f resident parents)
Sex Age Occupations * if non­
residents
Key: Agriculture, Craft, Education, Fishing, Trading, Rubber, Building, Garment, Others. 
When does this household catch fish?
J F M A M J J A S O N D
When does this household work in agriculture (including rubber)?
J F M A M J J A S O N D
At what time of year does the household feel most prosperous?
J F M A M J J A S O N D
At what time of year does the household feel least prosperous?
J F M A M J J A S O N D
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Fishing for home consumption only? Y/ N
If fishing at all, specify types of gear used in last year.






Cassete player y / n
T.V. y /n
Electricity y /n
Gas stove y /n
Fridge y /n
WC y /n
Sewing Machine y /n
Motorcycle y /n
Brick/concrete wall or floor y /n
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POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
OF FRESHWATER FISHERIES 
IN SOUTHERN THAILAND
1 INTRODUCTION
Fisheries play an important role in the daily life of the Thai people and the economy of 
Thailand. Though fisheries have not contributed much to the GNP of the country, they 
have been an important source of income and employment for a large number of people. 
It was estimated that over 300,000 people engaged in fisheries and associated industries 
in 1981 (Rientrairat, 1983). This did not include rural people who catch fish for 
household consumption and for supplementing their earnings.
Though marine fisheries are more significant both in terms of volume and value of 
fisheries' products, the importance of freshwater fisheries as part of rural people’s 
livelihoods has long been recognised (Bhukaswan, 1987). In the old days when marine 
fishing techniques were not yet well developed, rural people who resided further inland 
depended largely on freshwater capture fisheries. Freshwater capture fisheries were 
conducted mainly on a traditional basis for subsistence purposes. Therefore, they were 
crucially important for traditional ways of life. However, the importance of freshwater 
capture fisheries has recently decreased. While marine capture fisheries have grown fast 
in the past few decades due to the development of marine fishing technologies, 
freshwater capture fisheries have not grown as they might have done. This is partly due 
to policies and management strategies related to fisheries development which have not 
much emphasised the improvement of freshwater capture fisheries under their given 
conditions. This paper intends to present existing policies and management strategies 
related to freshwater capture fisheries in Thailand. The focus will be on the situation in
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Southern Thailand by referring to the freshwater capture fisheries in Bueng Yai Lake 
and Phru Thung Samet. These fisheries are now under threat of overexploitation.
2 OVERALL FRESHWATER FISHERIES POLICY
According to Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Plans, the most 
important guidelines for the country’s development policies, freshwater fisheries 
development policies have not changed very much since the First Plan was introduced in 
1961 (see Rientrairat, 1983). During the First National Plan (1961-1966), the main focus 
was on promoting the overall freshwater fisheries and fish farming, but the target was 
vague. In the Second National Plan (1967-1971), freshwater fish production was 
targeted at a level of 100,000 tons. This was to be achieved mainly by rehabilitating fish 
habitats and restocking of freshwater fish in irrigation canals, dam reservoirs, and 
natural waterbodies. The Third National Plan (1972-1976) did not specifically 
emphasise the development of freshwater fisheries. It put more emphasis on deep sea 
fishing and coastal shrimp farming to meet with the needs to improve the overall 
economic conditions of the country. The Fourth National Plan (1977-1981) focused on 
the increase of fisheries production, both marine fisheries and freshwater fisheries. A 
stronger emphasis was put on brackish water fisheries development. It also stressed the 
conservation of marine fish resources as well as rehabilitation of freshwater fish 
habitats. The Fifth National Plan (1982-1986) emphasised the need to increase of 
freshwater fisheries production, not only for domestic consumption but also for export. 
The emphasis was given to the development of management regulations and strategies. 
It also stressed the promotion of fisheries production through a village fish farming 
development programme (khrongkaan pramong mooban) in which people’s 
participation in the fisheries development programme is emphasised. The Sixth National 
Plan (1987-1991) focused more on research and development to increase the 
productivity of some fish species which are economically important(see also 
Suraswadee, 1989). This included the development of multi-disciplinary research, 
improvement of the working efficiency of fisheries research stations, acceleration of the 
freshwater rare fish species rehabilitation programme, development of joint programmes
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for rehabilitation of waterbodies between concerned development agencies, and 
dissemination of knowledge related to capture fisheries, aquaculture and fish resource 
conservation. The Seventh National Plan (1992-1996) placed more emphasis on the 
need to speed up the amendment of laws and regulations related to the conservation and 
development of fish resources. It focused also on encouraging the co-ordination of 
fishermen’s associations to develop fishing technologies, and dissemination of 
knowledge related to wise use of fish resources. No separation of policies was made 
between freshwater and marine fisheries.
3 FRESHWATER FISHERIES POLICY FOR SOUTHERN THAILAND
Freshwater fisheries in Southern Thailand overall are much less important than marine 
fisheries to the economy of the region. It shares only about 1 per cent of the total 
fisheries production of the region. This is partly due to the geographical characteristics 
of the region where waterbodies suitable for freshwater fishing are limited, and because 
the region is encompassed by long coast lines. This gives predominance to marine and 
coastal fishing. However, as marine fisheries in Thai water have been declining and 
facing several problems in the last few years, the Thai government has been interested in 
the development of the freshwater fisheries in the region in order to reduce the problems 
related to fisheries as well as to improve living conditions of fishermen who depend 
highly on freshwater fishing. Furthermore, development of freshwater fisheries is aimed 
at improving protein uptake of the poor in rural inland areas. In order to improve 
freshwater fisheries conditions in Southern Thailand, the following policies have been 
drawn up (see Rientrairat, 1983; Office of Agricultural Economics, 1986);
1) Increasing the productivity of large reservoirs such as Cheao Lam Dam in 
Surat Thanee Province, Bang Laang Dam in Yala Province, and main rivers throughout 
the region, by restocking fish species which are economically important and have 
become rare in the wild,
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2) Increasing the productivity of Songkhla Lake by attempting to develop the 
lake as a major fishing ground of the region, and promoting freshwater prawn culture in 
the upper and the inner part of the lake,
3) Increasing freshwater fishing resources through the development of reservoirs 
left from mining to become fishing grounds additional to natural waterbodies.
At present, there are six freshwater fisheries research stations in the region which play 
an important role in implementing the above policy guidelines. These research stations 
are responsible for conducting research relating to fish breeding, restocking fish, and 
maintaining main waterbodies in the region. These research stations are located in the 
following provinces; Trang, Pattani, Yala, Patthalung, Satun and Surat Thanee. There 
exists also a freshwater fisheries development centre situated in Surat Thanee. The 
centre plays a crucial role in fish breeding, both for restocking and aquacultural 
promotion. It is also responsible for providing intensive aquacultural training for 
fisheries officers and interest groups in order to promote aquaculture in the region.
4 FRESHWATER FISHERIES REGULATIONS
There are two sets of regulations which directly affect the development and the 
management of the fisheries sector in Thailand. These are The Fisheries Act of B.E. 
2490 (1947) and The Act Governing the Right to Fish in Thai Fisheries Waters of B.E. 
2482 (1939). However, only the Fisheries Act is concerned with freshwater fisheries, 
while the other is related more to marine fisheries. In addition to the Fisheries Act, there 
are notifications, regulations and rules related to freshwater fisheries. These 
notifications, regulations and rules had been drawn up under the Fisheries Act for the 
purposes of clarification and specification of some articles in the Act to be appropriate 
for different conditions and localities. This section will present the contents of the 
Fisheries Act and other regulations related to freshwater fisheries only.
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4.1 The Fisheries Act
The Fisheries Act is composed of 73 articles within 7 parts: Fishing Areas, Cultivation 
Ponds, Licensing, Fisheries Statistics, Fisheries Control and Prosecution of Offences, 
(Department of Fisheries, 1987; Rientrairat, 1983).
4.1.1 Fishing Areas
Fishing areas are divided into 4 categories; sanctuary, leasable area, permitted area and 
public area. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
each Provincial Council is empowered to declare any water body to become one type of 
these fishing areas.
1) A sanctuary includes areas in or nearby monasteries, in navigation locks, 
weirs, dams or any places suitable for conservation of aquatic animals. Such areas are 
reserved areas where any fishing activity is prohibited without permission of the 
Director General of the Department of Fisheries.
2) Leasable areas refer to areas reserved for individual licence holders who gain 
licences through auction. These areas must not be within irrigated areas for agriculture, 
or areas where fishing could affect rice cultivation or water transportation. Fishing in 
such areas is subject to compliance with the conditions imposed by the Director General 
of Department of Fisheries or competent officials.
3) Permitted areas refer to areas reserved for individual licence holders who gain 
licences under permitted conditions. The licences can be issued for capture fisheries, 
aquaculture, and refuge trap ponds. Fishing in such areas is subject to compliance with 
the conditions imposed by the Director General or competent officials.
4) Public areas cover any areas which are not declared as sanctuary, leasable or 
permitted areas. Fishing and culturing of aquatic animals in public areas is permissible 
for everyone under conditions imposed by the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
and published in the Government Gazette.
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Additional to the above descriptions of fishing conditions in different fishing areas, there 
exist restrictions related to the use of the areas, which can be summarised as follows.
a) Any construction, cultivation of any crops, and dewatering of the areas, are 
not allowed in any types of the fishing areas without permission from competent 
officials.
b) Construction of refuge trap ponds can be done in legally owned land, 
however, it must not disturb aquatic animals in reserved sanctuaries. On the other hand, 
construction of refuge trap ponds in public areas is not allowed without permission of 
competent officials.
c) Use of electricity and explosive substances in fishing is prohibited. Moreover, 
fish caught by using these methods are not allowed to marketed.
d) Any change in the natural conditions of fishing areas or lands which are not 
entitled to anyone is prohibited without permission of competent officials.
e) Construction of dams and dike, and placing of fishing gear which blocks 
waterways and that can affect fish movement, are not allowed without permission from 
competent officials, except if such activities are beneficial for agricultural activities in 
lands entitled to anyone.
4.1.2 Cultivation Ponds
The concern of this part is with the construction of cultivation ponds and fishing in the 
cultivation ponds. Construction of cultivation ponds in public areas requires official 
permission, but no restrictions are given on fishing in cultivation ponds.
4.1.3 Licensing
In this part, the designation on different levels of authorities to issue notifications 
concerning licensing is stated. Generally, it can be summarised as follows.
296
1) The Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives is empowered to issue 
notifications to require anyone engaging in fisheries related activities, including 
fishermen, fish traders, and fisheries product factory owners, to request permission in 
conducting their activities. The Minister is also empowered to require owners of any 
types of fishing gear to enter registration of ownership. The Provincial Commissioner, 
subject to the approval of the Minister, can withdraw any licences or auction 
concessions for public or official benefit. The Provincial Council, subject to the 
approval of the Minister, is empowered to issue notifications concerning the licensing 
period appropriate to any localities based on a 12 month period. Normally, the licensing 
period starts from 1st April and finish on 31st March every year. However, The 
Minister, or the Provincial Commissioner with the approval of the Minister, is 
empowered to declare the following regulations within each provincial boundary;
a) To define mesh size, gear size, gear type, amount and composition of any 
types of fishing gear,
b) To prohibit the use of any type of fishing gear in the fishing areas,
c) To determine the site for placing any particular types of fishing gear,
d) To set up methods of using any types of fishing gear,
e) To declare the spawning season appropriate to each locality within its 
administrative boundary, and to limit types of fishing gear and methods of fishing in the 
spawning season,
f) To limit the type, size and amount of aquatic animals that can be caught,
g) To set up rules prohibiting the catching particular fish species.
2) This part also covers the following regulations related to freshwater fisheries 
management:
a) The setting up or installing of stationary types of fishing gear, such as 
bamboo screens or barriers, set bags, and large lift nets, in public areas is prohibited. In 
other types of fishing areas, these types of gear are allowed with the permission of 
competent officials;
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b) Fishing in permitted areas is allowed only for fishermen who hold permitted 
licenses;
c) Fishermen who hold fishing licences and auction concessions must always 
carry them while fishing;
d) Competent officials have the right to withdraw fishing licenses, permitted 
licences or auction concessions, if permitted fishermen do not follow the given 
conditions;
e) Request for fishing licences and payment of licence fees may be done in the 
period of 1 st April to 31 st March, each year.
4.1.4 Fisheries Statistics
In relation to statistical collection, the Minister is empowered to require a statistical 
collection in any area if necessary. Once required by the Minister, the Director General 
may request anyone engaging in fisheries related activities to provide statistical data for 
official purposes. If necessary, the competent officials designated for this particular 
purpose have the right to require provision of statistical data from requested persons.
4.1.5 Fisheries Control
This part contains regulations related to the designation of different levels of authority in 
controlling the fisheries sector according to the Act. Subject to the approval of the 
Minister, the Provincial Council is empowered to declare restrictions on entering fishing 
areas of non-license holders without permission of the competent officials. The 
Provincial Commissioner is empowered to issue an order to license holders to demolish 
their fishing gear and constructions in fishing areas, if they are illegal or if their licences 
are already expired. The license holders carry any costs of demolishing in this case. The 
competent officials is empowered to enter any fishing area or fishing boat to inspect the 
commission of offences. They are also empowered to arrest any offenders under this 
Act, including seizure of any materials and equipment found. Then, court legal action 
will be taken against offenders
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4.1.6 Prosecution of Offences
This part of the Act outlines penalty fees and/or imprisonment terms for offences against 
various articles of the Act.
4.2 OTHER FORMS OF REGULATION
Apart from the Fisheries Act, there are other forms of regulation including royal decrees, 
ministerial enactments and notifications. These regulations have been released at 
different times in accordance with the Fisheries Act, in order to clarify and specify some 
of its articles (see Department of Fisheries, 1980). In terms of their application, some of 
these regulations are nation-wide, while others are specific to a particular area. This 
section will present some of these regulations which are related to the management of 
freshwater fisheries both nation-wide regulations and those specifically related to 
Songkhla Lake and Bueng Yai Lake. The freshwater fisheries regulations included here 
can be divided into 4 groups; regulations concerning fishing areas, regulations 
concerning fishing seasons, regulations concerning fishing methods and fishing gear, 
and regulations concerning licensing.
In relation to fishing areas, it is stressed that every province should consider the 
declaration of sanctuaries in the following places which adjoin water bodies; 
monasteries, government offices and state schools. There a r e  also policies related to 
improvement of swamps and reservoirs for increasing freshwater productivity. In order 
to improve such reserves, the Department of Fisheries declared cancellation of auction 
units in swamps and reservoirs throughout the country. Then, the Department of 
Fisheries would be responsible for controlling and overseeing swamp areas and 
reservoirs which are suitable for reserves, both for the purposes of conservation and for 
the improvement of fisheries conditions.
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In relation to the fishing season, only restrictions of fishing in the spawning season are 
stated. The nation-wide spawning season of freshwater fishes was declared to be 
between 15th May to 30th September every year. Nevertheless, there is a provincial 
notification which sets up another spawning season for Songkhla Lake, including Bueng 
Yai Lake, between 1st October and 31st January every year. This was said to be 
appropriate for the area within which ‘two-water fish species’ are abundant. The ‘two- 
water fish species’ are referred to the species which can survive in both fresh and 
brackish water, such as Hampala macrolepidota, Osteochilus hasselti, and Mystus spp. 
Because the specific spawning season was declared additional to the nation-wide 
spawning season, fishing in this area is limited by two spawning seasons which cover 
more than eight months a year, which is too long for fishermen who depend largely on 
fishing to observe. Fishing in the spawning seasons is limited to some types fishing gear 
only. These are divided into 3 groups: (1) hook with exception of long line; (2) dip net, 
scoop net, and lift net, which are not larger than 2 metres in diameter; and (3) any kind 
of trap. However, fishing in cultivation ponds is not restricted in the spawning period.
With regard to fishing methods and fishing gear employed, there exist several 
regulations which impose restrictions on fishing. Most of these regulations are 
concerned with restrictions of methods and gear types to be set in relation to fishing 
areas and localities. These can be summarised as follows.
(1) It is prohibited to use all kinds of net except scoop net with diameter not 
more than 2 metres, and barriers, for fishing in the following public fishing areas; 
canals, creeks, gullies and irrigation ditches.
(2) It is prohibited to use trawler, seine net and push net or other kinds of fishing 
gear which have similar effects to these types of gear, in reservoirs throughout the 
country. Using these types of fishing gear together with motorised boats is also 
prohibited in rivers and canals. These rules apply also for fishing in Songkhla Lake and 
Bueng Yai Lake. However, the use of seine net in Songkhla Lake and Bueng Yai Lake 
was then changed to be restricted only to gear which is 200 metres and above in length, 
2.50 metres deep or wide and over 1.50 cm in mesh size. This change was made as a
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response to the request for catching freshwater anchovy which is abundant in the lake, 
and seine nets are used for catching this type of fish.
(3) Set bag, winged-set bag, and other similar types of fishing gear, are 
prohibited in all waterbodies throughout the country without permission from competent 
officials.
(4) Block net and bamboo screen block traps (or barrier traps) are prohibited in 
all waterbodies throughout the country.
As a part of fishing methods, construction of refuge trap ponds is also subject to 
permission, if it takes place in public areas. Permission for construction of a refuge trap 
pond is subject to the following conditions; (1) the distance between the edge of the 
pond and the edge of nearby public waterbodies must not be less than 8 metres, (2) there 
must not be any water ways to connect the pond and public waterbodies, and (3) 
dewatering of the pond cannot exceed twice a year. It should be noted here that 
dewatering of fish trap ponds, either the ponds are in public areas or in areas owned by 
fishermen, requires permission from competent officials.
In relation to licensing, fishermen can apply for any kinds of license, either fishing 
licences or permitted licences, except auction concessions, at each local district fisheries 
office. Requesting an auction concession requires a process run by the auction 
committee appointed by the state at each province.
4.3 ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS IN THE STUDY AREA
Although there appear to be several regulations and rules related to freshwater fisheries 
management, both in the Fisheries Act and in other forms of regulations, effective 
enforcement of existing regulations is open to question. From informal discussions with 
several people including fishermen, village heads, elders and the district fisheries officer 
of Khuan Mangkhud District, together with some observation in the study area, there is 
much evidence which leads to an assumption that there is no strong and effective 
enforcement of existing regulations in the area. Although most of the area is a public
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fishing ground where access is open to all community members, there have been 
attempts to establish reserved sanctuaries in Bueng Yai Lake three times. The first 
attempt occurred more than 60 years ago. The second and third attempts have been 
made in the last few years. The results of these attempts were mixed. It was said that at 
the beginning of the first attempt the management of the sanctuary went very well. Most 
fishermen obeyed the rules prohibiting fishing in the sanctuary. A combination of 
official enforcement and traditional social sanction was employed in the management of 
the sanctuary. However, when the number of fishermen increased and with a decline in 
the fisheries productivity, some fishermen started to break the rules. The loose official 
enforcement together with the decline in the practice of social sanction, led to the 
sanctuary area being overlooked. The second declaration of a sanctuary area which was 
made in 1990 and failed completely in its implementation. The latest declaration of a 
sanctuary area, which was made in 1993, is still too soon for a firm judgement about its 
effectiveness to be made.
In general, the actual enforcement of fisheries regulations in the area has been very 
limited, either in relation to restriction of fishing in both sanctuary and public fishing 
areas, or in relation to licensing. In fact, the licensing system has not yet been officially 
applied to fishing in Phru Thung Samet, but it was said it would be applied soon. For 
Bueng Yai Lake, it appears that only serious offences are taken into account for 
prosecution. These include electric fishing, dynamite fishing and fish poisoning. There 
has been evidence of arresting fishermen due to these offences. Other general offences, 
such as fishing without licences, and use of other illegal fishing gear, do not appear to be 
enforced seriously. In most cases, warnings are given to offenders as a first step. Though 
this seems to be enough to stop most fishermen from making further offences, it does 
not appear to be strong enough for the small minority who dare to challenge the 
authorities. The absence of serious enforcement in the area has meant that offences 
against fisheries regulations are not uncommon, but only a few fishermen are involved.
The loose enforcement of fisheries regulations is related strongly to problems with the 
prosecution process. In the prosecution of offences, main responsibility is given to the
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local district fisheries officer. At the same time, each village official leader (phu yai 
ban) and sub-district official leader (kamnan) are also empowered to arrest offenders. In 
practice, the district fisheries officer or phu yai ban should be accompanied by other 
officials, which are local policemen, to inspect and arrest. Non-cooperation from police 
may cause problems.
Limitations in the enforcement of fisheries regulations is also related to the 
responsibility and commitment of district fisheries officers. For example, in Khuan 
Mangkhud district, there are only two officers representing the Department of Fisheries, 
and one of them was assigned to work in a neighbouring district, thus only one officer is 
on duty in the district. Generally the district fisheries officer is responsible for 
overseeing various fisheries activities in the district he serves, therefore the time 
available for working on the inspection of offences in waterbodies within the district is 
limited. It was estimated that only about ten days a month can be allocated for this duty 
by the fisheries officer of Khuan Mangkhud district. As there are many waterbodies in 
the district, the time he could spend on patrolling Bueng Yai Lake is minimal.
As part of the management, according to policies to increase the productivity of 
freshwater fisheries in the area, the Department of Fisheries' research station at 
Patthalung had restocked fishes twice in Bueng Yai Lake by the time the study finished 
in 1993. Four fish species had been restocked, including common silver barb, golden 
little barb, Jullien's golden-price carp and Nile tilapia. Other activities related to the 
management of freshwater fisheries in Bueng Yai Lake which are conducted by the 
Department of Fisheries include conducting research related to fisheries conditions in 
the area, collecting fisheries statistics, and promoting aquaculture. However, these 
activities do not seem to have been well organised in the past. Moreover, most research 
work was observed to be narrow in its scope, such as the study to identify fish species 
available, the study of water quality, etc. Additionally, it seems that be no continuous 
research has been done. This makes the data available about fisheries in the area very 
limited. Aquacultural promotion has also not been successful in reaching wider groups
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of fishermen; only a few better-off fishermen have tried and adopted the techniques 
introduced by officials.
5 THE TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Considering the survival of freshwater fishing in the area, especially in Bueng Yai Lake 
which has been an important freshwater fishing area for a long time, it should be a 
management system which is effective and rooted from fisherfolk tradition. However, 
the finding from this study does not show that there is a firm traditional management 
system in the area which is effective for the management of fish resources. All the 
waterbodies in the study appear to be of common pool type, therefore, everyone in the 
community has a free choice to fish. Rules that control fishermen behaviour in making 
use of fish resources do exist in forms of general norms and neighbourhood perceptions 
in which maintaining good relationships with neighbours is considered as vary 
important. Being neighbours they should care for each other in various aspects of living. 
With respect to fishing, fishermen in Bueng Yai community try to allocate the fish 
resources among themselves similar to the way they share other resources with their 
neighbours. When conflicts occur in the allocation of limited resources, they prefer to 
discuss each other and try to solve the problems themselves. Only when the cases are so 
serious their leaders were involved. For example, one fisherman would not set his gill 
net too close to other fishermen’s gill nets which were already set, even if the place used 
to be his fishing ground. Another example is when a fishermen needs to pump his refuge 
trap ponds, he will call his neighbours for help by offering only a meal and the 
neighbours will take some fish for consumption when the task is finished. This system 
is observed to be used in combination with economic consideration and inheritance 
system. The inheritance system applies only for stationary types of fishing gear and 
other related methods, such as lift net, barrier and brush pile for seine net fishing. Places 
used for setting these types of gear can be passed from parents members of their 
families.. It is observed that the neighbourhood system can work well to reduce conflicts 
between fishermen but does not mean much for the management of fish resources
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towards sustainabiltiy in this area. This is because there are no clear norms of 
controlling overexploitation of the resources.
Traditional land claims the public and reserved areas also affect the management of 
fisheries in this area. This practice created some restrictions on fishing places. 
Construction of refuge trap ponds in public land can be done only in the land claimed by 
the owners of the ponds without any legal titles, or in the swamp forest area which the 
fishermen clear after fire damage.
Though most fishermen did not seem to have clear views about the relationship between 
resource degradation and fisheries conditions in the future, there is a group in Bueng Yai 
community formed by some present fishermen and some former fishermen who have 
some experience with people from outside who believe that they can do something to 
improve fisheries conditions in the area. This group used to seek assistance from 
concerned government agencies to organise fishermen from the community to clear 
aquatic weeds. Moreover, some of its members are also involved in the recent 
movement to stop using seine nets throughout Songkhla Lake, as they considered that 
using seine net is harmful to fish stocks. The group were observed to be active not only 
in fisheries related activities, but also in other development activities.
6 CONCLUSION
Fisheries policies in Thailand has focused strongly on marine fisheries since the First 
National Economic and Social Development Plan which was introduced in 1961. 
Though freshwater fisheries have been important for the livelihoods of rural people, 
their economic contribution either to the country as a whole or to the southern region of 
Thailand has been minimal. This status of freshwater fisheries did not encourage policy 
makers to emphasise development planning of the country. Evidence can be seen in the 
broad policies drawn in the past which have not changed much since the beginning of 
the National Economic and Social Development Plan, and also most of the related 
policies have no clear target. As a result, the development of freshwater fisheries,
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especially capture fisheries, has been very slow, and fisheries conditions have declined 
significantly. The recent development policies place more emphasise on promotion of 
freshwater fish culture, as most of natural freshwater fish resources have been degraded 
to such an extent that full rehabilitation is difficult.
From the management point of view, there exist the Fisheries Act and other forms of 
regulation and rules which cover various aspects of freshwater capture fisheries 
management. However, problems arise regarding the effective enforcement of these 
regulations. Findings from this study indicated that in common pool fishing areas where 
every fisherman from the defined community feels free to fish, there is a likelihood of 
having activities which are harmful to fish resources in the long term. Although there are 
some traditional rules to control resource allocation and exploitation, the enforcement of 
these rules does not seem to be strong enough in the present social conditions in the 
area. There also exist official regulations and rules which cover most aspects of 
problems presently faced. But the question of how to enforce these regulations 
effectively arises. So far, it can be said that the enforcement of regulations and rules 
related to the management of the freshwater fisheries in this area is minimal. Moreover, 
there appear to be some regulations and rules which are nation-wide and which may not 
be appropriate for some local conditions. This would not be a serious problem if the 
provincial competent officials attempt to find out what the real problems are, and set up 
new rules which are more appropriate for each locality in the province to replace the 
nation-wide rules which are inappropriate. Finally, it seems that the Department of 
Fisheries’ local branch office mainly emphasises restocking fish and promoting fish 
culture, whereas other management alternatives are neglected.
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APPENDIX THREE
WEALTH POINT CALCULATION
Household wealth points used in classifying socio-economic groups in this study was 
calculated from data obtained through the household survey undertaken for the PSU- 
CDS Floodplain Project. The calculation was made by scoring household’s asset 
ownership and educational attainment of children. The score is given as follows:
a) 1 point for having a member studying above Grade 6;
b) 1 point for owning each of the following assets; a cassatte player, a TV, a 
gas stove, house with brick or concrete wall/floor, a WC in the house, a 
sewing machine, a refrigerator and a motorcycle.
The distribution of cumulative household wealth points was used in categorising the 
household socio-economic status. The wealth points distribution and household socio­
economic categorisation resulting from the calculation of cumulative wealth score of 
all households surveyed are as follows:
Wealth Points Frequency (%) Categorisation


















unit of Thai currency; 1 baht is approximately £0.025
refuge trap pond, used for trapping fish seeking refuge
Central Thai Language, the official language of 
Thailand
Southern Thai Dialect, the dialect commonly 
used in Southern Thailand
on
a method of fishing using chemical substance, 
especially of cyanide compound to taint fish
natural reservoir
a member of Sub-district Rural Development 




haasip pee siri 
ratchasombat
the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 
















abbot of Buddhist temple
provincial ruler during the time of absolute monarchy 
Thailand
Buddhist ecclesiastical leader 
sub-district ecclesiastical leader 
assist, help
a method of fishing by passing electric current from a 
battery into water to kill fish
obstinate or pigheaded
green light
seeing plenty of fry; an expression
literally means ‘head’, but it is referred in this study to 
as ‘piece’ of gill net according to local measurement 
of its quantity
head, head of office or section
huana samnak-ngaan Head of the Provincial Office
changwat
huana suan ratchakaan head of staff from each central department at the
radab changwat provincial level
jab  khae paw kin








catch (fish) just enough for consumption; an 
expression
generous, kind-hearted
‘The Four Pillars of State’, an ancient Thai 
administrative system which is centralised and divided 
into four departments; civic affairs, palace affairs, 
financial affairs, and agricultural affairs
poor
very poor
a type of sedge grasses, but is not suitable for mat 
weaving or handicrafts
a type of liquor made from rice
short forms of ‘thale ’ commonly used in the southern 
region, literally means ‘sea’ but sometime refers to 
any large waterbodies
mutual help practice








kamsang khong taang 
ratchakaan
kaan mii suan ruam 
khong prachachon






snacks served while drinking liquor
the Village Committee, the official administrative 
body
at village level
Buddhist temple lay committee
sub-district headman, the official leader of tambon
suggestion
advice
state orders or commands 
participation of people
bringing advancement and modernisation to rural 
areas
rural development
short name for the National Rural Development 
Committee {khana kammakaan pattana chonnabot 
haeng chaat)
well-off (economic status)
kaset amphoe District Agricultural Officer
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kaset tambon Sub-district Agricultural Officer
kaw-khaw name of a series of high yielding rice varieties 
developed by the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives’ Rice Research Division
khaa chay ngaan gifts or help offered to hosts in ceremonial events
khana tam-ngaan 
sanabsanun kaanpatibat- 
ngaan pattana chonnabot 
radab tambon
the Sub-district Rural Development Operational 
Committee
khao pansa Buddhist Lent season, beginning around July and 
ending around October every year
khaaratchakaan prajam permanent civil servant
khate raksa peutpan 
satnaam
an aquatic plants and animals protecttion area, a 
category of fishery reserve area
khaw mue reciprocal labour arrangement
khaw-paw-taw short name for the Sub-district Rural Development 
Operational Committee
khaw ratchakaan official directives or official matters

















village fish farming development scheme promoted 
under the Fift Plan (1982-1986)
teacher, especially primary school teacher 
school headmaster
hill or ‘island’ in the middle of the swamp area
an informal name for hand tractor, literally means 
buffalo’
government organised farmers’ group
a type of sedge grasses used for mat weaving and 
handicrafts.
policy framework set by each indidvidual ministry 
respect, awe
Department of Local Administration 
co-operation
village, the lowest administrative unit in the Thai 
administration
a traditional irrigation system found in Northern 
Thailand
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nai amphoe the District Officer, the head of district office
nai-phrai the dominant form of master-follower relationships in
the absolute monarchy system of Thailand
nakleng tough men, powerful men or local mafia
ngaan buat Buddhist ordination
ngaan songkraan water festival taking place in April every year
ngaan taeng ngaan wedding ceremony
ngaan taud kathin an offering ceremony made to all Buddhist priests in 
a temple taking place in around November every year





a special budget allocated for individual members of 
parliamnet to be used in the development of their 
constituencies
nua north
od yaahk starve or starving


















phaet prajam tambon 
phakphuak, kloe
the most recent form of local government introduced 
1995 to be operated at the tambon level
forest
District Forest Officer 






District Community Development Officer
community development worker working at tambon 
level
sufficient for household consumption, especially food 
relatives (cf. yaat pee naung) 
sub-district doctor or sub-district paramedic 
close companion
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phra, bhikkhu, piksu 
phra nak pattana 
phru
phu chuay phuyai ban










development monk, a group of reform Buddhist Monk 
swamp, marsh, wetland 
deputy village headman
deputy village headman for administrative affairs
powerful person or mafia (cf. nakleng)
literally means ‘elder’ or ‘knowledgeable person’, in 
this research it is generally referred to elected village 
official elder representing at sapha tambon
Provincial Governor
village headman, the official leader of moobaan 
District Fisheries Officer
the Thai mode of feudal system existing during the 
period of absolute monarchy, in which different 
amount of land was allocated to noblemen according 
to their ranks, and these noblemen were empowered to 
control local labour
raan khai khaung grocery store
317
raan nam cha tea shop
rai unit of land measurement officially used in Thailand,
1 rai is approximately 0.16 hectare
rawng phuwa Deputy Provincial Governor
ratchakaan changwat
reua haangyao long-tailed boat used by small-scale fishermen
rot saung theao modified pick-up truck used for public transportation
may rich
samet, ton samet a type of tree grown in swamp area, its wood is good
for making charcoal
samnak-ngaan office
samnak-ngaan ongkaan Provincial Administrative Office
borihaan suan changwat
samrab a set of meal
sapha tambon sub-district council, the lowest level planning body in
the Thai administration
sapha changwat provincial council

















District Public Health Officer
Sub-district Public Health Officer




a type of local government existing in urban or semi- 
urban area, mostly district towns
sub-district, the second lowest administrative unit in 
the Thai administration
paying charities or making good deeds
squatter land
a type of local government existing in urban area, 
mostly in provincial capitals
sea, sometime may be used in the meaning of large 
waterbody.







drinking circle which is normally organised among 
close friends and relatives
chatting circle, similar to drinking circle but covers 





CB AMNREP Committee for Budget Administration for the Management of
Natural Resources and Environment at the Provincial Level
CDS Centre for Development Studies at University of Bath, UK
CORIN Coastal Resources Institute at Prince of Songkla University,
Thailand
CPR(s) common property resource(s)
DEQP Department of Environmental Quality Promotion
DDC District Development Committee
FEKU Faculty of Engineering at Kasetsart University, Thailand
GNP Gross National Products
MOI Ministry of the Interior
NEDB National Economic Development Board, the former name
ofNESDB
NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board
NGO(s) non-governmental organisation(s)
NRDC National Rural Development Committee
NRDCC National Rural Development Co-ordination Centre
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDC Provincial Development Committee
PRDS Provincial Rural Development Sub-committee
PSU Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
SRDOC Sub-district Rural Development Operation Committee
STU Sukhothai Thammaathiraat University, Thailand
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UNRISD The United Nation Research Institute for Social Development
VC(s) Village Committee(s)
YFA Yad Fon Association
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